There are a whole hell of a lot of smart people who cannot fly in today's U.S. military because they are considered part of the inferior-working "blue collar" enlisted class. Yet many could fly, if given the training. If enlisted people pass flight training, you could make them warrant officers--since the serious skills needed to fly will "mature" them for sure, but this is not necessary, just change our cultural assumptions. Regardless, there should be no WOC (Warrant Officer Course) "harassment package" to go to. What do we gain by throwing bunks and TA-50 out of barracks windows? What is the thing that is really childish? Yelling and screaming like an idiot at a harassment package school or not letting your BEST people fly military aircraft, regardless of their rank? Look at TF Hawk's problems getting skilled pilots into the Balkans. Consider how childish officers have been hot-rodding in their aircraft to date that has led to many avoidable fatal crashes?
1. Notice, the response of the bureaucracy is MORE GUARD RAILS not to fundamentally alter THOSE WHO ARE DRIVING. You cannot lead an organization to excellence and steer them away from going over cliffs with guard rails.
2. If those flying cannot be trusted, is it because they have over-inflated egos (Narcissistic Personality Disorder)? How did that happen? By them being officers? And/or is it the fact that every U.S. military branch has its pilots in a separate branch off to itself and able to feed egos without adult supervision?
3. Our speculation here is that what we need is to co-locate Army pilots with ground maneuver elements via trailers and to start having them come from the enlisted ranks.
4. We had better do something before we lose effective manned aviation due to an absurd UAV backlash against some manned pilot egomaniacs.
www.yahoo.com/_ylh=X3oDMTB2MXQ5MTU3BF9TAzI3MTYxNDkEdGVzdAMwBHRtcGwDaW5kZXgtaWU-/s/239364
By TED BRIDIS, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - A deadly aircraft accident in Afghanistan last summer is one of a series of exasperating crashes in the military that was blamed on recklessness, not enemy gunfire or faulty equipment, The Associated Press found.
Events that led to the crash unfolded as 11 marines packed into an Army Black Hawk helicopter in eastern Afghanistan asked for an exciting flight on an otherwise dull mission, demonstrating for visiting dignitaries how troops are sped into battle.
"Fly hard," the marines asked. The cockpit responded, "You asked for it."
Climbing and swooping, the Black Hawk pilot crested a 400-foot hill then deliberately nosed into a dive so steep and abrupt that everyone inside felt weightless. A wheel chock rose off the floor like a magician's prop and flew forward into the cockpit, jamming the controls.
In the horrific, tumbling crash that followed, a crew chief in the doorway died. Everyone else was injured. The $6 million helicopter was destroyed.
"Top Gun"-style flying, personified by Tom Cruise as a brash Navy pilot in Hollywood's 1986 film, presents the Pentagon with a dilemma: How to breed aggressive aviators in high-performance jets and helicopters capable of extraordinary maneuvers without endangering crews, passengers and aircraft.
The pilot in Afghanistan, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Darrin Raymond Rogers, 37, of Mililani, Hawaii, pleaded guilty last week at his court-martial to charges of negligent homicide, reckless endangerment, property destruction and failure to obey orders.
"I'm not a bad person," Rogers told the judge. He acknowledged that he was "trying to impress the guys in the back." Rogers was sentenced to 120 days without pay at Fort Leavenworth military prison in Kansas. He also must retire from the Army, but will retain his pension.
"There's a difference between aggressiveness and recklessness," said Richard A. Cody, a four-star general who holds the Army's No. 2 job. "We want them to be aggressive but also disciplined, so they don't get themselves in an envelope they can't get out of."
Some pilots bristle over challenges to how they fly, says a retired Marine Corps judge.
"Hot-dogging is not necessarily negligent," says Patrick McLain of Dallas, who presided at courts-martial. "You need a person who's bold and daring and courageous. It rubs against the grain to have this sort of nitpicking oversight. A very small minority would be in favor of scrupulous adherence to the voluminous rules about flying."
A retired marine fighter pilot, Kris Elliott of New Orleans, said: "Anybody who says they haven't hot-dogged as a pilot probably isn't being truthful."
In one case, a Naval Reserve pilot, Cmdr. Kevin Thomas Hagenstad of Marietta, Ga., ejected and survived a crash in rural Tennessee last year that investigators attributed to flying so low that his $40 million fighter jet struck power lines three miles from the Watts Bar nuclear plant.
Hagenstad, who broke his ankle, said he was "not at liberty to discuss this."
The Navy's top safety commander, Rear Admiral Dick Brooks, cited "blatant" rules violations by Hagenstad.
Reckless accidents, which happen every year, frustrate senior military commanders because these typically occur during training flights and are considered easily avoidable. Air Force crews are encouraged to announce, "Knock it off," when a pilot begins to fly unsafely.
"There will be repercussions," the head of Army aviation, Brigadier General E.J. Sinclair, said in an interview with the AP. "If someone goes out there and does that and it's observed, I usually hear about it from another pilot."
At the same time, Sinclair said, the Army is rewriting rules to specify which maneuvers are allowed and teaching pilots aggressive new aerial techniques that push helicopters closer to their engineering design limits.
"We make it very clear, this is not something you go out and do on your own," Sinclair said.
For training, the Army uses a dramatic cockpit video from the crash of an Apache attack helicopter at Fort Campbell, Ky. It shows the co-pilot yelling, "Yeehaw!" during one maneuver banned as unsafe by the Army.
The tape also shows the pilot and co-pilot debating whether they can fly safely between tall trees while traveling nearly 90 miles per hour at 16 feet above ground.
"Think I can make it in between there?" the pilot asks.
"Nope," the co-pilot answers.
"Oh, ye of little faith. Look how big that is," the pilot says.
Seconds later, the Apache's rotors struck a huge limb, shattering one blade as the pilot struggled to land safely. "C'mon, get it under control, Mark!" the co-pilot shouts. Both crew survived. The 1997 accident caused $1 million in damage.
Marine Lt. Gen. Mike Hough complained last summer in a memorandum to his aviation commanders: "We are killing more aircrew in training mishaps than during combat missions. ... I will not tolerate the blatant violations and lack of leadership I am seeing from our aviators."
Hough's tough message came weeks before a Hornet fighter crash in Quantico, Va., that the Navy blamed on "unacceptable" flying.
But serious criminal charges such as those against Rogers are unusual. Prosecuting pilots in public deeply divides military aviators, who more commonly face quiet administrative proceedings that include warnings and temporary grounding.
"As long as they don't embarrass the government or hurt anybody, they'll typically be counseled and that will be the end of it," said law professor Michael Noone at Catholic University. The retired Air Force colonel has prosecuted and defended pilots in crash investigations.
Investigators said the helicopter pilot who was court-martialed rejected an earlier request by marines for acrobatics during the flight. But he agreed to a second request and radioed, "Taking room to maneuver," after a demonstration for marine gen. James L. Jones, the supreme allied commander for Europe and commander of the U.S. European Command, was delayed 10 minutes, according to an Army report. Crew chief Daniel Lee Galvan, 30, died in the crash.
Rogers, a veteran pilot with a reputation in the 25th Infantry Division as an able flier, would not talk about the accident when the AP contacted him at home in Hawaii. He said his lawyer also would not comment.
Other Army pilots said such requests for acrobatics are common from passengers.
"I've been asked that; I always felt like I had to enforce the rules," said Herb Rodriguez of Clarksville, Tenn., a retired Black Hawk pilot who won the Distinguished Flying Cross for heroism in the Somalia deployment in 1993. "I was like a parent."
On a memorial Web site dedicated to her husband, the widow of Daniel Lee Galvan described her young children's grief and lying atop her husband's grave. She said she hoped Rogers "lives with the guilt of taking my beautiful angel away from his family."
"I just don't want this pilot to think he can do this again, to hurt anybody else," Sonya Galvan of Lubbock, Texas, told the AP before the court-martial in Hawaii.
"At some point or another," she said, "they need to make someone accountable."
Associated Press writer Jaymes Song contributed to this report from Hawaii.
Oh, By the Way, Why can't we find the enemy? Where are our enlisted air observers?
NEW VIDEO! OV-1 Mohawks in Action during the Cold War, Vietnam and Iraq! Small Scout Helicopters, too!
Studying recent conflicts, even those pitting nation-state force against nation-state force moving brazenly in the open, a disturbing truth emerges: WE CANNOT SPOT THE ENEMY FROM THE AIR. During Operation Anaconda, the USAF could not hit targets requested by 101st Soldiers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Rangers after parachuting in to take an airfield motor on to hold the Hadithah dam but had artillery rain down on them for days and these weapons were not silenced by air strikes. Its obvious to any honest student of military affairs that rebels are free to lay road side bombs in Iraq as our growing casualties prove. UAVs do not work; they do not see as well as a human being can and cannot actively investigate lest they crash even more than their current 50% rate. Why can't we find the enemy from the air?
Awhile back Army enlistedmen could be left-seat observers in Army scout helicopters and right seat observers in fixed-wing aircraft basically, Airborne Forward Air Controllers (AFACs). Not only have we since Vietnam wrongly discarded 2-seat observation/attack planes, replacing them with loud and slow helicopters often in the wrong camouflage color, we have also ELIMINATED THE ENLISTED AIR OBSERVER WHOSE SOLE MISSION IN LIFE IS TO STUDY HOW OBJECTS APPEAR FROM THE AIR. In a naked grab for power, Army Aviation Branch in the early 1980s discarded the enlisted air observer from the seat opposite pilots, replacing them with ANOTHER OFFICER. With the desire to build their own empire and Army Aviation becomes a branch (1983). Rather than keep the enlistedman observer they say they need two rated pilots who are WOs or full-fledged officers which expands branch clout. Now we have EVERYONE IN THE AIRCRAFT FOCUSED ON FLYING IT AND NO ONE FOCUSED ON FINDING THE ENEMY.
To interface ground maneuver units, Army aviation has OFFICERS without aircraft to fly to act as Ground Forward Air Controllers (GFACs), we can't call them what they are---people would understand what's going on and call us on our bullshit so like calling ISO shipping containers "conex boxes" they call these guys "LNOs".
1. We lose the SYNERGISM of enlistedmen WHOSE SOLE PURPOSE IS TO OBSERVE, NOT
FLY BUT OBSERVE WHAT'S GOING ON THE GROUND.
Bye Bye a lot of ground detection fidelity! To find an enemy trying to hide from you (C3D2) you need to know your "beat" as it appears from the air during constant patrols--you can't do this if your mind is worried about aircraft emergency procedures as a back-up pilot.
2. These enlisted observers would also be IDEAL GFACs (not grounded pilot LNOs) on the ground when not IN THE AIR having focused on the art of detecting the elusive enemy.
3. If the pilot is injured or killed the enlisted observers can (swallow hard) BE PREVIOUSLY TRAINED IN HOW TO FLY A HELICOPTER IN AN EMERGENCY.
4. Army Aviation "branch" now that its got so much "clout" should step up to the plate and say:
WE NEED TWO FLIGHT CREWS PER AIRCRAFT FOR A BLACK AND GOLD ROTATION instead of trying to weasel it out of Congress by the two rated pilots BS and losing
ground observation fidelity and an unmatched GFAC capability.
5. The U.S. Army needs to reinstate enlisted air observers to act as AFACs in existing OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and ARH Bell 407 scout helicopters, and as GFACs on the ground to help maneuver units find the elusive enemy.
6. The U.S. Air Force needs to modify many of its A-10s into two-seat versions to have their own enlisted AFACs/GFACs in the back to help locate, identify and verify targets. One option would be to CO-OPERATE with the Army and have Army enlisted observers fly in the back to act as AFACs when not on the ground as GFACs organic to the BCT's RSTA (defacto Cavalry) squadron. Either way, the USAF needs to fully exploit the A-10 with a back-seat observer and start doing its CAS job or relinquish it to the Army to do.
7. The Army needs to trailer and container mobilize all its helicopters for rapid deployment and forward location operations to better support ground maneuver elements by conserving fuel and flight time.
8. Each Brigade Combat Team should have some easy-to-maintain, fixed-wing STOL "grasshopper" observation/attack aircraft like the Thrush Vigilante 2 under their direct control in the (Artillery) Fires unit to insure they have Maneuver Air Support (MAS) out to their front. Targets found by the AFACs in Vigilante 2 grasshoppers but beyond their light gun and rocket weaponry to dispatch would be handed off to Army AH-64s and/or USAF A-10s to fully destroy.
9. A ground-mobile MD-900 stealthy NOTAR LUH helicopter detachment for resupply, MEDEVAC and recon team insertion/extraction in the Headquarters is also needed.
www.strategypage.com/articles/3IDAAR/chap13.asp
Chapter 13 Aviation Operations
Lessons Learned
Divisional attack helicopter battalions are best suited to conduct close
attack operations and shaping operations in the heavy division
The responsiveness of Army aviation is directly linked to the command and
control architecture and the nested long range communications available
Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) degraded the general support aviation
available to support the division
Close combat attacks and enroute combat maneuvers must be included in our
training base
The aviation support battalion lacks depth in the current MTOE to sustain all
tactical logistics (TACLOG) functions in support of the brigade
Long range communications must be procured to overcome and sustain continuous
offensive operations
Close attack operations require enhanced optics to acquire and identify with
confidence threats on the battlefield beyond the three kilometer capability of
our current forward looking infrared (FLIR)
Army aviation must expand its capability in doctrine, training, and
resourcing to address the shortfalls in liaison operations
Topic A - Liaison Officer Distribution and Equipment Requirements
Issue: Aviation liaison officer distribution and equipment requirements
Discussion: 4th Brigade was fortunate that the attack battalion had
additional captains to augment the increased demand for aviation liaison officers
(LNOs). In addition to the position of the assistant division aviation officer
(ADAO), the division required LNOs for in each brigade combat team, the division
tactical action center (DTAC), and as an attack planner. The general support
battalion provided an LNO to the division rear. Liaison officer distribution
greatly impacted the ability of the attack battalion staff to plan, execute, and
battle track operations. The battalion was left with one aviation captain and
a chemical officer to execute operations. No MTOE equipment was available for
these LNOs. Limited resources were stripped away from other staff sections to
fill the void in both mobility and communications to support liaison
operations. The liaison officer concept benefited both the BCTs and the battalion and
directly contributed to the success of the brigade in supporting operations.
This was especially true with the air-ground integration and support to 3rd BCT.
This liaison concept must be maintained as we relook the role of the attack
battalion in the heavy division. The liaison officer is critical in the
planning and execution of close attack operations. They provide a link to rotary wing
aviation that is similar to the Air Force air liaison officer ( ALO) or the
marine corps air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO).
This function must continue to be developed to provide responsive attack and
lift assets to the BCT in the heavy division. The adjustment to the MTOE is
the start point for the continued success of this liaison team.
Recommendation: Provide a liaison team with sufficient personnel to conduct
24-hour operations with the ability to plan, execute, and track the employment
of aviation assets. The recommended number of teams is four in the attack
battalion and two in the assault battalion. Each team is composed of 1 x15B, 1x
93P30, 2x 93C.
Increase attack and battalion MTOE to provide up armored high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for each liaison team with a similar
communications suite provided to the air traffic service (ATS) company in the Tactical
Terminal Control System (TTCS). An additional M998 for the other half of the
team is provided for mobility. Incorporate Force XXI battle command brigade
and below (FBCB 2 ) and tactical satellite (TACSAT) into the liaison teams
package.
Revise doctrine through the Army Aviation Center, Director for Combat
Development to expand the role and functions of the heavy division liaison officer.
The Army Aviation Center develops introduction of basic liaison skills and
functions to include integration into the military decision-making process
(MDMP) at the Basic Course and expands on this function at the Captains' Career
Course (CCC). All liaison officers should attend the Joint Firepower Controller
Course after finishing the CCC.
Liaison officers should be post command captains and, at a minimum, CCC
graduates.
Topic B - Restructure of the Aviation Support Battalion MTOE
Issue: Restructure the aviation support battalion MTOE to support combat
operations.
Discussion: The aviation support battalion is a critical component of the 4th
Brigade to sustain air and ground maintenance. This structure works well in
garrison, but does not have the depth or the requisite functions to support
combat operations. This is due to a shortfall in the ability to support the six
TACLOG functions. This is further magnified at the maintenance support team
(MST) for both air and ground, as they do not have the necessary equipment or
personnel to perform these functions. As a result, the ground MST that supports
the division cavalry squadron is augmented, when possible, by the division
support command (DISCOM) to reinforce the ground MST capability. The ground MST
lacks the missile support and the necessary test and diagnostic support to keep
both M1 and M3s fixed as far forward as possible. This is also true for the
air MST, but sufficient depth between aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) and
aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) structure mitigate some of these
shortfalls, provided the aviation support battalion (ASB) is not operating in excess of
12 hours from the division cavalry squadron to accommodate logistical
resupply windows. Of the six TACLOG functions that a forward support battalion
provides, the aviation support battalion lacks the capability to support "move" and
"sustain" functions. It is only 50% mobile and lacks a medical company. The
ASB assisted 4th Brigade by placing all of A company's equipment on the ground
and using 5T and stake and platform (S&P) trailers to move the ammunition and
the Class IX and additional Class I requirement 4th Brigade needed to support
fluid offensive operations. Emplacing a palletized load section (PLS) will
offset this problem. Two additional TACLOG functions that demand an increase in
capability to sustain combat operations are "fuel" and "arm." The daily
Class III (air) bulk demand was 30,000 gallons per day. The internal bulk
capability after removing the forward arming and refueling point (FARP) augmentation
requirement of the ASB is 20K, and the difference in the daily bulk fuel
requirement was overcome by making multiple turns to the bulk fuel distribution
point. Although this work-around enabled 4th Brigade to maintain an adequate
quantity of JP8, it was not feasible to sustain over a long duration. This
negligible short fall can be easily overcome by providing additional 5K tankers to the
ASB. The last critical shortfall in the ASB was the lack of depth in the
"arm" function of the battalion. The density of ammunition specialists and
equipment available does not support the ammunition basic loads (ABLs) that are
maintained by the attack helicopter battalion and, if necessary, the division
cavalry squadron. This function requires an ammunition transfer point (ATP)
capability based on the density of munitions maintained and distributed to the
subordinate battalions. Success in these TACLOG functions is doctrinally solved by
corps throughput or augmentation. At the initiation of this operation, many of
the echelons above division (EAD) assets required were not in theater or still
conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). The
outlined TACLOG enhancements are critical to meet the sustainment requirements
of 4th Brigade. An MTOE review will identify by line the shortfall of
personnel and equipment required to fulfill the same functions of the FSB in support
of the BCT Recommendation: Review the MTOE and make corrections to reflect the
necessary requirements to sustain all TACLOG functions in support of the
brigade. Procure required equipment to support medical, fuel, ammunition, and move
functions of the aviation support battalion.
Topic C - Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) Degradation of General Support
Aviation Battalion (GSAB) Support to Heavy Divisions
Issue: Army Transformation Initiative degradation of general support aviation
battalion (GSAB) support to heavy divisions.
Discussion: 4th Brigade underwent the restructuring of the general support
aviation battalion as a component of the Aviation Transformation Initiative
(ATI). This reduced the number of UH-60 airframes from 24 to 16. This reduction of
aircraft degraded the ability to conduct internal support to the brigade and
external support to the division during combat operations. The number of
available aircraft based on maintenance was 12 of the 14 on hand. Of these aircraft
and crews available, five were available to support both internal and
external general support missions. We maintained two command and control aircraft to
support 4th Brigade and division command group, two immediate personnel
recovery aircraft for downed aircrew extraction, two casualty evacuation aircraft to
augment medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and one downed aircraft recovery team
(DART) aircraft. This is extremely inadequate when looking at the battlespace
the division covered and the length of our ground lines of communication (LOCs)
to support combat service support (CSS) functions. The battalion did conduct
high priority parts runs back to Kuwait, but the frequency was not sufficient
to meet demands. Additional Chinooks from the corps were provided on one
occasion to support emergency Class V operations. The augmentation of a minimum of
one heavy lift platoon to conduct routine GS mission sets to support CSS
operations would have alleviated some of our shortfall. Changing the MTOE back to
the 24 aircraft structure prior to ATI would enable the battalion to support
these critical general support mission sets. This would provide the division
greater capability to conduct airborne command and control, airborne retrans,
augment MEDEVAC, provide limited infiltration/exfiltration of small dismounted
units, and most importantly reinforce the move TACLOG function to support
sustainment operations.
Recommendation: Change the MTOE back to provide the general support aviation
battalion 24 aircraft in the heavy division. This will provide the airframes
to support the troop to task required to sustain heavy division operations and
provide the depth in airframes necessary to support CSS operations.
Topic D - Enhanced Optics Requirements
Issue: Generation I forward looking infrared (GEN IFLIR) is a serious
deficiency in the Apache and has shown little improvement in 20 years.
Discussion: The enemy in OIF hid much of its combat power, to include deadly
ADA systems, in and around urban areas and under groves of palm trees. This
became more evident as 4th Brigade closed on Baghdad. Aircraft operating in and
around the Euphrates River basin identified numerous air defense artillery
(ADA) and armor family of vehicles (AFVs) dispersed in the farms and palm groves
east of the river. GEN I FLIR was unable to assist the pilot with early
identification of systems hidden in this manner. The lack of fidelity to identify
threats in the close fight denied the aircraft the ability to make maximum use
of its weapons stand off. The 1-3 ATKHB commander required visual
identification in order to prevent fratricide. At distances exceeding 3 km at night,
positive identification was impossible. Although it greatly improved our ability to
fly in the 0 % illumination conditions that existed for the majority of
operations flown, its ability to see large wires and towers around urban terrain is
also questionable and places undue risk on the pilot and mission. Furthermore,
even in close distances, the GEN I FLIR is incapable of differentiating
between Soldiers and civilians, further complicating air-to-ground integration in
close combat attack missions on the urban periphery.
Recommendation: Purchase and install GEN II FLIR as soon as possible for the
AH-64 fleet. Prioritization should be given to division attack helicopter
battalions in the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) sequencing.
Topic E - Close Combat Attack Training
Issue: Static hover fire techniques in attack by fire (ABF) and battle
positions (BPs)
Discussion: Enemy ADA units had improved since Operation DESERT STORM in
their ability to target attack helicopters. ADA systems were placed in the tree
lines and in urban areas to exploit Apache vulnerabilities. On one occasion, the
enemy employed an obviously lucrative target, a T72 tank, in the open with
the expectation of drawing Apache helicopters into an ADA ambush. Fire to the
exposed flanks and rear of the aircraft was constant in many attacks.
Intelligence confirmed the use of ADA ambush experts in the Iraqi military.
Recommendation: Incorporated moving fire and dynamic engagements during
peacetime training, especially in the Longbow cockpit training (LCT) and during
Table V-VIII aerial gunnery densities where we can practice actual engagements on
stationary and moving targets. Change the MTOE to provide 21 aircraft to
perform security tasks during actions in the ABF.
Issue: Lack of doctrinal, standardized maneuvers to break contact and/or
suppress enemy enroute.
Discussion: The current FM 1-112, Appendix F is titled "Air Combat." Some of
this appendix discusses "air-to-air combat" but also discusses "air to ground
combat" and some team and company TTPs. This confusing appendix represents
the only "current" attempt to address this subject in doctrine. Enroute combat
maneuvers (ECM) were re-created by 1-3 ATKHB from previous air combat maneuver
doctrine. This TTP is a method to react to enemy fire enroute, suppress and,
reorganize to continue the mission. Having a common, trained TTP throughout
the battalion proved invaluable.
Recommendation: Forward ECM as a TTP to Army Aviation Branch to be
incorporated into training and doctrine.
Issue: Lack of doctrinal, standardized maneuvers for running fire
engagements.
Discussion: The aircrew training manual (ATM) and gunnery manuals discuss
running fire engagements. It does not, however, discuss implementation of these
tactics, supported training/gunnery, or control at the team, platoon, or
company level. Close combat maneuvers (CCM) was re-created and refined by 1-3 ATKHB
from tactics used in Vietnam and over water engagements in Korea. These
running fire tactics were organized into circuits based on the enemy, using two
methods of attack. Running fire provided enhanced accuracy during rocket
engagements and added security during 30mm engagements. Team members and command and
control shared a common picture of the situation.
Recommendation: Forward CCM as a TTP to Army Aviation Branch to be
incorporated into training, Table VII/VIII gunnery tables and doctrine.
Another aspect of enlisted pilots and observers would be that they would enable us to mass-produce and maintain more helicopters for them to fly and this includes "RoboCobras" and U/MCAV-UAVs, too to get saturation battlefield effects to overwhelm enemy Surveillance Strike Systems (SSCs) as well as hunt down and destroy sub-national terrorists. More human effort is what we need here to create a viable Air Cavalry and less being "kicked in the teeth" for trying by the snobby officer types in control.
The problem of having NCOs be pilots is you would have too many
people staying in the Army just to be Soldiers. This would create the dangerous situation of a permanent group of experienced pilots, Cavalry Troopers with a tradition of service with no bowing and scraping to the Yes-Man Courtiers (nothing to gain) and a warrior camaraderie that the current politically-correct Army has worked hard to eliminate. Then there's a serious drawback of Cav officers never having to be in the dirty part of the Cav............. Lets do it, but maybe make them spend a couple of years in a Ground Cav Squadron perhaps as FACs for attack helicopters or even as AFV unit commanders.
As far as the Cobra goes, I wasn't trying to imply they are better, just cheaper and easier to operate to overcome the Spinney "Death Spiral". I remember the Israelis felt the same way. They felt that no helicopter was truly safe over enemy territory in daylight because the ZSU-23 will bring either one down pretty quick--why we need to go to the RoboCobra concept. There is no denying the Apaches night capability is excellent with a trained crew. I didn't mean to sound so cynical, I do care about the pilots lives, but the cost of training and maintaining the Apache prohibites the creation of adequate air power mass in my view, and I've been brooding all day about how many light tanks you could buy if you eliminated some overly complex attack helicopter squadrons. I've also said for years that the Apache is useless without a very well-trained crew and excellent ground support. I have always felt that the more difficult it is to master the technical the less time spent in learning the tactical. It's my personal prejudice that Tactical is more important then Technical. The quote by Col. Boyd comes to mind;
"Machines don't fight wars, men fight wars, and they think!"
An Army Aviation expert adds:
- flying does require a bit of math, physics, and chemistry. hypothetically, college is supposed to provide that, but an awful lot of liberal arts majors get thru without one day of calculus, so that's no guarantee anymore. Instead of requiring a
bachelors, what they *should* require is 4 semesters of calculus, 3 of physics, and 2 of chemistry. That would provide the academic background for what they need to learn in flight school. Enlisted without any college (or liberal arts types) would require 1-2 years of night school to get this curriculum in. Non-trivial, but would 'weed out the slackers' I guess. These classes could be taught on base, or done via videoconference or something.
- concerning 'mass-production' of helicopters and UAVs, the problem is not really a lack of pilots but rather 'gilding the lily' during the procurement process. 'Better is always the enemy of the good enough'. However, along with the top-drawer, kick-ass vehicle, there is a need for an affordable, reliable good performer for all of those low-intensity tasks. Rather than a $20M Apache, we could field twenty $1M MD-500s. the Apache is kind of a sore point, since it was only designed for one role; blunting a Soviet armored assault into western Europe and I believe it was designed to survive only for maybe two or three sorties.
Here's my math;
1000 Apaches (that was the original intent) carrying 16 Hellfires per sortie, assume 25% knockout rate, and maybe an average of three sorties. So 1000 times 4 times 3 gives 12,000 hits, maybe half being MBTs. that pretty much takes out the brunt of the Soviet armor, leaving the infantry and artillery to be handled by U.S. ground forces. Anyway, the Apache is a late 1970s design with early 1980s sensors and weapons integration designed to stop a specific threat with Reagan-era spending. We need to bring the procurement cycle back to a 10-year period.
- our mix of rotary-wing aviation assets is probably on the short side of the optimum in terms of force effectiveness. for example, a flight of 4 Apaches out on a plain might be targeted by half a dozen enemy AAA or SAM spots. Pretty much in a back-against-the-wall mode from the get-go. Now add maybe a dozen MD-500s with chain guns and some sort of 'fire-and-forget' ATGM; now the ground threats are in defensive mode. Perhaps the Army (and marines) need to acquire the USAF's 'total air superiority' attitude, in a way. Do not rest until they have the aviation assets to dominate the battlefield".
A veteran U.S. Army Paratrooper writes on how our NATO allies view the enlisted pilot issue:
Best regards,"
Greg Namin
Military Confronts Reckless Air Crashes
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi
Freedom
Army aviation played a key role in the defeat of the Iraqi regime and
bringing freedom to the Iraqi people. The speed and flexibility of Army aviation directly contributed to the success of the division and proved invaluable during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This chapter addresses the issues that require immediate attention to enhance our capability to support Army aviation across the operational continuum.
FEEDBACK!
"An interesting article, that grazes the larger issue of the officer/enlisted chasm and socio-economic strata. A few points;
"Hi, I read your piece on having enlisted pilots in the Army
[www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/enlistedpilots.htm]. I totally agree! I was in the Army from 1987-1996. I served with the 3/325th Inf ABCT in Vicenza, Italy, and was deployed to northern Iraq from 24 April, 1991 to 17 July, 1991. We met up with the Spanish contingent to NATO and found out that their pilots who flew our platoon around were actually enlisted. Go figure!