M113 Gavins to the Rescue: Afghan Army Unit Better Equipped and More Capable than Americans getting Blown up in Humvee Trucks

www.defendamerica.mil/articles/apr2005/a042805la2.html

Members of the South Carolina Army National Guard's 218th Infantry Regiment pose next to an M113A2 Gavin with some of the Afghan National Army Soldiers they trained. From left are 1st Sgt. Bobby Duggins of Charleston, Sgt. 1st Class Michael Rector of Union, and Maj. Greg Cornell of Columbia. They are part of a group of embedded training team advisors from Task Force Phoenix assigned to train the Afghan National Army's mechanized kandak. Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Mack Davis

Afghan Army Gets Armored Personnel Carriers

South Carolina National Guard troops are tasked to train Afghan Soldiers to operate and maintain the new vehicles.

By U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Mack Davis
Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan Public Affairs

KABUL, Afghanistan, April 28, 2005 - The Afghan National Army is getting a new look over the next few months. As a result of a recent equipment donation, they will appear a little less Soviet and a little more like their Coalition partners.

The Afghan National Army recently took delivery of 10 M113A2 Gavin armored personnel carriers from the United States at Camp Pol-e-Charkhi, on the outskirts of Kabul. This was the first shipment of vehicles with more to follow. Lt. Col. David Braxton, logistics operations chief at the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, said, "Based on the force structure designed for Afghanistan's internal threat, armored personnel carriers were identified as a requirement for the Afghanistan National Army.

The U.S. M113A2s are an excess defense article, which allows them to be donated. Given the performance and popularity of the M113s around the world, it is an excellent match for the (Afghan National Army's) (armored personnel carrier) requirement."

"The (Afghan National Army) Soldiers in the mechanized 2nd Kandak that we have been working with are just ingenious; they have the ability to take any mission and figure out a way to accomplish it. They have done phenomenal things with minimum resources," U.S. Army Maj. Greg Cornell

The M113s already have a home. They will become part of the 2nd Kandak (Battalion) Mechanized Infantry, in the 201st Corps' 3rd Brigade, located in Kabul.

The 218^th Infantry Regiment of the South Carolina Army National Guard, part of Task Force Phoenix, has been tasked with training the Afghan National Army to operate and maintain the new vehicles.

According to 1st Sgt. Bobby Duggins, one of the kandak's embedded training team advisors, "The (Afghan National Army) Soldiers are totally excited about receiving this vehicle. The M113 is a new vehicle for them and there is always a level of excitement when you introduce something new."

"Because this (armored personnel carrier) is so versatile, it can be used in many ways," added Duggins. While the Afghan National Army will use the armored personnel carriers primarily to transport troops, Duggins added that the M113 "can also be used as a squad heavy weapon (to fire mortars), and it can be used by medical units and maintenance teams going into the battlefield." In addition to the 10 M113s that arrived recently, Braxton said, "We expect 45 M113s and 16 M577s (command vehicles) to begin arriving the second week in May. The remaining vehicles will be in country throughout the next month for a total of 63 M113s and 16 M577s."

Because the 2nd Kandak Mechanized team was previously fielded with another armored personnel carrier, the Soviet BMP-1, training on the M113 was a smooth transition.

Prior to the arrival of the U.S. M113s, the kandak Soldiers were trained by the International Security Assistance Force's Norwegian Battle Group using five modified M113s they deployed to Afghanistan earlier this year. According to Lt. Col. Jon Mangersnes, Norwegian Battle Group commander, "We conducted two weeks of practical training. This type of training cannot be conducted in a class room; you have to get hands on the vehicle."

The training covered the basic operation and maintenance of the M113, including how to start, steer and maneuver, and how to manipulate the operator switches. "It was a lot of fun for my guys," added Mangersnes. "The Afghan Soldiers were very receptive to the training and the younger soldiers are extremely proud to be in the Afghan Army."

Cranes are used to download an M113A2 armored personnel carrier from its transport vehicle at Camp Pol-e-Charkhi, Afghanistan, April 20, 2005. Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Army Lt. Col. Frederick Rice

South Carolina Army National Guardsman 1st Sgt. Bobby Duggins, the 2nd Kandak's embedded training team advisor, provides last-minute instruction to Afghan National Army Soldiers before they depart Camp Pol-e-Charkhi to drive their M113A2 armored personnel carriers to Kabul for a fresh painting. Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Army Capt. Mark Stachelski

This is not the first time the Norwegians have worked with the Afghan National Army. The battle group provides security in the Kabul area and often trains and works with the Afghan National Army.

Future training on the M113s will be provided to new Soldiers during basic training at the Kabul Military Training Center by U.S. and Coalition mobile training teams. The total donation, including repair parts, is estimated to be worth $10 million.

The U.S. is the only country providing the M113s, ensuring that all the M113 variants are the same so they will be less expensive to maintain. "To sustain the M113s here in country, the Afghan National Army's 3rd Brigade is receiving a one-year stock level of repair parts," said New Hampshire Army National Guardsman Chief Warrant Officer Gill Colon, the Task Force Phoenix logistics officer and embedded training team advisor to the 3rd Brigade. In order to support the M113s in Pol-e-Charkhi, several changes had to be made. "We have converted our warehouse to accommodate the (armored personnel carrier) spare parts and have converted some of the Quonset huts into maintenance bays," said Colon.

The maintenance for the M113 fleet will be conducted by Afghan National Army mechanics who will be trained by U.S. mobile training teams.

An Afghan National Army Soldier looks out from the driver's hatch of a recently donated M113A2 Gavin armored personnel carrier. Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Mack Davis The South Carolina Army National Guardsmen who normally train the 2nd Kandak will be leaving Afghanistan in a few months.

According to the unit's executive officer, Maj. Greg Cornell, "We want to get the (Afghan National Army) mechanized team at least to team-level proficiency on the M113 before we leave. A special range is being prepared so that we can work on maneuvers and team-level live-fire exercises."

Cornell added, "The range training will teach the (Afghan National Army) Soldiers to take two vehicles, placing one in an overwatch (security) position, and the other in a position so that the dismounts can flank the enemy and engage. We also want the (Afghan National Army) to be able to move and provide weapons fire."

Cornell said, "The (Afghan National Army) Soldiers in the mechanized 2nd Kandak that we have been working with are just ingenious; they have the ability to take any mission and figure out a way to accomplish it. They have done phenomenal things with minimum resources. As we (coalition partners) are able to provide more resources and support, there won't be much they will not be able to accomplish."

The Afghan people will get their first look at their army's newly painted M113s at the Afghan National Day Parade, scheduled for April 28 in Kabul.

Plain old "Gavin" M113 is ranked #1 by Top 10 IFV show

ATBs, ATVs & Dirt Bikes + Armored M113 Gavin Light Tank "Mother Ships"

A remarkable 1^st TSG (A) discovery is that not only can folded and unfolded all terrain bikes (ATBs) fit INSIDE M113 Gavin light tanks, so can motor dirt bikes and a 4x4 ATV. The idea came from pictures of the Australian Army during the Vietnam war placing 105mm light howitzers inside their M113 Gavins to effect greater cross-country mobility than trying to tow them on their wheels through the soft, muddy terrain there as well as concealing to the enemy what capabilities they were delivering.

www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww1/lt-horse/4-19-pow-lt-horse.htm

CAPTION: Bien Hoa, South Vietnam, 1965-08-18. Gunners of 161 Field Battery Royal New Zealand Artillery, manhandle a 105mm L5 pack howitzer into a M113 of 1 APC troop, Prince of Wales Light Horse, as the battery prepares to move to a temporary firing position six kilometres north of Bien Hoa airbase. The guns of 161 Fd Bty were carried to the firing site inside APC's to conceal the nature of the operation. This was the first occasion that the L5's of 161 Fd Bty were carried inside APC's. (donor H M. Lander)

Hunnicutt's book on American infantry fighting vehicles shows a jeep rolling off from inside a humongous M59 armored personnel carrier as well as photos of British General Percy Hobart's 79^th Armoured Division in WW2 transporting jeeps and Bren gun APCs inside LVT-4 Buffalo amtracks across rivers under enemy fire in WW2. This gave us the idea to experiment with an ATV and dirt bike with a M113 Gavin. This capability is not possible in Stryker (an ATV can't fit and they don't swim) or Pandur (an ATV can't fit) wheeled trucks. Removing the track commander's (TC) stand from inside the M113 frees up enough space for a 4x4 ATV like the new safe diesel-powered military model made by Polaris or 3 military dirt bikes--on top of the up to 10 x folding ATBs that can be carried on the outside in Cashwell airdrop bags.

The Gavin's armored hull and amphibious, tracked mobility then protects these scout vehicles from enemy fires and land mines (The Battle Against Man-TBAM) while conveying them over terrain and water they cannot traverse (The Battle Against The Earth-TBATE) to the desired area of operations.

Loading an 4x4 ATV into a M113 Gavin Light Tank

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After the ATV is inside, the TC can sit or stand on its front or rear (depending on how you load it) to operate the 360 degree spinning cupola with mount for a light, medium, heavy machine gun or autocannon like the ASP-30mm.

M113 Gavin + ASP-30mm Autocannon-in-action VIDEO

www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SPHgpLWPws

Dirt Bike Loading into a M113 Gavin Light Tank

LBI Electric AeroBike Scouts

A Canadian Csaba Lemak has created an electric-powered ram-air parachute to fly one man in winds up to 15 mph. Such devices could be easily carried inside or strapped outside in bags of M113 Gavins and LBI "AeroBike" Scouts could fly them to perform air recon just as unmanned UAVs could be operated. Powered parachutes and ultralights powered by gasoline fossil fuels are easily possible in conjunction with mother M113 Gavin tanks, but these fuel are dangerous and would have to be stored in 5 gallon cans. An excellent ATV that FLIES and could fit inside a M113 Gavin is the new Chimera air/ground vehicle!

www.atairaerospace.com

Key Features of the Chimera:

Air-droppable from a C-17, C-130, or other platform using an integrated parachute system

Ground-launchable using the largest elliptical paraglider ever constructed-100 ft wing span

Ducted fan propulsion

3-Cylinder, 110 Hp, liquid-cooled engine

Hybrid-electric drive

80 Peak Hp electric wheels motors

Max takeoff weight: 2200 lbs

Dry weight: 970 lbs

Ground speed: 60 mph

Air speed: 30 kts

The new Polaris ATV and dirt bikes powered by diesel/JP-8 can use the same fuel as the Gavin uses. If the ATB and/or the fan unit were ELECTRICAL motor driven then the Gavin could charge both their lithium-ion batteries when its engine is operating. Pedal/electric ATBs and powered paragliders (PPGs) would be silent and very mobile in both 2D/3D forms of movement to be able to spot the enemy first and develop the situation from there. If while flying the electric PPG, the pedal/electric ATB is underneath ready-to-ride, it becomes an air/ground vehicle system. Perhaps by integrating the electrical motor/fan and batteries INTO THE ATB, the Li-on batteries can power the fan unit in the air and a rear hub motor on the ground with the AeroScout's pedaling helping recharge the batteries whenever possible.

ultralightstore@ultralightnews.ca

What's a watt?

The watt (W) is a measure of power. Power is the ability to produce force at some speed or RPM. Although the more familiar unit of power used for engines is horsepower (hp), electric motors measure their power in watts.

Don't confuse torque with power. Torque is a force, like how much pressure you must exert to get a screw out. Power is twisting against some torque through some number of revolutions per minute.

746 watts is the same as one hp. Some interesting comparisons of watts:

• A human being climbing a flight of stairs is doing work at the rate of about 200 watts.

• A trained athlete can work at up to 900 watts for short periods.

• A car engine produces work at a rate of around 100,000 watts.

An incandescent light bulb uses 40 - 100 watts.

Assuming a sky-camouflage colored parachute, power unit and jumpsuit worn by the LBI Aeroscout....

a. Is it feasible eventually to generate enough electrical power to add a 30 pound pedal mountain bike to its payload?

b. Would it be then feasible to attach the electric rear fan unit to the rear of the mountain bike and have the motor that spins the prop to also spin the rear wheel without excessive weight?

c. If not, at least give the whole unit ground mobility by pedal power....

During a 1-hour flight at 25 mph can the LBI AeroScout pedal and generate with his 1/2 a horsepower meaningful recharging of the batteries to keep him aloft?

If not, how much pedaling on the ground ostensibly doing ground movement would it take to rejuvenate his batteries for flight?

Say his parachute was 20 feet wide and 5 feet wide for a total of 100 square feet, could meaningful battery charging take place during his 1 hour flight if solar photovoltaic cells covered the top of his parachute?

How long would it take to recharge his batteries if the parachute was laid on top of the ground and staked into position there?

How long would it take to recharge the AeroBike's batteries if it was strapped to the outside of a M113 Gavin light tracked AFV that had as it ran an AC converter?

Flying APCs: Making the M113 Gavin FLY--by ITSELF = Do-It-Yourself Air-Mech (DIY-AMS)

Russian KT-40 Flying Light Tank Glider

The technology already exists to make the "mother" ship M113 Gavins--a "Flying APC" aka troop-carrying, light tanks that fly--by attaching fixed-wings and a powerful prop or jet engine as legendary armored vehicle designer Walter Christie wanted to do in the 1930s with a TURRETLESS tank with hull-mounted 75mm cannon--a STUG before the Germans came up with it. The Russians flew a light tank with wings towed as a glider before WW2.

Christie's Flying Light Tank

To make the AeroGavin fly as a short take-off and landing (STOL) air/ground vehicle by parachute or fixed-wing means is just a matter of adequate funding to pay for the R&D. To make an AeroGavin take-off and land vertically would take more effort to create an autogyro system but is feasible if we have the courage and imagination to do so. AeroGavins with air/ground maneuver capabilities would fulfil British Brigadier Richard Simpkin's Race to the Swift dream as well as well as give General Gavin's KIWI concept wings--literally.

ARMOR HISTORY: IN THE MAKING, YOU ARE PART OF IT NOW

Rethink WW2 on the Ground: how did Germany hang on so long? What was their most successful tank? (Hint: it WASN'T the Panther or Tiger)

"The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see."

--Winston Churchill

"The tank advocates (especially Guderian) have always contended that a 'tank' (possessing turret armament traversable through 360 degrees) can be employed as a Sturmgeschutz but a Sturmgeschutz cannot fight as a tank. One only has to look at the kill ratios against tanks achieved by the low-profile Sturmgeschutz with the short-barreled gun to observe that those advocating the use of tanks for both purposes paid heavily for their preference"

--Hillary Doyle, Tom Jentz, Peter Sarson; STUG III: Assault Gun 1940-1942, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England 1999

The "usual suspects" are rounded up when the establishment group think pontificates on why the Germans lost WW2; they began with light tanks, gobbled up most of Europe, then bite off more than they could handle invading Russia, who introduced wide-tracked T34 medium tanks and then they couldn't make enough medium Panthers and heavy Tigers and were overwhelmed by allied numbers to include 55, 000 Sherman medium tanks blah, blah, blah. The question is how did Germany hang on so long?

The problem is that the common WW2 tank mythology its that its NOT fully true.

The truth is that the Germans over-ran Europe in LIGHT TANKS, and then HELD ON WITH LIGHT TANKS.

The MOST SUCCESSFUL GERMAN tank in WW2 was the TURRETLESS assault gun "Sturmgeschutze" or "STUG", a LIGHT TANK at 20 tons that was effective ALL THROUGH-OUT WW2 as both an infantry fire support tank and as a tank destroyer. The truth turret tankists don't understand that the late British combat historian Kenneth Macksey realized was if you do away with the weight/complexity inefficiency of the turret you can have a HEAVY TANK KILLING GUN and VERY HEAVY ARMOR on the front with a very low silhouette to not even be hit in the first place--and still have a very light tank for outstanding cross-country and air transport mobility. STUGs were the do-anything "M113s" of the German Army in WW2. 30, 000 Allied tanks were destroyed by 10, 000 STUGs. The question has to be asked; what would have happened had the Germans concentrated production on just STUGs to get say 50, 000 of them and stopped wasting time and resources on 5, 000 less mobile Panther/Tiger essentially heavy tanks? What if they had improved the STUG by widening its track width and providing better roof armor and a rapid-firing 20mm roof cannon to ward off our fighter-bombers? The Germans had their most success with mechanized infiltration, non-linear war tactics when they used LIGHT TANKS like the excellent Czech-built 35T and 38Ts which had excellent closed terrain mobility to surprise the Allies by going through "unpassable for tanks" terrain like the Ardennes forest.

The Amazing Czech-Built 10-ton 38T Light Tank: Could be flown by Me-321 glider or Me-323 STOL transport plane: even better as a turretless Hetzer STUG

38T Variants

STUG Assault Guns : "Hetzer" and "Marder III"

www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pk9HriWsQ2A

SP Anti-Aircraft Gun

The excellent 10-ton 38T chassis was also made into the superb Hetzer STUG with hull-mounted assault/tank destroyer gun. And contrary to popular myth, Guderian liked and wanted more STUGs over more turreted Mark IV light to medium weight tanks.

Another benefit of light tanks is simplified mobility engineering;

River Crossing: German Assault Pioneer Style

Part 1: Fascinating conceptual presentation using animation; engineers act as terrain cavalry for main body, More excellent outboard motor to push assault boats fast across the water to the far bank means less exposure to enemy fire than paddling as 82^nd Airborne had to to cross Waal to take Nijmegan bridge, minimalist ferry concept pushed by motor assault boat at least gets towed AT guns across, ferries become pontoon bridge

Part 2: pontoon bridge enables excellent Czech-built 38T light tanks and pioneers in motorcycle sidecars to cross, Dragon's teeth tank obstacles blown up, rubber boat to cross another small river where a girder bridge is projected across, minefield encoutered they launch some form of smokescreen shell to mask themselves as the bangalore torpedo some wire and mines to make a breach, smoke grenades used liberally, flamethrower and pole charge against a pillbox

The Germans had a "killer bee" mudfighter ON THE GROUND in WW2---it was the STUG. They also had a "stealth fighter" and M113 Gavin near-equivalent in the STUG and 38T chassis.

Turret Fixation Caused the Allies to be Creamed in WW2

The next question is why did we, the allies FAIL TO LEARN THE TRUE LESSON OF EUROPEAN GROUND WARFARE, which is to USE LIGHT TURRETLESS TANKS with maximum terrain mobility to support infantry in closed terrain and be air-transportable?

We knew from even in France in 1940 that the German 88m anti-aircraft gun was a formidable tank killer. We had guns like the British 76.2mm "17 pounder" and 90mm guns that could meet the RANGE and lethality of the German 88mms--so why didn't we place them in a TURRETLESS hull STUG clone and attain at least parity if not overmatch? All this whining about the high-silhouette Sherman tanks being out-gunned and not armored enough could have been solved by placing a gun equal or superior to the German 88mm in a thick frontal armor hull with low silhouette on a fast, light tank chassis with Walter Christie suspension. The problem was--and still is TURRET FIXATION by the Army's tank duelers who want to lazily swivel a turret instead of maneuvering their tank into ambush positions.

The M113 is a turretless STUG but without the big gun. Gavin realized this need for go-anywhere light tanks when he created the M113. Soldiers in Vietnam who attached 106mm recoilless rifles to their M113s in essence created STUGs. Today we got the M113 STUG chassis but still don't have the building/bunker/tank busting big guns for them. Why did we fail to understand and emulate the MOST SUCCESSFUL GERMAN TANK but instead proceeded to re-invent the German heavy breakthough tank? Is it because our hubris-filled narcissistic infantry hates to admit it needs mechanization at all? (YES). No comparable "Hobart's Funnies" in arrogant U.S. forces on D-Day and heavy casualties on Omaha Beach nearly cause the entire invasion to fail. Could it be that not only is our own lack of a progressive-thinking CAVALRY BRANCH the cause of our ignorance of the need for LIGHT TANKS for cavalry mobile recon and independent operations, but its our egomaniac infantrymen who don't realize they need assault fire support that even the uber-narcissistic Germans realized they needed on the initiative of Manstein in 1935? Combine this with a bunch of heavy tankers who only want to duel other tanks (tank destroyer and breakthrough tasks) in medium to heavy tanks that can only operate in open, firm open terrain (AKA "tank country") and we have a recipe for disaster replayed again and again at Kasserine Pass in 1943, Cisterna a little later, all throughout the rest of WW2 in Europe, Task Force Smith in Korea, in Vietnam when we decided to foot slog from helicopters, and now in Iraq/Afghanistan.

Americans had trouble fitting an adequate anti-tank killing gun in a turret during WW2? WHY DIDN'T WE EMULATE THE GERMANS AND PUT A 90mm GUN IN THE HULL IN A FIXED MOUNTING TO BE OUR TANK DESTROYERS? Why did MacNair insist on 360 degree revolving turrets with open tops, he couldn't see the STUG clearly in German newsreels and our own intel reports? How many Americans who died in high-profile tank destroyers with inadequate armor for such a visible turreted presence? Imagine how hard-to-hit a turretless 60 mph M18 Hellcat would be...

German Turretless Assault Guns "STUGs": inspiration for today's M113 Gavin Assault Guns

Actual Post-WW2 German Army STUG version of the M113 Gavin

Firepower: Turretless is better

During combat against sub-national groups the enemy will be mostly infantry or idiots in wheeled trucks so not having a turret and having a negative 10 degree or plus 20 degree elevation and 24 degrees of left/right traverse of your main gun is not a problem. On top machine guns or autocannon on a 360 degree swivel can provide close-range defense.

The STUG had the following firepower in WW2 that puts our current Army/marines to shame:

54 x 75mm shells
15 x smoke (more direct-fire projected smoke than we have today to thwart ATGMs and mask maneuvering infantry)
15 x armor-piercing
24 x high explosive

Smoke candles in rack on back deck could be released to lay a smoke screen for the unit

10, 000 STUGs destroyed 20-30, 000 allied tanks, a 3-to-1 raw input/output exchange ratio

Not having a turret to have a height under a man, making you extremely hard-to-hit using folds in the terrain, vegetation, camouflage with 24 degrees of instant gun traverse and the remaining 336 degrees of aiming after turning the vehicle to face the threat with heaviest armor protection is a greater advantage than having instant 360 degree gun firing traverse capability that offer the enemy a visible target far above the height of a man that can hit you instantly from all directions

The Germans were only able to make 5, 000 hard-to-produce, complicated turreted Tiger heavy tanks to 55, 000 American Sherman medium tanks, perhaps if they had instead produced 50, 000 simple STUGs with 75mm guns they'd have stopped the allied advance?

Turrets Stink

If there's no defilade, the "S" tank can make its own hull-down position with a dozer blade!

Swedish "S" Medium Tank Documentary: This will Convince if you are not already!

Turretless Benefit: Everyone is a Driver

In the S tank everyone is a driver to spell the main driver/gunner...the man facing the rear can immediately drive the tank in the opposite direction WITHOUT HAVING TO TURN!

The "S" tank can be operated by just 2 and even 1 man in a pinch...

We wonder how a turretless Swedish "S" medium tank with the same one-shot-one-kill fire control but heavier armor than a turreted heavy tank do against a M1 Abrams in open terrain moving directly at eachother, Kursk-style if terrain folds shield the turretless tank so the turreted one can't even hit them, but the turreted ones are easily hit within the limited 24 degree left/right traverse? 30 tons of the M1's weight is its huge turret with lots of dead air holding 3 dead men inside just asking to be popped by enemy ATGMs; would you want instead to use this weight for ACTUAL ARMOR to protect you or have a lower overall weight to at least get medium weight 12 PSI mobility?

And by being a MEDIUM tanks, the "S" tank can SWIM itself across lakes and rivers! Try doing that in a heavy tank! (you can't).

Turretless Amphibious Mobility

Mobility: good thing the Germans were handicapped with steel

STUGs could give infantry a ride on back or towed behind in a snow sled as required...

The STUG at 20 tons with 15 inch wide tracks had a lousy high ground pressure of 16 PSI---the same as our M1 Abrams heavy tanks of today. The reason is the STUG was made of very heavy steel and even with extreme minimalism by having no turret ended up weighing 20 tons. Track extensions were fitted that widened the tracks to 20 inches lowered ground pressure to 12 PSI or medium Bradley mobility levels. Still better closed terrain mobility than their Tiger heavy tanks!

In contrast, the M113 Gavin made out of aluminum alloy armor is roughly just as thick as the 2" thick STUG but weighs HALF the weight at 10 tons with room inside to carry a 9-man infantry squad with 15 inch wide tracks, has a 8 PSI ground pressure. All things being equal, reducing the M113 Gavin hull to just what's needed for a 4-man assault gun crew, even with an assault gun/ammo should reduce weight to 8 tons and get ground pressure down to 4-6 PSI, plus the Gavin SWIMS and if a reduced width Mini-Gavin flies inside CH-47 Chinook helicopters. Good thing the Germans didn't figure out aluminum alloy armor!

Protection: not being there is the best armor

The STUG was 2 inches thick on its front, protective up to early war 40mm guns only. So if everyone's guns could penetrate it, how did they not just survive, but THRIVE?

STUGs exploited the first battle against the earth---by hugging the ground human foes couldn't get line-of-sight to even hit them. If you can't hit you don't have any penetration effects.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StuG_III

Sturmgeschütz III

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

StuG III Ausf. G in Yad la-Shiryon museum, Israel.

Type: assault gun
Place of origin: Germany
Production history
Number built 10,500

Specifications

Weight 23.9 tonnes
Length 6.85 m
Width 2.95 m
Height 2.16 m
Crew 4

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Armor 16 - 80 mm

Primary armament 1x 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/48

54 rounds

Secondary armament

1x 7.92mm Medium Maschinengewehr 34
600 rounds

Engine Maybach HL120TRM V-12 gasoline engine
300 hp (224 kW)
Power/weight 13 hp/tonne
Suspension torsion bar

Operational range 155 km
Speed 40 km/h

The Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault gun was Germany's most produced armoured fighting vehicle during World War II. It was built on the chassis of the Panzer III tank. Initially intended as a mobile, armoured light gun for infantry support, the StuG was continually modified and was widely employed as a tank destroyer.

The Sturmgeschütz series is probably best known for its excellent price-to-performance ratio. By the end of the war, over 10,500 had been built.

Contents

1 History
2 Operational history
3 Variants
4 External links

History

The Sturmgeschütz III originated from an initial proposal that Colonel Erich von Manstein submitted to General Beck in 1935 in which he suggested that Sturmartillerie (Assault Artillery) units should be used in a direct-fire support role for infantry divisions. On June 15, 1936 Daimler-Benz AG received an order to develop an armoured infantry support vehicle capable of mounting a 75 mm (3 in) artillery piece. The gun was to have a limited traverse of a minimum of 25 degrees and be mounted in an enclosed superstructure that provided overhead protection for the crew. The height of the vehicle was not to exceed that of the average man.

Daimler-Benz AG used the chassis and running gear of its recently designed Panzerkampfwagen III light tank as a basis for the new vehicle. Prototype manufacture was passed over to Alkett, which produced five examples in 1937 of the experimental 0-series StuG based upon the PzKpfw III Ausf. B. These prototypes featured a mild steel superstructure and Krupp's short-barreled 75 mm Sturmkanone 37 L/24.

As the StuG III was intended to fill an anti-infantry close support combat role, early models were fitted with a low-velocity 75 mm StuK 37 L/24 gun, firing high explosive shells. After the Germans encountered the Soviet T-34, the StuG III were armed with the high-velocity 75 mm StuK 40 L/43 (Spring 1942) or 75 mm L/48 (Autumn 1942) anti-tank gun.

Later models of the StuG III had a 7.92mm MG34 mounted on the hull for added anti-infantry protection.

In 1944 the Finnish Army received 59 StuG III from Germany and used them against the Soviet Union. These destroyed at least 87 enemy tanks for a loss of only 8 StuG's (some of these were destroyed by the crew when they abandoned the vehicle to prevent capture). After the war they were main combat vehicles of the Finnish Army until early 1960s. These Sturms gained the nickname "Sturmi" which can be found in some plastic kit models.

Sturmgeschutz III's were also exported to other nations like Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Spain.

After the Second World War, the Soviet Union gave some of the captured German vehicles to Syria, which continued to use them at least until the Six Days War (1967).

Operational history

Probably the most successful engagement involving Sturmgeschütz III Ausf F took place in Stalingrad in early September of 1942. Stug III Ausf F from Stug.Abt.244, commanded by Oberwachtmeister Kurt Pfreundtner destroyed 9 Soviet tanks in 20 minutes. On September 18, 1942, Oberwachtmeister Kurt Pfreundtner received the Knight's Cross for this achievement.

From 1 to 4 January 1943, Unteroffizier Horst Naumann from Stug.Abt.184 destroyed 12 Soviet tanks during heavy fighting in the Demyansk area. On January 4, Naumann was awarded a Knight's Cross for destruction of a total of 27 enemy tanks.

The most notable Waffen SS Stug ace was Waffen SS Sturmbannführer Walter Kniep, who commanded the 2nd Sturmgeschütz Abteilung of 2nd Waffen SS Panzer Division "Das Reich". From July 5, 1943 to January 17, 1944, his unit claimed destruction of some 129 Soviet tanks, while losing two Stugs. Kniep was then awarded the Knight's Cross.

Overall, Sturmgeschütz series proved to be very successful and served on all fronts as assault guns and tank destroyers. Although Tigers and Panthers are more famous, assault guns killed many tanks. Because of their low silhouette, Sturmgeschütz III's were easy to camouflage and a difficult target. Most German assault guns carried a high-velocity 75mm gun by 1944. Sturmgeschütz crews were considered to be the elite of the artillery units. Sturmgeschütz units held a very impressive record of tank kills - some 20,000 enemy tanks by spring of 1944. As of April 10, 1945, there were 1,053 Stug IIIs and 277 StuH IIIs in service. Approximately 9,500 Sturmgeschütz IIIs of various types were produced until March of 1945 by Alkett and a small number by MIAG.

Variants

/wiki/Image:Stug3g.jpg/wiki/Image:Stug3g.jpg

Early version StuG III Ausf. G

/wiki/Image:StugIII_at_Kursk.jpg/wiki/Image:StugIII_at_Kursk.jpg

A 1944 model

StuG III Ausf. G. Note the Saukopf gun mantlet.

/wiki/Image:Sturmhaubitze-42.jpg/wiki/Image:Sturmhaubitze-42.jpg

Sturmhaubitze 42 at the Auto- und Technikmuseum Sinsheim, Germany.

StuG III Ausf. A (Sd.Kfz 142; 1940, 30 produced)

First used in the Battle of France, the StuG III Ausf. A used the chassis of the Panzer III Ausf. F and the 7.5 cm StuK 37 L/24 gun.

StuG III Ausf. B (Sd.Kfz 142; 1940-41, 320 produced)

Widened tracks and other minor changes.

StuG III Ausf. C (Sd.Kfz 142; 1941, 50 produced)

Minor improvements over the StuG B.

StuG III Ausf. D (Sd.Kfz 142; 1941, 150 produced)

Minor improvements over the StuG C.

StuG III Ausf. E (Sd.Kfz 142; 1941-42, 272 produced)

A MG 34 is added to protect the vehicle from enemy infantry. Other minor improvements.

StuG III Ausf. F (Sd.Kfz 142/1; 1942, 359 produced)

The first real upgunning of the StuG, this version uses the longer 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/43 gun. This change marked the StuG as being more of a tank destroyer than an infantry support vehicle. Side hull skirts were added to some F models for protection from Soviet anti-tank rifles; although these skirts were far more common on the later ausf G.

StuG III Ausf. F/8 (Sd.Kfz 142/1; 1942, 334 produced)

Another upgunning, the F/8 used 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/48 gun.

StuG III Ausf. G (Sd.Kfz 142/1; 1942-45, 7,893 produced)

The final, and by far the most common, of the StuG series. The G-series StuG used the hull of the Panzer III Ausf. M and after 1944 a second machine gun. Later versions were fitted with the Saukopf (Ger. pig's head) gun mantlet, which was more effective than the original box metal structure at deflecting shots. Side hull skirts were added to G models for added armour protection on their sides.

Other Stug III Based Vehicles

Some StuG III were also made from a Panzer III chassis but fitted the bogie suspension system of the Panzer IV tank. Only about 20 were manufactured. The intention was to simplify field repairs but this did not work out well and the model was cancelled.

In 1942, a variant of the StuG III F was designed with a 10.5 cm (105 mm) howitzer instead of the 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/43. These new vehicles, designated Sturmhaubitze 42 (or StuH 42, also known by its Wehrmacht designation Sd.Kfz 142/2) were designed to provide infantry support with the increased number of StuG III F/8 and Gs being used for anti-tank duties. The StuH 42 mounted a variant of the Model 1918 Light Field Howitzer, modified to be electrically fired and fitted with a muzzle brake. Later models were built from StuG III G chassis as well as StuG III F and F/8 chassis. The muzzle brake was often deleted as well because of the scarcity of resources.

In 1943, 10 StuG IIIs were converted to StuG I (FLAMM) configuration by replacing the main gun with a Schwade flamethrower. These chassis were all refurbished at the depot level and were a variety of Pre-Ausf. F models. There are no reports to indicate any of these were used in combat and all were returned to a Stug III G standard at depot level by 1944.

The Soviet SU-76i self-propelled gun was based on captured German StuG III and Panzer III vehicles. About 1,200 of these vehicles were converted for Red Army service by adding an enclosed superstructure and the ZiS-5 76.2 mm gun.

PART 1: 3:24, 5:17 German bicycle troops by STUGs, able to kill Russian turreted tanks despite inadequate original gun

German "killer bees" Air-Mech Cavalry TODAY: High-Performance Tankettes Like General Gavin's Ontos

German Army Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Mettler's "Airborne Anti-Tank Battalion", U.S. Army Infantry magazine, January-February 1995, pages 24-29

We can achieve the same "killer bees" effects by reducing the size of our own M113s into "Mini-Gavins"

Non-Linear Battlefields Require FULL armor protection: tracks are 28% more capable of armor protection--and can go cross-country to avoid ambushes in the first place!

General James M. Gavin as Army Chief of Research & Development created the Airborne Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family (AAM-PVF), the amazing M113 in the 1950s for maximum mobility over nuclear devastated, non-linear battlefields.

The official history of the U.S. Army for that time period says the following:

www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-26.htm

The seven divisions stationed in the United States constituted the strategic reserve. Four of these-two airborne and two infantry-were designated in 1957 the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and were maintained in a high state of readiness for quick deployment in event of an emergency. The other three were earmarked as STRAC reinforcements and as a training base for expansion of Army forces should the crisis become prolonged or develop into a full-scale war.

With the emphasis on mobility, even the larger and heavier weapons and equipment were designed to be air-transportable.

A program to produce ground and air vehicles with the necessary battlefield mobility led to the development of armored personnel carriers, such as the M113 with aluminum armor, that could move troops rapidly to the scene of operations while providing greater protection for the individual Soldier. Since

585

highways and bridges might be damaged or destroyed, dual-capability amphibious vehicles that could travel on rough terrain and swim across rivers and swamps freed the fighting units from total dependence upon roads.

What today's planners don't realize is that what was required for a nuclear battlefield is required today with PGMs in a Surveillance Strike System (SSC) that can be as equally devastating but in a more localized way: units ON TRACKS not wheels. We need GREATER PHYSICAL mobility, firepower, protection and livability features not less regardless if tied in to a "Mother May, I?" computer network to alleviate the anxieties of senior officials.

Thus, the M113's purpose was armored, amphibious cross country mobility for LIGHT, AIRBORNE units. In 1960, America's Airborne should have been the first ones to have "air-mech" capabilities organic but the ill-conceived ROAD reorganization plan reverted back to the paratroopers foot slogging and their armored tracks went to heavy units instead. Mass-produced and inexpensive, there was and still is enough M113s to supply BOTH light and heavy units. The old saying if you don't get it right, you spend the rest of your time trying to get it right comes to mind.

BMD-1 after parachute airdrop; note kneeling landing gear

BMD-2

BMD-3

Compare the U.S. Army in 2007 to the Russian Army of today...8 years after we revolutionized ground maneuver tactics with the M113 but sat on its potential, they created their own BMD and fielded one to every paratroop squad. They are already on their 4th Generation BMD and we are still trying to get "GEN I" M113 Gavins IN light units. What a disgrace to the memory of our great Airborne leaders, Gavin, Lee, Ridgway, Yarborough, Hackworth, Moore that we are not having American Light and especially Airborne forces---live up to their full potential.

U.S. Army TALKING about Light Units with M113 Gavin tracked armor (still after 4 decades of using them on & off)

U.S. Airborne/Light units would be lucky just to have M113 Gavins with machine guns, much less autocannon...this wasn't always the case...the 82nd Airborne actually had M551 Sheridans and M113 Gavin light tanks in the 3^rd Battalion, 73^rd Armor until 1997.

VIDEO: How the U.S. Army Airborne should Power Project by Parachute Airdrop

www.combatreform2.com/USARMYAIRBORNEpowerprojection.wmv

www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcSwXW49J_I

www.youtube.com/watch?v=50cpPAVoxJQ

www.youtube.com/watch?v=kEgBoROaD2g

LAPES = Low Altitude Parachute Extraction from 5-10 feet

LVAD = Low Velocity Air Drop from 600-1200 feet

Picture above of C-17 interior with a M551 Sheridan light tank and HMMWV truck rigged for low velocity airdrop shows 54 sidewall seats and walkways to the side jump doors are still available; yet Airborne still inefficiently loads C-17s with either all people or all equipment, then offers the lame excuse that "they do not have the airlift" to bring tracked armored vehicles to the fight below. How convenient. Current "can't-do" U.S. Airborne is a disgrace to the CAN-DO spirit of all the Paratroopers who have gone before us and created the American Airborne in the first place.

Here's the 82^nd Airborne's post OIF AAR (from the CALL Website):

MANEUVER
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

LESSON LEARNED 1: Lack of lethality/firepower by Airborne Infantry in Urban Terrain.

DISCUSSION: Recent combat operations in As Samawah and Ad Diwaniyah during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM highlighted the need for increased lethality and firepower in the current airborne infantry brigade structure, while operating in urban terrain. The DA decision to eliminate the divisional armor battalion, in favor of employing the Immediate Ready Company concept (IRC) [EDITOR: which can only AIRLAND after an airfield is seized and cannot parachute drop with the 82nd Airborne Paratroops], while waiting for the Army to identify and field an air-deliverable armored gun system (AGS) left the airborne brigade woefully in need of increased lethality and firepower. Frequently during these recent operations, airborne forces would move in advance of heavy forces (TF 1-41 IN) to isolate an objective area while the heavy force postured for action at the decisive point in the fight. Heavy forces delivered the firepower that rapidly and decisively terminated the conflict. An airborne infantry brigade, with an organic AGS capability would enable it to quickly and decisively defeat an enemy in an urban environment without having to depend on heavy force augmentation. [EDITOR: if the closed terrain cannot facilitate medium to heavy tanks, these forces are off doing something else, they can't get there at all in a timely manner etc.]

RECOMMENDATION: Modify the Airborne Division MTOE to include a battalion of air deliverable armored gun systems (AGS). The armored gun system must meet the requirements of being air transportable by C130 and air droppable by G-11 cargo parachute, must be capable of providing accurate and lethal fires, and must be survivable in an urban environment against small arms and RPG type weapons.

DISCUSSION: Recent light/heavy operations in Central Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM highlighted the lack of mobility of the airborne infantry brigade operating in unrestricted desert terrain. Frequently, airborne forces would LD well in advance of the heavy forces to isolate an objective area while the heavy force postured for action at the decisive point in the fight. The heavy forces provided the firepower to terminate the conflict rapidly and decisively, but it would constantly outpace the airborne infantry forces forward in subsequent tactical sets.

To maintain tactical pace with the heavy forces, both organic and task organized truck assets had to be reallocated from the FSB and DIV MSB, as well as, inorganic truck assets from 1st COSCOM and PREPO stocks to support mobility requirements for the current and future fight. The reallocation of organic transportation assets also complicated logistical resupply and forward positioning of BDE and higher command posts. [EDITOR: wheeled trucks cannot go forward in combat in the face of enemy fire]

The addition of four mounted platforms per platoon would greatly enhance the airborne infantry platoon's mobility. Four per rifle squad and one per weapons squad (two of which are outfitted for PL and PSG C2 nodes) with .50 caliber machine guns and/or MK-19s would substantially enhance the rifle platoon's mobility and firepower, and allow it to be much more effective while operating independently or in conjunction with heavy forces. These platforms would deploy as part of the Charlie Echelon and employed after seizure of an airfield and establishment of a lodgment. [EDITOR: violently disagree; "C" echelon is too late. Time for American Airborne to start maneuvering immediately after landing on the drop zone] Additionally, these mobile platforms would greatly relieve the strain on precious logistical assets required to move and sustain airborne infantry units.

RECOMMENDATION: Modify the MTOE of the airborne infantry platoons to equip them with organic assets (four each 2 w/ .50 caliber MGs and 2 w/ MK-19s) that provide mobility, firepower, and ability to conduct non-standard CASEVAC.

[EDITOR: M113 Gavins should be the mounted platforms since they are tracked and armored to keep the paratroops alive while moving forward with the M8 AGSes. Paratroops in wheeled Humvee trucks are just going to go up in flames and die from nearly any enemy fire as daily tragedies in Iraq prove. M113 Gavins should be in the "Delta" weapons company and be used as needed to give A, B, C mobility as needed. However, providing A, B, C M113 Gavins can also work, too but we better not hear of any whining from them that they have to spend half a day each week in the motor pool and its going to somehow make their penises shrivel up]

www.stormingmedia.us/46/4652/A465262.html

Light Infantry, Augmentation, and the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier: A Step in the Direction of Versatility

Authors: William K. Sutey; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Abstract: This paper examines a proposal to create M113 Armored Personnel Carrier support units (vehicles, drivers, and service support) to provide protected tactical mobility augmentation for light infantry forces. Light infantry divisions are a crucial component of the Army's force structure to meet potential challenges across the spectrum of conflict. They lack, however, the tactical mobility assets to be of any utility beyond the lowest intensity conflicts in the most restrictive terrain. This limitation constrains the Army's versatility as a whole. This monograph first considers tactical mobility as an element of combat power, establishes an analytical framework for the analysis of the infantry mobility systems, and considers the heavily armed and mobile nature of potential world threats. Next, the light infantry concept is explored focusing on the intended purposes for which light infantry divisions were formed and an evaluation of their actual tactical mobility capabilities. Following this examination of today's light infantry, this paper looks at the Pentomic Era in the late 1950's in which M59 armored personnel carrier companies were consolidated at division level and sent vehicles as attachments to augment the tactical mobility of infantry units. Finally, this monograph conceptually outlines a proposal to use M113 APC's to augment deployed light forces and evaluates how this might enhance their utility. Although there are philosophical objections to, and practical problems with, augmenting light infantry with armored personnel carriers, this paper concludes that today's demands for maximizing the versatility of all forces merits reexamination of such a concept.

Russian Airborne FIELDING BMD-4 tracked armor with 100mm guns

BMD-4 uses an improved versionm of the powerful 100mm main gun, 30mm autocannon, 7.62mm medium machine gun turret first fielded with the BMD-3M shown above

The Russian Paratroop crew of the BMD-4 ride INSIDE it during airdrop to save time de-rigging and getting it in action on the ground. Dismount paratroop infantry squad jumps out in FRONT of the IL-76 jet's engines SIMULTANEOUSLY with their mother BMD-4 exiting the rear ramp in order to land closer together. Their D-8 parachutes deploy only a stabilizer chute upon aircraft exit in order to jump in front of jet engine; U.S. old-fashioned static line and deployment bags leave a tangled mess streaming outside the plane as paratroopers exit.

Note the minimalist approach to getting the BMD-4 to slide out the floor of cargo planes; runners under the tracks conserves weight and payload of the plane compared to the U.S. Type V airdrop platforms that each take up about 2, 000 pounds of payload and are a pain to recover on the drop zone for re-use.

The BMD-4 under canopy

The BMD-4 has low ground pressure cross-country mobility like the M113 Gavin first pioneered

The BMD-4 has waterjets to swim in the ocean like the M113 "Amphigavin" with the ARIS GATOR kit

The BMD-4 has stabilized optics and gun mounts to shoot-on-the-move; a capability our M113 Gavins could have if they were OWNED BY LIGHT/AIRBORNE/AIR ASSAULT UNITS and improved on by ownership; ad hoc temporary load of M113s to units will not result in their full potential being achieved...and could result in the enemy killing a lot of Americans in battle because we chose to be inferior.

---

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060616/49637256.html

New combat vehicles on way to Russian airborne units

19:24 | 16/ 06/ 2006

MOSCOW, June 16 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's Airborne Forces will receive the first batch of a new armored airborne combat vehicle on June 21, an army spokesman said Friday.

The BMD-4 airborne combat vehicle is amphibious, light and well armed. Like its predecessor, BMD-3, it has a hull made of special alloys and a turret, but features many modifications. In addition, it is equipped with a 100-mm gun.

"The start of deliveries of the BMD-4 marks a new era in the development of the Airborne Forces and will significantly raise the combat strength of Russia's most mobile units," Alexander Cherednik said.

The vehicle will be shown off during an exercise on June 26 that senior officers are expected to attend.

Legendary Tanker Ralph Zumbro asks the question:

Could this be the American BMD-4 killer: the "M113A4" Gavin

Nurol of Turkey has a M113-based AIFV with a BMD-3 type turret

"Gents;
That turret sounds like a development of the BMP-3 turret which at lease one ex Russian/Soviet country has adapted to the M-113. Maybe we ought to just BUY them and adapt them to our vehicle????"

Ralph

SO WHY ARE WE TRAVELING IN VULNERABLE TRUCKS DOWN ROADS INTO PREDICTABLE AMBUSHES?

www.youtube.com/watch?v=KGCTSg0bqBg

Paul Hornback's Wheels vs. Tracks Article in the March-April 1998 issue of U.S. Army Armor magazine (before it became politicized) Warned Us Against the Wheeled SASO "Nation-Building" Racket EuroFad

1^st TSG (A) EXCLUSIVE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Wheels/Tracks NRMM Study

Steel Tracked M113 Gavin went 75+ mph in 1979! There's NO justification for wheeled trucks on the non-linear battlefield!

According to Hunnicutt Bradley: A History of American Fighting and Support Vehicles on page 109, the "Hot Rod" averaged 75.76 mph over a 500 foot gravel test track at Fort Knox in 1979. Power was 2 x 440 cubic inch Chrysler gas engines driving two modified 727 transmissions.

Imagine what M113 Gavins would do today on band tracks with hybrid-electric drive!

www.combatreform2.com/bandtracks.htm
www.combatreform2.com/hybridelectricdrive.htm

...thanks be to retired LTC Dave Tooker for finding these pictures!!

Tracks can easily traverse the vast terrain off to the left and right of paved roads like these...if we were not lazy, impatient Americans who want to ride around in comfy wheeled trucks instead of tactically-sound tracked tanks...and live in tents, former dictator palaces and eventually Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) with all the comforts and absurd parade-ground garrison home life using flimsy wooden buildings.

The Army wheeled narcissist lie exposed: Video Proof that steel tracks can go 60+ mph on paved roads

www.youtube.com/watch?v=we9wRITQwwA

This should end the "Stryker and Humvee 60 mph on roads" non-sense forever. Take the governors off our tracks and they can go as fast as you want them. There is NO reason to have or use rubber-tired trucks on the non-linear battlefields of today...they need to go the way of the horse cavalry.

Edited Clip

www.combatreform2.com/steeltrackscango60mphonpavedroads.wmv

Full Clip with an excellent short History of Tanks

www.pioneertv.com/video/tanks900.wmv

Recent Productions

http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:FFlc_wMMrHAJ:www.pioneertv.com/recent.asp+tycoon+toys+national+geographic&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

Tycoon Toys

(2 x 60' for National Geographic Channel/Freemantle International Distribution) are what the super-rich choose to spend their hard-won zillions on. We meet the few individuals who have a particular penchant for owning, driving and firing huge pieces of ex-military hardware, from field guns to tanks to fighter jets. Tycoon Toys goes on a journey to watch them at play. 2004 - Distributed by: Freemantle International Distribution

3D maneuver requires light tracked AFVs

By the time 1^st Infantry Division "Big Red One" Soldiers in M1 Abrams heavy, M2 Bradley and M113 Gavin light tanks slowly airlanded by C-17 into Northern Iraq, Saddam and cohorts were already in hiding in Tikrit. USMC foot-infantry egomaniacs doing feel-good methodical battle but clobbered by mere rear guards while dismounting from vulnerable trucks were 6 days late reaching Baghdad and also contributed to the mission failure. While pompously boasting they believe in "Maneuver Warfare" the USMC shows no understanding of the operational art to rapidly seize nation-state centers of gravity (grab the capital city) to collapse an opponent (3rd Generation Warfare) which would require them to fix their force structure and stop packing our amphibious ships with hundreds of wheeled trucks when they can and should be filled with light tracked tanks. Had the U.S. Army 173^rd Airborne Brigade been properly equipped with their own M113 Gavin and M8 Buford/Thunderbolt light tanks they could have parachute dropped their entire force and within hours fanned out into blocking positions to deny Saddam's Ba'athist Regime cohorts to escape to start a rebellion later. Instead the egomaniac Army Airborne did the "seize & hold" BS WW2 re-enactment it likes to do and "held the airfield" so "follow-on forces" could airland. Airborne WARFARE is not airfield (logistics base) seizure and sitting on your ass and digging in WW2-style. Even in WW2, the Airborne was made to MANEUVER after parachute insertion. To do this well, they need their own light tanks and not sit and wait for someone else to do their job for them as the enemy escapes. After the war, General James M. Gavin as Army R & D Chief realized this and created the Airborne Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family which became the M113, named years later in his honor. Light tanks can do things that medium and heavy tanks cannot do over and above the obvious air-insertion capability: they have the absolute best cross-country mobility we have to go through closed terrains to include swimming across shores, lakes an