HELMETS FALL OFF...HERE IS A SOLUTION...
VIDEO: Helmets Falling Off
STILLS
According to the official U.S. Army history of wound ballistics from WW2 to Korea [ http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/woundblstcs/chapter11.htm]
70, 000 troops were saved by wearing the M1 steel helmet. We lost 368, 000 dead in WW2 so saving 70K is nothing short of a minor miracle. However, retaining the helmet of the head with an adequate 3 or 4 point suspension system seems to have been unfathomable by the U.S. Army that tried to make-do with a single chinstrap and other work-arounds despite the fact that they only had to look at the German Paratrooper's helmet to see an effective 3 point suspension in use. That the current U.S. Army PASGT helmet and the M1 steel pot before it still has the defective single chinstrap 6 decades and thousands of dead later is inexcusable incompetence.
In CHAPTER XII: Wound Ballistics and Body Armor in Korea by Carl M. Herget, Ph. D., Capt. George B. Coe, Ord Corps,and Maj. James C. Beyer, MC [ http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/woundblstcs/chapter12.1.htm]
They observe:
"Not all Soldiers wore their helmet, because of its weight, lack of stability, and so forth. Many men on patrols complained about the noise made by the helmet when it came in contact with bushes and twigs and felt also that the helmet interfered with their hearing. For these reasons, some men on patrol preferred not to wear their helmets. These objections to the helmet can be overcome by continuing indoctrination and by improving the helmet characteristics, especially its stability on the head."
So here you have Army medical officers advancing the state of troop body armor as a "preventative medicine measure" and not the infantry whose lives they want to save. What is wrong with this picture? Why are medical officers having to drag the narcissistic egomaniac infantry ahead to save themselves? Do they think they are bullet-proof? Notice helmet design is under the control of the infantry today--Fort Benning---is it a wonder that we still have defective chinstraps on our PASGT helmets? They have no clue how dangerous the Non-Linear Battlefield (NLB) is today when they spend most of their time working on their bodies via sports attire PT so they can pick up chicks and look like what the phony Army/marine bureaucracy thinks they should look like. Image is important to fool the tax payers, substance and performance in combat is not. The people who do know are the Army doctors who try to desperately patch the egomaniacs up and see what happens when even they do reassemble the "Follow Me!" Disciple that the body sometimes refuses to work again. We have the wrong people in charge of troop body armor. If the egomaniac infantry is not interested in saving themselves from a flag-draped coffin ending, then Army Medical Branch should be placed in charge of body armor design and development as should Army engineers should be in charge of armored vehicle design since they know what high explosives can do on the NLB.
Furthermore, this BS of doing half-assed field training not wearing body armor and ammunition loads which distorts our Soldier's load planning and field living skills development to learn how to live lighter in the field with less equipment must end forever. This trash talk that we will "train as we fight" must stop and the actual deeds done. The way to do this is by ending our "Beetle Bailey" garrison mindset and fixation with static buildings and lawn care by completely ISO containerizing ourselves and everything we own and operate into "BattleBoxes" that are in the field every day on every Army post so every day we dress for war to include full body armor, ammunition loads and weaponry.
The following article by Army and marine enlistedman and officer Mike Sparks begins at today's PASGT "kevlar" helmet which replaced the M1 steel "pot" helmet but kept the pathetic single chinstrap.
Wednesday, November 15, 1995 with 2005 UPDATE!
THE FORT BRAGG POST
Another Paratrooper is dead after a "routine" parachute jump, possibly after his PASGT kevlar(r) helmet became unsecured. Last year, it was a sub-120 pound jumper getting towed: she died when her helmet too, fell of as she banged against the plane. Light jumpers should be at the end of the stick so they can be discovered/pulled in by the jumpmaster if towed. A new DA Form 1306 Aircraft Loading manifest with blocks to fill in the Soldier's height/weight and number of jumps, special equipment would increase jumpmaster situational awareness and insure lighter Paratroopers jump last in their sticks. If we had a streamlined T-21 parachute with the reserve at the back with the main, we wouldn't have some much clutter causing Paratroopers to get snagged upon exits out narrow jump doors like the C-130 has. Even if you adjust the helmet "by-the-book" the current chinstrap is notorious for popping loose at the "pull-the-dot" metal snap and sags low over your eyes regardless when low-crawling.
SOLUTION #1: THE GENTEX 3-POINT SUSPENSION CHINSTRAP
GENTEX CO.
POB 315
Carbondale, PA 18407
(717) 282-8555
To prevent further head injuries, what we need now is a Fastex(r)-buckle 3 or 4-point suspension chinstrap for the PASGT Kevlar(r) helmet, which will keep the helmet securely on in an effort to save your life from impact. The current metal "pull-the-dot" snap corrodes, bends and is notoriously unreliable.
The Gentex Fastex(r) chinstrap has been on my helmet for more than a year. The strap comes in small, medium and large. It was jump tested at LeapFest '95 in August and has been checked out by the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. I haven't written about it because I was going to let Natick Labs work through their certification process, but now another Paratrooper is dead. We are supposed to get a decent chinstrap with the 21st Century Land Warrior program (21st CLAW), but how many will have to die or be seriously injured before these arrive?
Before one more Paratrooper dies needlessly, slandering the viability of the Airborne operation, we need these chinstraps on all 82nd Airborne Division Paratrooper helmets on an emergency interim basis without waiting for the bureaucratic "process" to kick in. Not only will the Fastex(r) quick-release buckle save lives, it will be dramatically more comfortable and keep helmets from sagging over eyes when low crawling.
Ask the Australian Airborne, which uses the Kevlar(r) helmets with the Fastex chinstrap. Australian SAS members now in the desert report to us that these helmet's buckles will give way in the event of a nearby explosion, saving injuries from necks being snapped. If we cannot buy these, then local Riggers could sew a strip of material with a Fastex(r) buckle on top of the metal snap of the current chinstrap to make it doubly secure. It has been several years since the then 82nd Airborne Division commander lost his helmet on a jump and subsequently ordered a fix. So much for "you have to be a General to get anything done". RIGHT. Is this brain surgery?
The courageous Paratroopers of our Airborne have waited long enough.
So in 1997, 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne) Director, Mike Sparks makes the suggestion for a better chinstrap through the Fort Benning Infantry Center/School AIEP program.
Now notice in the picture on the top of this web page of a Soldier in 2005 running wearing the PASGT helmet without even the Paratrooper's retention strap--a mere two point suspension---its sagged over his eyes and he cannot see where he is going.
This obvious defect of the PASGT helmet was pointed out by Sparks in 1997. So the need for a better chinstrap is an urgent concern FOR ALL THE U.S. ARMY. Yet read the absurd bullshit response from the Army on how 3 and 4 point suspensions don't work as if the 2 and 3 point PASGT helmet chinstrap and suspensions do:
After reading the Army's pile of bullshit, consider that since then thousands of Soldiers have worn the MICH/ACH helmet with its 4-point suspension and not had them fall off during parachute jumps nor droop down over their eyes during combat, saving many lives and preventing injuries. Then consider how if we interviewed all these Soldiers and asked them to compare their MICH/ACH helmets to the old PASGT helmet chinstraps they'd no doubt say the old helmets sucked.
Below is an Army RDECOM magazine article singing the praises of a 4-point chinstrap suspension system and why its superior to the existing PASGT 2-point suspension system. "Natick, we have a problem"---Fort Benning says there is no problem with the PASGT chinstrap even though the helmet is sagging over their eyes and they can't see anything, maybe that's a condition they are used to? Hre's an excerpt:
"By incorporating a four-point retention strap, similar to the MICH, the lightweight helmet is seven times more stable than the Kevlar, so it won't rock back and forth or fall off. Although most marines won't be jumping out of airplanes, it's airborne-certified."
www.rdecom.army.mil/rdemagazine/ 200309/itf_marines_lw_helmet.html
RDECOM Magazine | in the field |marines Field Lightweight Helmet
Natick Soldier CenterFielding of more than 200,000 of the lightweight helmets to marines will start this summer, replacing the old "Kevlar," as it's commonly called, which has been around since the early 1980s.
Natick, Mass.-It may not look much different from the current Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops helmet, but the new marine Corps Lightweight Helmet is improved in almost every way. Fielding of more than 200,000 of the lightweight helmets to marines will start this summer, replacing the old "Kevlar" as it's commonly called, which has been around since the early 1980s.
A project that began in 1999, the helmet is part of the redesign of all individual equipment for marines, according to Jim Mackiewicz, marine corps customer team leader at the Soldier Systems Center. The team provides technical and contract support for Product Manager-Individual Combat Equipment at the marine corps systems command in Quantico, Va.
Helmet prototypes went through operational testing at the marine corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, Calif., in 2000 and 2002 during combined arms field exercises. In addition, the helmets were field-evaluated by marines at Camp Lejeune, N.C.
"It was one of the highest rated pieces of equipment in the (marine corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity)," Mackiewicz said, who was project officer for the helmet. "To get an 85 to 90 percent approval rating is almost unheard of."
Marines can look forward to improved comfort with the new lightweight helmet, which features soft black leather for the X-shaped nape pad, headband and border around a new breathable nylon mesh suspension pad, and black suede-lined chinstrap. Two buckles on each side of the helmet provide tensioning and centering of the nylon retention webbing.
Testing lasted an extra year to work out glitches and allow time to compare the Army's new Modular Integrated Communication Helmet, or MICH, he said.
"Both the lightweight helmet and the MICH were comfortable and higher rated than the (marine's previous helmet), but the lightweight helmet was higher rated than the (older version)," said Maj. Stuart Muladore, Product Manager-Individual Combat Equipment team leader. "As it boiled down, it was still the helmet of choice for us."
The helmet's shell is shaped like the older version, but new materials bring a 6 percent improvement in fragmentation protection, as well as the ability to stop a direct hit from a 9mm round. Lab testing showed a 40 percent improvement in impact protection, which also means better durability. The manufacturer, Gentex Corp. in Carbondale, Penn., warrants the helmet for 15 years.
As the helmet's name suggests, the extra capability was designed with a corresponding weight reduction of about one-half pound. For comparison, a medium-size older version helmet weighs 3.6 pounds versus a medium lightweight helmet's 3.05 pounds.
"It's the same weight as the MICH but doesn't lose the area of coverage," Mackiewicz said. "We could have made it as light as 2.8 pounds with a MICH-style cut. The MICH feels good, but marines said they didn't feel as protected wearing it."
Complaints have been voiced about the Kevlar interfering with the Interceptor Body Armor, but the solution was more a matter of improving stability, not just reducing size, he said. By incorporating a four-point retention strap, similar to the MICH, the lightweight helmet is seven times more stable than the Kevlar, so it won't rock back and forth or fall off. Although most marines won't be jumping out of airplanes, it's airborne-certified.
Comfort is improved with soft black leather for the X-shaped nape pad, headband and border around a new breathable nylon mesh suspension pad, and black suede-lined chinstrap. Two buckles on each side of the helmet provide tensioning and centering of the nylon retention webbing. The Kevlar helmet's five sizes remain, but marines can easily adjust headband circumference and height by one-half inch with the lightweight helmet's hook and loop fabric fasteners for a better fit.
"One reason we didn't go with a trimmed version is because you can have it sit too high," he said.
Both adjustments help accommodate marines when they're wearing masks or hoods, or when any helmet-mounted displays or optics are attached. Heat stress is similar to the Kevlar, according to Mackiewicz, and in anticipation of wear and tear, each helmet is delivered with a replacement kit containing an extra chinstrap and two headbands.
So how in the hell does the Army's bureaucrats get off saying such lying bullshit back in 1997 WHEN THERE GODDAM WAS A PROBLEM?. We KNOW THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE CHINSTRAP BECAUSE SPARKS AND OTHERS EXPERIENCED IT. WHY DID IT TAKE THE FUCKING SPECIAL FORCES TO BREAK RANKS WITH THE REST OF THE ARMY AND INSIST ON A HELMET AND CHINSTRAP THAT WORKS---FOR THE REST OF THE ARMY TO UNFUCK ITSELF? Why all of a "sudden" the chinstrap was a problem when "special" troops complained. So the laws of physics don't work when a non-special feces Soldier has a helmet fall off? Its somehow his fault because he's a "lesser being"?
No, the problem is with Fort Benning, a place populated by some snobby Airborne/Light Infantry/Ranger assholes who think their shit doesn't stink. All they have to do is get off their fat asses and step out of their building 4 and look at the jump tower training for a few minutes and see old PASGT helmets flying off as students stepperd off the 40 foot tower. But they do not give a damn about the troops unless the commanding general orders them to. They have no moral compass of their own. Its all a stupid macho game of penis size to them. This is why Airborne school is so fucked up and its safety situation getting worse. "Airborne" to them is a big ego trip and when a female student recently died it was HER FAULT THEY SAY for not pulling the reserve ripcord when her main parachute didn't open, when the TRUTH IS THAT ITS AIRBORNE SCHOOLS FAULT FOR NOT DRILLING HER AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN RIP-CORD PULLS WHILE IN SUSPENDED HARNESS TRAINING SO IN A LIFE/DEATH JUMP SITUATION PULLING THE RIPCORD WOULD BE A PART OF HER MUSCLE MEMORY--LIKE THEY DO IN CIVILIAN SKYDIVE TRAINING. Always blame it on "pilot, ehh jumper error" the dead guy who is not there to defend himself. Defend the fucked up and corrupt bureaucracy at ALL COSTS. Fort Benning's "blood on the risers" jump school killed her. Just like they are killing the Airborne operation and the 3D maneuver America needs by their fucked up view that its only an I'm better-than-you "hooah" badge.
SOLUTION #2 IMPLEMENTED: IN 2003 THE U.S. ARMY HAS ADOPTED THE NEW MICH HELMET CHINSTRAP!
MICH helmet and chinstrap for SF
The Army has a new 4-point chinstrap being developed for its SF MICH helmet that needs to be immediately put on ALL Paratroopers on jump status NOW. We had a Soldier die last year when his helmet fell off--who would be alive today---if he had this new chinstrap.
Saying we have to wait for all our chinstraps to wear out is MURDER. This is like saying you have cars with defective breaks and not changing them until they wear out or a fatal accident takes place. An ounce of PREVENTION is better than a pound of "cure" too late.
The new chinstrap's National Stock Number (NSN) is 5895-01-476-2605 (Medium/Large) but you need to specify the chinstrap has a single rear attachment point for it to interface with the existing holes on the PASGT kevlar helmet. The MICH helmet strap for the PASGT helmet is connected at 3 points, thus it requires no drilling or new bolt/nut hardware. Manufacturer is CGF Helmets.
Cost is $13.
Illustrated power point presentation of how to install MICH chinstrap to PASGT helmet
www.geocities.com/michhelmetstraps
General instructions:
1. Cut off the center tab of the rear shock pad
2. Remove camouflage cover, existing chinstrap, return nut/bolt to cover holes up.
3. Remove front side suspension bolts, add MICH chinstrap buckles and re-assemble.
4. Remove rear suspension bolt, attach MICH "V" shape attachment hole, suspension nylon and shock pad, tighten bolt/nut.
523 Benfield Rd.
Severna Park, MD 21146
Phone # 410-647-8833
Fax # 410-647-8828
Another nagging problem with the current chinstrap is that during low-crawl and other individual movement techniques (IMT) the brow the helmet will dip down blinding the Soldier at a critical time when he needs to see the enemy and shoot his weapon to kill-him-before-he-gets-you. The kevlar helmet dipping down is attributed to at least 2 fatal military motor vehicle accidents. The MICH-type chinstrap will solve this problem forever.
SOLUTION #2 IN ACTION TODAY AT U.S. ARMY AIRBORNE SCHOOL DECADES LATE
How many have died and been damaged for life needlessly because snobby more-Airborne-than-thou types denied there was a problem with the PASGT chinstrap?
CLOSER EXAMINATION: PROGRESS BUT STILL FLAWED PRACTICES
Fort Benning BAYONET photo by Captain Kamil Sztalkoper
PROBLEM #2: THE SUSPENSION AND LACK OF IMPACT PADDING
The dirty secret of the PASGT helmet is that its painful to wear because the current headband suspension system:
The "New" slightly improved U.S. Army issue helmet suspension is as follows:
Improved PASGT helmet Suspension
NSN 8470-01-442-2969 (sx)
-2990 (s)
-2995 (m)
-3001 (l)
-3021 (xl)
Improved Headband, PASGT Helmet
NSN 8470-01-442-1429 (s-m-l)
While the headband has velcro instead of metal clips to attach a wider headband, the fact remains that the PASGT helmet is still painful to wear resulting in lax Soldiers and particularly marines not to wear them, even in a combat zone like Afghanistan! If you are not wearing your helmet your head can be easily injured and your life ended by mundane bumps working around heavy equipment as well as enemy fire. The problem with the PASGT helmet is NOT its weight (3 pounds) but HOW ITS SUSPENDED ON THE SOLDIER'S HEAD.
In a more physical age, Americans better understood the need to physically spread loads to cushion impacts. For example, the WWI "pie plate helmet" is actually more comfortable to wear than the WWII "steel pot" helmet because it has a wider headband.
However, widening the headband does not stop the helmet from smashing against the skull after a hard impact from a parachute landing fall or vehicle accident. This is why motorcycle and bike helmets have surrounded the entire head with shock absorbing material so the inside wall of the helmet does not smash against the skull and injure it with concussion and collapse. Every U.S. Army Soldier is supposed to be wearing a kevlar PASGT or CVC helmet when operating tactical vehicles in peace or in war. Motor vehicle accidents are the number #1 cause of Soldier/marine deaths each year. If we were to properly cushion and suspend every PASGT helmet in the U.S. Army and marines we would save thousands of lives and millions of dollars.
Some have proposed throwing out the millions of PASGT helmets we have and replace them with $350 each MICH helmets (the start-over approach) which have Oregon Aero impact resistant padding and more comfortable, safe suspension.
Oregon Aero has three kits to fix this:
KLU: Fix the headband
The KLU(tm) G.I. Soldier Helmet Upgrade works with existing webbing without helmet modification and basically widens the helmet band and gives impact resistant padding.
Oregon Aero's KLU(tm) G.I. Soldier Helmet Upgrade is installed in less than 5 minutes and offers the G.I. a pain-free kevlar helmet (KLU stands for "Kevlar Liner Upgrade"). In the words of the National Guard Command Sergeant Major responsible for the helmet's first evaluation;
"The KLU(tm) G.I. Soldier Helmet Upgrade is ...a godsend to the infantry Soldier, likely the greatest invention since the P-38 can opener."
Either the Army or individual G.I.'s can purchase and install the KLU(tm) G.I. Soldier Helmet Upgrade kit. The upgrade kit works with existing helmet webbing without any helmet modification.
The one-size-fits-all KLU(tm) G.I. Soldier Helmet Upgrade is made from a patent-pending proprietary composite construction. It features improved wicking properties and shock absorption and can be machine-washed and air-dried. Oregon Aero has built a specially adapted, semi-automatic, template sewing machine to manufacture the BLU(tm) and KLU(tm) Helmet Upgrade.
BLU "Ballistic Liner Upgrade": Replace the suspension
The upgrade kit can be installed in any style ballistic helmet. Soldiers can train and perform missions with a pain-free, stable, safer helmet, thanks to Oregon Aero's BLU(tm) Soldier Helmet Upgrade Kit. Branches of the U.S. military commissioned Oregon Aero to create a helmet upgrade because of Soldiers' chronic complaints that helmets were painful, uncomfortable and unstable. The modified helmet works equally well with or without external equipment such as night vision goggles, which require a high degree of helmet stability to work properly. Military tests performed on the custom designed Helmet Upgrade revealed dramatic improvements in levels of transmitted shock loads, improving the helmet's safety. Transmitted shock loads decreased from an average of 300G's to an average of 75G's with the BLU(tm) Soldier Helmet Upgrade. (300G's is the threshold between concussion and fatality, and 75G's is below the threshold of injury, which is around 90G's).
The Upgrade wicks heat and perspiration away from the scalp, reducing heat buildup and the problem of perspiration rolling into the user's eyes. The BLU(tm) Soldier Helmet Upgrade can be machine washed and air-dried.
A patent is pending for the helmet upgrade's proprietary, composite design.
BLSS (Ballistic Liner Suspension System): Replace the chinstrap, do away with the headband and suspension
The BLSS(tm) Kit is stable, pain-free, safer, waterproof, self-wicking, positively buoyant, air permeable, reduces sound reverberation and is installed without any helmet shell modifications. The Kit includes a four-point chinstrap connected to a lateral band/harness which mounts to existing PASGT helmet holes/bolts. It has an integrated nape pad and seven highly engineered impact pads that replace the PASGT parachute impact helmet liner (PIL). The camouflage helmet cover connects to the lateral band.
Here was the challenge for Oregon Aero from the U.S. military:
Using the military's existing PASGT helmet, create a stable helmet, one that remained solidly on a Soldier's head regardless of what the Soldier is doing. The military also asked that the current chinstrap be replaced with something more effective and that the upgrade be able to be installed without any helmet modifications.
The military got what it wanted-and more. The new Oregon Aero Ballistic Liner Suspension System (BLSS(tm) Kit):
Is always STABLE, (it uses a highly engineered pad system instead of a web system).
Is PAIN-FREE (the visco-elastic, temperature and pressure sensitive padding system removes all pressure points).
Is SAFER (shock transmission is reduced from 220Gs to 77Gs with top impact and from 161Gs to 88Gs with side impact).
Is WATERPROOF (a proprietary coating application developed by Oregon Aero allows submersion to 66' and passes other requirements).
Is AIR PERMEABLE (the same proprietary coating application permits air, but not water, to pass through).
REDUCES HELMET SOUND REVERBERATION (auditory sense of the surrounding environment is improved).
Is SELF-WICKING (the helmet's cooler: heat and perspiration are drawn away from the scalp and evaporate).
Is POSITIVELY BUOYANT (so the helmet is safer in amphibious or water fording situations).
REQUIRES NO HELMET MODIFICATION (the entire system uses the same six bolts and plates of the current issue web system).
The Oregon Aero BLSS(tm) Kit is being evaluated in military field tests.
The helmet upgrade's breakthrough chin retention system includes a four-point chin strap/harness with an integrated nape pad. The liner upgrade includes seven individually designed and manufactured pads. These, two-part, visco-elastic foam pads are pressure and temperature sensitive and provide pain-free use, no matter how long the helmet is worn. The pads also enable the helmet to remain stable, even when the user is in a prone shooting position. Each pad goes through 27 manufacturing steps.
The padding system, developed by Oregon Aero as the Ballistic Liner Upgrade (BLU(tm) Kit), also is used in the military's Modular Integrated Communications Helmet (MICH).
2005 CONCLUSION
THOUSANDS OF SOLDIERS are still stuck wearing the PASGT helmet with the absurd and unsafe 2-point chinstrap suspension. HOW MANY MORE WILL HAVE TO DIE? At the very least for god's sake order parachute retention straps for your men and have them wear them for at least some better stability. So fucking what that you are "not Paratroopers". FUCK THAT. Do you want the goddam helmet drooping over your eyes? Wake the fuck up. Stop being a lemming victim in the Army's weak co-dependence paradise (nightmare). Stand up for yourself so you get the job done and come home alive.
The more frugal and wise option to GET ALL SOLDIERS A BETTER CHINSTRAP/SUSPENSION would be to simply retrofit Oregon Aero suspension and impact padding into every U.S. Army PASGT helmet with the MICH chinstrap (3 or 4 points) at a cost of about $100 each as the U.S. Army National Guard Light Infantry Brigades are doing:
www.oregonaero.com/p81_2001.html
Oregon Aero, Inc.
34020 Skyway Drive
Scappoose, Oregon 97056
(503) 543-7399 Fax -7199 1 (800) 888-6910
Also notice in order for special feces troops not to look like the "unwasheds" they wanted the MICH helmet to LOOK DIFFERENT so they reduced the size of the helmet under the "Fritz" ear overhang to ostensibly enable them to better lift their heads up in the prone. At least one Army surgeon has gone on record as saying the reduced ballistic coverage of the MICH/ACH helmet has caused the head wounds (see article on bottom of this web page) and deaths of some Soldiers in Iraq. Notice, however that if the 1st TSG (A) suggestion of retrofitting better chinstraps/suspensions had been done to ALL PASGT helmets as we proposed in 1997 and even as late as 2003, these Soldiers would be alive today. Chalk up another FUBAR to the stodgy Army bureaucracy and uncaring brass.
So, "YES" we in the 1st TSG (A) "told you so".
Not only that, WE WILL KEEP ON TELLING YOU AND ANYONE ELSE WHO GIVES A DAMN ABOUT OUR SOLDIERS AND DEFENDING FREEDOM "SO".
One last thing. Notice once we went to quasi-war after 9/11/2001, "ALL OF A SUDDEN" people realized that the PASGT helmet chinstrap and suspension stunk. WHY DIDN'T THEY NOTICE THIS BEFORE LIKE WE DID? WHAT WERE THEY DOING ALL THE YEARS PRIOR TO THAT? WERE THEY GOING TO THE FIELD?
NO.
They were spending the day mowing lawns, polishing floors, and doing silly sports PT WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DRESSED FOR WAR EVERY GODDAM DUTY DAY.
And don't doubt for one second, when the misguided occupation of Iraq is over, the weaklings will rip off all the armament, armor they can to return to the bullshit garrison lifestyle/routine A-S-A-P.
We think America should NOT be funded welfare recipients-in-uniform to spend half the day doing jogging and the other half as lawncare specialists. We should fire ALL those in the army/marines that supoport such bullshit and GET RID OF ALL THE FANCY BUILDINGS AND LAWNS they use to justify their wasting the day to be fucked up and not combat-ready. Here is how to do it:
www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver/battleboxconcept.htm
Until we realize how dangerous the Non-Linear Battlefield (NLB) of today is, and START SPENDING EVERY WAKING MOMENT ON COMBAT SKILLS AND CAPABILITIES, we are going to continue to get our asses kicked by teenagers with a finger on the button to set off a command-detonated landmine A.K.A. a ROADSIDE BOMB. We do not call CDLMs "IEDs" thats a bureaucratic cop-out to pretend these are new threats to cover the asses of the incompetents who wshould have been studying their perofession and watching event is plasces like south Lebanon where Hezbollah used these weapons against the IDF. Maybe IDF we spent less time being snobs, wasting time in the gym and being lawn mowers we'd know more about what to do to win?
BACKGROUND
1. The History of WW1 and WW2 Helmets and body armor in general
Official U.S. Army history of wound ballistics from WW2 to Korea
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/woundblstcs/chapter11.htm
CHAPTER XI
Personnel Protective Armor
Maj. James C. Beyer, MC, William F. Enos, M.D., and Col. Robert H. Holmes, MC
The development and field usage of helmets and body armor in warfare before World War II has been adequately documented by a number of excellent books and reports.1 Most of these references have been utilized in the preparation of this chapter, and in many instances they have provided the sole source of available material.2
HELMET DEVELOPMENT
During modern times, the helmet has had a rapid rise in general troop acceptability with remarkably little variation in design. The first protection provided for the head in World War I came about in a purely fortuitous manner. General Adrian of the French Army noted that a Soldier who had received a head wound due to a rifle bullet explained his escape from death on the fact that he had carried his metal food bowl under his cloth cap. Therefore, following initial experiments in 1914, steel cap liners ("casque Adrian") were issued to French troops in 1915 and led to the characteristic World War I French helmet in 1916. Many of the other countries soon realized the value of a helmet. The British adopted their own design in 1915; the Germans, in 1915; and the Belgians and Italians, in 1916.
1(1) Helmets and Body Armor. Handbook of Ordnance compiled by H. T. Wade. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919, pp. 413-418. (2) Dean, Bashford: Helmets and Body Armor in Modern Warfare. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. (3) Dean, Bashford: Helmets and Body Armor-The Medical Viewpoint. In Medical Department of the United States Army in the World War. Surgery. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925, vol. XI, pp. 1-8. (4) Helmets and Body Armor, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Washington, 1 June 1945. (5) Gregg, Anne J.: Project Supporting Paper No. 44 Relating to Helmets and Body Armor, 1917-August 1945, Ordnance Department, Washington, D.C. (6) Peterson, H. L.: Body Armor in Civil War. Ordnance 34: 432-433, May-June 1950, (7) Ward, Gordon B.: Personnel Anti-Fragmentation Equipment. Library of Congress, Technical Information Division, Washington, D.C., July 1955. A bibliography, 63 pages.2 The members of the Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, have been most gracious in locating material in their files and in providing free access to many of the original manuscripts. The illustrations for this chapter were made available through the complete cooperation of Dr. H. C. Thomson, chief of the Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Much of the material pertaining to helmets can only be written in regard to the history of the development of a particular helmet model, and there is a great lack of medical documentation which really should be the sole purpose of this chapter. Therefore, in many ways, the relating of the development of helmets and personnel body armor would seem to be more of a history of the participation of the Quartermaster Corps and the Ordnance Department rather than the Army Medical Service. However, it is felt that there has been an intimate association and liaison between all of the interested technical services and that the inclusion of this chapter in the present volume follows a natural and logical selection of materials. Full recognition must be offered to the major participation which the Quartermaster Corps and Ordnance Department had in the development of personnel protective armor, and the inclusion of the Medical Service for consultation and advice on development of new prototypes has been gratifying.-J. C. B., W. F. E., and R. H. H.
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Following the decision in 1917 to equip the American Expeditionary Forces with a helmet, 400,000 helmets were initially procured through the British Quartermaster's Department. Subsequently, the same type of helmet was manufactured in the United States under the direction of the Ordnance Department, and approximately 2.7 million helmets, M1917, were produced by Armistice day, 1918. The American helmet was a slightly modified version of the British Mk I helmet. The helmet was made of 13 percent pressed manganese steel alloy, 0.035 inch thick, and could be ruptured only by a blow of 1,600 pounds or more. The British helmet had twice the ballistic strength of the French helmet. The helmets of British design produced in the United States had an overall ballistic strength 10 percent greater than that of the original British helmet. The ballistics specifications of the M1917 helmet required it to resist penetration by a 230-grain caliber .45 bullet with a velocity of 600 f.p.s.
Numerous experimental models were developed to provide (1) additional protective coverage; (2) improved ballistic properties; (3) adaptability for special functions, such as machinegunner, tank operator, aviator, and so forth; (4) a more adequate suspension lining; and (5) a distinctive patriotic design. Because of the large numbers of helmets of the M1917 design which were produced in the United States, none of the experimental models developed by the U.S. Army Ordnance Department received adoption before the end of World War I. In the interval between World Wars I and II, the United States continued its research and development program on helmets in an attempt to increase the area coverage, to improve the protection ballistics limit (V50 or that velocity level at which there is 50 percent probability of a complete penetration of the test ballistic material by the projectile), and to facilitate troop acceptance by modification of the suspension system. Changes designed to improve the first two factors required careful consideration in order to be compatible with the weight and comfort limitation imposed by other testing technical services. Concurrent with the changes in weapon design were the demands for modification in the helmet specifications. With the advent of new weapons in the hands of belligerent countries, countermeasures can follow several patterns, such as increasing firepower to overcome the advantages of the new weapon, developing specific antitype weapons, or producing interim personnel protective devices.
Between 1918 and 1934, interest and progress in helmet development were maintained by the Ordnance Department and the Infantry Board. Following a series of experimental models (the model 5A was of pot-shaped design and received extensive testing before it was discontinued in 1932) and tests, it was recommended in 1934 that the M1917 helmet with a modified lining of a hair-filled pad be standardized as Helmet, M1917A1 (fig. 304). The final end item with an adjustable headpad weighed 2 pounds and 6 ounces. A lull in helmet development occurred in the period from 1934 to 1940 when the first draft call was issued. With the resurge of military life and expenditures, new overtures were made to American industrial firms and to
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the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York in an attempt to improve the protective coverage and ballistic limit of the M1917A1 and to take advantage of recent advances in steel alloy manufacture, liner materials, and mass production methods. In addition, a two-piece helmet was considered desirable to meet the increasing variety and complexity of tactical and climatic conditions.
FIGURE 304.-Helmet, M1917A1.
The following quotation from one of the reports of the Infantry Board reveals the natural evolution of the new helmet from the original M1917 design: The ideal shaped helmet is one with a dome-shaped top following the full contour of the head and supplying uniform headroom for indentation, extending down the front to cover the forehead without impairing vision and down the sides as far as possible to be compatible with the rifle, etc., and down the back as far as possible without pushing the helmet forward when in a prone position, and with a frontal plate flanged forward as a cap-style visor and the sides and rear flanged outward to deflect rain from the collar opening.
Therefore, the M1917 model was considered suitable for protecting the top of the head and by removing its brim, by adding sidepieces and rearpieces, and by incorporating the suspension system into a separate inner liner, the World War II Army helmet came into being.3 The original test item was known as the TS3, and it received a favorable report from the Infantry Board in February 1941.
The Army M1 helmet (fig. 305) was standardized on 30 April 1941 and was approved on 9 June 1941. It was of two-piece design with an outer Hadfield steel shell and a separate inner liner containing the suspension system. The complete item weighed approximately 3 pounds, with the outer shell accounting for approximately 2.3 pounds and the inner liner, 0.7 pound.
3Studler, R. R.: The New Combat Helmet. Army Ordnance No. 132, 22: 933-934, May-June 1942.
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Ballistic protection was afforded only by the Hadfield manganese steel outer shell with the plastic-impregnated fabric liner serving as a light-weight headpiece outside of the frontline area and facilitating the attachment of the suspension system. Various utilitarian functions were also ascribed to the outer steel shell. The ballistics properties of the outer shell had been improved so that it would resist penetration by a 230-grain caliber .45 bullet with a velocity of 800 f.p.s. The Riddell type of suspension (fig. 305C) used in football helmets was modified for the inner liner. The principle of the original Riddell suspension did not contain an adjustable headband, and this feature was developed for the helmet liner. The M1 helmet was a marked improvement over former models (fig. 306) since it furnished increased coverage (fig. 307) over the sides and back of the head and provided a more comfortable fit with the partial elimination of the "rocking" tendency of the older helmets. Following adoption of the M1 helmet, the Ordnance Department retained development and procurement of the outer steel shell and the Quartermaster Department made development and production progress of the inner liner and suspension system.
FIGURE 305.-Army M1 helmet. A. Outer steel shell. B. Inner liner. with head suspension system and adjustable headband. C. Liner with head suspension system and adjustable headband.
During the course of the North African campaigns in 1943, the
rigid hook fastener of the chinstrap was found to be a source of potential danger by remaining intact under the impact of a blast wave resulting from a nearby detonation and thereby jerking the head sharply and violently with the production of fractures or dislocations of the cervical vertebras. Therefore, it was necessary to redesign the helmet strap with a ball-and-clevis release so that it would remain closed during normal combat activities but would allow for a quick voluntary release or automatic release at pressures considerably below
the accepted level of danger. Following extensive tests by ordnance engineers, a new release device was developed which would release at a pull of 15 pounds or more. This device (fig. 308) was standardized in 1944
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FIGURE 306.-Helmet, TS3, later standardized as Helmet,
M1 (left), and Helmet, M1917A1 (right), April 1941.
The M1 helmet was the standard item of issue to ground troops, Army and marine, during World War II and the Korean War. Before the standardization of the M1 helmet, 904,020 M1917A1 helmet bodies were manufactured from January to August 1941. During the period from August 1941 to August 1945, 22,363,015 M1 helmets were produced. Troop acceptability was fairly high, but a common complaint, was the lack of stability of the helmet. This problem had its origin, in good part, from the type of ballistic test in practice at the time the helmet was being developed. The caliber .45 pistol ball was the major test weapon, and this type of projectile with its soft lead core and thin gliding-metal jacket will deform easily against the Hadfield steel. When the helmet causes the defeat of this missile at service-weapon velocities, it will be deeply indented, and it was deemed necessary to allow a 1-inch offset
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FIGURE 307. M1 helmet. A. Front view, illustrating offset and area coverage. B. Side view, showing increased coverage to sides and back of head.
between the helmet and the head. However, battle casualty survey studies during World Wars I and II and the Korean War have shown that the primary wounding agent among the WIA and the KIA casualties was the fragmentation-type weapon. The World War II experiences are universal except for the surveys of some of the Pacific island campaigns where small arms missiles accounted for a greater proportion of casualties. After World War II, fragment simulators in a range of 5 calibers were widely used in ballistics evaluation tests of prospective ballistic materials for helmets and body armor. The advisability or necessity of the present 1-inch helmet offset requires a thorough investigation and evaluation in the development of any new helmet. A suitable offset will always be necessary to counteract the denting of a metallic helmet or the transient deformation of a nonmetallic helmet, but the prime objective of any protective military headgear is to prevent the entrance of missiles into the cranial cavity. This entrance might be prevented over a
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wider range of missile weights and velocities by modification of the present offset concept in helmet design. The missile defeat might result in skull fractures in a number of casualties, but the skull fracture type of injury is amenable to successful treatment by the neurosurgeon. Despite the widespread use of the M1 helmet by all the U.S. fighting forces during World War II, no definite survey was ever conducted to obtain an accurate evaluation of the value of the helmet. Numerous investigators in various surveys and separate publications in medical journals allude to the undoubted value of the Ml helmet in preventing a. considerable number of deaths and nonfatal wounds in ground troops. However, because of the marked variability of collection methods and evaluation techniques of the investigators, it is most difficult to derive an accurate correlation based on sound statistical methods.
FIGURE 308.-Ball-and-clevis release for chinstrap of
M1 helmet.
Some aspects of the value of the M1 helmet are discussed by Beebe and DeBakey in their book on battle casualties. 4 More recently, Norman Hitchman 5 of the Army's Operations Research Office reviewed some of the World War II casualty statistics and reached some important and timely conclusions regarding the value of wearing a helmet in combat. The following observations resulted from this statistical analysis:
1. Of all hits upon the helmet, 54 percent were defeated.
2. For every 100 men wounded while wearing helmets, 9.6 men received wounds in the cranium. Without the helmet, it would be expected that 11.4 men would be wounded in the head.
3. The M1 helmet prevented a number of incapacitating hits equal to 10 percent of the total hits on the body.
4Beebe, Gilbert W., and DeBakey, Michael F.: Battle Casualties. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1952, p. 176.
5Hitchman, N. A.: Keep Your Head . . . Keep Your Helmet. Army 8:42-44, September 1957.
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4. The estimated savings in total battle casualties means that the helmet in World War II probably prevented wounds in more than 70,000 men. A significant proportion of these men would have been killed had the helmet not been worn.
5. To get the same amount of saving by protecting other regions, body armor weighing more than twice as much as the helmet would have to be provided.
The numerous casualty surveys conducted during the Korean War provide more accurate anatomic localization of wounds in the head region covered by the helmet as related to the total head, face, and neck region, but again it was not always possible accurately to determine whether the man was wearing a helmet at the time of wounding. One survey was conducted by Capt. George B. Coe, Cm1C, in an attempt to determine more accurately the relationship between incidence of head wounds and the wearing of the helmet. One interesting observation was related where men wearing the helmet would assume a prone position to escape missiles from a mortar or an artillery shell and upon striking the ground the helmet would be released from the head and they would sustain a head wound from a second group of shells detonating in the same area. Accurate information regarding the exact value of the helmet as a protective device is of vital importance in the training and indoctrination of troops. If it can be graphically shown that the helmet is a main line of defense against the greater proportion of projectiles commonly encountered on the battlefield, troop acceptability might be higher. Against the cast iron fragmentation projectiles which were commonly used by the North Korean and Chinese Communist Armies during the Korean War, the M1 helmet probably gave a better performance than with the steel fragments which predominated during the World War II fighting. The relatively soft and brittle character of the cast iron fragments would lend itself to low hardness and toughness and to greater ease of refragmentation and defeat upon impact against the helmet. The U.S. high explosive shell fragment has an average Rockwell "C" hardness of 29-31 and the Soviet cast iron shell fragment has a hardness of 8-14. Research programs following the Korean War have been directed toward an increase in both the ballistic protection limit and the troop acceptability under varied combat conditions. A multiplicity of factors must be reconciled and coordinated in order efficiently to effect significant changes in either of these properties. World War II investigations proved the efficacy of nonmetallic ballistic materials (nylon and doron) alone or in conjunction with metallic outer shells, but satisfactory field tests were not completed before the termination of hostilities in Korea. With the recent success of these plastics in the body armor developed for ground forces during the Korean fighting, increased emphasis has been given to all forms of research bearing upon helmet development and design.
Notwithstanding the respectable performance of the M1 helmet during World War II and the Korean War, continued improvement should be actively supported. The doldrums of peacetime can prove very lethal to worthwhile
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and unspectacular research programs directed toward the development of items of equipment where the present standard items might appear acceptable. Any new helmet, regardless of its V50 superiority, will have to pass the ultimate test of combat troop acceptance, and this is primarily dependent upon the fit and stability of the helmet. The frontline combatant must be indoctrinated and impressed with the protective integrity and necessity of the helmet and equally with the ease and comfort with which it can be worn. Therefore, this is one field of military design where correct tailoring should be obtained commensurate with the imposed limits of the protective ballistic materials. Certain testing procedures on newer experimental helmets would appear to have been excessively delayed, and active aggressive interest in the problem has frequently dropped to a very low level.
HELMET DESIGN
Ground Troop Models
In addition to the M1 helmet, a variety of other designs were developed by the Ordnance Department during World War II. These will be discussed in the paragraphs to follow.
Helmet, steel, M1C (Parachutist's).-This helmet (fig. 309) included a modification of the M1 liner (Liner, Helmet, M1, Parachutist's) with a special chinstrap which insured that the helmet would stay on during the opening shock and descent of the parachute. This liner chinstrap was provided with a chin cup, and two snap fasteners secured the steel shell to corresponding fasteners on the inside of the liner and prevented the separation of the two components during parachute jumping. The regular helmet shell chinstrap was worn behind the head. This item was standardized in January 1945, and 392,000 helmets were produced during the period from January to April 1943. Helmet, T14 series (Signal Corps).-This was an experimental series of helmets designed to provide the combat Signal Corps photographer with maximum protection under extreme operating conditions. The standard M1 helmet restricted necessary movement and adjustments of still and motion picture cameras and prompted the dangerous habit of removing the helmet while being exposed to enemy fire. In May 1944, the Signal Corps proposed that the front segment of the M1 helmet be cut away and an adjustable, hinged visor flap be placed over the cutaway area. The Ordnance Department prepared test models which did not gain wide acceptance during field tests in the European theater. One objection was due to the fact that, when the visor was locked in its upright position, the helmet bore a superficial resemblance to the German helmet. The Metropolitan Museum of Art incorporated this problem in their work on a helmet for the Armed Forces and developed several promising models. Cessation of hostilities in 1945 prevented the completion of an end item.
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FIGURE 309.-Helmet, Steel, M1C (Parachutist's). Helmets, T19 and T20 series (Tank).-In November 1940,
Headquarters, Armored Force, Fort Knox, Ky., requested the cooperation of the Ordnance Department in modifying the then existing tank helmets to make them more compatible with the varied functions and hazards of tank crewmen. Concurrently, the Quartermaster Corps was engaged in a design of a new tank crash helmet which would offer protection from blows to the head. In 1944, subsequent correspondence requested that the tank helmet designs embody (1) a liner, incorporating a crash-type suspension, over which could be fitted a modified M1 ballistic shell and (2) the ballistic steel shell with an integral crash-type suspension. The proposed military characteristics required that the
helmet would (1) protect the wearer from blows to the head during maneuvers over rough grounds, (2) be relatively light in weight with a comfortable fit, (3) permit full access to and the usage of various sighting devices, (4) permit wearing of radio headsets, (5) allow the forehead of the wearer to rest directly against the tank headrest, and (6) be capable of furnishing either ballistic or crash (bump) protection. The Ordnance Department developed six experimental series,
and the Metropolitan Museum of Art evaluated the models in accordance with the Armed Forces specifications. Series T8 incorporated a ballistic helmet with a crash suspension and T9 provided a ballistic cover for the existing tank crash models (fig. 310). During this same period (1944), extensive work had resulted in a number of prototypes of flyer's helmets, and certain of these were considered as being adaptable to the needs of the combat tank crewmen. The T10 series
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FIGURE 310.-Tank crash helmets in use in November 1941.
(fig. 311A) was very similar to the helmet, T9, but provided an associated crash suspension in the steel shell. Helmet, T12 (fig. 311B) was based directly on the Helmet, M3 (Flyer's) with an internal crash suspension, and T13 (fig. 311C) was prepared without the latter feature and was designed to fit over a cut down M1 liner. The T16 (fig. 311D) series was a modified M3 flyer's helmet with a reduction in certain dimensions to bring it within the limitations of the requisite military characteristics. Between October and December 1944, helmets of the T10, T12, T13, and T16 series were tested by the Armored Force Board, Fort Knox, Ky. All the samples were found to be excessive in weight and overall dimensions and incompatible with the operation of the various sighting devices. The extensive offset and posterior extension of the helmets were developed to accommodate the radio headset and to provide adequate neck protection, respectively. In 1944 and 1945, a coordinated effort of the Ordnance Department and the Quartermaster Corps was directed toward the development of an acceptable modification of the M1 helmet shell to be used with the crash suspension-type M1 liner. Helmet, T19E1 (fig. 312) was derived from an M1 helmet shell. Changes in its contour permitted the use of various optical equipment while allowing the helmet to be used in conjunction with the new quartermaster
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FIGURE 311.-Series of helmets. A.
T10. B. T12. C. T13.
D. T16. liner which offered bump protection and clearance for the
headsets. An unfavorable report on this helmet was rendered in May 1945 because of the instability of the helmet-liner combination. After this work on the T19E1 helmet, helmets T20 and T20E1, produced in sample lots, incorporated a head suspension directly within the T19E1 ballistic shell. Finally, the T19E2 and T20E2 series evolved and were
based upon a new contour design developed at the Armored Medical Research Laboratory. Definitive reports on these four items were not available before the cessation of hostilities in World War II. However, the consensus was to the effect that further attempts to produce a helmet for use in tanks by modifications of the standard M1 helmet should be abandoned and that the search should be directed toward a completely new and specific tank helmet design. More recent advances in the design of helmets for crewmen of combat vehicles
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Helmets, T21-24 (ground troops).-Throughout the
World War II period, investigative work continued in an attempt to improve the
standard M1 helmet. In conjunction with the Ordnance Department and the Aero
Medical Labora-
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paralleled the work performed for the Armored Forces. Combat
airmen were faced with the situation of wearing oxygen masks and goggles and
earphones but still requiring some ballistic protective device for the head.
Before an acceptable helmet was available, 35.7 percent of unarmored bomber
combat crews sustained lethal wounds in the head region. After introduction of
the "Grow helmet" or M4 helmet, this number was substantially reduced.
A few of the helmet models which were developed and standardized are discussed in
the paragraphs which follow.
Helmet, steel, T2 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M3.-This
was a direct modification of the M1 steel helmet shell with an associated
adjustable head suspension and cutaway on each side of the helmet body to
accommodate earphones. A hinged earplate provided protection over the cutaway
earphone area. Because of the immediate need for a flyer's helmet, the T2
received extended service tests and was eventually standardized in December 1943
as Helmet, M3 (fig. 316). This helmet weighed 3 pounds and 3 ounces. Between December 1943 and April 1945, 213,543 helmets of this type were
produced. During its development, it was recognized that this type of helmet
was unsuitable for a number of confined combat stations where a closely
fitting skullcap type of helmet was necessary.
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upon this design and field experience. By September 1943, this model was being tested in conjunction with the T2 model. It consisted of
overlapping Hadfield steel plates which were enclosed in cloth pockets and
mounted in the skullcap cover of fabric and leather. Openings were available on
the lateral aspect of the helmet to permit the wearing of headphones.
Notwithstanding the decreased protective coverage of this helmet, it could be
worn in the restricted space of aircraft turrets where a larger one would not
be acceptable. This helmet was standardized as Helmet, M4, in December 1943
(fig. 317A). It weighed 2 pounds and 1 ounce. In February 1944, it was
recommended that the length of the M4 be increased to provide an adequate fit
over all types of summer and winter leather flying helmets.
Helmet, T3E3 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M4A1.-Shortly
after the M4 became standard issue, it was apparent that armored
earplates were required, and a number of experimental models were developed and
tested. Finally, by April 1943, the T3E3 was adopted to replace the M4 and was
standardized as the M4A1 (fig. 317B). It differed from the M4 by having a slight
increase in length and by being equipped with attached metal earplates over the
temporal regions. This helmet weighed 2 pounds and 12 ounces. A method was also
devised to equip the existing M4 helmets with a fitted hood containing metal
earplates. In addition, the M4A1 was later modified (M4A2) to improve the
attachment of the earplates and to increase its compatibility with other flying
gear. After the adoption of the newer model, a considerable number of
experimental helmets were developed and tested in a continuing effort to produce
a universal air force helmet with extended area coverage, increased protective
ballistics limits, wearer acceptability, and compatibility with associated
flying goggles and headphones. Because of fabrication difficulties with the
overlapping steel plates in M4 helmet series, emphasis was centered upon a
one-piece closely fitting helmet bowl with attached earplates. In addition to
the Hadfield manganese steel, a number of other metallic materials were
considered, and at one time aluminum seemed to provide the promising combination
of comparable ballistic protection at a somewhat lower weight. However, during
World War II, Hadfield steel continued to be the principal ballistic material
for helmets.
Helmet, steel, T8 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M5.-The
helmet, T6E4, had a single steel bowl with no associated suspension system,
fitted close to the head, and had large hinged earflaps. It was a most promising
model, and future modifications originated from the T6 series. The T8 models
were based upon the specifications of the T6E4 but incorporated numerous design
changes which increased its acceptability over previous models. The helmet
consisted of a one-piece steel bowl with a head suspension system and hinged
earplates or cheekplates which extended down on to the sides of the face in
line with the leather flyer's helmet. The usual webbing suspension system was
augmented by a nape strap that held the front of the helmet against the forehead
so that there would be no interference with vision. The cheekplates permitted
the wearing of earphones and goggles. One additional mod-
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type of breastplate was manufactured by the Atwater Armor
Company, also of New Haven. Both types consisted of metallic ballistic material
made up of a number of steel plates. The product from the Cook & Company
consisted of two pieces of steel inserted into pockets in a regular black
military vest. The infantry vest weighed 31/2 pounds, and another model for
cavalry and artillery weighed 6 pounds. The purchase price of a vest for an
officer was $7 and for that of a private was $5. The Atwater armor consisted of
four large plates of steel held in position on the body by broad metal hooks
over the shoulders and a belt around the waist. In addition, smaller pieces
could be attached to the bottom of this cuirass. This vest was heavier than
the Cook models and cost approximately twice as much. The supply of these
finished commercial products was augmented by specimens of armor apparently of
individual manufacture by some local blacksmith.
During the course of his investigations, Dr. Bashford Dean of
the Metropolitan Museum of Art was able to test the Atwater armorplate and found
that it would defeat a jacketed bullet fired from a caliber .45 pistol at a
distance of 10 feet. In his short but excellent discussion of body armor in the
Civil War, Harold L. Peterson felt that the chief factors in the discontinuance
of body armor at that time were the inconvenience due to the extra weight and
bulk and the marked ridicule of those individuals who were wearing the armor by
their comrades who did not avail themselves of the protection.
Dr. Dean in his "Helmets and Body Armor in Modern
Warfare" presents a complete account of the history of body armor during
World War I. Most of the participating countries developed various forms of
protective devices for the torso and the extremities, but the excessive weight
or lack of adequate protection restricted their general use in combat. Some form
of body armor was seen on all fronts from 1915 through 1918, but only on
experimental basis, and body armor was never in general usage. The most
successful use of armor was by sentinels, members of patrols, and stationary
machinegun crews. Despite the relative low troop acceptability because of
excessive weight, it was generally believed that these forms of personnel armor
had great potential value.
General Adrian who was instrumental in developing the French
helmet was also interested in a number of other devices, including an abdominal
shield, a breastplate, and leg armor. Some of the medical officers
investigating the casualties of British forces through the year 1916 indicated
that more than three-quarters of the wounded men could have been saved if some
form of armor had been worn. This assumption was based upon a study of the type
of wounds (penetrating rather than perforating) and the preponderance of
causative missiles being derived from fragmentation-type weapons (either
shrapnel or shell fragment). Similar statistics were derived from studies of
French casualties where it was believed that 60 to 80 percent of all wounds were
produced by missiles of low to medium velocity.
Maj. Charles H. Peck, MC, Assistant Director, Surgical
Service, American Expeditionary Forces stated: "Wounds caused by missiles
of medium and low
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sufficient armor for crews of 12 B-17's were ordered and
received about 1 March 1943. Later, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker who had assumed
command of the Eighth Air Force directed that sufficient armor be produced in
England to equip all heavy bombers located there and also recommended that armor
suits be provided for all heavy bomber units destined for the Eighth Air Force.
The original armor provided complete protection for the
anterior and posterior aspects of the thorax. The vest was placed across the
shoulder and fastened by closing the dot fasteners over one shoulder. In
addition to the vest, a sporran apron section was suspended from the vest by
fasteners and provided protection for the abdomen, crotch, and part of the lower
extremities. A number of models were made to be worn by various crew members,
depending upon their position and function in the aircraft. The pilot and
copilot wore a half vest only in the front, and bombardiers, navigators, and
gunners wore full vests to secure both front and back protection. A full-width
sporran was for men who had to stand during the performance of their combat
duty. Other forms were tapered toward the bottom. The full vest weighed 16
pounds; half vest, 7 pounds; full sporran, 61/2 pounds; and tapered
sporran, 41/2 pounds. The armor was made to wear over all other clothing and
equipment and eventually was constructed so that the complete suit could be
quickly jettisoned (fig. 319) by pulling a ripcord.
Numerous casualty surveys10 conducted at various times
following the introduction of flyer's armor showed a variable reduction in the
total wounds incurred and in the number of fatal wounds over the parts of the
body protected by armor. Despite the variability expressed by the various
surveys, they all showed one thing in common; namely, that flak suits for combat
crewmen were a highly successful and valuable adjunct in decreasing the total
number of wounds and the number of lethal wounds in the thoracoabdominal region.
Surveys conducted among heavy bomber combat crew members
before and after the adoption of body armor showed the following results. The
surveys in the period before the use of body armor were conducted from March
throted from the Eighth Air Force in England. This was
made up of two sections which provided protection for the front and back of the
body and was fastened at the shoulders by quick-release dot fasteners. It was
intended to be worn by gunners, navigators, bombardiers, and radio operators
whose combat duties required them to move about so that they
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Since there was the important question of whether the foregoing results were due solely to the usage of body armor or due to a number
of tactical conditions, such as change either in combat formations or in enemy tactics, a survey was done of the battle damage to aircraft during the same survey period. In the period before the use of body armor, 26.46 percent of aircraft returning to their bases from bombing missions were found to have battle damage. In the period after the use of body armor, 21.47 percent of returning aircraft had battle damage. Therefore, in a comparison of the two periods, one finds a 60 percent decrease in total number of wounds sustained by crewmen following the introduction of body armor and a concomitant 18 percent decrease in aircraft battle damage. Therefore, some of the reduction in the
number of casualties and in the total number of hits sustained by the casualties was undoubtedly due to factors other than body armor, but there can be no doubt whatsoever that the main reduction was due solely to the introduction of body armor.
A study pertaining to the anatomic location of wounds
sustained during the two survey periods revealed a reduction of 14 percent
in wounds of the head
666
and neck, 58 percent in wounds of the thorax, and 36 percent
in wounds of the abdomen. During the survey period among the heavy bomber combat crew members, there was a reduction in fatality of thoracic wounds from 36 to 8 percent and of abdominal wounds from 39 to 7 percent. This meant that after the introduction of body armor there was a reduction of 77.1 percent in the fatality rate of thoracic wounds and a reduction of 82.8 percent in the fatality of abdominal wounds. During the survey period, it was also shown that body armor
prevented approximately 74 percent of wounds in the body region covered. After termination of hostilities in Europe, a comprehensive survey of casualty figures showed that the fatality rate for individuals with thoracic wounds fell from 34.9 percent in the unarmored group to 15.3 percent in the individuals wearing
body armor. In those individuals sustaining abdominal wounds, the fatality rate was reduced from 32.5 to 15.7 percent. Therefore, because of the untiring pioneer work of General Grow and his fellow medical officers, the value of body armor for combat crewmen in the Army Air Forces was definitely established, but not until the Korean War was a similar situation attained in regard to combat ground troops.
Initially, the flyer's armor, or flak suit, as it was more
commonly known, was produced solely by British manufacturers. However, it soon became apparent that they should not be required to be the sole source of supply for the critically needed manganese steel. Nevertheless, a total of 600 suits were made in England. Samples suits were received in the United States in July 1943, and the Army Ordnance Department took over the task of quantity production and improvement in design. From that date until the termination of World War II hostilities, the Ordnance Department and various civilian institutions were responsible for producing approximately 23 types of flyer's armor. The armor workshop of the Metropolitan Museum of Art became the main design research laboratory in the development of flyer's armor. The Air Force Materiel Command at Wright Field, Ohio, had also been interested in development and production of armor, but this function was also turned over to the Ordnance Department.
The initial production of the armor in the United States was
based solely on the design which had been developed by General Grow and his British advisers. Hadfield manganese steel plates, of the same composition as that used in the M1 helmet, provided the ballistic protection. These plates were sewed into cloth pockets and fastened to a cotton-duck backing. However, by the end of 1943, a nylon-duck cloth was substituted for the cotton material. The nylon duck weighed 20 ounces to the square yard and increased the ballistic protection limits of the vest.
The Flyer's Vest, M1 (fig. 320), was a close copy of the
design which had been submitted from the Eighth Air Force in England. This was made up of two sections which provided protection for the front and back of the body and was fastened at the shoulders by quick-release dot fasteners. It was intended to be worn by gunners, navigators, bombardiers, and radio operators whose combat duties required them to move about so that they
667
would be exposed to injury from both the front and the back. The complete M1 vest, including both front (fig. 320A) and back sections (fig. 320B), weighed 17 pounds and 6 ounces and provided an area protection of 3.82 square feet. Between August 1943 and August 1945, 338,780 M1 vests were produced.
The Flyer's Vest, M2 (fig. 321), was made up only of an armored front section, very similar to the frontpiece of the M1 vest, and an unarmored backpiece. It was intended to be worn by pilots and copilots and other
combat personnel whose duties would allow them to sit in a seat which could have
an armored back and provide the protection for the back of the body. The weight
of the front section for the M2 vest was 7 pounds and 15 ounces and provided an
area of protection of 1.45 square feet. Between August 1943 and July 1945,
95,919 M2 vests were produced. Both the M1 and M2 vests were standardized on 5
October 1943. As mentioned previously, the ballistic protection was provided by
2-inch square overlapping Hadfield manganese steel plates which were enclosed in
pockets, and since the original linen canvas stock for the backing was not
available in the United States a cotton canvas stock was utilized and later
replaced by ballistic nylon stock.
The Flyer's Apron, M3 (fig. 322A) had a construction
similar to the frontpiece of the M1 vest and consisted of a roughly triangular
piece of armor intended for use in turrets and other positions in the aircraft
where space limitation was a factor. It could be fastened to the front of the M1
or M2 vests by means of dot fasteners and had a total weight of 4 pounds and 14
ounces. It gave an area protection of 1.15 square feet. The Flyer's Apron, M4
(fig. 322B), was similar to the M3 but was larger in size and was intended for
use by waist gunners and other individuals who could utilize a full length
armor. It had a weight of 7 pounds and 2 ounces and an area protection of 1.66
square feet.
668
1These figures have been compiled from various sources and do not
represent final Ordnance Department compilations.
TABLE 250.-Flyers'
armor and corresponding weight and area protection
673
Following the widespread use and adoption of flyer's armor,
a considerable number of other sections of the fighting forces became interested
in its possible usage. In October 1943, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Number
Twenty Five became interested in possible revision or modification of the flyer's
armor for their usage. Similarly, the Cavalry Board at Fort Riley, Kans., was
also interested in its possible use for mechanized cavalry personnel. In
addition, one of the companies producing flyer's armor also submitted samples
of a modification of the original design for possible usage in amphibious and
other invasion landings. These designs were of various types; some provided
only thoracoabdominal protection, and others provided protection for the
extremities.
Ground Troops (World War II)
Unlike helmet design, which had a considerable carryover from
World War I development and experience, little if any information was available
at the advent of World War II on the possible design of a body armor
for ground troops. Numerous military authorities had advocated the use of body
armor during World War I, but it had only reached a preliminary testing stage
before it was generally rejected. During World War I, the United States
had developed several types of armor. One, the Brewster Body Shield, was made of
chrome nickel steel, weighed 40 pounds, and consisted of a breastplate and a
headpiece. This armor would withstand Lewis machinegun bullets at 2,700 f.p.s.
but was unduly clumsy and heavy. In addition, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in
February 1918 had designed a breastplate based upon certain 15th century armor.
Again, this model weighed 27 pounds; all investigators considered it to be very
noisy and thought that it markedly restricted all movements of the wearer.
Another extremely interesting model was the scaled waistcoats or jazerans which
were constructed of overlapping steel scales fixed to a leather lining. The
armor was closely fitting and was considered comfortable. The total weight was
11 pounds.
Numerous investigators in the Ordnance Department and in the
other technical services had contemplated the development of armor for ground
troops in the early stages of World War II. However, very preliminary
investigations had shown that most models were too heavy, were incompatible with
standard items of equipment, and tended to restrict the mobility of the
Soldier. Therefore, the development of armor for ground troops was initially
rejected as an unsound idea, and the development of a flyer's armor received
more or less full attention. However, continued investigation in the development
of lighter weight metallic ballistic material and in the relatively new field
of nonmetallic ballistic material led to a resurge in interest for armor for
ground troops. Therefore, the historical study must be traced through both types
of ballistic material, and initially the types of armor utilizing metallic
material will be discussed.
It is difficult to ascertain exactly when the redevelopment
of armor for ground troops was initiated, but it apparently began sometime near
the middle
675
Other types of Japanese body armor (figs. 327, 328, and 329)
which were captured in the Pacific consisted of an anterior thoracoabdominal
shield with and without lower extremity protection. Various other members of
casualty surveys in the Pacific areas, notably in the New Georgia and
Bougainville campaigns, were also convinced of the apparent importance which
body armor might have in reducing total number of wounds and number of lethal
wounds in ground troops.
Based upon the armor submitted by Colonel Trimble and on the
various other specimens collected by technical observers of the Ordnance
Department in the Southwest Pacific Area, an experimental model was developed
and this design was known as vest, T34. The armor consisted of 0.684-inch thick
carbon steel plates. Owing to the excessive weight of the end item and also to
the development of lighter weight ballistic materials, the T34 series was
discontinued. Various other experimental models were being tested at about the
same time and one of these consisted of the armor, breast, T36, which was
patterned somewhat after a World War I model. The vest, series T39, consisted of
a small piece of anterior armor with a stitched nylon-webb backing and utilized various metallic ballistic materials, such as steel or aluminum, in
the form of overlapping plates. Numerous other experimental models were
FIGURE 312. Helmet, T19E1. have made increasing use of nonmetallic ballistic materials and have attempted to provide a headgear with high user acceptability and possessing primary bump protection and secondary ballistic protection. Figure
313 illustrates the present combat vehicle crewman's helmet. The following information on this helmet was released on 25 February 1958 by the Public Information Division, Office of the Chief of Information and Education, Department of the Army: Tank crewmen will have the first helmet specifically designed for their protection when mass protection tests of a new helmet developed by the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps are completed. Up to the present time, tank Soldiers have worn either the standard M-1 Steel Helmet with liner or football helmets, none of which met their requirements. The new helmet, officially designated Combat Vehicle Crewman's (CVC) Helmet, is constructed of multi-layers of laminated nylon fabric, and has a built-in communications system
developed by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. The total assembly weighs about three pounds. Nylon employed in its construction is similar to that of the Army's armor vest. Mounted outside the helmet, the communications equipment includes a microphone on an adjustable boom, a three-way switch for listening or talking by radio or through the tank's intercommunications system, and a cable with a quick-disconnect plug for emergency evacuation from the vehicle. Inside the helmet, snug-fitting earphones reduce outside noise and help guard the ears
against injury.
654
FIGURE 313.-Combat vehicle crewman's helmet, February 1958.
tory, at Wright Field, Ohio, the Metropolitan Museum of Art
designed the T21, T22, and T23 series.
The T21 (fig. 314) was patterned after the crown of Helmet,
M5 (Flyer's), but without the earflaps and with a brim contour based on the M1
shell. Its shape had been established through anthropometric studies of the
human head (fig. 315) and provided a curvature in all directions at all points
on the body of the helmet. This latter feature was purported to provide a
decrease in the size of the helmet with no sacrifice in area coverage while
increasing the strength and protection beyond previously possible limits. The shell weighed 2 pounds and 2 ounces and was to be worn with
the
conventional inner plastic liner.
Helmet T22 was smaller than T21, was a one-piece unit
incorporating a head suspension, and was designed to be worn without a liner.
Conversely, the T23 was larger in size than the T21 and permitted the use of
thicker liners. In the interim between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War,
modifications of the series just mentioned and additional new series were
developed but none obtained approval or standardization.
Shortly after the adoption of the M1 helmet, various
investigations revealed that other materials might possess superior ballistic
protective limits
655
FIGURE 314.-Ground troop helmet, T21.
and that these materials might obviate certain metallurgical
and production difficulties inherent in the Hadfield manganese steel. In 1942,
a one-piece helmet was fabricated from the resin-impregnated glass fiber
laminate known as doron (p. 682). At this time, doron was under consideration
primarily for use in a proposed nonmetallic helmet for civil defense workers,
but subsequent tests by interested military agencies showed that existing
prototypes did not stand up well when exposed to the rigors of combat life.
Aluminum and nylon in combination had received extensive
ballistic testing in the development of body armor for ground troops and flyers,
and by 1945 samples of helmets utilizing these materials were being produced.
Coupled with the high degree of protection against fragmentation-type weapons
was the additional possibility of furnishing equivalent coverage to the Ml
helmet with an appreciable reduction in weight. Therefore, the T24 helmet was
produced consisting of an outer aluminum shell, modeled after the M1, with an
inner laminated-nylon liner. Despite the cessation of World War II hostilities,
the helmets were tested and deficiencies noted in the ability of the nylon
insert to resist delamination and warpage. The T21E utilized the aluminum and
nylon elements but was based upon the contour pattern of the T21. This pattern
had evolved from scientific anthropometric studies of the human head and
permitted a lower silhouette and closer fit than the M1 design. At the present
time (1958), the Helmet, M1, is still the standard item of issue to Army
ground troops.
656
FIGURE 315.-Aero Medical Laboratory standard head models.
Flyer's Models (World War II)
Despite the fact that the development of protective devices
for air forces combat personnel in World War II is somewhat beyond the scope of
this volume, it is believed that a brief discussion of the development of some
of the helmet models is very appropriate since many of the problems which were
encountered were very similar to those seen in the development of certain
forms for ground force personnel. The complete story of the development of
protective devices for air force personnel has been written by Link and Coleman.6
This work should be consulted by all those who are interested in the medical
participation in the development of helmets and body armor in the Army Air
Forces in World War II.
By 1943, it had become very apparent that the standard Army
helmet required redesigning to make it adaptable to the needs of air forces
combat personnel.7 Similar in nature but more extensive in scope,
the problem
6Link, Mae M., and Coleman, Hubert A.:
Medical Support
of Army Air Forces in World War II. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 617-635.
7In 1943, Col. Loyal Davis, MC, senior consultant in
neurological surgery in the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of
Operations, U.S. Army, found that the regular issue steel helmet furnished
excellent protection against craniocerebral injuries for the Soldier but that it
did not provide the same excellent protection for crews of aircraft. He realized
the necessity for a helmet designed specifically for air force combat personnel.
For an account of his efforts to obtain a helmet, designed for this personnel,
which would allow free and unrestricted movements, would not interfere in any
way with the field of vision, would be lightweight and afford protection from
heat and cold, and, most important, would provide protection, at least equal to
that afforded by the regular issue steel helmet, against craniocerebral
injuries, see chapter IV in "Medical Department, United States Army,
Surgery in World War II. Surgical Consultants. Volume II." [In
preparation.] See also Davis, L.: A Helmet for Protection Against Craniocerebral
Injuries. Surg. Gynec. & Obst. 79: 89-91, July 1944.-J. C. B.
FIGURE 316.-Flyer's Helmet, M3.
Helmet, steel, T3 (Flyer's), standardized as Helmet, M4.-During
the early part of 1943, the Eighth Air Force had combat tested a skullcap
type of helmet, and the Ordnance Department proceeded to develop prototypes
based
659
FIGURE 317.-Flyer's
helmets. A. M4. B. M4A1.
C. M5.
ification provided a slight roll to the back of the helmet
to reduce the possibility of injury to the neck region during crashlandings. In
January 1945, the T8 was standardized as Helmet, M5 (fig. 317C), and was
designated for all combat aircraft positions except the upper turret gunner of
the A-20 and the ringsight gunner of the B-29. The M4A2 was still used in the two positions just mentioned. The M5 helmet weighed 2 pounds and 12 ounces.
Between February and August 1945, 93,495 helmets of this type were produced.
During the period from October 1943 to July 1944, numerous
designs for face armor were studied concurrently with the development of flyers'
helmets. Most of the models were intended to be worn in conjunction with the
helmet and were to provide protection over the lower part of the face, the
neck, and the oxygen mask. Both metallic (fig. 318) and nonmetallic materials
were tested. The project was suspended in 1944 because of the lack of
specific requirement for this type of armor.
660
FIGURE 318.-Face armor (T6 type) designed to be worn in
conjunction with the flyer's helmet.
BODY ARMOR
"Body armor is not new."8 Some form of personnel
protective device has probably been used in every war which has been recorded
in the pages of history.
During the Civil War,9 a
number of types of
protective shields and breastplates were developed by interested parties, and
some of these were considered for possible official military usage. However, no
standard official form of armor was available, and all forms were purchased by
individual Soldiers. Two types have been described as being most popular among
Union Soldiers. These consisted of the "Soldiers' Bullet Proof Vest"
manufactured by the G. & D. Cook & Company of New Haven, Conn.,
and the second most popular
8I have used this simple statement as the introductory
remark
in numerous lectures given on the subject of the history of body armor, and it
certainly expresses the course of body armor development in modern times.-W.
F. E.
9See footnote 1 (6), p. 641.
662
velocity constitute about 80 percent of all." Therefore,
numerous test models were developed by the Ordnance Department and a few of
these did reach the stage of field testing, but no final standardization was
ever achieved.
The British were interested not only in metallic but also in
nonmetallic ballistic material. They developed a silk-lined necklet which was
purported to stop a 230-grain pistol ball at 600 f.p.s. However, the primary
materials, extremely difficult to obtain, deteriorated very rapidly under combat conditions and were considered costly ($25). In addition, the British
also studied a 6-pound body shield that was approximately 1 inch thick and was
made of many layers of linen, cotton, and silk hardened by a resinous material.
Certain responsible military authorities were also convinced of the possible
potential value of body armor, and in 1917 General Pershing said: "Effort
should be continued toward development of a satisfactory form of personal body
armor."
In the interim between 1918 and the onset of World War II, experimentation in body armor materials and design was maintained at a very
low level. However, in conjunction with its general program of developing and
testing ballistic materials, the Ordnance Department was aware of the
possibilities of certain materials' being utilized for a protective garment
for the individual Soldier.
In the fall of 1941, the British Army was producing a model
of body armor in preparation for a field test, and samples of this model were
furnished to the United States. The armor weighed 2 pounds and 12 ounces and
consisted of three plates of 1 mm. thick manganese steel. Two plates were to be
worn over the front and one over the back of the body. In addition, the Ordnance
Department was considering two other forms of British body armor; namely, the
Armorette and the Wisbrod Armored Vest. The Armorette was composed of metal
plates embedded in a vulcanized rubber-duck foundation which imparted a high
degree of flexibility to the model. The Wisbrod vest utilized cloth-covered
steel plates which overlapped to provide protection to the front of the thorax
and abdomen. Both of these latter two models had been under consideration since
the early part of 1941. The models were studied by various testing boards of the
interested technical services, but all reports indicated that any advantages of
such armor would be very slight as compared to the overall loss of combat
efficiency and to the increase in the Soldier's carrying load. Therefore,
individual body armor for ground troops seemed to be a military luxury which
could not be indulged in during an all-out global conflict, and there was no
apparent requirement for a standard item of issue. This latter decision was
officially reached in November 1942 and led to some decline in the overall
interest and developmental program for body armor for ground troops. But shortly
after this, an extensive program was initiated for the development of protective
armor for the Air Forces. It is of some interest to note that in April 1943 an
endorsement was written to the Army Air Forces by the Army Ordnance Department
in which it was felt that body armor for general use by ground troops had been
rejected because of the apparent loss of mobility of the troops and that an
application might well be considered for
663
combat Air Forces personnel. It was felt that ballistic
protection could be provided either by use of personnel body armor or by use of
plates or curtains which might be placed in strategic places within the
aircraft.
Air Forces (World War II)
The history of the development and usage of body armor by
combat crewmen of the Army Air Forces during World War II is adequately
discussed in the publication by Link and Coleman. The development of these items
was so intimately connected with various casualty surveys-some of which are
reported in this volume-and by research work of the Army Ordnance Department
that a brief résumé would be appropriate in this chapter. No attempt will be
made to give a complete coverage of all items and the rationale behind their
development, but the more important models will be described since many of these
bear a very close relation to subsequent development for Army ground troops.
The initial impetus to the development of body armor for the
American flyer was due to the research and field testing which the British had
performed in an attempt to develop some form of personnel armor for their ground
troops operating in North Africa. Subsequent to this, in early October 1942, an
analysis of wounds incurred by U.S. Eighth Air Force combat personnel revealed
that approximately 70 percent were due to relatively low velocity missiles. In
one survey involving 303 casualties and conducted before the adoption of body
armor, it was found that flak fragments were responsible for 38 percent of the
wounds; 20 mm. cannon shell fragments, 39 percent; machine-gun bullets, 15
percent; and secondary missiles, 8 percent. A later survey of 1,293 casualties
revealed a similar breakdown of missiles. In addition, it seemed that protection
provided to the regions of the chest and abdomen would bring about the highest
rate of return in reducing both fatalities (mortality) and total numbers of hits
(morbidity).
Therefore, it appeared to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Malcolm C.
Grow, MC, then surgeon of the Eighth Air Force, that some type of body armor
might serve to protect aircrew members and save a considerable number of lives
among the combat crews. The initial consideration of a ballistic material was
based upon previous British experiments which had revealed that a manganese
steel plate 1 mm. in thickness would resist penetration of a caliber .303 bullet
at a velocity of approximately 1,250 f.p.s. In addition, this material was
shatterproof, had high resistance, and was comparatively light in weight. After
deciding on this ballistic material, Colonel Grow, in association with the
Wilkinson Sword Company, Ltd., of London, formulated plans for a vest made up of
overlapping plates of manganese steel. These 2-inch square Hadfield steel plates
were secured in pockets and sewed to a backing of flax canvas. Preliminary
testing of the armor was so favorable that Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding
General, Eighth Air Force, approved the recommendation on 15 October 1942 for
the order of 10 suits of armor for experimental testing. Following this,
FIGURE 320.-Flyer's Vest, M1. A. Front
section. B. Interior of back section
FIGURE 321.-Flyer's Vest, M2. Interior of armored
front section.
FIGURE 322.-Flyer's apron.
A. M3. B. M4.
In addition to the flyer's apron, it was also believed that
some protection should be provided to the groin, the abdomen, and the thighs for
personnel who remained seated. The first test item was a groin armor, T12 (fig.
323A), designed in 1943. It consisted of 10 steel plates which were shaped and
hinged to give protection to the anatomic areas just listed. The armor weighed
approximately 8 pounds and gave an area protection of 235 square inches. A later
modification known as T13 was received from the Eighth Air Force in January 1944
and consisted of three sections of overlapping steel plates and weighed
approximately 14 pounds and gave an area protection similar to that of the T12.
The T13 was modified in March 1944 and standardized as Groin Armor, M5 (fig.
323B and C). It was made in three sections so that the central area could be
drawn up between the legs. The side section spread out to provide protection for
the upper aspect of the thighs.
669
FIGURE 323.-Flyer's groin armor.
A. T12. B and C. M5, showing
interior view.
The entire piece could be attached to the M2 vest. It weighed
15 pounds and 4 ounces and provided an area protection of 3.72 square feet. All
forms of the armor just described were equipped with quick-release dot fasteners
and tapes and thongs connected by a ripcord for rapid jettisoning of the armor
by the wearer.
The continued research of the Ordnance Department in an
attempt to provide an equal or higher level of ballistic protection with an
increase in area coverage and a decrease in total weight of the armor soon led
to the development of other models utilizing different ballistic materials. The
Flyer's Vest, M6 (fig. 324), was standardized on 1 July 1945. This vest had
the same function as the M1 vest but was made of aluminum plates with a nylon
back padding. The vest weighed 14 pounds and 9 ounces, or 2 pounds and 14 ounces
less than the M1 vest, and had an area protection of 4.09 square feet as
compared to the 3.82 square feet of the M1 model. The Flyer's Vest, M7, was
of the same construction as the M6 and was made to replace the M2 vest. With
670
FIGURE 324.-Flyer's Vest, M6. A. Front
section, exterior view. B. Front section, interior view. C. Back section, exterior
view. D. Back section, interior view.
the shift of emphasis to back-packed parachutes in the
Pacific areas, the armor design had to be modified to fit over the parachutes.
This gave rise to two models (M6A1 and M7A1) which fulfilled this function. The
models were constructed of aluminum and nylon. In addition to these last two
items, a number of other experimental models were developed by the Ordnance
Department and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The T5 series of flyer's armor
contained larger overlapping armorplates and were held snugly against the body
by an elastic webbing. This provided an increase in area protection with a
decrease in weight of the end item.
Concurrent with the interest by both the Army and Navy in
laminated layers of woven glass fabric impregnated with plastic (doron), this
material was considered in flyer's armor. The T37 series in experimental
models showed a replacement of the steel plates in the M1 vest by flat doron
plates 2 inches square and 0.130 inch thick. A later modification utilized
thicker doron plates that had an outer curvature. However, with the advent of
improved aluminum and nylon ballistic material, the doron project for flyer's
armor was discontinued.
671
FIGURE 325.-Flyer's neck armor.
A. T44. B. T59E1.
In addition to the improvement in the flyer's vest, similar
end items and experimental models were developed in aprons and groin armor. The
Flyer's Apron Armor, M8 and M9, were standardized in July 1945 and were to be
used with the M6 and the M7 vests. Both of these were constructed of aluminum
and nylon; the M8 apron armor weighed 4 pounds and 11 ounces while the M9
weighed 6 pounds and 8 ounces. Additional apron armor to correspond with the
M6E1 and M7E1 were also developed. With the replacement of the Hadfield steel
plates by aluminum and nylon, a similar change occurred in groin armor. The
Groin Armor, M10, standardized in July 1945, was made of aluminum and nylon and
was to be used in conjunction with the newer vest. At the termination of
hostilities, many very interesting tests were being performed to see if flyer's
clothing and equipment could be made of nylon-type cloth and by itself provide
some ballistic protection. This would then have reduced the weight of the
aluminum-nylon-cloth combination ballistic armor and might have provided a
higher protection ballistic limit with a decrease in total weight of the armor
end item.
At one time, it was felt that protection should be given to
the region of the neck which might be exposed between the helmet and the armored
vest. Therefore, a T44 series (fig. 325A) of experimental models was developed
and consisted of a Queen Anne's type of neckpiece which was made to rest on
the shoulders and attached to the M4 series of helmets. This had the same
construction as the M1 vest and consisted of 2-inch square Hadfield steel
plates. The development of this item was terminated in June 1945 when a shift
was made to aluminum and nylon as the ballistic material. The T59 series (fig.
325B) consisted of curved aluminum plates with a nylon-duck backing which was
made to fit the contour of the shoulder and neck. Both frontpieces and
backpieces were made to be attached to the armored vest of similar construction.
One of the experimental models, T59E2, was standardized as M13 in
672
September 1945. Tables 249 and 250 show some of the production figures for
the various types of flyers' armor and a summary of the weight and area
protection. All of the statistics have been derived from various sources and
might show some variation from other compilations.
TABLE 249.-Production figures1
for flyers' armor in
World War II, 1943-45
Type of armor
1943
1944
1945
Total
Flyer's Vest:
M1
111,842
130,937
96,001
338,780
M2
42,373
29,546
24,000
95,919
M6
---
---
1,075
1,075
Flyer's Apron:
M3
57,513
54,571
30,730
142,814
M4
68,467
84,665
56,012
209,144
Flyer's groin armor, M5
---
41,872
68,029
109,901
Flyer's neck armor:
T44
---
---
10,969
10,969
T59E1
---
---
100
100
Material and type of armor
Weight
Area protection
Lb.
Oz.
Square feet
0.045-inch Hadfield manganese steel:
Vest:
M1
17
6
3.82
M2
7
13
1.45
Apron:
M3
4
14
1.15
M4
7
2
1.66
Groin Armor, M5
15
4
3.72
0.102-inch 24 ST aluminum and 7-ply 19 ounce
nylon duck:
Vest:
M6
14
8
4.09
M7
7
13
1.82
Apron:
M8
4
11
1.23
M9
6
8
1.89
Groin Armor, M10
13
11
3.62
0.102-inch 75 ST aluminum and 6-ply 13 ounce
nylon duck:
Vest:
M6A1
16
15
5.88
M7A1
7
12
2.08
Apron:
M8A1
4
4
1.23
M9A1
5
12
1.89
Groin Armor, M10A1
12
5
3.62
Neck
3
13
1.33
674
FIGURE 326.-Japanese body armor; the type studied by
Lt. Col. I. Ridgeway Trimble, MC.
of 1944. In June 1944, the Army Service Forces requested
armor for the protection of Soldiers from antipersonnel mines. Another major
initiating feature was undoubtedly due to some of the excellent work performed
by Lt. Col. I. Ridgeway Trimble, MC, then chief of the surgical service at the
118th General Hospital, Sydney, Australia. Colonel Trimble became very
interested in reports concerning the use of armor by Japanese ground troops.
After a great deal of difficulty and personal disappointment, he was able to
secure a copy of Japanese armor (fig. 326). Based on the Japanese design and his
own personal observation as to the areas to be protected and the most commonly
encountered wounds and causative agents, he developed a model for ground troop
armor.11
In addition to Colonel Trimble's persistence in presenting
his material, various other members of the consulting division of the Medical
Department of the Army were very instrumental in overcoming some of the
prejudice which was present on the part of the services which would use the body
armor.
11A chronological report of his development of a design
for body armor for ground troops has been prepared by Dr. Trimble and is
presented on pages 685-689. It is of considerable significance to note the
general course the development followed, and it is also of some personal
interest to us to see the great many obstacles which had to be surmounted before
the responsible individuals developed any great interest and respect for the
submitted item. As mentioned by Dr. Trimble, a report of the body armor
design and photographs of the Japanese armor were submitted to Dr. George R.
Harrison, Chief of the Research Section, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific
Area. The initial report was tendered in April 1944, but owing to the accidental
loss of the report and pictures, it was not until 23 May 1944 that the report
was finally on its way to Washington. After a review of the material, Dr. Karl
T. Compton, Chief, Office of Field Service, Office of Scientific Research and
Development, War Department, advised the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific
Area, that the Ordnance Department was extremely interested in Colonel Trimble's
design and felt that it represented an improvement over the one which they were
currently considering.-J. C. B., W. F. E., and R. H. H.
FIGURE 327.-Japanese body armor. A. Type III. B. Type II.
676
FIGURE 328.-Japanese body armor, Type III, disassembled.
developed, but only those which resulted in a standardized
end item will be discussed.
The vest, T62E1, consisted of two pieces, front and back,
which were fastened together at the shoulder by quick-release fasteners. The
ballistic materials consisted of 0.102-inch thick aluminum plates and a backing
of 5-ply nylon cloth. All of the aluminum plates had a slight overlapping to
provide thorough protection, and there was a small anterior flap on the
frontpiece which was designed to give additional protection to the region of
the heart and great vessels. The vest weighed 9 pounds and 10 ounces and had an
area protection of 3.45 square feet. The vest, T62E1, was modified in order to
provide additional ballistic protection and resulted in the T64 series which was
standardized in August 1945 as the Armor, Vest, M12 (fig. 330).
This M12 vest was made of thicker aluminum plates than the
T62E1 series and had additional layers of nylon cloth. It weighed 12 pounds and
3 ounces and provided an area protection of 3.45 square feet. The design had
been modified to provide greater protection for the anterior portion of the
thorax both by increasing the width of the main frontpiece and also by
increasing the size of the anterior flap over the heart and great vessels. In
addition, some increase in protection was provided for the axillary regions.
However, the areas of the junction of the neck and thorax and of the axillary
regions were still relatively uncovered and, as it was seen during the use of