"'Fast moving aircraft are not designed to support ground troops,' said Army Sgt. First Class Frank Antenori. 'As much as the Air Force and Navy would like to think that, fighter aircraft that travel at speeds can't slow down to identify the targets,' he told National Defense......

He said the Air Force A-10 attack plane and the Army Apache helicopter are the ideal platforms for close air support, best suited to SOF missions. Air Force F-16s and Navy F/A-18s are much too fast to be able to properly identify targets, he said. 'The problem is getting the pilots at the altitudes and speeds that they are flying to be able to ID the targets,' he said.

A-10s and Apaches do a much better job, because they can move at a slower speed. 'With fast movers, I never had any success," he said.'

"Fast Jets Not Ideal Choice for Close Air Support" by Roxana Tiron National Defense magazine, April 2004

1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) Director, Mike Sparks writes:

"This web page of the Maneuver Air Support Working Group (MASWG) of the 1st TSG (A) was originally published as an article in the December 2002 issue of Armed Forces Journal International magazine offered below as pictures (click on them to see full-sized version). This web page is now an enhanced version of that article with new information, pictures and references."

Sergeant Grunt needs CAS.

"As the military continues to transform into a truly 'integrated' joint force capable of operating against all adversaries, from armored forces to guerrilla bands, a critical requirement missing today, and into the future, is Close Air Support (CAS). Current aerial weapon platforms designed for CAS; trained and equipped Forward Air Controller (FAC), both ground and air; as well as the training of tactics, techniques and procedures are lacking or insufficient to meet the demands of today's battlefield.

CAS has taken a 'back seat' to precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and pre-planned aerial-delivered fires when what we need is a 'back seat' in CAS aircraft for an aerial observer to help spot targets. Though precision fires are critical, advantageous improvements, many fleeting targets on the battleground still require immediate, suppressive and pinning fires, at times over large pieces of ground, brought in very close to maneuvering ground units. Cannon and machine gun fire, bombs under 500 lbs., and napalm are still viable supporting munitions to the advancing infantryman.

Ground Soldiers and air controllers still must have the ability to call for, mark, direct, and adjust CAS for maneuver forces who are locating, encircling and destroying enemies and controlling key ground to keep the peace. The capability to attain the synergistic effect of simultaneous fire from ground and air weapons is critical to combat operations. Trained personnel on the battlefield and in the air as observers must exist with the know-how to employ USAF, USN, and USMC fixed-wing aircraft along with Army lift and gunship helicopters; indirect mortar, artillery, rocket-fire; in conjunction with ground assaults.

Recent war games and combat operations in SW Asia, such as 'Anaconda,' have demonstrated that our Armed Forces' ability to provide and employ effective CAS is waning. The CAS requirement today is no different for the grunt than it was during the Vietnam War. I will never forget the lifesaving CAS capability provided by the A-1E, A-37B, and even the marking rounds: the OV-l0 in Vietnam that saved us on many occasions from being over-run by more numerous enemies. Over 20 years later, the same was true with Air National Guard and Active AF A-10s in the deserts of west em Iraq during the Gulf War. Today in Afghanistan, if we have Gulf War II, or in any other future conflict, CAS will be a decisive 'force multiplier' in combat.

This web page expresses the views of experienced warfighters outlining the critical requirements for effective CAS today and in future conflicts.

CAS failings in Afghanistan

Robert's Ridge 0700 hours

Pinned down by enemy mortar fire with longer reach than the rifles and machine guns in their hands, the rescuers for Navy SEAL Neil Roberts are themselves in need of rescue. Rallying around a downed MH-47E Chinook helicopter they have dead and some men who will be dead if they cannot secure the area for an evacuation helicopter to land.

Finally after over an hour's wait, F-15Es appear and have to be talked into doing gun strafing runs on the enemy's positions since they've never trained to do this Close Air Support (CAS) task.

Hours later, the area is secure for extraction helicopters to land but not in time to save some men who died from their wounds and exposure.

The USAF in a recent interview with Stars 'n Stripes has tried to put a "happy face" on all this (see below), but the fact remains that after building over 700+ heavily armored A-10 attack planes built specifically for CAS for helping Army maneuver units; only a small fraction are on active flying status and when the troops needed the air strikes, the Army had to wait and men died needlessly.

In the September 30, 2002, Army Times, "Officers: Air Force Policy Left Ground Troops High And Dry: General, senior officer say units need more personnel to call in munitions" even status quo apologist Sean D. Naylor reports:

"The Army general who ran Operation Anaconda and one of his senior fire-support officers are taking issue with Air Force practices they say allowed enemy targets to escape destruction and deprived Soldiers under fire of badly needed close air support.

In particular, they say, the Air Force's reliance on precision-guided bombs created several problems for troops on the ground in Anaconda, the March battle in Afghanistan's Shah-e-Kot Valley. The comments come at a time when Army leaders are fighting a rear-guard action in Washington against what they see as the Defense Department's trend toward over-reliance on precision-guided munitions in shaping the future U.S. military.

Their arguments are laid out in two articles in the September-October issue of Field Artillery magazine, the official journal of the Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Okla. The first article is an interview with Maj. Gen. Franklin 'Buster' Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Division commander who was in charge during Anaconda. The second article, 'Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda,' was written by Lt. Col. Christopher Bentley, Hagenbeck's fire support coordinator during the operation.

It sometimes took 'hours' for the Air Force to deliver close air support to Soldiers on the ground, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. Once a request for close air support had been passed to a jet by an Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, it took the Air Force 26 minutes to calculate the desired mean point of impact, which is required to ensure the bomb hits the target, Hagenbeck said.

After that, the aircraft had to get into a busy airspace management scheme before it could attack the target and deliver the bomb. 'Aircraft were stacked up to the ceiling' and could only be flown in a few at a time, he told Field Artillery. 'It took anywhere from 26 minutes to hours [on occasion] for the precision munitions to hit the targets.'

'That's okay if you're not being shot at or the targets aren't fleeting,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. But often U.S. troops were under fire, and the targets were 'fleeting.'

When al-Qaida forces on resupply missions stopped their sport-utility vehicles in one place long enough, 'the fixed-wing aircraft would slam them,' Hagenbeck told the magazine. But, he said, that didn't happen often enough.

'We really worked to find ways to kill fleeting targets the first three or so days,' he told Field Artillery. 'Honestly, we weren't that successful.' But getting the jets on station quickly enough was only part of the problem. All too often, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley, even when a jet was available, Air Force rules prevented it from coming to the aid of Soldiers who needed its support.

'We have a huge procedural and training issue we've got to work through with our Air Force friends,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery.

The problem, as he explained it, is that the Air Force refuses to drop precision-guided munitions unless the strike has been called in by an Air Force ground forward air controller or an Air Force enlisted terminal attack controller. But there are not enough of these personnel for one to be placed in every Army unit that might require close air support. This particularly was the case in Anaconda, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery.

'This war became platoon fights separated by distances in very rugged terrain with too few ETACs to go around,' he said.

Even infantry units with an airman to call in strikes, he said, can easily lose that critical capability during combat.

'What happens if the ETAC is injured and has to be medevaced [medically evacuated] or is killed?'

'We needed as many ETACs and GFACs as we could [get] on the ground, and the Air Force doesn't have them now, and they probably won't have them in the foreseeable future,' he told Army Times.

The solution, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley, is to train and certify the Army's forward observers - who call in artillery and mortar fire - as 'universal observers,' able to call in any Army or Air Force munitions. 'Our FOs must be certified as ground forward air controllers,' Bentley said in the article. 'This may be a sore spot with the Air Force, but I believe it to be nonnegotiable.'

For his part, Hagenbeck said while it may be a 'sore spot' among Bentley's counterparts in the Air Force, it was not a point of discord between Army and Air Force generals. 'Conceptually, we're all in agreement that it needs to happen,' Hagenbeck told Army Times.

'Fight As A Team'

In the meantime, the Army must do a better job of integrating Air Force tactical air control party personnel - the EFACs and GFACs - into ground maneuver units' training and operations, according to Bentley.

'We cannot continue to operate with an add-on conglomerate of Air Force personnel, especially during combat operations,' he writes. 'We must train and fight as a team.'

The Air Force did not provide an official to discuss the issues raised by Hagenbeck and Bentley before Army Times' deadline.

Hagenbeck and Bentley also touched on other procedural problems that surfaced with the Air Force during Anaconda.

Bentley criticized the need to coordinate what strike aircraft would be needed over the battlefield 36 hours ahead of time, as part of the air tasking order process.

The ATO is 'the best mechanism available to coordinate the hundreds of human and mechanical pieces involved in getting air on station, but it is conversely inflexible and not well-suited to support a nonlinear, asymmetrical battlefield,' he wrote. 'The ATO must be flexible enough to change aircraft and munitions packages as the intelligence picture changes by the minute. Increasing the flexibility of the ATO cycle is imperative to responsiveness in today's' operational environment.

In his article, Bentley suggests that perhaps the Air Force was reluctant to take steps that would lead to better close air support.

'In some cases, the inabilities of aircraft to break self-imposed [Air Force] altitude restrictions, slow their strike speed down or strafe the battlefield (the latter in the case of bombers) restricted these aircrafts' abilities to deliver timely munitions in close support of troops on the ground,' he wrote.

Hagenbeck also warned against being too impressed by the numbers that get thrown around whenever air campaigns are discussed.

'A ground force commander does not care about the number of sorties being flown or the number and types of bombs being dropped and their tonnage,' he told Field Artillery. 'Those statistics mean nothing to ground forces in combat. All that matters is whether or not the munitions are time-on-target and provide the right effects.'

Hagenbeck told Army Times that he was not 'pointing a finger at the Air Force' with these comments.

'It's easy to understand numbers, and I think we all often fall into those kinds of traps,' he said.

Nevertheless, the general said, 'To tell me that we flew this many sorties and dropped this many bombs, in and of itself, doesn't tell me that it's been effective in the war fight. It doesn't tell me where the bombs landed.'

A Few Praises, Too

Hagenbeck and Bentley were not completely dismissive of precision-guided bombs, the best known of which is the Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM. 'The JDAMs were terribly effective against fixed targets,' Hagenbeck told Army Times. 'If we were receiving fire from a cave, if we knew there was going to be a delay [before the close air support arrived], we could continue suppressive fires with our mortars and machine guns, and then they could put a bomb inside the cave. What was more difficult for us is if there were fleeting targets on the ridgeline. ... Then the JDAMs were not effective."

In those instances, it was better for the jets to strafe the target area with cannons. The best close air support aircraft for these missions were the Army's AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and the Air Force's A-10 "Warthog" ground attack aircraft during the day, and the Air Force Special Operations AC-130 Spectre gunship at night, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley.

'The most effective close air support asset we had was the Apache, hands down,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. 'The detainees later said the Apaches were the most feared weapons on the battlefield - the helicopters were on top of them before they knew what was happening. The Apaches came as close to 'one shot, one kill' as you can get.'

Both officers also had high praise for the Spectre gunship. 'Its effectiveness was amazing,' Bentley writes. 'The enemy began referring to it as the 'Spitting Witch.'' He advocated giving each of the Army's four light infantry divisions a squadron of AC-130s, or at least making the aircraft available for 'all light infantry training and military operations around the world.'

Hagenbeck also made the following points in Field Artillery:

**He didn't consider bringing in 105mm howitzers 'because I knew we could accomplish the mission without them.' The 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) divisions, each of which contributed troops to Anaconda, are armed with 105mm towed howitzers, but none was deployed to Afghanistan. Hagenbeck told Army Times he did not know who made the decision not to deploy them, but he acknowledged in Field Artillery that even if he'd had them available in Afghanistan, he wouldn't have taken them into the battle on the first day, because he had too few CH-47 Chinook helicopters to carry them and his infantry force.

However, he also told the magazine that an organic ground-based indirect fire capability is 'indispensable' for the close fight.

**The U.S. troops might not have had artillery, but al-Qaida certainly did. U.S. forces destroyed five Soviet-made D-30 122mm towed howitzers that the enemy used to fire on a joint attack by Special Forces troops with Afghan allies in the early hours of the battle's first day, and also on the infantry force's helicopter landing zones, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. U.S. forces found several others in caves, Hagenbeck said. He told Army Times he did not know whether the enemy guns inflicted any casualties.

**American surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft found it very difficult to identify al-Qaida troops and their cave complexes around the valley. 'It took 'boots on the ground' to find the caves,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. 'The shadows alone precluded our discovering a cave until our Soldiers were almost on top of it.'

The enemy moved in small groups of three to five fighters, making them hard to spot. "During the daylight, we watched them on the Predator,' Hagenbeck told Field Artillery. 'At night, when these groups heard a Predator or AC-130 coming, they pulled a blanket over themselves to disappear from the night-vision screen. They used low-tech to beat high-tech.'

2002 Ranger Association Banquet Remarks

The following message from Bill Schwartz '59 is reposted with his permission.

George Lawton

On Close Air Support issues, Bill Schwartz, after listening to comments and discussions from various 10th Mountain Division officers who fought in Afghanistan and participated in the Senior Leaders Panel, came to the following conclusions:

"CAS in Afghanistan was abysmal until the arrival of the A-10s, months into the operations. As I listened to the informal tales told by 10th Mountain Division people about the lack of support, my stomach turned. This was not the Air Force that supported us in Vietnam. Air Force shooters would not fly below 10,000 feet in daylight per Air Force dictates, not for political reasons. Hence no strafing runs. No AC-130 support was permitted by the Air Force during daylight hours. For example, when the Rangers were going back into Roberts Ridge to find the SEAL who was killed and support the operators in the area, AC-130 support was withdrawn by the AF Cmd Center in Saudi Arabia five minutes before Chinook touchdown at the LZ because it was daylight. The result as we know contributed to dead and wounded Rangers.

CAS as we knew it was only provided by Navy and marine aircraft when they were in the AO. Only they would come in low for strafing and bombing runs. Unless a unit had an ETAC or FAC they weren't permitted to call in AF close air support. Small units lacked this support. Precision munitions often weren't and could require hours to get on target. At one point it took five hours to bring in close air support for 10th Mountain troops that were in a tough fight. After the Rangers were evacuated from Roberts Ridge, the Air Force pounded the hell out of it for hours with precision munitions prior to a reinsertion by the 1-87 Inf. When the 1-87 hit the LZ the same Al Queda who fought the Rangers were still on the ground. None had been killed. It took troops on the ground to kill the 12 Al Queda that continued to fight from their fortified positions.

One of the reasons for poor CAS was that the Air Tasking Order was laid out 72 hours in advance, and the Air Force staffers were so bureaucratic that they wouldnt adjust weapons loads or missions. By the time the 10th left, they were able to reduce this to 18 hours. This approach to air support means that hitting fleeting or moving targets is very unlikely.

The ASOC in Afghanistan was often overruled by Blue Suit staffers at the Command Center in Saudi Arabia who didnt have a clue as to the real situation on the ground.

For a long period the Air Force would not allow heavy lifters to land in Afghanistan in daylight. Because of poor weather conditions at night this stifled resupply operations. God forbid a round should hit a resupply bird. I contrast this with Vietnam when C-123s and C-130s landed under fire in daylight to support troops on the ground.

In effect there is a significant cultural difference between the views of the Army and the Air Force when it comes down to close air support. These problems must be ironed out before any further operations, such as in Iraq, are undertaken.

Former Commander of the OPFOR at NTC, Colonel John D. Rosenberger, U.S. Army presented the following report; The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Technology: Insights from the National Training Center's Opposing Force:

"To the 2,500 troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Opposing Force (OPFOR) at the U.S. Army's National Training Center (NTC), it came as no surprise to watch the 3rd Serbian Army march back into Serbia virtually unscathed by the relentless attacks of NATO air power during the Kosovo conflict this past year. Moreover, it came as no surprise to see the Serbian Army employ a wide variety of physical and electronic deception techniques, remain tactically well-dispersed, and hide their combat systems in the infrastructure of cities and villages to preserve their combat power.

This is old news to the combined-arms team of the NTC's Opposing Force. These same Serbian adaptations have been learned and employed successfully by the OPFOR at the NTC since 1994-adaptive countermeasures critical to preserving combat capability at the tactical level of war against the impressive array of intelligence collection and attack technologies employed by America's joint team. Moreover, this is only one of several insights the OPFOR can provide into the limitations and vulnerabilities of the current warfighting technology that underpins America's style of warfare in the 21st Century.

In the past six years, the NTC OPFOR has exposed many limitations and vulnerabilities inherent to the warfighting technologies our joint services are currently pursuing. Moreover, they've learned to defeat them just like any adaptive and savvy opponent will do-just as the Serbian Army did this past year. In my view, these vulnerabilities that we have exposed are compelling, not simply to make smarter technological investments in the years ahead, but equally important, ensure we do not forfeit combat effectiveness, the ability to deter, or the ability to quickly defeat our enemies at both the operational and tactical levels of war in the years ahead.

To begin with, we have learned that active and passive force protection measures are vital to preserving combat power against asymmetric technologies, asymmetric in this case meaning some technological capability that provides a decisive advantage over an opponent in combat. For example, cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, satellite reconnaissance systems, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles have provided us an asymmetric combat advantage over all our opponents this past decade.

In response to these capabilities, we have learned that thermal deception, vehicle and unit dispersion, decoys of all types, camouflage, concealment, and electronic deception are vital means and ways to protect and preserve our ground combat power. Furthermore, the OPFOR has learned that air power and overhead intelligence acquisition systems have significant limitations and are inherently vulnerable to deception-even in desert and mountainous terrain. And by extension, even more so in densely forested areas and jungles, not to mention complex and urban terrain.

Take fixed-wing attack aircraft. It is not difficult to survive against the existing suite of joint close air support aircraft (F-16, F-18, A-10, and equivalents), attacking at altitudes above 15,000 feet, even in the desert. Given the target acquisition capability and the speed in which these aircraft fly, target acquisition and target recognition at these altitudes is difficult at best. We have learned that if we limit our movement, don't create dust clouds, remain tactically dispersed, use camouflage, and employ decoy equipment, we will absorb few losses to fixed wing attack above 15,000 feet-the same methodology of force protection the Serbian Army and para-military forces employed in the dense forests, cities, and villages in Kosovo.

By using a combination of these force protection techniques, the effectiveness of high-altitude, fixed-wing attack against ground forces can be limited and thereby endured. Moreover, this ability to eliminate the effectiveness of high-altitude fixed-wing attack, in turn, places an even higher value on overhead target acquisition platforms like satellites, JSTARS, and unmanned aerial vehicles. And as we have learned, these overhead intelligence collection systems-the operators and analysts-are inherently easy to deceive.

Take reconnaissance satellites in low earth orbit. Given our experience, it takes about 18 hours to complete the targeting process using these sensors-from acquisition, to imagery analysis, to integration into the ATO, to effective attack. Consequently, we've learned to move critical combat systems every 10-12 hours to protect them and keep them in the fight. Frequent survivability moves, in small packets of vehicles are an essential technique to employ to preserve combat power."

Even more troubling is that the AF has almost two hundred A-10s in mothballs and at least 1 or as many as 30 were two-seat types that could be used to house an aerial observer to render the kind of alert air support ground combat units need, freeing the pilot to fly the aircraft.

This state of affairs is not satisfactory with the new geopolitical situation where asymmetric, primarily light infantry enemies will seek to attack the U.S. while hiding behind difficult terrain, vegetation and civilian populations. The U.S. military must regain "air observational superiority" by fielding a two-seat observation/attack aircraft to win the war on sub-national terrorism or else the bad guys will continue to get away. In future nation-state combats, alert, agile CAS guided by Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in the air (AFACs) and on the ground (GFACs) will insure that friendly troops are not killed by "friendly" fires since over-relying on precision guided munitions to get accuracy without FAC help to get aircraft line-of-sight (LOS) means at least 10% of this ordnance will go out of control and could kill our men.

Therefore we propose:

1. All OA-10As be made into 2-seat OA-10B models for observer in back to spot targets

2. More powerful engines fitted to ALL A-10As and OA-10Bs

3. A Night Observation sensor package be fitted to the OA-10Bs

4. SLEP ALL A-10s so the aircraft can fly to 2050

5. Unused A-10A/Bs taken out of storage returned to flight status for AFSOC

6. Rebuild OA-10Bs "Nimrod IIs" supplied to to AFSOC for deep-penetration helo/V-22 escort

7. The synergism between Army attack helicopters and USAF A-10As/OA-10Bs exploit both aircraft's inherent STOL capabilities: "Cactus Air Force" Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) to be forward-deployed with Army ground units to render better CAS and to evade asymmetric enemy attacks on fixed airfields

8. Comm/C4I Package- everybody talk to everybody else (UHF/VHF/FM/HFSSB) plus secure system. Data link. Secure nav system. Color TISEO synched with laser designator and the night observation system.

9. Air-to-air IFF. UHF/GPS/DF (find troops/CSAR survivors/other aircraft). Both IFR systems

10. Both "probe and drogue" and receptacle mid-air refueling.

11. Selectable ejection system.

12. Autopilot (long ferry flights, orbiting and looking out).

13. Wingtip AIM-9X air-to-air self-protection missiles or tiptanks - saves 2 stations for air-to-ground ordnance plus tip tanks increase ferry range over standard underwing drops. Rear quarter missile detection system.

14. Also needs a modular ECM/IRCM system capability to accept upgrades as they develop.

15. General Dynamics GAU-19/A .50 caliber heavy machine gun pods fitted to all A-10s to increase their gun strafing capability: this is the safest and most responsive fires for CAS. Their 2.75" Hydra 70mm rockets must up upgraded to laser guidance, also.

GENERAL DYNAMICS ARMAMENT SYSTEMS
Lakeside Avenue Burlington, VT 05401
Tel: 802/657-6841
Fax: 802/657-7493
nblancha@gdarm.com
Contact: Mr. Norman Blanchard

General Dynamics Armament Systems (GDAS) is a world-class defense company with a range of armament and munitions capabilities from 12.7mm Gatling guns to 155mm artillery projectiles. Its weapon systems are in production for aircraft, helicopters, vehicles and ships across all branches of the U.S. armed forces and more than 20 allied nations. GDAS has design, systems management and production expertise in all aspects of armament system development, including high rate of fire guns, gun barrels, ammunition handling systems, turrets, fire control computers, drive mechanisms, munitions demilaritization, ammunition and sensor integration. GDAS is a leading systems management company with the capability to integrate weapon systems on a full range of aircraft, naval and land-based platforms. Its products featured Eurosatory included HYDRA-70 rockets, reactive armor tiles, 120-mm mortar rounds, munitions demilitarization, GAU-19/A 12.7mm pintle systems and 40mm grenades.

16. A FAC Career field for non-rated officers instead of the grounded flyers who are now called Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) but frankly, unhappily filling a position in an ad hoc manner. FAC officers would also be OA-10B observers for a 20+ year USAF career and see to it that their enlisted FACs are taken care of and that their service area is vibrant and improved constantly with officer clout so the Army doesn't have to suffer from a lack of CAS as it has had to in recent years.

17. Decide on a single name for FAC/ROMAD/ETAC/TACs etc. and stick to it

We suggest the Army name-recognition term of "FAC" be used in two forms;

"AFAC" means an Airborne Forward Air Controller in the rear seat of an aircraft like an OA-10B

"GFAC" means a Ground Forward Air Controller on foot or in an armored fighting vehicle with laser ranging and target designation, and secure commo with all players in the air and on the ground.

It should be a JOINT term used by all the services in DoD. In fact, DoD should come up with standardized criteria for ALL AFACs and GFACs in use by ALL of the services.

Collectively, all the A-10 pilots, ground crews and observers would be termed "Air Commandos" in AFSOC, reviving a tradition lost when the A-1 "Sandy" SkyRaider fixed-wing prop attack and A-37B turbojet observation/aircraft were retired.

18. Enlistedmen would also be OA-10B observers so they have a perspective from the air, too. In fact, they should rotate tours of duty from inside the rear cockpit of the OA-10Bs and on the ground throughout their careers. This will also make this career field challenging and rewarding for all involved.

19. Fold A-10 wings during SLEP so they can have ground mobility via trailers. Add a tail hook for short field operations. Develop a centerline ordnance hard point to attach JATO rockets.

20. Regain PHYSICAL VISUAL MARKS for pilots, AFACs and GFACs to use.

One of the erosions of the electronic, mental gadget RMA mentality is the devaluation of PHYSICAL, VISUAL means to mark targets for pilots to see them and control where their ordnance goes. We used to be very good in Vietnam designating targets with smokew rockets from L-19/O-1 Bird Dog "grasshopper" aircraft flown by AFACs:

Grasshoppers must return!

Shining a laser beam requires SOMEONE to be exposed to get a line-of-sight (LOS) and the munition that follows the laser reflection off the target is not cheap. GPS both the human inputs (GIGO) and how the munition behaves can be off with deadly fratricide consequences as the reports on this web page show. If we'd drop the technohubris, we'd employ M113 Gavins as the universal GFAC ground mobility mount and provide them with roof-top M224 60mm mortars (M24 Chaffee light tanks and IDF Merkava heavy tanks have this) with smoke and white phosphorous bombs so we can clearly mark targets for air strikes like we used to do in Vietnam. A WP hand grenade is so lethal you can BARELY through it beyond its lethal radius. Therefore, the best WP self-mark for GFACs would be having M113 Gavins with M224 60mm mortars connected to a bracket or ground mount trigger-fired to indirectly project a nasty incendiary bomb that will clearly show a white smoke cloud above anyone and anything unlucky to be under it. We lost WP tank round point & shoot, direct-fire capability when we went from 105mm to 120mm and it behooves us to either develop a 120mm WP round or bring back 105mm via M8 Buford AGS light tanks--or BOTH.

Another visual mark we could gain is MARKER BALLOONS that the British used extensively in their COIN operation in Malaya to get a visual mark above jungle foliage since smoke grenades couldn't rise out.

Here's what jungle canopy looks like from the air over Vietnam....

Ironically, we contacted the Army years ago on creating a CAS marker balloon kit AND THEY AGREED, then promptly DID NOTHING about creating such a device.

Despite U.S. Army Infantry Center stating an interest in marking balloons, nothing happened to make kits for this a reality and Mike found the following article in the Fort Benning Library when he was gathering up all of Colonel Hackworth's articles for him in 1997. The following article from the 1966 U.S. Army Infantry Journal shows that U.S. Army infantry units realized like the British in Malaya that they needed marker balloons for aircraft to see a distinct and clear mark above thick vegetation to render effective close air support. Why this equipment was not made a part of the tools available to the U.S. armed forces is a mystery and is something that still needs to be acted on today.

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THE EXPEDIENT HYDROGEN BALLOON

Capt Edmund H. Hornstein, Inf and Capt Charles H. Armstrong, Inf

The proper utilization of close air support in the jungle is a complex problem. The need for this support is paramount. The pursuit force cannot be burdened with large caliber indirect fire weapons and often it is not within range of heavy supporting weapons.

The pilot's problem is essentially one of locating the target and line of contact. It is difficult, often impossible for him to see beneath the tangled overgrowth of the jungle canopy. Matters are further complicated by poor maps and the inability to locate the pursuit force.

Several months ago 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry conducted a field training exercise in Hawaii entitled "Operation Jailbreak." One phase required platoon-sized elements to move 10,000 meters across the Oahu rain forest, living off the land and relying on aerial resupply. In the planning stage, however, it became obvious that aerial resupply would be an immense problem. Drop zones were few and far between Tropical overcast greatly reduced flight time over the operational area. Clearing drop zones was hard work and resulted in the loss of precious movement time. Expedient methods of ground-to-air signaling were slow to attract the aircraft; it was impossible

Items needed (L to R) are: a carrier, thread or light line, balloon, storage jar and packets of calcium hydride, reaction jar and water.

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to determine which patrol was signaling for what supplies. Dropping bundles on radio direction-finding was inaccurate. Sometimes it would take hours to recover a bundle dropped a few hundred meters off the mark.

A signaling expedient had to be devised that could be transported easily by the patrol, prepared rapidly and could be identified readily by the aerial observer. Thus, the idea of the field expedient hydrogen balloon was born.

If a device could be fabricated to yield hydrogen, the patrol could inflate a balloon, allow it to float above the jungle canopy on a light line and await the bundle drop. Each patrol could be identified by balloons of different colors.

After much experimenting the hydrogen problem was solved with calcium hydride (CaH2) which, when mixed with water generates hydrogen. The calcium hydride is readily available from metro elements, organic to division artillery and rocket battalions, or from any air base that utilizes weather balloons.

All that is necessary are 75-gram packets of calcium hydride (approximately three-quarters of a cigarette pack) wrapped in paper toweling to slow the violent, hydrogen-producing reaction.

A small baby food. jar is used to protect the package until ready for use. A wide-mouth jar of pint or quart size (an APC bottle for example) makes an excellent reaction chamber or hydrogen generator.

The balloon may be either the 10- or 30-gram size also available from metro elements. Of course, the lighter the line, the less drag there will be on the balloon. The common gas mask carrier can hold 15 complete hydrogen-producing setups. The total weight is less than six pounds.

Activating the balloon is a simple five-step procedure:

1. Pour about three-quarters of a canteen of water into reaction jar. A half canteen will do but the more water, the less explosive the reaction.

2. Add calcium hydride packet.

3. Quickly slide balloon neck over the mouth of the jar. The hydrogen producing reaction will begin immediately. Hold the balloon in a raised position above the generator as the bottle will get extremely hot and could rupture the balloon on contact.

4 Wait approximately 10 minutes for the balloon to fill and cool. Cooling can be eliminated but the hot balloon may burst while ascending. By firmly shaking the jar you ensure maximum hydrogen yield.

5. Shake balloon slightly so that condensation formed on the inside of the balloon will drain back into the reaction chamber. Twist the neck of the balloon, remove from the jar and secure with a light line.

While inflating the balloon several safety precautions should be served. There should be no open flame or smoking near the operation.' Avoid bare skin contact with the generator jar during the reaction as it will get extremely hot. When the balloon is detached from the jar take care that drippings do not get into eyes. If only one generator available and it is desired to inflate

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another balloon immediately, the jar can it be cooled rapidly by filling with dirt and then washing. The balloons can be reused if necessary.

The best method for signaling is to allow the balloon to rise to an altitude of several hundred feet. Once detected by the aerial observer, the balloon is then reeled into position just above the jungle canopy over the desired drop zone. This compensates for balloon wind drift and ensures pinpoint aerial resupply, even though the aircraft pilot might never see a patrol member or any other DZ marking.

Another use for the balloon was discovered during the exercise. A small patrol without indirect fire support found a hidden guerrilla jungle base. The patrol activated a balloon, gave a compass heading and distance to the target area from the balloon, and radioed for a simulated ordnance and napalm air attack. The execution of the mission was perfect.

The system was even used with some degree of success at night. By using light-colored balloons it was found a strong flashlight beam could be reflected off the balloons and make them detectable to an airborne observer. The expedient rig we put together is by no means refined. For instance, there is no reason a metal container cannot be substituted for the glass jar.

The expedient was effective beyond our wildest expectations. By utilizing the expedient hydrogen balloons, the battalion was able to effect continual aerial support of a number of platoon-sized patrols in dense jungle. Without the balloons, this could only have been accomplished with great delay, if at all.

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DISCUSSION: Add to the list urban combat; its very hard to see friendly forces in tight alleyways surrounded by buildings; a colored balloon could solve this. The potential of a deliberately produced "CAS/MAS Marker Balloon Kit" is vast; the reaction jar can be lined with heat insulating material to be held without gloves. The balloons can be in myriad colors to include glow-in-the-dark for night signaling. A small chemlight could also be attached in visible or infared visible light giving properties. If the cord was a thin wire or a fiber-optic cable a small video camera could be held aloft for observation as a "hip-pocket" observation balloon capability. The point of all of this is that for CAS/MAS GFACs and Army Attack Pathfinders must get out of their VS-17 panel and radio and electronic gadget doldrums and use balloons as PHYSICAL marking means to better effect air/ground interface especially when amongst closed terrain clutter. Army Pathfinders and USAF CCTs use balloons to measure winds for parachute drops, why not for signaling to aircraft for CAS/MAS & resupply? We need human AFACs in the air to see the marker balloons to guide them in dropping supplies as well as ordnance.

Other World Armies Realize the need for effective CAS and DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT

We recently discovered we have counterparts in Australia!! Their Army Aviation Association has been fighting a battle to get their wannabe-lawn darts Air Force to provide CAS. In their excellent report, "The Tactical Air Support Group" they make some observations about the highly successful German Air Force/Army cooperation in WWII where ground troops served as air observers:

The Tactical Air Support Group

By O.M. Eather MBA.

www.fourays.org/archives/closeair.htm

"Examining the Luftwaffe's development reveals sound principles of tactical air support that were later reflected by other air forces as they sought to emulate the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe's 'Blitzkrieg' techniques. From the outset and in spite of the pervasive influence of classical air theorists, the German High Command realised that technical limitations would always constrain air power from being the decisive arm. Rather, the Luftwaffe would always act in concert with the Wehrmacht, and to a lesser extent, the Kreigsmarine. Great attention was paid to cross training army officers and non-commissioned officers as observers in reconnaissance squadrons and, both in basic flying training and at the Air Command and Staff School, to train young flyers in ' the science of Army Tactics.' (Ref 15) This had the very real benefit of giving Air Force officers, particularly air crew, a proper military education grounded in an appreciation of those elements of their defence forces that were actually decisive.

Mobility, short flight times and immediate reaction were required from the Luftwaffe to match this new style of fluid warfare. This necessitated minimal reliance on fixed bases by operational squadrons and co-location of Luftwaffe and Army headquarters to maximise effectiveness by minimising chain-of-command decision time. Squadrons followed their Army units or the unfolding battle, 'lodging' with independent airfield companies who operated and prepared tactical airfields. Difficulties arose when 'Luftwaffe command units were not based forward' but improved when forward command and control elements moved with the ground combat units.

Ultimately, in Greece and Russia, liaison teams and forward observers were in the frontline, directing aircraft to targets nominated by the immediate infantry or artillery regimental commanders. Also, in Russia, the value of smaller units, two to three bomb carrying aircraft, was recognised in their greater flexibility, and manoeuvrability and that they could attend to targets too small for larger units.(Ref 17) The combined air and land forces of Germany were: 'Self contained. Stukas, tanks, recovery vehicles, petrol wagons, anti-tank gunners, all went forward together and their senior officers were often in the van.' (Ref 18)

The German General Staff calculated that, between 1939 and 1942, aircraft were employed in the ratio of 5:4 for Strategic as to Direct Support roles. This would include fighter and suitable bomber aircraft detached after the air superiority battle was won. However, the actual number of aircraft used for direct Army support was more modest and could not, at any time, have been considered an imbalance against the Luftwaffe's other missions. At the beginning of the French campaign, of 3,824 operational aircraft, there were 342 dive bombers, 42 ground attack and 501 reconnaissance. Similarly, in Russia, with 3,701 operational aircraft, 302 were dive bombers and 593 reconnaissance. However, close tactical support is always accompanied by high attrition in aircraft; if not in crews, due to aircraft being downed from low-level and mostly in reach of friendly forces. By the battle of Kursk, both the Germans and the Soviets had come to expect destruction to be almost equal amongst aircraft and tanks. The Red Army fielded 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft, the Germans, 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. So, whilst purpose designed close air support types have always been a small proportion of total air resources, in an intense surface battle, high levels of attrition of air assets, as well as armour and artillery, came to be expected and allowed for.(Ref 19)

The Luftwaffe was not merely an adjunct of the Wehrmacht. From the outset its doctrines were meshed to the theories of Douhet. Indeed, whilst those theories were seen as fundamental in defining the singularity of the service, the Luftwaffe contrived to be an effective mariner to reconcile the unique properties of airpower without ignoring the needs of the land battle or indulging in naive dismissal of surface forces as obsolete. The German Air Ministry field manual, 'The Conduct of Air Operations', which lay down doctrine, stated the overriding mission was to 'secure and maintain air superiority' and only then to provide 'combat and other air action supporting army forces on the ground'. The 'Air Field Manual No. 16' went further, stating the prime missions as 'strategic operations against sources of hostile military power' and 'attacks against targets in large cities.' (Ref 20) The Luftwaffe always figured about forty per cent of its strength would be bombers, twenty five to thirty per cent fighters, and the rest for the support of ground forces, including transport. Its first two phases of operations were to attack and destroy enemy air forces and aircraft factories and then ' vital centres'. But always included was the intention to aid the Army in its decisive engagements. For this reason, purpose built aircraft, such as the Junkers 87 divebomber,", were permanently under command of the Army to 'concentrate all striking power' with the service best able to judge its effective application in the land battle. (Ref 21)

Control of the Luftwaffe was always at the highest level with the Commander in Chief of the German High Command and, whilst there was general agreement that Air Superiority forces stayed under the command of the Luftwaffe, fighter units were assigned to Army control when circumstances justified such a change. In effect, they became specialist Army units and both services planned and trained for this as a normal part of operations. The Army local commander directed Luftwaffe units as he was best qualified to direct their activities, whilst in no way interfering with the technical command of Air units.(Ref 22) It is a common fallacy that the Luftwaffe was only ever the air arm of the German Army. Examination of its own doctrine refutes this. Its performance in gaining air superiority in Europe, from 1939 to at least 1943, and in the Western Desert up to the First Battle of El Alamein, and then its consistently determined defence of Germany against the Allied bomber offensive, gives the lie to such criticisms. But it never lost sight of the inescapable reality that, if ever it was to be credible, it must be part of the land battle. It took the Air Forces of its opponents several galling years to reach the same conclusion and to begin to copy the principles that the Luftwaffe had established for effective support of the Army.

The principles that the Luftwaffe experience showed to be successful in the Air Arm's support of the land battle can he now drawn. Those principles, for the use of air assets for Close Air Support, are:

a. Operational command by Ground Force Commander.

b. Forward location, preferably within. short flight time of in action combat elements.

c. Control by Air Arm personnel or fire support control specialists with leading combat elements.

d. Maximum and early use to assist in either breakup of aggressive enemy ground concentrations or, in assault, breakthrough with disabling concentration and surprise.

e. An irreducible proportion of specialist Close Air Support aircraft, organic to the Ground Force and commanded by it and not available (or suitable) for Control of the Air tasks.

f. Side-by-side location and direct command links between Ground and Air

20. GFACs must have not only SOFLAM laser rangefinders and target designators but M224 60mm mortars which can trigger-fire colored smoke bombs (prevent spoofing) to in a "low-tech" way mark targets for CAS aircraft to strike. If we had Army M8 Buford AGS light tanks and M1064A4 Gavin 120mm mortar vehicles with turrets shooting White Phosphorous (WP) rounds this would be another clear mark for CAS aircraft to aim in on.

A multi-war CAS attack pilot writes about GFAC to AFAC radio "talk-ons":

"Been thinking over troubles I experienced with green ALOs and here's a technique.

Presupposing the guy on the ground has a laser ranger (available even from Cabela's, etc) and a field compass he can give both magnetic azimuth and a good range to the target for the CAS pilots. I know the ones I've seen advertised only go out to 800 yards but surely that is pretty good for field use. And who knows? Maybe the manufacturer can tweak the thing to go out further or we can buy an expensive binocular with laser rangefinder like the Leica VECTOR used by Canadian snipers in Afghanistan.

On another track, the big problems was that green guys on the ground saw landmarks with a different idea as what stood out than the guy in the air saw. Quote from a ROMAD in Korea - 'we're up the little canyon off the big one' Hell, Korea is full of canyons of all sizes and from the air they look like roots from a tree . . .we did get it straightened out but it took a while. Also - 100 meters on the ground and eyeballed from the air can be wildly different. I once had a USAF FAC (new guy) almost run me out of bombs before we got on the target, dropping one at a time and moving "50 meters" (?) each time. (He wasn't very good with his smoke rockets either).

A good mark is a great start.

Another super technique is sort of a 'delayed TOT'.

If the fighters know where the GFAC is, they can give him an ETA - the GFAC can give the CAS a target azimuth and range or a vector off a prominent landmark, mark the target (laser or pyro) when the fighters are 4-5 miles out (30 seconds) and give the bad guys a real surprise. At an attack speed of 550 or better the airplane gets there at about the same time as the sound of an exploding smoke bomb/rocket. Only works for ordnance that is cleared for release that fast (unless the CAS has balls) - doesn't work for high drags cause the fins can fail above 450 mph. But slick bombs, rockets, strafing, cluster bombs [CBUs] all work just fine when released supersonic."

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/attack/a10/index.shtml

Once we have the "Air Commandos" in place with upgraded OA-10Bs with AFAC in the rear seat and GFACs on the ground designating and ranging with lasers, we would normally have an OA-10B flying continuously overhead of friendly ground maneuver troops. The RAND enemy Air Defense-is-doomsday crowd should take note that the A-10s would be primarily BEHIND friendly lines and not subject to all the nasty missile and gun weapons systems they read about in Jane's and work into expensive DoD-funded computer simulations of worse-case "boogie man" nation-state threats.

If targets appear and are requested to be struck, the OA-10B can immediately take care of small targets with its 30mm cannon and twin underwing GAU-19/A .50 caliber gatling gun pods and laser-guided Hydra-70mm rockets. If the target needs more firepower to be suppressed/destroyed, the OA-10B can shoot smoke rockets to assist other fighter-bombers like F-15E Strike Eagles or other single-seat A-10s to hit the target with guns, rockets and with controlled bombs.

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MODELLING THE OA-10B: Click to enlarge image of the mighty OA-10B!

Chinese communist Trumpeter models make a large 1:35 scale two-seat OA-10B which you can buy from Squadron in Texas.

www.squadron.com/ItemDetails.asp?item=TR32215

1/32 (54mm) Scale
Manufacturer: Trumpeter from China
Subject: A-10 Thunderbolt DoubleSeat
Stock No: TR32215

Type: Aircraft Models

Description: A-10 Thunderbolt DoubleSeat. 1970s experimental USAF night/all-weather attack a/c based on A-10. Detailed exterior w/ engraved panel lines. Detailed cockpits, engines, and landing gear. USAF mkgs. See Review by ModelingMadness - Roberto

MSRP: $109.95

Your Price: $98.96

Here's pics of the OA-10B model we built:

Toys R US also offer a remote-controlled two-seat OA-10B in tan that we repainted to look more realistic. Here's a pic of their AIR FORCES line of aircraft so you know what to look for in the store except look for a tan two-seat OA-10B.

Here's what it looks like now after a "MAS make-over"

Maneuver Air Support

The Precision Firepower Myth is a recipe for disaster

The current media feeding frenzy over expensive guided munitions hasn't factored in the many friendly deaths these bombs have inflicted on our men and WHY.

1. JDAMs are not terminally guided with only internal GPS and INS guidance and can go astray killing our own troops. Terminally guided means a FAC on the air or ground designates the target shining a laser beam and the ordnance flies directly to this spot and/or the FAC radio-directs the attack aircraft to a SAFE LOS attack path parrallel not perpindicular to the friendly troops. A First Sergeant in the 101st Air Assault Division writes:

"Equipment wise, our greatest shortcomings were optics and organic or direct support long-range weapons. After the initial fight all our targets were at a minimum of 1500m all the way out to as far as you could see. Our 60[mm] and 81[mm]'s accounted for most of the kills. Next was a Canadian Sniper team with a MacMillian .50 cal [sniper rifle]. They got kills all the way out to 2500m.

The problem with our mortars was there as a 24 hour [Close Air Support] cas cap. And they wouldn't fly near us if we were firing indirect. Even though our max ord[nant: how high mortar rounds arc into the sky] was far beneath their patterns. Something for you and your alo [Air Liaison Officer] to work out. The other problem was the Air Force could never fly in small groups of personnel, I watched and called corrections on numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. My verdict is if you want it killed use your mortars. Pay close attention to ti-hz direction of attack your ALO is bringing in the CAS. Every time it was perpendicular to us we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the time they dropped a 2,000 lbs [bomb] in the middle of our company, it didn't go off by a sheer miracle I'm sure. [Marine] Cobras and 2.75" [rockets] shot at us. Also, once again, they were shooting perpendicular to our trace. Aviation provided the most near misses of all the things we did".

Below is a story on how a JDAM killed some of our men recently...

Three Special Forces killed, 19 wounded by friendly fire

Fort Drum Soldier dead

by Staff Sgt. Marcia Triggs

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Dec. 5, 2001) - Three Special Forces Soldiers were killed and 19 were wounded north of Kandahar, Afghanistan, when a 2,000-pound U.S. bomb missed it's target and hit in close proximity to friendly forces Dec. 4.

The names are being withheld until next-of-kin notifications have been completed.

A B-52 that was called in to provide fire support to ground forces who were under fire, reportedly dropped it's ordnance about a football field away from two Special Forces teams and Afghan opposition fighters, officials said.

Two Soldiers were pronounced dead at the scene, and the third Soldier died while being transported to a medical facility in the region, officials said. Five Afghan opposition fighters were also killed and an unknown amount wounded, officials said.

"A close air-support strike is one of the most potentially hazardous types of missions used," officials said. "Simultaneously calling in air strikes on your own position and the enemy's position that you're engaged with takes very fine control, coordination and precision. Unfortunately, it doesn't always happen without causing our own casualties."

Officials said they would not speculate on the reason the precision-guided bomb missed its target, whether the wrong coordinates were given, wrong coordinates were entered on the plane or the system malfunctioned.

A second bomb was also dropped and it did hit the intended target, but officials said they did not know how much damage the bomb inflicted on enemy forces.

Since the war began this is the second U.S. bomb that has missed its target and hit in the proximity of U.S. troops. A stray bomb hit four Soldiers and an airman while they were helping Northern Alliance forces fighting armed Taliban captives in a fort near Mazar-e Sharif.

In an unrelated incident, an infantryman from the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. died Nov. 29 in Uzbekistan. Pvt. 2 Giovanny Maria, 19, was a native of Camden, N.J., and had enlisted in the Army in May.

Although the incident in under investigation, Maria's death was not the result of enemy action, officials said.

Link to original news item:

http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Aug2002/a2002080282ndided.html

2. Trying to STEER bombs and missiles from a distant, offset location is problem-prone and gets worse the farther away you try to do it. Alleged "Precision" guidance on munitions has led to a lack of appreciation for the CAS strikes being guided by a FAC on the ground be it radio verbal directions and/or a laser spot for terminal guidance so the PHYSICAL aircraft delivery platform is lined up on the target so there is less physical "murphy" things that can go wrong. Munitions still bump into each other on release from the rack and fins get bent for example.

Carlton Meyers writes:

"G2 gem: GPS Guided Munitions and Fratricide

The May 2002 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette has an interesting article by LtCol John T. Rahm entitled: 'Bombing Accuracy for Idiots'. He points out the circular error probable (CEP) is commonly used to measure the accuracy of a weapon. However, he points out that "probable" means the circle, often very elliptical, where 50% a projectile or bomb is likely to hit. While that was good for ballistic weaponry, it is very misleading for GPS guided munitions. While they have great CEPs, many of their guidance systems malfunction and the bomb goes miles off target. LtCol Rahm states that testers disregard such failures when measuring CEPs anyway, and he worked at China Lake were the testing occurred. He writes this makes them too dangerous for close air support.

This explains the frequent 'mistakes' in Afghanistan where bombs landed far from any real target. The complexity of GPS guided bombs like JDAM, or the Navy 5-inch ERGM still under development, or the proposed 155mm Excalibur will often lead to friendly fire casualties which may be caused by any of these factors: a defective guidance system; a guidance system damaged during transport or installation; an incorrect GPS coordinate sent by the targeting system; and incorrect GPS coordinate entered into the bomb; GPS signal interference from nearby mountains, buildings, or solar flares; or GPS signal jamming. So if an aircraft drops a GPS guided bomb from several miles away, any guidance problem may prove disastrous. Even if 90% work great, that loose 10% may prove too dangerous".

Even the USAF is grudgingly admitting that it needs men on the ground to call in strikes:

European Stars and Stripes
August 15, 2002

Afghanistan War Showing Air Force The Importance Of 'Eyes On The Ground'

By Lisa Burgess, Stars and Stripes

ARLINGTON, Va. - Afghanistan has added a "new wrinkle"; to the Air Force's basic doctrine, according to the service's top analyst for the war on terrorism: Wars aren't won by air alone.

The rugged and unforgiving mountains of Central Asia have revealed many hard truths to each of the services. But for the Air Force, perhaps no single lesson resonates more clearly, Col. Fred Weiners said Tuesday: "Eyes on the ground" are essential to round out the advanced space- and air-based sensors, weapons and platforms that make up the service's inventory.

"You can have all the high technology you want, but it's these 25-year-old staff sergeants on the ground making strike decisions" that, according to Weiners, have in the past been made by high-level planning officers located nowhere near the battlefield.

Weiners is acting director of the Air Force's Task Force Enduring Look, and spoke with Stripes in an interview in his office in Arlington, Va.

Air campaigns traditionally have been planned in advance. Coordinates have been known, and target sets could be chosen from data gathered weeks or months in advance.

To hear an Air Force official emphasizing the need for "boots on the ground" is a significant shift in conventional U.S. military thinking.

The Army and marine corps both are founded on the principle that war is never won until "boots hit the ground" - when military personnel actually occupy the turf. The Air Force has tended to be dominated by officers who believe air operations alone can conquer an enemy.

In Afghanistan, however, forward air controllers and special operations forces -not planners sitting in Washington with maps and satellite photographs - have been responsible for almost all critical targeting calls, Weiners said.

"They are our most versatile and highly sophisticated sensor, and they are proving highly effective," Weiners said. "They dramatically enhance overall air power and bombing effectiveness."

Thanks to ground controllers, "We've enjoyed an accuracy like we've never enjoyed," Weiners said - and not only due to more sophisticated "smart" bombs, such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition.

Sensor-To-Shooter Loop

But Afghanistan also revealed a critical break in this "sensor-to-shooter" loop: Air Force pilots had not had enough practice working with the ground operators, particularly the special operations forces.

The service has moved with extraordinary speed to remedy that deficiency, Weiners said.

His task force first identified the need for more pilot training with ground forces in January, and by June, pilots at the Air Force Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., were "engaging special operations forces on the ground, including full mission profiles and simulations, to replicate what we were doing [in Afghanistan]."

Not every lesson coming out of Afghanistan is revolutionary. Much of what the Air Force is gleaning validates tactics and technologies that have worked well in exercises, but never have been proven in combat, Weiners said.

One especially critical validation to come out of the Central Asian campaign is proof that the Air Force's Air and Space Expeditionary Forces, which were designed for peacetime, also work in war, Weiners said.

As the Defense Department continued to pull back from its overseas bases throughout the 1990s, Air Force leaders decided they needed a way to keep the increasingly home-based service ready for action.

C-17 Proves Itself

One example: Afghanistan is the first major conflict for the Pentagon that has required "everything to come in and out by air," Weiners noted.

The Air Force's newest transport, the C-17, was key, Weiners said.

"The C-17 really proved itself, given the austere nature of our bases" in Central Asia, he said.

Creative aircrews also have found ways for the C-17 to perform that its designers never anticipated, Weiners said, citing in particular its function as a "mobile filling station."

Afghanistan has no fuel supply infrastructure, and roads there are so treacherous that trucking large amounts of fuel in is out of the question.

That means every drop of aviation gas and jet fuel needed by the U.S. forces is supplied by the Pentagon's fleet of KC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft.

Meanwhile, Army and marine helicopters and the assorted special operations aircraft stationed at the rough airfields that dot Afghanistan "need a lot of gas," Weiners said.

During Operation Anaconda in March, when fuel was at an absolute premium, an unknown airman came up with a novel idea to get fuel to the fighters quickly: Combine the C-17's ability to land almost anywhere with its large fuel tanks.

"We would park a tanker in an orbit, and the C-17 would go up, tap the tanker, land and off-load the fuel - and now you have avgas [aviation gas]" where tankers can't land, Weiners said.

Bombers With Eyes

Another much-discussed evolution was the decision to use of Cold-war era strategic bombers in tactical combat.

The Air Force's B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers all were originally designed to deliver nuclear munitions in end-of-the-world scenarios.

In Afghanistan, however, Air Force officials took advantage of the bombers' extensive payloads, range and high-altitude capability to deliver lethal strikes on enemy forces - all while being directed by ground-based forces.

The bombers proved very effective, Weiners said.

"The B-1s and B-52s flew approximately 10 percent of the sorties and delivered close to 60 percent of the weapons," Weiners said.

During the Gulf War, B-52s dropped some 30 percent of all U.S. bombs. Neither the B-1 nor the B-2 was deployed.

One reason for that is the versatility of the bombers: They can carry traditional "dumb" bombs, but thanks to modifications, they also can deliver a range of smart weapons.

Secondly, all this can be done with greater standoff. The bombers fly much higher than fighter craft with no need for a visual, using coordinates from forward air controllers - the eyes on the ground.

Change comes with difficulty for the military; it's a "risk-averse group," Weiners said.

But, he said, "this is a great time to question the old way of doing things."

F/A-22: Deja Me-262 all over again?

The new tailspin of calling the F-22 Raptor a "F/A-22" to imply an unarmored, compromised-flight-performance-for-low-radar signature (F-15s have faster top seeds than F-22s) medium-high altitude air-to-air combat aircraft can perform Close Air Support (CAS) ground attack is a dangerous lie. The F-22 has an internal weapons bay to not have sharp-sided bombs sticking out which reflect radar signals; these small internal spaces are designed to carry slim air-to-air missiles, not large, fat bombs--in order to shoot down enemy aircraft because its an air-superiority FIGHTER not a ground attack aircraft. Giving the AF the benefit of the doubt, with the space available, how many bombs can a "F/A-22" carry internally?

Two.

That's right, 1, 2.

A recent Defense News article by Vago Muradian, Gail Kaufman and Bruce Rolfsen reports (see below):

"The aircraft's initial striking ability will come from a pair of 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions in its weapons bays, then get beefed up over time through fleetwide upgrades, Air Force spokesman William Bodie said".

AF spokesman Willian Bodie elaborates further in the article:

"Given the size of the 1,000-pound weapon, the aircraft can carry only two of the bombs internally. That will change, however, with the arrival of the Small Diameter Bomb in 2006. The F/A-22 will be able to carry eight of the 250-pound, high-yield precision munitions internally, and additional ones on the underwing weapons stations. Upgrades will eventually allow the Raptor to hit moving ground targets in all-weather conditions, Bodie said.

Bodie then boasts that the F/A-22 will somehow render CAS for Army Brigade Combat Teams:

"Air Force planners are teaming with their Army counterparts to support the ground service's new Brigade Combat Teams, he said.

'The Raptor can support mobility forces deep in enemy territory while at the same time penetrating any defenses to come to the aid of Soldiers on the ground, 24 hours a day and in any weather,' Bodie said."

Troops on the ground require ordnance that is directed by both human observers on the ground and in the air that is released by aircraft on physical, low-altitude flight paths that are safe in event the bomb tailfins are bent on release, the guidance goes awry and any other myriad problems occur. The hypocrisy of using the enemy ADA threat as a convenient "strawman" to say armored, highly agile A-10s cannot do low-level CAS is made evident when you strap bombs under the wings of "F/A-22s" because this is said to be justified because the ADA threat has subsided so its stealth features---now negated by the externally hung bombs---are not needed. Either the enemy ADA threat has been taken out or it has not; if it has, then what's good for F/A-22s to carry bombs externally is also good for A-10s; except the A-10 can fly low with armor protection and agility to fly beneath overcast weather conditions to render effective

F/A-22s trying to fly CAS missions under 15K if hit by enemy ground fire will be shot down and could crash into steep terrain if boxed in by low cloud ceilings. Knowing this limitation, on "bad weather days" the F/A-22s will not fly and our ground troops will again be without CAS as they were in the dark days of the 1945 Battle of the Bulge in WWII. Dropping bombs blind through clouds by F/A-22s even with allegedy "precision guided" bombs to do CAS is a recipe for killing our own ground troops. JDAMS have already killed American Soldiers in Afghanistan when used in such a fool-hardy manner. In fact, large bombs are not what's needed to do CAS well; guns and rockets aimed by aircraft line-of-sight aircraft under 15,000 feet talked onto target by FACs and terminally guided by their laser designators is what's required.

Cautionary examples of trying to make fighters into quasi-fighter-bombers are the German Me-262 fighter jet which could have as an air superiority fighter swept the prop-driven U.S. Army Air Force from the skies over Europe in WWII. However, instead Hitler insisted it be laden with bombs negating its speed advantage over prop planes. Strapping bombs onto F/A-22s will eliminate any stealth it has to enemy radar detection. Another bad compromised design example is the overweight, under-performing F/A-18 and F/A Super Hornets used by the Navy/marines which cannot even fly Mach 2 but are stuffed with attack avionics. Hornets are unarmored and fly too fast in relation to the ground to provide CAS let alone under operate under low overcast conditions. The ability to be "multi-role" and carry bombs was the design intent of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which would also have STOVL variants that could operate without needing vulnerable, fixed air bases easily ground attacked by asymmetric enemies. Renaming the F-22 a quasi-attack aircraft is likely an opening shot to abandon funding of the JSF and upgrades to actual A-10 CAS aircraft by the USAF in favor of their sexier F-22s operated from comfortable, air-conditioned bases. While our men on the ground that are actually finding, locating and encircling our elusive enemies---and not blowing up decoys, civilians and clumps of rocks from 15,000 feet---who need attack aircraft continuously overhead as far forward as possible operating from dirt strips to render effective CAS---will once more go without.

OA-10C SeaHogs: Saving Naval Aviation with a High-Low Mix

Sadly, America's industrial base is dying as we prefer to build mental gadgets to feed consumerism and not produce PHYSICAL, durable things which takes hard work, character and toil. What this means for America's defense is we will soon not be able to make planes, tanks and ships and will have to try to fight wars with men with rifles in their hands and military versions of mental gadgets driven around in SUVs with a splash of military color. This emasculated U.S. military has already failed and continues to fail daily on the non-linear battlefield of Iraq dominated by high explosives bombs, and RPGs. The enemy is using "smart bombs" against us--they just are not dropped from an expensive aircraft. Great Britain at the time of the 1956 Suez invasion 14 aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers, 68 destroyers, 186 frigates, 54 submarines, 30 landing ships and 36 major landing craft. The Royal Navy of 1956 is bigger than the U.S. Navy of today. The Royal Navy of today 20 times smaller with the collapse of their overseas empire. America is on the same downward spiral.

In Naval Aviation, the rising "death spiral" of aircraft complexity and costs has driven our aircraft carriers to just one fighting aircraft type: F/A-18 Hornets to try to fly both fast and slow, short and long with F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) "salvation" at the end of the tunnel to keep 1 out of two U.S. plane makers in business. This represents a "high" cost aircraft that simply will not be affordable in the numbers needed nor able to perform the "low" end missions needed. Something will have to give. And what that will be will be a "Hollow Navy" with multi-billion dollar aircraft carriers sitting in port with no aircraft. It will continue to mean U.S. ground troops getting blown up by enemy roadside bombs because we have no low-speed, low-altitude manned observation/attack aircraft to maintain 24/7/365 cover overhead. It will mean more never-ending "no-win" wars like Iraq draining the U.S. economy by $1 BILLION A WEEK, which means the end of naval aviation when we can no longer afford aircraft carriers, either. Many countries would like to have aircraft carriers but cannot afford them--we might be joining their ranks.

If America wants to keep operating aircraft carriers they will need to offer important capabilities to non-linear battlefields (NLBs) and to simply survive from enemy submarines, and air-refuel to even reach distances to strike air, land or sea targets will need a low-speed aircraft. We propose that we create a "High/Low mix" for U.S. Naval Aviation by taking the 188 x A-10 Warthog attack planes sitting in the Mojave desert at Davis-Monthan AFB and navalize them into 15 squadrons of OA-10B "SeaHogs" with new engines, folding wings, tail-hook and a second back seat. Another option is the 300+ A-7 Corsair II attack planes sitting alongside the Warthogs under the southwestern US sun that are already "navalized". Plug-in rudder pedals, HOTAS flight controls and instrument panels make any designated SeaHog/Corsair II a trainer aircraft. After flight training, the rear seat is reconfigured to act as an attack observer with image intensifier/thermal vision TV that can be transmitted directly to Army and marine grunts on the ground with wrist-watch TV screens like the IDF uses.

The rear seat observer Airborne Forward Air Controller (AFAC) would be an ANGLICO marine who would do tours on the ground as a Ground Forward Air Controller (GFAC) talking on air strikes by radio, balloon, smoke, air panel and laser marking. With proper coordination with USAF A-10 and ETAC communities this same synergism could be achieved by USAF ETACs doing tours in the back seat of USAF A-10s or A-7s modified into 2-seat configuration. Naval SeaHogs would have the low-speed agility, 30mm gatling cannon, bombs, rocket, missile armaments and armored construction to loiter over battlefields after launch from the sea to provide legendary air tactician Chuck Myers' Maneuver Air Support (MAS) that stops bad guys laying bombs on roads as well as busts enemy nation-state tanks on the roll towards a beach landing. The SeaHogs can deploy ashore onto short take off and landing (STOL) strips as the ground maneuver advances inland for continuous MAS. Without use of our Iowa class battleships for naval gunfire support, we need SeaHogs' close air support strikes just to make sure our marines on foot and flimsy wheeled trucks are not repulsed by swarms of enemy mechanized troops in tracked armored fighting vehicles. We should put two Iowas back in service with rear ski jumps to operate F-35 JSFs to enable us to go into harm's way via their armored construction and beach-clearing fire support to land our Army troops in tracked armored fighting vehicles like the 3rd Infantry Division from sealift ships using Navy LCACs with RO-RO interfaces and heavy lift helicopters. The U.S. Army's 3rd ID was the first to Baghdad because it has the tracked AFV armored and off-road mobility to bypass enemy rear guards that stymie those in rubber-tired trucks.

The SeaHog beacause of its second seat could house an operator of an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) array, drop sonobuoys and depth charges to attack enemy diesel-electric submarines lurking to sink an American flat top. The SeaHog can sip fuel while offering a hose/drogue to thirsty Hornets and Joint Strike Fighters.

Thus, the SeaHog and/or A-7 Corsair II,"Multi-Purpose Corsairs" could perform the missions now lost when the S-3 Viking ASW/tanker, A-6 Intruder, A-4 SkyHawks were retired--reinstituting a low part of a high/low mix to give Naval Aviation frankly an ability to continue to exist. Without bending to the needs of the low speed/altitude arena Naval Aviation is going to simply break by out of control costs, a dying physical industrial base and the coffin clincher: irrelevance when wars are fought by people who live ashore. This ain't "Waterworld". And it certainly ain't "Demolition Man" where mental gadgets have made physical capabilities mouse clicked away. We need to inject some muscle back into Naval Aviation ASAP by a high/low mix that provides enough aircraft to make aircraft carriers viable and relevant to 4th generation wars.

The First Air Battle Decides the War?

On the Road to Abilene...

Its apparent in the U.S. military that at the rank of Major, the staff officer loses contact with reality and buys into the corporate mythology (lies) if he wants to advance. The key cut-off point in the U.S. Army is Command & General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth (the school, not the prison--though many students could use incarceration). One of the colorful sayings students there have created is "we are on the road to Abilene" when they are clearly on a ride of corporate fantasy. A long journey on a hot, dusty trail that in the end leaves you in a dirty, beaten down town (no pot of gold at end of rainbow).

The U.S. DoD/military is clearly dead set on taking several fatal rides to "Abilene" where it may be "Boot Hill" as their final destination. One of these is the implosion of manned fighter aircraft by death spiral. Future war pundits will say, "Good! about time the fighter jock egomaniacs got what's coming to them" and that "we are now fighting sub-national wars where who needs fighter jets?". The problem is that if you are a nation-state and you control the skies, you can put even the best ground nation-state Army out of business and force it into hiding like we did to the VC/NVA for a decade. We will not have a decade and we may not have 10 months...we may not even have 10 DAYS to decide an issue, we may have just 10 HOURS. He who wins the first air battle may win the war. The reason is that we do not know whose Air Force is going to dominate; whose is full of Brewster Buffalos and who's got the Jap Zeros...who figured out the future pattern of war best?

The Journey Stops at Boot Hill...

Its our belief that Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles are now at the point of near hit certainty after lock-on, there's nothing for the pilot to do but evade, drop countermeasures then eject before being incinerated. Using the western analogy, the side that "draws" first, wins. The U.S. Air and Naval Forces are in deep trouble because the number of "bullets" in their "6-shooters" is dwindling due to military stupidity and corporate greed resulting in us having less and less shooting aircraft.

USAF

224 x F-15s 1, 000+ F-16s 335 x A-10s

USN/Mc

No F-14s, No A-6s, No A-7s, No A-4s 1, 000+ x F-18s 200 x AV-8Bs

Nation-State War "Doomsday" Scenario

If regional power, the Red Chinese (CHICOMs) invade Taiwan, they can put up into the sky 1, 000 day fighters with AAMs. The USAF will be thousands of miles away and out of the fight even with air refueling. This means initially 2 aircraft carrier battle groups of the Navy/Mc with 124 x F-18s each with 4 x AMRAAM BVR missiles and 4 visual range (VR) Sidewinder missiles. If the F-18s close with the "alien" CHICOM force they will be able to at best kill only 50% of them before having to make a hard choice--continue ahead and get into short-range dogfights where the enemy SU-30 fighter clearly has the advantage to get lock-on by its superior maneuverability and helmet aimed sighting and POSSIBLY finishing off the CHICOMs or POSSIBLY getting themselves all shot down and leaving their carriers undefended and certain to be sunk. If the CHICOMs have a reserve of fighters they hold back and wait for the U.S. F-18s to show their intention ("hand" in poker) they could finish off the F-18s as they turn back low on fuel/armament and/or follow them back to their carriers to sink them. If we lose this air battle, we will not likely insert any ground forces to defend the island and Taiwan will be lost.

Notice, we didn't even talk about what the CHICOM diesel-electric submarines, surface ships, sea mines etc. are going to do to harm our carrier battle groups, too.

The F-35 Radar Stealth Salvation: is it there or not?

The bottom line is will the F-35 JSF be radar invisible so it cannot be taken out in a volley of BVR missiles?

Yes or no?

If no, then we certainly do not need its reduced numbers due to its excessive costs reducing the number of "shots" we have to get our first licks in.

Will the F-35A/C JSF out-maneuver a SU-30, yes or no?

Would a F-35B STOVL with thrust vectoring be able to out dogfight a SU-30?

Obviously, we do not know the answers to these questions but if they are indeed no and no then we should cancel the F-35 pronto and get a radar stealthy superior dogfighter forgetting all the V/TOL stuff (we don't have the time) on a P-51 style crash course basis (Mark Ash's "clean slate" proposals).

Avoiding an Air Debacle

Could the SeaHog be a latter-day version of the F-6D-1 "Missileer"?

If we had a leading edge of fighters that are truly radar un-targetable "F-Invisibles" by the other side, we could indeed get the first volley in. However, we will not have enough of these F-Invisibles even if frugal Burt Rutan created and produced them at $30M each. We need more BVR missiles than can be carried internally to preserve stealth...we need an "Archer" force to rain BVR missiles that is called in after the enemy's leaders are taken out by the F-Invisibles. The "Attack-Archers" or A-Archers would carry under their wings a massive amount of BVR AMRAAMs to cover the F-Invisibles as they withdraw. We propose that we create a 2-seat navalized OA-10B Warthog (SeaHog) whose 60 foot (but now foldable) wings would carry 12 x AMRAAM BVR missiles with the rear seat crewman directing them using a simple search radar. Sort of like the proposed "Missileer" concept to get lots of AIM-10 Eagle (antecessors to the Phoenix) BVR AAMs into the air from the 1960s before the F-14 Tomcat was created. We take every A-10 we own out of the boneyard and make them into SeaHogs to be the "low" end of the current everything mediocre F-18 non-mix and a future F-35 JSF or F-Invisible "high" end mix. .

While we slink our way to Abilene, each year NAVAIR loses a squadron of 12 x F-18s to combat and accidents at $56M each. If we don't keep building F-18s at a low rate in 5 years an entire aircraft carrier would have no planes to fly. In an all-out war with Red China, we could lose half a carrier's F-18s every 24 hours. If we commit two carriers, after 3 days they would have to withdraw because they'd have not enough airplanes to defend themselves--if they are not sunk before that. If we surge 6 carrier battle groups, we could lose 25% of the entire F-18 force if we win the war and 50% of it if we lose the war. We'd have 6 aircraft carriers with no aircraft at best and 6 aircraft carriers sunk and 30, 000 men dead at worst. This is why we must have a "low" end, affordable, IN PRODUCTION (100 aircraft a year) non-stealthy, SLOW attack plane to do the ASW, ASUW, MAS/CAS and A-Archer missions that the mediocre "high" end F-18 cannot do or is too expensive to keep flying in adequate numbers to do everything required.

Defense writer Joe Katzman observes:

An Aside: While my research over the last couple years has flipped me into being a supporter of the F-22, I have also changed my views re: the F-35 JSF, and become a harsh skeptic but a despairing one. Despairing, because the Navy has few alternatives and a 9-nation program is orders of magnitude more difficult to cancel due to diplomatic and industrial fallout.

Meanwhile, I tend to agree with Super Hornet characterizations as "The Brewster Buffalo of its era" if put up against the increasingly common SU-30 family over the next couple of decades. Worse, I'm not sure that the F-35 does a whole lot better in that matchup.

I've seen some thought-provoking ideas here, but nothing yet that really seems like a viable way out of the conundra. I'm going to try to state them, in hopes of provoking a fruitful discussion:

[1] The F-18 E/F Super Hornet can't compete with the SU-30 family in the air, and the reasons are too fundamental to its design to be changed. It's also a non-starter as a primary opponent to air defense systems using SA-15s, S-300s, and other advanced SAM/radar combinations, unless the U.S. puts the responsibility more or less entirely on air-launched, medium range missiles like SLAM-ER or JASSM and invests in new models for anti-radar work. Adding EA-18Gs to the mix evens the odds somewhat in both scenarios. Enough? I don't know. Suspect not.

This means the F-35 can't be a "low end" complement to the F-22A, but is being pushed toward a "high end" platform by BOTH the US Navy AND allies who will buy the F-35 as their only aircraft. F-22A/ F-35 JSF are therefore evolving into a "high/high" combination, not a "high/low" one.

To go with a "low" option, an answer to the "high" problem of the SU-30s must be found OR the goal of competitiveness in this area for naval aviation must be abandoned, and another solution must be found for high-end SAM systems.

[1a] I'm not sure the F-35 will be a whole lot better against SU-30 family planes than the F-18, for a variety of reasons (rear visibility questionable, stealth questionable with recent downgrades, range questionable, maneuverability and ability to change state quickly unknown to me but unlikely to be canard equivalent, no thrust vectoring).

[1b] I've come to the conclusion that the F-35 won't really work as an F-22 replacement on the high end. Stealth is sub-par, range is sub-par for Pacific theater needs, lack of supercruise means much less time over target at range and shorter AAM reach, inlet design means adding supercruise later not an option without a whole stealth redesign, no thrust vectoring, cockpit visibility not outstanding, no gun in F-35B and F-35C models, etc.

[2] The USA has 6 Tarawa Class LHAs, 8 Wasp Class LHDs, and more LHA-Rs coming. Each is effectively a $1.5 billion investment given replacement costs. Planes or plane equivalents that can operate from these ships are a non-negotiable requirement, and producing more Harriers isn't really in the cards.

(The modified "Singaporean A-4SU Super Skyhawk" solution with the F404 engine was primarily interesting on these grounds as a low-end but compatible solution - but you'd have to either cut all long-range air-air missile capability or make a lot of airframe changes, and the wiring/electronics would need to be designed from scratch, etc... by the time you're all done I wonder if you're looking at another several-year development cycle and $40 million sub-par airplane. As for converting existing airframes, there are major safety and fatigue modeling issues that would make it a problem verging on non-starter. Take a close look at efforts by countries like Canada to implement these kinds of "conversion/bargains" in various areas. This whole model has a very unencouraging history.)

[3] Pulling out of a multinational program with 9 partners would be incredibly painful, and so won't be done except under the greatest duress. Corollary conclusion: it probably takes a huge operational failure that's so glaring it can't be covered up (and consider that all foreign allies in the program will have even MORE vested interest in spinning any bad results).

[4] The US Air Force continues to shrink, as it has since about the 1950s for reasons ably detailed by Spinney. That shrinkage may now be reaching the dangerous/critical level among fighters.

[4a] For 80+% of the USA's military needs in combat theaters, even an F-16 is overkill. For the other 20%, it's unlikely that even an F-35 will do throughout the next 20 years. How to solve #4, deal with this reality, and yet address the issues in #1 and #2 for the Navy is not obvious to me at this point. Without an answer, the barrier in #3 goes from extremely difficult to insuperable.

* My personal sense is that an O/A-10 E/F "Seahog" (or resurrected and navalized A-9, which the SU-25 Frogfoot strongly resembles) is part of the solution.

* Compound attack helicopters might have a role to play answering issue #2, but we're now at a point where development schedule & timelines could be a problem.

* Do not yet see good answers to #1 and #4. One potential answer I'm beginning to see given is that fighters are now overrated in many day-day roles due to range and loiter issues, and perhaps the answer is more bombers and fewer fighters outside of true air superiority and close air support roles. Not sure what I think of this - it has some rationale to it, but would really accelerate the numbers collapse unless we came up with something quite clever. If this answer is rejected, the question comes back to "What would a true high/low force model involving the F-22 at the high end and adequate overall numbers look like? And what does the Navy do?"

[As far as Iran goes], if the US faces Sparrow clones, it wins. The AIM-7 Sparrow was not a good missile. Don't have data on whether the Iranians own R-77 "AMRAAMskis," or indeed whether their MiG-29 fleet's radars are fully compatible (earlier versions are not, apparently). Short-range, you'd be facing a bunch of Chinese AIM-9L equivalents, plus some AA-11/R-73s which are excellent missiles. (Testing them on East German MiG-29s is what pulled the Germans out of ASRAAM, because they saw the AA-11's design as better in some very fundamental ways. They went on to develop the multinational IRIS-T).

Iran has also adapted some F-14s to carry modified Hawk SAMs (effectiveness uncertain) - and there's data that suggests it has kept some of its Phoenix missiles operational. Official US sources were writing the F-14s and Phoenix off in the Iran-Iraq war, but credible research suggests that this was not true and the F-14/Phoenix combination was very effective.

See this DID article.

www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/03/chesire-tomcats-the-f14-fades-into-us-naval-history/index.php

Flip side note... if Cooper & Bishop's research on Iranian F-14 performance is correct, the implications for the F-22A Raptor debate are very large indeed. The Iranian case clearly showed a lot of military utility in small numbers of air dominance fighters that could kill before you knew they were there. Stealth + Supercruise + very advanced passive EM detectors gets the F-22 that ability, and the more I thought about this research the more it shook my views re: the F-22. So Iran's F-14 experience is actually worth close and careful study for many reasons.

Final thing to remember about Iran is that it has TWO air forces. The regular air force, and the Revolutionary Guard air force. They have separate equipment, support, and command structures. Suffice to say that coordination is going to be poor and subversion opportunities large, as the Iranians have even more reasons that the usual 3rd world air force template to distrust its regular pilots.

STEPS TO SUCCESS:

1. Begin with the MAS-WG OA-10B Proposal for the USAF

What we really need is to take some of those 188 x A-10s sitting in mothballs at Davis-Monthan AFB, upgrade with bigger engines, a second seat for an observer and fly several squadrons off the decks of our carriers. OA-10B Air Commandos:

www.combatreform.com/aircommandos.htm

2. Carlton Meyer's A-10 "Sea Hogs"

Carlton Meyer's article: www.g2mil.com/Carriers.htm

There has been some discussion as to whether aircraft carriers are obsolete or far too costly. Cruise missiles fired from bombers, destroyers, cruisers or submarines can strike targets at a far lower total cost. Political leaders now ask if the USA afford 12 "supercarriers", in addition to 13 LHD/LHA "helicopter carriers" which also operate Harrier fighter-attack aircraft, are larger than American World War II carriers, or any foreign aircraft carriers today.

Does the USA need 25 aircraft carriers?

The biggest problem is that new carrier aircraft cost twice as much as those they replace, even after adjusting for inflation. The Navy maintains 10 Carrier Air Wings (CAWs), two fewer since one carrier is always undergoing an extensive multi-year overhaul, and another was deleted a few years ago due to a lack of aircraft. A shortage of aircraft has resulted in the number of fighter-attack aircraft deployed with each CAW to fall from 50 during the 1990s to around 36, typically with 26 x F/A-18Cs and 10 x F-14s. Even with planned budget increases, the Navy cannot afford to fill each carrier deck with its goal of 48 fighter-attack aircraft, giving rise to speculation that two carriers will be trimmed from the fleet. However, the Navy can retain all its carriers if it takes three steps to save billions of dollars while improving the value of CAWs.

#1 Assign a marine corps squadron to each CAW

While the cost effectiveness of carrier strike missions is debated, their value to attack moving targets and provide close air support is unquestioned. Marine corps pilots are specifically trained at close air support and can provide the staff of CAWs with valuable insight and skills. The marine corps has 21 active-duty fighter-attack squadrons, eight F/A-18C and six F/A-18D (two seat) squadrons with 10 aircraft each; and seven AV-8B squadrons with 16 aircraft each. The AV-8B "Harrier" aircraft deploy and support forward deployed marine units from the smaller LHD/LHA carriers.

However, the F/A-18 squadrons have no real peacetime role. They continue Cold War deployments to Iwakuni, Japan, where one squadron is permanently based and two others are maintained through six-month rotations. There is no need for marine squadrons to continue these costly deployments to a region which has overwhelming US and allied airpower. Several years ago, the Navy lacked aircraft to fill out its CAWs, so the marine corps agreed to assign four F/A-18 squadrons. This has worked well over the past decade and should be expanded to cover the growing shortage of Navy carrier jets.

The marine corps should assign 10 F/A-18 squadrons to the 10 CAWs, to allow the Navy to return a CAW to service and reduce op-tempo. This would still leave three marine squadrons for other missions, which could be permanently based at Iwakuni if Generals insist. If a major war occurred, the marines have seven AV-8B squadrons, three F/A-18A squadrons in the reserves, and Navy reserve squadrons could relieve some carrier-based marine squadrons to transition ashore. It makes no sense to deploy multi-billion dollar carriers overseas without a full complement of aircraft while carrier-trained marine corps squadrons sit back home or in peaceful Japan. If this upsets some marine generals, then perhaps these aircraft and their manpower funding should be shifted to the Navy. However, if marines are serious about being "First-to-Fight", they should eagerly accept the idea of using Navy aircraft carriers to forward-deploy.

#2 Cancel the F-35C Navy JSF-Carrier version

There is no need for a Navy "catapult" carrier version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which requires a larger wing, strengthened fuselage, catapult attachment points, improved landing gear, and other modifications. This will cost an additional billion dollars to finish development and testing. Since the Navy plans to buy just 300 JSF aircraft, it should simply buy the (Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing) STOVL version, of which 642 are planned for the Marine Corps and 60 for the Royal Navy, with possible sales to Italy, Spain, and even the US Air Force.

Including one STOVL JSF squadron in each CAW would add new capabilities. Carrier operations during adverse weather are very difficult, and almost impossible with ice. STOVL JSF aircraft can operate safely in any conditions. Although the prospect that Navy ships may suffer combat damage seems remote today, STOVL JSF aircraft could operate from a damaged carrier deck. During the 1991 Persian Gulf war, 20 x marine STOVL Harriers operating from the USS Nassau proved that an aircraft carrier can launch a STOVL squadron four times faster than one requiring catapults, which is very important when reacting to threats near shore.

Navy STOVL JSF could also operate from smaller LHD/LHA carriers if necessary, which may become vital if the number of super-carriers decline. STOVL JSF aircraft could be attached to almost any Navy ship for a variety of missions. Finally, STOVL aircraft can make emergency landings on any ship or flat surface, an important advantage during chaotic combat operations STOVL JSF aircraft can provide aircraft carriers with unique capabilities to complement those of the F/A-18s. Ironically, a truly "joint" STOVL variant of the JSF would save almost a billion dollars in development and simplify training and maintenance for the Navy/Marine team.

Most carrier pilots will oppose a STOVL JSF because they are too easy to operate from carriers, which is hard to understand, but true. The Navy carrier-version is planned to carry 4,000lbs more payload, but this does not outweigh the advantages of the STOVL version. Imagine a pair of STOVL fighters detached to a cruiser to greatly expand the fleet air defense perimeter.Imagine STOVL fighters landing on destroyers to refuel, or sitting on their decks on alert rather than clogging a carrier's busy flight deck. Navy STOVL is so logical that even retired Admiral Bill Owens of SAIC has advocated the idea.

#3 Acquire 149 surplus A-10s for the marines

For many years, the marine corps has debated the need for a dedicated attack aircraft like the Air Force A-10. The A-10 "Thunderbolt II" aircraft was specifically developed as a close air support aircraft with reliability and maintainability as major design considerations. The Air Force Requirement documents emphasized payload, low altitude flying capability, range and loiter capability, low speed maneuverability and weapons delivery accuracy. About 30% of A-10s are modified as OA-10s forward air controllers, which use the A-10s longer loiter capabilities to orchestrate air strikes.

The A-10/OA-10 have excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude, and are highly accurate weapons-delivery platforms. They can loiter near battle areas for extended periods of time and operate under 1000-foot ceilings with 1.5-mile visibility. Thunderbolt IIs have Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS), compatible single-seat cockpits forward of their wings and a large bubble canopy which provides pilots all-around vision. The Thunderbolt II's 30mm GAU-8/A Gatling gun can fire 3,900 rounds a minute and can defeat an array of ground targets to include tanks. Other equipment includes an inertial navigation system, electronic countermeasures, target penetration aids, self-protection systems, and AGM-65 Maverick [ASM] and AIM-9 Sidewinder [AAM] missiles.

Specific survivability features include titanium armor plated cockpit, redundant flight control system, separated fuel tanks, two rear mounted engines, manual reversion mode for flight controls, foam filled fuel tanks, ballistic foam void fillers, and a redundant primary structure providing a get home capability after being hit during dangerous close air support missions. The aircraft can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles up to 23mm. Their redundant hydraulic flight-control systems are backed up by manual systems to permit pilots to fly and land when hydraulic power is lost.

The Air Force currently has 368 x A-10s and OA-10s in active and reserve squadrons, and 149 in storage. The marine corps should modernize these surplus A-10s to replace their aging F/A-18s starting in 2006. The surplus A-10s in storage can begin overhauls in 2004, perhaps earlier if the Navy needs some marine F/A-18Cs to fill its squadrons until more F/A-18Es arrive. This will provide 8 x A-10 and 4 x OA-10 Thunderbolts for each of 10 marine attack squadrons (120 aircraft plus 39 for pilot training and spares).

Modifications for a marine corps A-10 "Sea Hog" should only require folding wings, a tail hook, and a catapult attachment point. The Air Force is currently upgrading its fleet of A-10s with better electronics and targeting equipment, so there would be no development costs as the marines simply join in the Air Force program. The A-10 uses the same TF34-GE turbofan non-afterburning engine as the Navy S-3 Viking carrier aircraft [were] now used primarily as refuelers This Navy supported engine produces less noise and heat, which is advantageous for an attack aircraft. The A-10s straight wings allow slower flight, making them ideal for carrier operations. The heavily armored A-10 was built to operate from primitive airfields, so it already has strengthened landing gear.

These "Sea Hogs" should cost only around $20 million dollars to overhaul and modernize, compared to around $80 million for each new JSF-STOVL. The Corps would still need 300 JSF-STOVL to replace its AV-8B Harriers and the other three active and three reserve F/A-18 squadrons, unless more A-10s are absorbed as the Air Force begins to retire more A-10s in 2018. A squadron of marine corps A-10 "Sea Hogs" can provide each Navy CAW with new Capabilities to engage ground forces with a custom built attack aircraft, while saving almost $2 billion in future procurement costs.

Realistic CAW Options

Each CAWs now deploys short a dozen fighter-attack aircraft, and one CAW was already disbanded. Even with planned budget increases, aircraft carriers will go to sea with fewer aircraft each year. Political leaders must force Admirals to accept realistic options.

Navy Carrier Air Wing Options for Fighter-Attack Aircraft

Current  CAW	+ 10 Marine sq	Current Goal	Realistic Goal
26 F/A-18*	24 F/A-18C	24 F/A-18E	12 F/A-18E
10 F-14A/D	10 F-14A/D	12 F/A-18F	12 F/A-18F
	12 F/A-18	12 JSF-Carrier	12 JSF-STOVL
			12 A-10s

* 4 of 10 CAWs include a marine F/A-18 squadron with 12-aircraft

These three proposals can save the U.S. Navy billions of dollars over the next decades. It would allow the overall production goal for the F/A-18E to be cut in half. However, all the services have an urgent need for a new electronic jammer to replace the aging EA-6B. The obvious solution is a two-seat F/A-18G "Growler", which would offset some cuts to the F/A-18E program. The JSF-carrier version would be cut outright, while the JSF-STOVL remains unchanged as 300 go to the Navy and 300 to the marines, while the marines modernize and upgrade 149 A-10s. The future of carrier aviation and carriers themselves is fuzzy, unless the Navy-marine team combines to save money while improving the value of CAWs.

Carlton Meyer
editor@G2mil.com

Here an article from years ago from a Naval aviator warned of the coming implosion of Naval air...his warning were ignored and Naval aviation is dying...too bad the taxpayers are in a "Patriotic Correct" la-la land where one day they will wake up and realize they have no defense from enemy attack because narcissist lifers turned the military into ego clubs for boys.

www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles00/prorowe.htm

Saving Naval Aviation

By Lieutenant Commander Steve Rowe, U.S. Naval Reserve

Proceedings, September 2000

The Navy has unbalanced the carrier air group's support and force-protection capabilities in favor of decks jammed with strike aircraft, essentially duplicating the Air Force's role. If naval aviation is to survive, it must be able to perform unique missions with forces based entirely at sea.

Ask any naval aviator or naval flight officer (NFO) why the Navy bases its tactical aviation at sea, and he will tell you that Navy air is a vital and unique national capability. He will say that only carrier-based aviation can provide powerful combat power without the need for overseas airfields, basing rights, and overflight permissions, and regardless of the sensibilities of other nations. Navy aircrew will say that every aircraft carrier is little piece of sovereign U.S. territory from which the United States can defend its vital interests--with allies if desired; alone if required. Until very recently, the Navy pilot or NFO would have been right.

During my 12 years as a naval flight officer, I took great pride in the unique contribution of naval aviation. Navy air was the nation's enabling air arm. This unique capability arguably is no longer credible today, and will almost certainly become a paper tiger in the near future. Why? Because the leaders of naval aviation and the Navy as a whole have forgotten what the Navy is about. In the mad rush for dollars in an underfunded military, the leaders have neglected our core competencies, and grossly unbalanced support and force-protection capabilities to favor strike aircraft. The capabilities Navy air has retained are the same ones provided by Air Force tactical aircraft, and, to an extent, Army aviation and long-range artillery and missile forces. The capabilities the Navy has chosen to discard are those for which we alone are responsible. The once powerful enabling capability of naval aviation has become little more than a copy of an Air Force fighter wing. Today, like its Air Force counterpart, the carrier air wing (CVW) can no longer operate effectively without shore-based support.

The shift toward a littoral, land-attack focus was an appropriate response to the demise of the Cold War's open-ocean naval threat. In the rush to capture limited defense dollars by cashing in on power-projection funding, however, the Navy has effectively eliminated the battle group's ability to operate in a contested littoral without land-based support. This situation will become worse in the next decade, as current budget plans are followed and littoral area-denial threats continue to grow.

Consider the capabilities that today's carrier air wing struggles to bring into a littoral fight:

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). Littoral submarine threats are becoming Stronger, and advanced automated systems are eliminating the Third World submariner's traditional weaknesses--lack of training and the need to expose a periscope to attack. The failure to respond to these trends applies to Navy aviation and to the Navy as a whole. Despite the fact that the problem is more difficult and the threat is becoming more dangerous, layered battle-group ASW capability is gone.

The S-3B Viking was the battle group's only air-ASW search platform, and it is being eliminated. In addition to a solid acoustic capability, the Viking had naval aviation's best non-acoustic sensor suite, and it was the only platform with the dash speed to investigate rapidly a contact more than a few miles away. Today, all acoustic ASW capability has been stripped from the S-3 community, and the aircraft will be decommissioned by 2008.1

In addition, the number of ASW-capable aircraft in carrier-based H-60 Seahawk squadrons has been cut in half. The special operations-configured HH-60 may be better suited for plane guard, passenger transfer, and other logistics functions, but it cannot prosecute a fleeting radar contact or flaming datum. Having an ASW-capable helo ready when needed will be a challenge in the face of other mission requirements, maintenance priorities, and flight-deck-spotting considerations.

Its aging avionics and airframe and vulnerability to littoral threats can justify retiring the S-3. But it is inexcusable that no replacement has been planned or even seriously considered. The common support aircraft (CSA), in theory the S-3's replacement, never has been more than a Power Point slide.2 Even if a new aircraft were made a priority today, it probably would not be operational in less than 10-15 years.

To make matters worse, the P-3 Orion maritime patrol (VP) community, which is supposed to assume the Navy's air-ASW mission, has been cut dramatically. The Orion is even more vulnerable than the Viking to littoral air and missile threats, and antisubmarine training and readiness have suffered because the Navy's emphasis has been on other missions. Many VP aircrews will admit freely that they have lost perishable ASW proficiency. Finally, even though the P-3 has long legs, the aircraft is slow and must be based near areas of operation to keep pace with dynamic situations.

Furthermore, the P-3 is an aging airframe that will need replacement in the near future. Despite increasing corrosion and fatigue problems that threaten the airworthiness of the Orion, the Navy simultaneously is postponing a replacement and cutting a service-life-extension program that would push the aircraft's service life to almost 40 years.3 The Navy is taking the same dead-end approach to the P-3s as it did with the S-3, despite the fact that studies have shown that building a new aircraft is the most cost-effective option.

The result of these programmatic decisions is that naval aviation will have almost no sea-based capability at a time when advanced submarine sensors, and fire-control and weapons technology will become widespread. The automation inherent in new submarine systems means that Third World submariners soon will be able to get off a good shot without extensive training or the need for a close approach. Battle-group capabilities for air-ASW search, mid- and long-range attack, and possibly the close-in reactive capability needed to exploit the typically fleeting and unexpected submarine contact, are rapidly disappearing. Meanwhile, land-based ASW aircraft will continue to be affected by diplomatic constraints and by survivability, numbers, training, and aircraft condition limitations. If land bases are not available, the situation becomes worse; if they are available, one must wonder why carrier aviation is needed.

Antisurface Warfare (ASUW). These programmatic decisions also will degrade the battle group's ASUW capability. The S-3B also was the battle group's best organic ASUW platform and remains the only CVW asset with an imaging radar. The Viking's endurance and multi-sensor suite made it the platform of choice to locate priority surface t