U.S. ARMY WHEELED VEHICLE DISASTER: HUMMER, FMTV and Stryker Trucks: they're not suitable for COMBAT--what can YOU do about it?
WARNING: the "Small Wars Manual," published in 1940 by the United States marine corps, cautions:
"Every detachment representing a tempting target will be harassed or attacked. The population will be honeycombed with hostile sympathizers."
CAUSE:
IRAQ 2003-Today
EXCLUSIVE!
WHERE ARE THE SANDBAGS?
WHERE ARE THE GUNSHIELDS?
WHY ARE THEY IN UNARMORED, RUBBER-TIRED TRUCKS AND NOT TRACKED ARMORED VEHICLES?
WHY IS THIS VEHICLE IN GREEN CAMOUFLAGE AND NOT DESERT TAN?
ANYONE READING FM 55-30?
THIS IS NOT A GAME. THE WHEELED U.S. ARMY MADNESS IS HORRIBLY KILLING AND MAIMING AMERICA'S SOLDIERS. Army officials are LYING to the American Congress and the American people. These deaths are PREVENTABLE and the result of U.S. Army incompetence that refuses to admit wheeled vehicles are not suitable for combat. Army laziness not to sand bag and paint helicopters and ground vehicles in the proper camouflage color.
HUMVEE WARNED VULNERABLE IN 1989: Click on photo to see in full size to view!


Plain text of his article:
www.combatreform.com/vehiclecombat.htm
We also had the experience of thousands of Vietnam combat vets to not become a road-bound truck dependent force. Instead, post-Vietnam with no one shooting at us we fantasized of WW2 style linear battlefields where there would be safe "rear" areas for the Pvt. Jessica Lynch underclass to drive around in unarmored, unarmed trucks and for the "studs" to hitch a ride then fight on foot mano-e-mano. We tried to get industry to take action as the January 7, 1994 letter to Stewart & Stevenson, makers of the FMTV series of trucks shows below:
Now years later after over 1, 800 dead and 20, 000 wounded the Army/marines STILL want to drive around in vulnerable wheeled trucks. They must have a death wish--for OTHERS of lesser rank.
"Just a few weeks before he was scheduled to leave Iraq, Army SPC. Arron R. Clark of Chico was killed by a remote-control bomb, the Pentagon reported. The 20-year-old Soldier was ready to come home, said his mother, Lyne Clark. 'He wanted out of Iraq so bad. All he was seeing was dead Soldiers.' Clark was killed Friday in Baghdad as he was riding through the city in a three-vehicle convoy. Clark's childhood dream was to become an elite Airborne Ranger, and he had just been accepted to the training school and was planning to attend when he came back from Iraq, his mother said. Clark had been in Iraq since March, his mother told the San Francisco Chronicle. 'He kept telling me how bad it was over there.' Lynne Clark said her son received a General Equivalency Diploma early so he could leave Chico High School to enlist in the army. After entering the army in 2001, Clark was assigned to a signal battalion in Darmstadt, Germany, where he specialized in detection and decontamination of biological warfare agents. He was part of the first invasion wave of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Clark's aunt, Robin Clark, said he always wanted his family to be proud of him. 'He knew if he didn't get out of Chico, he wasn't going to get anywhere,' Robin Clark said. 'He wanted to make something of himself.'www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/12/09/state1754EST0128.DT
I HAVE NEWS FOR EVERYONE.
SPC CLARK WAS "SOMEONE" WHETHER HE BECAME A "RANGER" OR NOT; HE WAS A HUMAN BEING MADE IN GOD'S IMAGE.
AN AMERICAN. A HERO.
SPC CLARK WAS A SOLDIER.
AND HE EARNED HIS "RIGHT" TO WEAR HIS BLACK BERET IN SPADES.
Now in memory of this hero its time for us--THE LIVING---to live UP to the heroes who have gone before us and make our Army ALL THAT IT NEEDS TO BE.
Its going to take courage to face the truth.
THE WHEELED ARMY IS A FAILURE.
SPC CLARK DIED BECAUSE WE FAILED HIM--by sending him to combat in a wheeled truck.
IF THE ARMY PERSISTS WITH ITS CURRENT FANTASY OF CHEAPO RUBBER-TIRED WHEELED VEHICLES WITH COMPUTERS FOR MICROMANAGEMENT, MORE MEN WILL DIE AND BE MAIMED HORRIBLY.
Its time to wake up and grow up. Ranger tabs don't stop bullets. Nor do callous rationalizations that our casualties are "ok" because HMMWVs are trucks not combat vehicles (circular illogic). When in COMBAT ride in COMBAT vehicles. 1-800-OBVIOUS to those not clouded by egotism. The 360 degree, non-linear battlefield of today doesn't allow us topick and chose where combat will or will not take place. Everyone had better be able to fight and survive, and this means TRACKED not wheeled vehicles.
Wheeled vehicles be they Stryker, HMMWVs or FMTV trucks are not combat vehicles. Wheeled vehicles are 28% less space/weight efficient than tracked vehicles. You frankly cannot make wheeled vehicles RPG-proof because their wheels have to turn to steer and they can never be as armor protected as tracked vehicles. Sending our men into combat in anything less than a RPG-resistant light tracked AFV is letting heroes like SPC Clark down and its time this wheeled madness be stopped in America's Army. Its going to take Congress and the American people to save our Soldiers because the Army is fullof weak co-dependant people who are too proud and arrogant to admit their dreamof a lazy Army rolling on rubber tire wheels evading breaking a sweat by computer mental gymnasics to create linear safe and front lines that do not exist is a miserable failure. The Army continues to "spin" how their wheeled vehicles and computers have succeeded as the enemy "votes" otherwise with RPGs, IEDs and AK47s. Its interesting how the Army "spins" away our dead and mangled men by citing how heroic they are to excuse away their incompetence, which if corrected would result in living instead of dead heroes. Able bodied men and women with all their limbs to enjoy the rest of their lives.
AKM AUTOMATIC WEAPONS +
RPGS +
LAND MINES FROM SIDES AND BELOW +
AMERICANS DRIVING AROUND IN VULNERABLE, WHEELED VEHICLES =
>>>>>>>>>>TRAGEDY AND DISASTER<<<<<<<<<<<<
The mondern non-linear battlefield has enemies that can come from any direction--there are no "safe" "rear" areas. The WWII paradigm that we can resupply the "front" lines in cheapo trucks is over. Everyone in COMBAT needs to ride in tracks including resupply. We can do this. We have thousands of the greatest tracked AFV of all time, ever made in our possession sitting in storage awaiting its call to rescue us from our lazy slacker stupidity: the M113 Gavin.
WHEN YOU LOOK WEAK BECAUSE YOU ARE WEAK RIDING ON WHEELS, THE ENEMY ATTACKS YOU.
The world's leading researcher on combat psychology, LTC Dave Grossman (On Killing) weighs in on our weak appearance/condition in Iraq driving around in uncamouflaged, unsandbagged, wheeled HMMWV, FMTV and Stryker trucks:
"Yep, I also discuss these factors in the book also, and you are absolutely correct. Here is the section from the book on this:The Shalit Factors: Means, Motive, and Opportunity
Although somewhat obvious, such factors as, 'Will I do the enemy any harm by killing this poor slob, and will I be able to get away with it without getting killed myself?' should not be overlooked as critical factors in the potential killer's decision to engage in a specific killing circumstance. Given an opportunity to kill and time to think about it, a Soldier in combat becomes very much like a the killer in a classical murder mystery, in that he makes a rational assessment of his 'means, motive, and opportunity'. Israeli military psychologist Ben Shalit has developed a model of 'target attractiveness' revolving around the nature of the victim, which have been modified slightly and incorporated into our overall model of the killing enabling factors.
Shalit takes into consideration:
-The relevance and effectiveness of available strategies for killing the victim (i.e. the means and opportunity).
-The relevance of the victim and the payoff of killing in terms of the killer's gain and the enemy's loss (i.e. the motive).
Relevance of Available Strategies: Means and Opportunity
'Man taxes his ingenuity to be able to kill without running the risk of being killed.'
---Ardant du Picq
Tactical and technological advantages increase the effectiveness of the combat strategies available to the Soldier. Or, as one Soldier put it, 'You want to make damn sure you don't get your own ass shot off while you are hosing the enemy.' ...
IRAQI TRAGEDY LIST
1, 800 Americans DEAD, 20, 000 wounded as of July 17, 2005
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/
75% of all our dead by Land mines and small-arms fire attacks (numbers growing daily) and vehicle accidents...
How many would be alive today if instead of driving around in unarmored BS HMMWV and FMTV trucks they were in M113 Gavins?
Potentially over 1, 000 people alive instead of dead from land mines if they had been in M113 Gavins with RPG and roadside bomb resistant applique' armor.
Another 2 Soldiers alive if instead of wasting money on Stryker armored cars we had fitted belly armor kits to M113s.
Chapter III: Growth of U.S. Armored Forces in Vietnam
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter3.htm
"To reduce mine damage to M113's, "belly armor" kits arrived in 1969. When this supplemental armor was applied to M113's and Sheridans, it protected them from mine blast rupture, saved many lives, and gave the crews added confidence"
Basically 63 people would be alive today if we had upgraded M113s and used them more extensively than HMMWVs, FMTVs and other unarmored trucks in Iraq.
How many of the 49 people who died in vehicle accidents could have lived had they gotten adequate sleep?
How many would be alive today and not how many would not be without limbs if they were in up-armored M113 Gavins or simply had GUNSHIELDS?
O, how many of these folks were/are "worthy" of wearing a BLACK BERET?
EVERY SINGLE DAMN ONE OF THEM.
AND THEIR BROTHERS AND SISTERS ON DUTY IN HARM'S WAY NOW.
Land Mines/Roadside/Car Bombs: "Improvised Explosive Devices" 50% of all combat deaths or 1/4 of all deaths in Iraq and growing...
www.geocities.com/militaryincompetence/americaniraqwarcasualties.htm
EXCERPTS:
1. Sapper Luke Allsopp 24
2. LCPL Andrew Julian Aviles 18
3. SGT. Michael Paul Barrera 26
4. SGT Gregory A. Belanger 24
5. SPC Joel L. Bertoldie 20
6. CPL Mark A. Bibby 25
7. CSM James D. Blankenbecler 40
8. SGT Trevor A. Blumberg 22
9. PFC Timmy R. Brown Jr. 21
10. 2LT Todd J. Bryant 23
11. CPT Joshua T. Byers 29
12. SGT Charles T. Caldwell 38
13. SSG Joseph Camara, 40
14. SPC Isaac Campoy 21
15. SPC Andrew F. Chris 25
16. 2LT Benjamin J. Colgan 30
17. SGT Timothy M. Conneway, 22
18. SSG Christopher E. Cutchall, 30
19. Spc. Darryl T. Dent, 21
20. Pvt. Michael J. Deutsch, 21
QUESTION: if his M113 Gavin had been fitted with Belly Armor Kit / Cage No. 80212, P/N 4240277 would he have died? If the Army was not wasting $9+ BILLION on Stryker armored cars maybe belly armor kits could have been purchased and fitted to all M113s?
M113 Gavin BELLY ARMOR that could be fitted that has not been fitted to Gavins in Iraq:
Chapter III: Growth of U.S. Armored Forces in Vietnam
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter3.htm
"To reduce mine damage to M113's, "belly armor" kits arrived in 1969. When this supplemental armor was applied to M113's and Sheridans, it protected them from mine blast rupture, saved many lives, and gave the crews added confidence"
21. PFC Analaura Esparza Gutierrez 21
22. PVT Jonathan I. Falaniko 20
23. PVT Joseph R. Guerrera, 20
24. SSG Terry W. Hemingway, 39
25. SSG Jamie L. Huggins, 26
26. SPC Eric R. Hull, 23
27. 1LT Joshua C. Hurley, 24
28. SPC Maurice J. Johnson, 21
29. SSG Paul J. Johnson, 29
30. CPT David Jones, 29
31. SPC Spencer T. Karol, 20
32. SPC Chad L. Keith, 21
33. MAJ Hieronim Kupczyk N/A
34. SPC William J. Maher III, 35
35. SGT Francisco Martinez, 28
36. CPL Jesus Martin Antonio Medellin, 21
37. SSG Frederick L. Miller Jr., 27
38. SPC Rafael L. Navea, 34
39. PFC Branden F. Oberleitner, 20
40. SPC James E. Powell, 26
41. PFC Kerry D. Scott, 21
42. PFC Jeremiah D. Smith, 25
43. CPT John R. Teal, 31
44. MAJ Matthew Titchener, 32
45. 2LT Richard Torres, 25
46. Warrant Officer Colin Wall, 34
47. SPC Donald L. Wheeler, 22
48. SGT Steven W. White, 29
QUESTION: if his M113 Gavin had been fitted with Belly Armor Kit / Cage No. 80212, P/N 4240277 would he have died? If the Army was not wasting $9+ BILLION on Stryker armored cars maybe belly armor kits could have been purchased and fitted to all M113s?
M113 Gavin BELLY ARMOR that could be fitted that has not been fitted to Gavins in Iraq:
Chapter III: Growth of U.S. Armored Forces in Vietnam
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/mounted/chapter3.htm
"To reduce mine damage to M113's, "belly armor" kits arrived in 1969. When this supplemental armor was applied to M113's and Sheridans, it protected them from mine blast rupture, saved many lives, and gave the crews added confidence"
49. SPC Michael L. Williams, 46
50. SGT Taft V. Williams, 29
51. PFC Stephen E. Wyatt, 19
Rocket-Propelled Grenades: 17/437 = 3.89%
Unarmored vehicle deaths: 16
1. CPL Evan Asa Ashcraft, 24
2. Fusilier Russell Beeston, 26
3. 1LT David R. Bernstein, 24
4. SGT Jacob L. Butler, 24
5. PFC Jonathan M. Cheatham, 19
6. SPC Brett T. Christian, 27
7. SPC Jon P. Fettig, 30
8. SGT Justin W. Garvey, 23
9. PFC John D. Hart, 20
10. SPC Justin W. Hebert, 20
11. SGT Jason D. Jordan, 24
12. SSG Kevin C. Kimmerly, 31
13. SSG Mark A. Lawton, 41
14. SPC Paul T. Nakamura, 21
15. SPC James H. Pirtle, 18
QUESTION: would he have died had he been behind a gunshield? Or even if his top hatch opened forward like Russian armored vehicles do?
16. PVT Sean A. Silva, 23
17. CPL Tomas Sotelo Jr., 20
SOMALIA, 1993.
"Blackhawk Down!"
HMMWVs burning. 5-ton trucks torched by RPGs. Men dead. Men trapped miles away that cannot be reached. After a desperate relief mission led by tracked armored vehicles reaches the trapped Rangers/Delta operators, the U.S. pulls out shortly thereafter from Somalia under the direction of cowardly liberal President Clinton. 18 men died to end clan violence only for weak willed politicians to cut their losses in popularity with the voters and end the mission. But that's not the total story---the real story is that 10 years after "BHD", the U.S. Army still has not supplied the 75th Ranger Regiment with M113A3 type light tracked AFVs nor even added gunshields to their HMMWVs or gunshields to their shoulder weapons!!!
33 Engineer Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal), North London, England
Killed in attack on British vehicles in southern Iraq on March 23, 2003
4th Assault Amphibian Battalion, 4th marine division, Tampa, Florida
Killed on April 7, 2003, in central Iraq when an enemy artillery round struck his amphibious assault vehicle
3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Von Ormy, Texas
Killed when his M1 tank was hit with an improvised explosive device in Baqubah, Iraq, on October 28, 2003
325th Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army Reserves , Narragansett, Rhode Island
Died of injuries sustained when an improvised explosive device struck his vehicle on August 27, 2003, in Al Hallia, Iraq
4th Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division , Independence, Missouri
Killed when an explosive device was detonated underneath the military vehicle he was driving in Fallujah, Iraq on July 18, 2003
422nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division, Watha, North Carolina
Killed when an improvised explosive device was detonated near a convoy he was traveling in to a water treatment facility in Baghdad, Iraq on July 21, 2003
1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Regiment , Alexandria, Virginia
Killed when the convoy he was in was attacked with an improvised explosive device and rocket-propelled grenades in Samarra, Iraq, on October 1, 2003
1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Canton, Michigan
Killed when two improvised explosive devices struck his vehicle while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq, on September 14, 2003
519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade , Conway, Pennsylvania
Killed when his convoy struck an improvised explosive device in the vicinity of Taji, Iraq on August 12, 2003
1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
Riverside, California
Killed when an improvised explosive device exploded while he was on patrol in Fallujah, Iraq, on October 31, 2003
Headquarters Troop, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment, Nevada
Killed when his convoy hit an explosive device east of Baghdad, Iraq on July 23, 2003
115th Military Police Company, Army National Guard, North Providence, Rhode Island
Killed when his Humvee struck an improvised explosive device on September 1, 2003, on a supply route south of Baghdad, Iraq
115th Military Police Company, Army National Guard, New Bedford, Massachusetts
Killed when his Humvee struck an improvised explosive device on September 1, 2003, on a supply route south of Baghdad, Iraq
3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Douglas, Arizona
Killed when his M1 tank was hit with an improvised explosive device in Baqubah, Iraq, on October 28, 2003
3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, California
Killed when his vehicle passed by an vehicle loaded with explosives that detonated on June 26, 2003, in southwest Baghdad. Chris was serving on Task Force 20, the special operations unit hunting for Saddam Hussein and other fugitive Iraqi leaders
2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Kent, Washington
Died from injuries suffered when he was struck with an improvised explosive device while responding to a rocket-propelled grenade attack in Baghdad, Iraq, on November 1, 2003
3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Enterprise, Alabama
Wounded when an explosive device detonated and struck the vehicle on June 26, 2003, in Baghdad, Iraq, he died of wounds on June 28
Delta Troop, 4th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania
Killed when an improvised explosive device was detonated as his vehicle passed by while traveling in a convoy west of Baghdad, Iraq, on September 29, 2003
547th Transportation Company, Army National Guard, Washington, D.C.
Killed when an improvised explosive device struck his vehicle in a convoy near Ar Ramadi, Iraq, on August 26, 2003
1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Division
Dubuque, Iowa
Killed when his M113 Armored Personnel Carrier hit a landmine in Baghdad, Iraq on July 31, 2003
4th Forward Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
Houston, Texas
Killed when the convoy she was in was attacked with an improvised explosive device and rocket-propelled grenades in Tikrit, Iraq, on October 1, 2003
70th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division
Pago Pago, American Samoa
Killed when a vehicle containing an improvised explosive device detonated near the Al Khadra Police Station in downtown Baghdad on October 27, 2003
2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Dunn, North Carolina
Killed when his vehicle was hit with an improvised explosive device while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq, on October 26, 2003
1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Willingboro, New Jersey
Killed in action April 10, 2003, in Iraq, when a car exploded next to his vehicle
2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, Hume, Missouri
Killed when his vehicle was hit with an improvised explosive device while on patrol on October 26, 2003, in Baghdad, Iraq
307th Military Police Company, Army Reserves , Uniontown, Pennsylvania
Died of injuries received when his vehicle hit an improvised explosive device while returning from the Baghdad airport on August 18, 2003
326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne Division, Virginia
Died from injuries suffered when his Humvee was struck by an improvised explosive device, in Mosul, Iraq, on November 1, 2003
C Company, 501st Signal Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Levittown, Pennsylvania
Died from injuries suffered when an improvised explosive device struck his Humvee in Mosul, Iraq, on November 1, 2003
1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Calumet, Michigan
Killed when the vehicle he was riding in on a mounted patrol was hit by an improvised explosive device and later came under small-arms fire in Fallujah, Iraq, on October 20, 2003
1st Battalion, The Queen's Lancashire Regiment, Louth, Lincolnshire, England
Killed in a bomb attack on a British military ambulance in Basra, Iraq on August 14, 2003
165th Military Intelligence Battalion, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Woodruff, Arizona
Killed when a command detonated device exploded, overturning his vehicle while on a mission to observe enemy activity in Ramadi, Iraq, on October 6, 2003
2nd Brigade, 325th Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Batesville, Indiana
Killed while he was on mounted patrol and his vehicle drove past an object that exploded on the roadside on July 7, 2003, in Baghdad, Iraq
1st Brigade, Multinational Division Central-South, Poland
Killed when a convoy of four Polish military vehicles was shelled near al Mussabiyah, Iraq, on November 6, 2003
1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Yardley, Pennsylvania
Killed when an improvised explosive device was dropped from an overpass onto his convoy as it traveled through Baghdad's Al Rashid district on July 28, 2003
82nd Soldier Support Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, Humacao, Puerto Rico
Killed when an improvised explosive device was detonated next to a military convoy in Baghdad, Iraq, on November 4, 2003
3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Fort Worth, Texas
Killed on April 7 in central Iraq when an enemy artillery round struck his amphibious assault vehicle
Troop K, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Hagerstown, Indiana
Killed when his vehicle was struck by an improvised explosive device while on a security patrol in Ar Ramadi, Iraq, on September 20, 2003
2nd Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Killed when his vehicle was struck by an improvised explosive device on August 27, 2003, in Fallujah, Iraq
2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Worthington, Ohio
Killed when his patrol received grenade fire on June 5, 2003, in Fallujah, Iraq
1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division Radcliff, Kentucky
Killed when his M2/A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle struck an anti-tank mine northwest of Baji, Iraq, on October 12, 2003
1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, Mount Vernon, Washington
Killed on October 6, 2003, when his combat patrol convoy was hit by an improvised explosive device in Iskandariyah, Iraq
1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Odessa, Missouri
Killed when his vehicle hit unexploded ordnance while escorting heavy equipment transporters on May 26, 2003, in Baghdad, Iraq
2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Mechanicsville, Virginia
Killed when the convoy he was traveling in was struck by an improvised explosive device in Baqubah, Iraq, on October 23, 2003
150 Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Southport, Merseyside, England
Killed during an attack by gunmen on a British military ambulance in Basra, Iraq on August 23, 2003
1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, Clarksville, Tennessee
Killed when his convoy, while on combat patrol, was struck by an improvised explosive device in Baghdad, Iraq, on October 6, 2003
150 Provost Company, Royal Military Police, County Durham, England
Killed during an attack by gunmen on a British military ambulance in Basra, Iraq on August 23, 2003
"C" Battery, 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, Concord, Michigan
Killed when his convoy was attacked with an improvised explosive device and small-arms fire on October 13, 2003 in Balad, Iraq
4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Lawton, Oklahoma
Died of injuries he received when his M113 armored personnel carrier hit an antitank mine in Tikrit, Iraq, on August 13, 2003
105th Military Police Company, Army National Guard, Buffalo, New York
Killed when his vehicle ran over an improvised explosive device near Baghdad, Iraq, on October 17, 2003
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, New Orleans, Louisiana
Killed when his vehicle hit an improvised explosive device on August 12, 2003, near Ramadi, Iraq
"C" Battery, 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, Kilgore, Texas
Killed when his convoy was attacked with an improvised explosive device and small-arms fire on October 13, 2003 in Balad, Iraq
Armored vehicle deaths: 1
1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division West Hills, California
Killed when his vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade during an ambush of a military convoy north of Hawd in northern Iraq on July 24, 2003
52nd Lowland Regiment (Volunteers), Territorial Army Govan, Glasgow, Scotland
Died when his convoy was attacked by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades near Amarah, Iraq, on August 27, 2003
1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Phoenixville, Pennsylvania
Killed when his patrol was ambushed with rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire in Taza, Iraq, on October 18, 2003
1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division Wellsville, Kansas
Killed in action April 1, 2003, in Samawah, Iraq, when a rocket-propelled grenade hit his vehicle
489th Engineer Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve Camden, Arkansas
Killed when the convoy he was riding in was attacked with rocket-propelled grenades in Baghdad, Iraq on July 26, 2003
2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, North Royalton, Ohio
Killed when the convoy he was in was attacked with rocket-propelled grenades in Mosul, Iraq on July 23, 2003
957th Engineer Company, Army National Guard Dickinson, North Dakota
Killed when the truck he was in was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade near Ramadi, Iraq on July 22, 2003
1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Townsend, Massachusetts
Killed when his vehicle was ambushed and struck by rocket-propelled grenades while on patrol in Tallifar, Iraq on July 20, 2003
1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Bedford, Massachusetts
Killed when his patrol was ambushed with rocket-propelled grenades and small-arms fire in Taza, Iraq, on October 18, 2003
319th Field Artillery, 173rd Airborne Brigade Arlington, Washington
Killed when his vehicle was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade in Kirkuk, Iraq on August 1, 2003
1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division Elba, Alabama
Killed when his vehicle was ambushed and struck by rocket-propelled grenades while on patrol in Tallifar, Iraq on July 20, 2003
4th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment North Creek, New York
Killed when his vehicle was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade while on patrol in Baghdad, Iraq, on September 15, 2003
244th Engineer Battalion, Army Reserves Hayden, Colorado
Killed when his convoy was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade on August 29, 2003, north of As Suaydat, Iraq
437th Medical Company Santa Fe Springs, California
Killed when a rocket-propelled grenade hit a U.S. military ambulance south of Baghdad, Iraq, on June 19, 2003
2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division La Mesa, New Mexico
Killed when a rocket-propelled grenade hit his Bradley Fighting Vehicle in Assadah, Iraq, on October 4, 2003
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment Roseville, California
Killed when his unit was ambushed while on patrol by individuals using small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades in the Sadr City section of Baghdad, Iraq, on October 9, 2003
Headquarters Troop, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment Houston, Texas
Killed when a rocket-propelled grenade struck his vehicle while traveling in a convoy in Baghdad, Iraq,on June 27, 2003
Even worse, the entire U.S. Army is getting clobbered TODAY in Iraq by RPGs, small-arms fire, and command detonated landmines (mis-identified as "Improvised Explosive Devices or "IEDs") riding around in unarmored HMMWV and FMTV trucks. Note how easily rubber tires burn. The Stryker armored car has 8 air-filled rubber tires.
Simple common sense things like sandbagging your vehicles are not being done in Iraq.
Photographic proof (photo above):
http://us.news1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/rids/20031114/i/r2556915053.jpg
We know for a FACT that the Army is not even sandbagging its vehicles as we have photographic and witnessess as proof of this dereliction of duty and incompetence.
FM 55-30, ARMY MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS AND OPERATIONS is the Bible for hardening vehicles: www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/toc.htm
Specifically checkout Appendix O at the Reimer Library:
www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/appo.htm
In case the Army web page on vehicle hardening suddenly "disappears" its copied here: www.combatreform.com/fm5530.htm. We've also included it in its entirety on this web page.
Since adding sandbags to Army vehicles increases Soldiers' survivability and is in an Army doctrinal reference manual, there is no excuse. Painting dark green helicopters and ground vehicles light gray or tan if they drive/fly during the daytime is not being done, either. The status quo is somehow smugly thought of as being "adequate" as ones and twos of our men are getting killed by command detonated land mines, RPGs and small arms fire attacks each day. The Army is NOT doing ALL it can to win the fight and protect Soldiers' lives and anyone saying otherwise is incorrect.
The U.S. Army doesn't even teach its Soldiers to sandbag their vehicles as an annual CTT Level 1 task. Its high time we learn from these combat experiences on the non-linear battlefield; fathom that that soft-skin rubber tired wheeled vehicles are unsuitable and to supply EVERY Army unit with M113 Gavin light tracked armored fighting vehicles as the baseline vehicle. Not pathetic HMMWV, FMTV and Stryker wheeled trucks.


Army lying: says it can only provide more wheeled trucks when THOUSANDS of M113 Gavin TRACKS are available, a lesson in desperation 101
December 14, 2003Unfit For Combat: Humvees need armor to give them a fighting chance
By Craig Gordon, Washington Bureau
Washington - American troops are dying in Iraq and suffering amputations and other massive injuries while they confront the Iraqi insurgency in Humvees not designed to withstand frontline combat.
These lighter Humvees and other military vehicles have become the target of choice for anti-U.S. guerrillas. Shrapnel from a roadside bomb, or even a simple AK-47 rifle round, can slice through the unarmored vehicles - some of which have little more than vinyl fabric for their roofs and doors, troops who know them say.
"We're kind of sitting ducks in the vehicles we have," said Lt. Col. Vincent Montera, commander of the Long Island-based 310th Military Police Battalion, which has crisscrossed the Iraqi countryside for months in those "soft-top" models.
But the Army does not expect the full complement of a more heavily armored version, designed to withstand armor-piercing bullets and land mines, to arrive in Iraq until the summer of 2005. The Pentagon failed to move them into Iraq in significant numbers because war planners had seriously underestimated how violent the newly liberated nation would be.
Just one in eight of all Humvees in Iraq are of this more heavily armored variety.
Many in Congress say that 18 months is too long to wait and question why assembly lines at the sole production plant for the heavier models aren't yet running around the clock.
In the eyes of Alma Hart of Massachusetts, her son, John, might have come home after an Oct. 18 ambush if his unit had been driving the armored models that day. "My son could be alive if he'd had this equipment," she said. "The recruiter didn't tell us this stuff when we let our son sign up."
To 26-year-old 1st Lt. Jonathan Pruden of Georgia, not having an armored Humvee meant an attack July 1 cost him five inches of bone in his right leg and a left leg at risk of amputation, he believes. "It would have made a huge difference, probably saved my legs," Pruden said.
Montera doesn't expect to get any of the armored models for his unit before his troops come home in the spring, so he's doing what he can to make his soft-sided ones safer. The 310th has been stuffing sandbags onto the floors and hanging flak vests on the doors to add something, anything, for added protection.
"It isn't much," Montera said, "but every little precaution just might save one of my Soldiers' lives."
The shortage of armored Humvees - and the risks for units like Montera's without them - are just the latest example of what critics say was war planning through rose-colored glasses, based on overly optimistic predictions of how U.S. forces would be greeted after the invasion.
Some U.S. military officials have told Congress they simply did not foresee that there would be such a long and bloody period of insurgency that would require U.S. troops to be patrolling Iraq from behind armor plating.
"It's true. We do not have as many up-armored Humvees as we would like to have in Iraq," the Army vice chief of staff at the time, Gen. John Keane, told a congressional committee in September. "To be honest with you, we just did not expect this level of violence ... that we are currently dealing with. That's the straight answer."
At the war's end May 1, the Army saw the need for just 235 of the armored Humvees for all of Iraq.
Today, the Army's need has grown more than tenfold. The Army is trying to rush 3,200 of the armored models into the country and already has met about half that goal.
Added a second Army official last week: "The main phase of battle, to get rid of the Iraqi army, you're talking tanks, Bradleys, the fighting vehicles. The phase we're in now, the stability and support operations, we have an enemy that's adapted and that is targeting our lighter vehicles. No reason to expect we'd need 3,000-plus armored Humvees. How could we have known?"
Some congressional critics scoff at that assessment and say the Pentagon should have done a better job preparing for this contingency. "Our troops are dying because their vehicles are obviously vulnerable," said Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.). "It's shameful that [Defense] Department officials didn't accelerate production of armored Humvees long before now." Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) said, "The initial perception - once the shooting stops, everyone will embrace us as liberators and it's going to be great- I think that colored all the planning for what units you need and how long to keep them there."
U.S. Central Command doesn't keep a breakdown of Humvee casualties, but at least 70 troops have been killed in vehicle attacks since major combat ended May 1.
Standard, non-armored Humvees never were meant to see frontline combat. They were introduced in the mid-1980s as an updated version of the Jeep, but with bodies of thin aluminum and fiberglass. Some older models like Montera's have soft-sided roofs and doors, and others, like the popular "turtleback" model, have a hard roof and machine-gun turret.
"The standard Humvees don't really have any protection at all. They're not designed with protection in mind. They're designed to move forces on the battlefield," said Maj. Tim Baxter of the Army's up-armored Humvee program.
The deadly 1993 raid in Somalia led to a Humvee with better armor protection. But with a price tag of about $150,000, they never were designed for wide use throughout the military. Iraq has turned that requirement on its head as vehicles never intended to see frontline combat can find themselves under attack on almost any road or street.
In addition, armored Humvees were parceled out mainly to active-duty units before the war - yet National Guard and reserve troops are being thrust into a more active role in patrolling the countryside. The Army Reserve -of which the 310th MP battalion is a part - said it has no armored Humvees in its normal peacetime stocks.
Even Montera's 300-strong battalion, which includes about 100 Long Islanders, didn't expect to spend this much time traversing Iraq's dangerous roads.
The 310th's specialty is guarding enemy prisoners of war, a task that generally keeps it in one location, but that job changed even before Montera's troops reached Iraq. Instead, they are helping re-establish Iraq's civilian prison system, which took Montera's troops to six cities from their home base in Diwaniya.
In logging all those miles, the 310th and its roughly 80 Humvees have taken their share of fire. Sgt. George Avalos was returning from Baghdad Sept. 9 when a pair of roadside bombs went off next to his convoy. One Soldier, traveling in a non-armored vehicle with no door, received minor injuries. Avalos believes a bigger, closer bomb would have done much greater damage. "The incident was a reality check on our vulnerability driving along these roads," Avalos, a Hicksville resident who works in the unit's motor pool, wrote in an e-mail. "Non-armored vehicles are useless in this or any hostile environment."
That's how Alma and Brian Hart of Bedford, Mass., feel about the attack that killed their son, Pfc. John Hart, 20, a paratrooper with the 173rd Infantry Brigade, who died outside Kirkuk. John Hart and another Soldier were shot in a non-armored Humvee that came under rocket-propelled grenade and small-arms fire while searching for the culprits behind a rocket attack at a nearby base.
John Hart was shot in the neck while returning fire, and his mother believes, based on conversations with fellow Soldiers, a metal gun plate found on armored models - but not on the standard ones - might have made a difference that day. John Hart himself expressed worries about the lack of armored Humvees in his unit in a call home a week before he died.
"They were really concerned that things had heated up quite a bit. They were being trained for a particular mission, and they didn't have the right equipment. 'For one thing, we don't have any armor on our Humvees. I'm standing out there exposed,'" Brian Hart recalled his son saying.
Now Brian Hart has taken up the case, trying to figure out ways to press Congress and the Pentagon to get armored Humvees into Iraq as fast as possible.
"I know it would not bring John back ... but he's got friends over there that are riding in the same gun slot in the same patrols, and I owe it to them to address the issue," said Brian Hart.
Right now, the only source of new armored Humvees will be the production line, because the Army already has diverted existing stocks that it can afford to send, including about 350 on the way, Army officials said. The Army's sole contractor for putting the armor plating on the standard Humvee chassis, Armor Holdings Inc., is hiring 150 workers at its Ohio plant but won't go to round-the-clock shifts until February. Peak production won't come until April, when the company hopes to make 220 armored Humvees a month. Officials from Armor Holdings and the Army defend the pace of production, already on the rise from a rate of 60 armored Humvees a month last summer.
"Between now and April, it's a mistake to ask us to move faster than we are because I don't think we can maintain the quality," said Bob Mecredy, president of the company's aerospace and defense group. "You don't want a round going through because you built a poor-quality vehicle."
That answer has not satisfied critics on both the Republican and Democratic sides in Congress, who have told the Army to find ways to speed up that mid-2005 deadline. "Unacceptable," said Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The Army is exploring using armor kits that can be bolted onto existing vehicles and hopes to produce 13,000 kits for Humvees, troop and tank transports in all.
In Iraq, Montera is already a step ahead of them. His unit's job is changing again, back to a focus on enemy prisoners of war in southern Iraq that he hopes will keep his troops off the roads and closer to base.
Still, he has explored getting large sheets of heavy metal to bolt onto his existing trucks, anything to give his troops a better chance of surviving an attack if one should come.
"My concern is my Soldiers, and at almost every staff meeting, I bring it up and try to think of ways to keep my Soldiers safe, by reinforcing the door and reinforcing the floor," Montera said. "If I had those up-armored, I'd feel a hell of a lot better."
Article from 1998 U.S. Army Infantry magazine: remember Somalia? Army has no excuse: SASO violence from years ago showed HMMWV trucks are inadequate
Platoon Under Fire: Mogadishu, October 1993
When are we going to take war seriously?
Now after a best-selling book and a movie, you would think we would realize that vulnerable vehicles should be fixed as much as possible and better, more protected light tracked armored vehicles like the M113A3 Gavin better utilized.
KOREA, 1969
Consider what happens when your rubber-tired wheeled vehicle isn't properly armed, armored or able to go cross-country:
"In regard to the incident on October 18, 1969, as mentioned in "The Second Korean Conflict," the four 7th Infantry Division Soldiers killed were in a 3/4-ton utility vehicle, not a jeep. They were members of "C" Company, 1/32nd Infantry ("Queens Own"). I was a Staff Sergeant serving with the Battalion Headquarters Company Reconnaissance Platoon in the 1/32 at the time. C/1/32 was providing garrison personnel for Guard Post Turner, the westernmost of two such guard posts in that sector inside the DMZ. There were usually 18 men in each guard post. Just after dawn on the 18th, a pair of gun jeeps from the 1/32nd Headquarters Company Reconnaissance platoon escorted all but one of the vehicles, a 5/4-ton truck, back and advised that they would return at 1030 hours to pick up the last vehicle, what was involved in mess maintenance. At about 0830, the truck left the guard post unescorted. The driver and a staff sergeant in the cab were armed with .45 ACPs and the two Soldiers in the back had M14s.War is an extreme activity and things we get away with in peacetime that are foolish will get our men killed in shooting wars. Other Armies know this, we do not. If we are going to use soft-skin vehicles as troop transports, DON'T. Get 11 ton M113A3s that weigh the exactly the same as 22,000 pound trucks and use them: that's right they CAN BE AIRDROPPED, "There isn't enough airlift" and other lies will not stand. The M113 was DESIGNED to be an air-droppable AFV. The combat-proven, tracked, M113 will not go up in flames from a single burst of enemy small arms fire. "Light-itis" kills, for it preaches that we can walk wherever you go when the truth is that the men are going to get trucked at some point, where they could get &**%d by enemy fire. Just like the Paratroopers and marines and other lightfighters do when at NTC, 29 Palms or in Middle Eastern combat.Evidence found afterward (footprints and cigarette butts) indicated that the ambushers had set up there before dawn and may have been watching the gun jeeps, and escorted vehicles come and go for some days. Without the gun jeeps to contend with, they fired more than 100 .32-caliber PPSh submachine-gun rounds into the vehicle from 15 to 20 feet and at least two grenades, one on which landed in the bed of the truck. All four Soldiers seem to have died in the first assault. All four tires were flat, the windshield and driver's side window had been shot out and the engine holed.
Charlie Company personnel radioed an alarm and stayed in the guard post until Recon gun jeeps arrived and secured the area. A patrol in the area north of Turner tried unsuccessfully to intercept the ambushers."
Michael John Ruffley
Carbondale, IL
If at some point, we are going to ride in trucks, the time has come to face the realities of combat and get them ready to survive some enemy fire and fight back. What is most disturbing is I know a young LT who wrote an article warning about this in the November 1989 edition of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings that was ignored and now 18 men are dead and the U.S. has suffered a major foreign policy set back (again--remember Beirut truck bombing that killed 241 sleeping, lax security marines that caused the U.S. to pull out from Lebanon, now a considered "untouchable" terrorist hell-hole?).
That was me.
U.S. ARMY VEHICLE INCOMPETENCE IS A POST-VIETNAM PHENOMENA
All of our reformer brain-storming, is healthy and wise; its what professionals do to get the best minds on the problem (BMOTP). However, let's digress into current Army reality for a few seconds, a reality that may be alien to you as you may have lived in a get-the-job-done era and always had more rank behind you or you may just be a common-sense civilian. Look at this now from company-level and below.
1. Current DoD/U.S. Army Bureaucracy won't let you save your own life
Right now, I have a friend in Iraq who cannot do shit to his FMTV and HMMWV trucks, because the Army thinks these trucks are going to somehow survive Iraq in their peacetime BS unarmored, unarmed condition. These trucks have to remain in a virginal peacetime, bean-counter, non-warrior state DESPITE WHAT FM 55-30, APPENDIX O says. If armor kits or weapons mounts are going to be used its going to have to be "store bought" and Army approved thru the bureaucracy, an on the "radar screen" budget item to Congress (so it wont fuking happen, Army has other funding "priorities"). So our men are driving HMMWV and FMTV trucks to their deaths and maimings. Now there is a middle ground; TACOM could get off its ass and get its experts working with troops IN THE FIELD to get "approved" improvised armoring and gun mount kits etc. but that ain't happenin, either.
This is why we vigorously propose we send up-armored or even as-is M113 Gavins to Iraq RIGHT NOW so some bureaucrat CAN'T DENY OUR TROOPS ARMOR PROTECTION--ITS BUILT IN. Look at the M113A3 it has the bolts to accept RPG resistant applique' armor but THE ARMY WILL NOT BUY IT. Lesson Learned. Don't count on the Army buying you what you need unless you already go it.
Let's explain now the rank/file side of the story.
2. The troops themselves are often lazy and ignorant-they don't know "what right looks like"
Somewhere after Vietnam and the reality of bullets hitting your body and shredding it faded away, we in the USMC and the Army had a massive turn-over of personnel, with the Vietnam vets who knew better from hard experience leaving the service. We also had the Reagen build-up and the HMMWV was one of the "big ticket" items bought in quantity. The "store bought" mentality took effect that to do something "right" we had to have it made that way. The mentality then drifted into "if we can't do it 'store bought' WE WON'T DO IT AT ALL". Example, so you know we're not BSing you:
JRTC 2000. Army 20th Airborne Combat Engineers are attached to our M1/M2 Company Team, we give them M113A3 Gavins, they learn in just a few days how to use em, kick ass. It was either that or they don't "play" with us since they have no armored vehicles. We learn they have a rifle launched grappling hook device I happen to have experimented with, too in case we needed to do our own breaching. These things in TRAINING are shot by using a full power 5.56mm blank cartridge at about $1 a pop. Of course the supply system is fuked up and doesn't work yadda yadda. No full power store-bought blanks. What you do is take 3 x regular 5.56mm blanks and open them up and make one full power blank using your leatherman's pliers to shoot the grappling hook. That's what the maker of the Launched Grappling Hook told me to do, I've done it dozens of times and even taught all my men how to do it (infantry, grunts).
The active duty combat engineers WOULD NOT DO IT.
It was "beneath" them.
With a welfare recipient's attitude of "If it ain't supplied to me, I ain't struggling to make somethin" they refused to employ the rifle-launched grappling hooks during our JRTC rotation.
Thus...........
AN ENTIRE COLUMN OF 50+ VEHICLES WAS STOPPED REPEATEDLY ALONG ROADS/TRAILS AS ENGINEERS HAND TOSSED AND RECOVERED AND HAND TOSSED AND RECOVERED, AND HAND TOSSED AND RECOVERED A GRAPPLING HOOK WITH A ROPE TO BREACH.
We stood still for hours as the engineers played "grappling hook rodeo".
Had an enemy attacked us....
3. The HMMWV laziness took effect in the early 1980s
During the '80s the unarmored wheeled HMMWV became the main troop carrier instead of the tracked armored M113 Gavin. Why?
Because it LOOKED NEW, was "new".
During Vietnam, almost everyone that wanted to live rode in a M113. The light tracked AFV was the "standard" set for troop transport over the lethal battlefield. Then the "bar" was lowered with the HMMWV as a quasi-combat vehicle.
Ignorant non-professionals easily buy into the "new is better" mentality. However, when the "new" thing is LESS CAPABLE than the "old" thing, what you get is LESS CAPABLE.
As the threat of death in combat faded from the Army's consciousness, the HMMWV began to be used as a combat vehicle when its not....its a truck. No one was shooting at us to show us otherwise....In peacetime, priorities are conformity and rigidity to look good; with "new" equipment awash in the hubris of American technological "superiority" why should we improve on it with field expedients? Its already "great" etc etc ad nauseum. Anything from Vietnam "sucked, we lost that war" (Did we? ask Thailand). The HMMWV is a no brainer, requires actually no maintenance---PMCS is just a time waster/schedule filler--if it doesn't crank and you can't jump it, you turn it in to a mechanic, end of your responsibilities. Easier than a M113 Gavin which you are expected to have to keep running, change tracks (which I've never had to do after 10 years of hard use of neglected M113s)...other skill sets that keep you victorious and alive in COMBAT...
So here you have this pressure from the Army to "leave everything alone" and do less or better yet DO NOTHING---show up on time, keep mouth shut, don't go out on town and get in trouble etc. and the HMMWV arrives------------awwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww transportation without any need from the operator to give a damn or sweat or be tactical. All in a quest for "perfect administrative efficiency" (look good on paper forget about FUNCTION IN WAR). The advent of computers have made everything even worse. Now every damn piece of paper has to be proof read ad nauseum 'til its a doctor's thesis. All convenient time wasters to keep the masses occupied and brain-dead to not question the garrison status quo created by the non-warrior pushy assholes who run the Army. The non-tactical, non-thinking status quo that is killing and maiming our people in Iraq.
Fast forward to today, 2005.
"Sand bag my HMMWV?"
"Where's the procedure?"
"Where's the FM or TM showing me how?"
"Hey! Is this AUTHORIZED??? I don't think we should do it, we might get in trouble...."
God forbid someone actually does harden and modify their HMMWV trucks and a TACOM nazi sees you...heads will roll....yours!
Before we get some smart ass writing us. Take some fukin MRE boxes 550 cord them to the HMMWV troops seats to act as a "wall" . Stack your sandbags so you have a wall/parapet to defeat small arms fire and sidewards exploding roadside bombs, o I have to be PC, "IEDS". Amazing what you can do when you try. Sandbags are not limited to just floor protection. Look at the diagrams in FM 55-30.
4. Combat the final reality check? Maybe not.
So what we are seeing in Iraq is enemy firepower killing and maiming our men repudiating our peacetime bullshit. However, rather than waking up and changing our Army qualitatively, Bush Administration politicians are speeding up our retreat by saying we only have to hang on 'til next June. In other words we can remain in our BS status quo of technotactical ineptitude---all we have to do is hang on til June, 7-8 months from now.
We have bad news, at the current casualty rate (Black November isn't even over yet!) we have 2,000 KIA and 20,000 WIA now, in 7-8 months we will have 700-800 more dead and 2500 wounded and maimed. Total Iraq dead will be 3000 and 40,000 wounded by then. An entire Brigade's worth of troops DEAD. Tombstones. Another 10 brigades ruined for life and certainly not likely to make the Army a "career". In other words, AN ENTIRE DIVISION destroyed by Iraq, out of an Army with only 10 active duty divisions. 1/10th of the entire Army destroyed by Iraq is the future if we keep on our current course.
What will likely happen is just like after Somalia when troops in rubber-tired trucks got their asses kicked in a non-linear, urban battlefield, the Army will go back to what it was doing before and cover their asses by using the deaths and maimings of our men to divert attention from their incompetence that caused these needless tragedies by talking about their "valor and unselfishness". If you give a crap about our dead and wounded you will take ACTION to insure we kick the enemy's ass by improving and fixing the status quo.
Reading "Taming the Land Mine" by Peter Schiff, you realize Rhodesia/South Africa have already experienced how land mines can devestate small utility trucks like Land Rovers and HMMWVs. Their first response was to STOP DRIVING SMALL TRUCKS and use only larger trucks that can be heavily sand-bagged until they could develop "V" hull shaped armored vehicles (it took YEARS, we don't have YEARS in Iraq). We should do the same in Iraq until up-armored M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs can be delivered:
1. Park and DO NOT DRIVE any unarmored HMMWV or civilian truck/car; do not offer enemy a target to attack
2. Close cab doors on FMTV trucks and create sandbag/MRE case filled with dirt/sand wall. Open top ring cover even if you don't have machine gun ring mount and post a Soldier with a light, medium or heavy machine gun to provide 360 security and immediate return fire capabilities. Even if its just a Soldier with a M16 rifle/M4 carbine have EVERY FMTV truck showing an armed sentry in the cab. Enter/exit from this top circular opening out the back truck bed. When driving under an overpass, throw old flak jackets around the circle cover over the hole until you pass the danger area. Place sandbags around the fuel tank. Place watercans and sandbags on floor. The water will dissipate the heat and shock wave of an explosion as the Rhodesians/South Africans found out. They suggest putting water in the tires via a schrade valve.
EVERY VEHICLE IN EVERY CONVOY WITH AN OBVIOUS ARMED SENTRY. Let enemy know we will fight back from EVERY vehicle.
3. Lead FMTV truck does not carry troops or cargo; just driver and sentry/gunner. Truck bed is full of dirt to absorb blast.
4. Paint ALL vehicles TAN, to include the absurd dark green helicopters that are now regularly shot down because they are easy to spot, track and fire at during the blue-sky day time. CARC Tan paint can be brushed on if you wear protective clothing/respirator: Tan 686 33446 NSN 8010-01-276-3638 1 Qt Can
5. Request war-tock/in-storage M113A3 or M113A2 Gavin light tracked AFVs: this is your own life. Don't be a weak co-dependant afraid of "making waves". If you are DEAD you will not have an Army "career", you'll be DEAD. Use the following National Stock Numbers (NSNs) and request through your chain of command these life-saving vehicles:
M113A2: 2350-01-068-4077
M113A3: 2350-01-219-7577
The M113A3 Gavin is the better vehicle with spall liners, external fuel tanks and a much more powerful engine. However, the as-is M113A2 Gavin is far more protective and mobile than the up-armored HMMWV truck will ever be.
1. Arm EVERY Soft-skin vehicle, NOW! EVERY VEHICLE MUST BE A "GUN TRUCK"
The enemy in Iraq deliberately attacks our weakest vehicles without armament and armor protection. Yet for 7 years we've denied our light forces a light tank for assault firepower:
"Within this evolutionary climate, fiscal realities and the aging of existing systems have resulted in a significant gap in our forced/early entry capabilities. The deactivation of the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor, coupled with the termination of the Armored Gun System (AGS), has created a critical need for enhanced direct fire assault support and anti-armor capabilities for forced/early entry forces".
Official U.S. Army ACTD web site statement
Three of our light divisions, the 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault are in Afghanistan/Iraq today without ANY light tank fire support.
More demonstration of the half-assed U.S. military in action: "rediscovering" gun trucks
In WWII, we armed almost every one of our vehicles--like the British SAS and LRDG gun jeeps because we knew in war, vehicles get shot at. In Vietnam, after enough men died we got serious about self-preservation and hardened and ARMED our trucks. Here are pictures from the U. S. Amy transportation museum:


More pics of Vietnam Gun-trucks:
www.yumodel.co.yu/takmicenje/bruce/guntruck.htm
http://groups.msn.com/VietnamGuntrucks/unknownguntrucks.msnw
[NOTE: Why settle for a M113 hull? We must remember that in Vietnam, every working M113 Gavin was being used, so when they needed an armored box, M113 hulls were slapped on top as the transportation museum pics show.
Today, its a different situation, we don't have to settle for just M113 hulls, we have thousands of fully functioning war-stock M113 Gavins that could be up-armored, gunshielded and up-engined very quickly and sent to Iraq to save men's lives and beat the enemy.]
These "Lessons Learned" were institutionalized in Army Field Manuals like FM 55-30, ARMY MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS AND OPERATIONS which is the Army's "Bible" for hardening vehicles. However, the U.S. Army is a sleepless, brain-dead culture where professional reading and thought about the modern battlefield neither takes place or is encouraged enough so when folks go to places like Afghanistan and Iraq they know what to do.
www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/toc.htm
Specifically checkout Appendix O at the Reimer Library.
www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/appo.htm
[In case the Army web page on vehicle hardening suddenly "disappears" its copied here: www.combatreform.com/fm5530.htm or scroll down this page where we've reprinted it]
We know for a FACT that the Army is not even sandbagging its vehicles as we have photographic and witnessess as proof of this dereliction of duty and incompetence. Most of our HMMWVs today are bare of any armament at all. The new M197 low-cost mount depicted above bolts a pedestal to the rear area of the soft-top HMMWV to fit either a M60/M240B MMG or a M249 LMG organic to just about every unit in the U.S. Army. If the enemy sees a weapon-armed vehicle, often he will leave it alone and seek a more vulnerable target that can't fire back. Think about it. Its your life. Is following Army rigamarole going to be there to save your life when the bullets are flying at you and your men?
The M197 mount and M6 Pedestal are available from:
Ramo Manufacturing Inc.
412 Space Park S
Nashville, TN 37211-8104
(615) 832-6700
As you can see above, the FMTV has a MG mount kit for its cab that can be on ALL VARIANTS! Get these for your trucks! Some of these trucks need MK-19 40mm belt-fed autogrenade launchers on them not just 7.62mm MMGs and .50 cal HMGs.
When you get your MGs mounted, you will see that the metal ammo can sits on a tray to feed the gun. Try Ranger Rick Tscherne's suggestion on pg.25 of his Ranger Digest III, and weld two ammo cans together to double your 7.62 ammo supply to 400 ready rounds instead of the one box of 200, since in a firefight you do not have time to duck down and reload. This technique may even work for .50 caliber ammo cans.
Ranger Rick Tscherne's Books Inc.
11 Poppy Lane
West Grove, PA 19390
IF THERE IS A WILL THERE IS A WAY:
SF Soldiers in Desert Storm found a "way" to pedestal mount a .50 caliber M2 Heavy Machine Gun onto a Toyota pick-up truck:
BETTER WEAPONRY:
M242 Bushmaster 25mm autocannon
2. Add Belly Wheels or buy MATTRACKS
Image courtesy of CG˛ Inc. http://www.cg2.com..Thanks Tricia Garcia!
The HMMWV and all wheeled vehicles in general are notorious for getting stuck in soft mud since their belly can bottom out on the ground if its wheels sink. What we need is a set of belly wheels/rollers that are there to prevent the belly from sticking, like the Russian BRDM Scout cars have.
If you are going into combat and you are not going to internally load HMMWVs into CH-47Ds, then replace all 4 vulnerable tires/air-filled wheels with MATTRACKS.
These are special track sets that bolt on in the place of the wheels. These will not go flat if bullets hit them, and provide x-country mobility to get away from the roads in the first place to avoid ambushes. While their rubber tracks are vulnerable still to being burned up in a fire, this could be solved by making the tracks out of kevlar for military use. ALL U.S. Army Light Divisions with "D" Company TOW ATGM and HMG MK-19/.50 cal hard-top HMMWVs with armor suffer from reduced mobility when using air-filled tires, and should replace their wheels with MATTRACKS. We must as an Army not become road bound or else suffer the consequences of what the enemy did to us in the Korean war or more recently in Somalia.
In fact, we believe that had the HMMWVs in Somalia October 3, 1993 had MATTRACKS on they would not have been left burning and destroyed that day in the fight for Task Force Ranger.
The heavily armored HMMWVs now entering service and the upcoming LOSAT HMMWV need MATTRACKS for x-xountry and adverse weather mobility.
An "ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure".
3. Centerline seats kits
Notice these Republic of China (ROC) Paratroops are in a SOFT top HMMWV yet are FULLY armed---a .50 cal HMG in right front seat, a rearward facing Medium Machine Gun----why can't we be similarly well armed and ready?
HOW MANY U.S. ARMY SOLDIERS HAVE TO DIE BEFORE WE WAKE THE HELL UP HERE?
We have the techniques to do this for our trucks outlined in FM 55-30 and FM 90-5 Jungle Operations, we just have to do it. Every Light unit that goes to NTC/JRTC should have to sandbag at least one truck before convoying anywhere as a METL task to insure they know how to do it, and understand the importance.
The FMTV and HMMWV should have centerline troop seat kits so the troops face outboards for better vigilance and instant return fire capability. The atrocious truck tailgate on the 5-ton that has to be unscrewed needs to be replaced with a quick release so troops can "de-bus" instantly. Again, another example of not thinking about and for war.
Since its likely hardening trucks will be ignored, FM 55-30 APPENDIX O is reprinted below in its entirety:
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| As the nature of conflict changes, so does the threat to logistics units. War and certain other operations--especially peacekeeping or peacemaking--place renewed emphasis on convoy security and reinforce lessons learned in Vietnam. Current threats include the use of command-detonated and pressure-sensitive mines placed on, above, or along the shoulders of roads traveled by military vehicles and the ambushing of convoys and harassment with sniper fire. These methods of disrupting military operations are highly effective, cheap, require limited time and labor, are easy to coordinate, and can be accomplished by an unsophisticated enemy. To counter these threats, motor transport units may be provided with security forces and supporting arms firepower. Also, special vehicle-hardening techniques using sandbags and other improvised material have proved successful in protecting convoy personnel, equipment, and cargo. This appendix describes these techniques. Although effective, vehicle-hardening techniques must be tailored to fit the specific environment in which the motor transport units are operating. |
O-1. HARDENED VEHICLES. A hardened vehicle is made less vulnerable to the effects of explosives and small arms fire by adding sandbags, armor plating, ballistic glass, and other protective devices. Hardening may make certain vehicle components and cargo less vulnerable. Its primary purpose, however, is to protect the truck's occupants. The protection afforded is significant and often means the difference between injury and death.
The vehicle hardening techniques described here include locally fabricated (improvised) armor kits and sandbags. When an enemy threat exists, consider the following factors in determining the method and extent of vehicle hardening:
During Vietnam, the Army had three nonremovable armor kits for hardening 1/4-, 2 1/2-, and 5-ton trucks. These kits were later deleted from the inventory. Although no kits are currently available through the Army's supply system, several projects are under way to develop armor plating for use in hostile environments.
O-2. SANDBAGS. Sandbags are effective in reducing the effects of blasts, preventing fire from reaching the driver, and providing protection from small arms fire and fragmentation. Sandbags are usually readily available and do not permanently impair the flexibility of vehicles. Sandbags can easily be added or removed from the vehicle as the situation dictates. One drawback to using sandbags is that their weight limits the vehicle's capability to haul cargo.
All vehicles must be properly maintained according to the operator's -10 TM. Use the procedures below to prepare vehicles for convoy operations.
a. Cab. Experience shows that using sandbags to harden vehicle cabs for protection against mine blasts saves lives (Figure O-1). Normally, the cabs of all vehicles subject to detonating mines are hardened. Certain cautions, however, must always be observed. Sandbags should be placed so that they--
To reduce the sandblast effect when a mine is detonated near the vehicle, various materials may be placed on top of the floorboard sandbags (such as rubber mats, light metal plates, plywood, or scraps of runway membrane material). Wetting down the sandbags is also effective but contributes to deterioration of the metal.
To properly prepare the vehicle cab, double-stack sandbags under the passenger seat and on the cab floor. Stack the sandbags two high under the driver's seat; in some vehicles this may not be possible. Remove the tools from the BII storage compartment and place them inside the bed. Place sandbags in the storage compartment to give the driver required protection. As an added precaution, place a heavy rubber or fiber mat over the sandbags. This reduces danger from fragments (such as stones, sand, and metal parts from the vehicle).
NOTES:
1. If the tools remain in the BII storage compartment and the
vehicle detonates a mine, the tools may become secondary projectiles that can
injure the driver. Also, if sandbags cannot be placed under the passenger seat
because batteries are located there, then stack the sandbags on the seat. Never
place sandbags directly on the batteries.
2. The cab of a 5-ton M923 cargo
truck needs about 14 to 20 sandbags, while a 2 1/2-ton truck requires about 12
to 18 sandbags.
Figure O-1. Proper placement of sandbags in the cab
Attach to the doors locally fabricated 1/4- to 1/2-inch-high hardened, removable armor plates. (Use hooks to attach the steel plates to the window slots). Cover side windows and the front windshield with wire mesh to protect personnel from rocks and grenades. The convoy commander will decide whether to have windshields removed, lowered, or left in place. If the windshield interferes with the use of weapons and blackout operations and must be lowered, place a single layer of sandbags under the windshield, lower the windshield onto the bags, place a second layer of sandbags over the windshield, and then cover both with canvas (Figure O-2). Placing sandbags under the windshield ensures that--
NOTE: Leaving the windshield in place protects against heavy and driving rain, incoming grenades, and decapitation of personnel from wire stretched across the road.
b. Cargo Bed. Depending on the type of load, the cargo bed may or may not be hardened. For example, if troops are being transported, the bed needs to be hardened with a double layer of sandbags. The bags also need to be properly fitted to the contours of the vehicle. Stack the bags five high around the sides of the vehicle to add protection. To hold the sandbags in place, construct a support structure and place it inside the bed of the vehicle. This structure can be made by using four-by-fours on the corners and two-by-sixes in between (Figure O-3).
NOTE: Caution must be taken to ensure that the sandbags do not exceed the allowable weight of the vehicle bed. Double stacking the sandbags increases the possibility of exceeding the vehicle's payload capacity. The mission, coupled with the enemy threat, must determine the extent of hardening (single- or double- layer sandbags). The bottom line is to ensure soldier safety.
Figure O-2. Proper placement of sandbags under the windshield
Figure O-3. Support
structure for the bed of the truck
Figure O-3. Support
structure for the bed of the truck (continued)
It takes about 226 sandbags (dry, weighing about 40 pounds each) to prepare the bed of a 5-ton, M923 cargo truck. Distribution is as follows: 86 on the floor bed (single layer); 5 high on each side (50 per side = 100 bags); 20 in the front; and 20 in the rear of the bed (Figure O-4).
Figure O-4. Sandbagged 5-ton M923 cargo truck
c. Fuel Tanks. Protective plating around the fuel tank will lessen the damage to the fuel tank. It will also help to ensure that the fuel tank is not pierced, thus immobilizing the vehicle. This protective measure is especially critical when a vehicle is caught in the kill zone of an ambush. An alternative solution to this problem is to hook up a 5-gallon can of fuel in a safe location for use as an auxiliary fuel tank. This will allow the vehicle to travel a safe distance outside the kill zone if all the fuel is drained from a damaged fuel tank.
NOTES:
1. A 5-ton M923 cargo truck requires about five sandbags to provide
top protection. Consider placing protective plating around the sides and bottom
of the fuel tank to increase protection.
2. Older vehicles in the Army inventory may still be operating on MOGAS. If a tank filled with MOGAS is ruptured, the fuel may ignite and seriously burn operating personnel.
3. When putting sandbags or protective plating on or around the fuel tank, ensure that the hanger straps of the fuel tank do not crack or break.
O-3. TARPAULINS AND CAB TOPS. There are advantages and disadvantages to using canvas truck tops or tarpaulins, and these should be assessed. Advantages to keeping cargo covered include:
Major disadvantages to installing truck tops or tarpaulins include:
O-4. MAINTENANCE OF HARDENED VEHICLES. Hardening vehicles with armor plating places abnormal stresses on the vehicle that can result in early component failure. It is common for engine mounts, cab mount bushings, and bolts to loosen. For this reason, they should be checked, tightened, and replaced regularly. In the past the vehicle deadline rate for hardened vehicles was up to 20 percent greater than for nonhardened vehicles.
Sandbags become torn or punctured in day-to-day use. They also collect and hold water, causing metal surfaces to rust. Added maintenance is required to keep the sandbags in good condition and to prevent rust. Sandbags should be checked periodically and removed or replaced. When the sandbags are removed, the vehicle metal should be cleaned, painted (if necessary), and allowed to dry before the sandbags are replaced. Empty sandbags and ties should always be kept in the vehicle.
NOTE: When sandbags get wet, their weight increases significantly, thus putting added stress on the vehicle.
O-5. FUTURE HARDENING MATERIALS. The hardening materials described in this appendix are those currently available. Lighter, more durable materials are being developed, so the problems now associated with vehicle hardening may be alleviated in the future. Improvements will include: ballistic glass, redesigned seats, ceramic-faced composite steel doors, and armored deflective shields on the undercarriage of the vehicle (on wheel wells and under the cab).
O-6. GUN TRUCKS. Logistical convoys cannot always depend on military police support or added firepower. To provide more firepower for a convoy, units developed the gun truck. The purposes of a hardened gun truck are to--
The gun truck is equipped with a crew-served weapons system, preferably in a protective position. In Vietnam this principle worked well and provided convoys a means of self-defense.
Deploy the gun truck in the convoy where it can best provide the needed firepower. If adequate communications assets are available, they should be located with the gun truck and the convoy commander. This enables the convoy commander to call the gun truck forward when needed. (A predesignated signal is required to bring the gun truck forward and inform the crew-served weapon system personnel of the enemy location.) If communications assets are not adequate, pyrotechnics may be used to signal the gun truck to move forward.
The gun truck should not be pulled up right on top of the enemy location. The crew-served weapons on the gun truck can cover a significant distance. Therefore, the vehicle should be situated where it has a clear field of fire to engage the enemy with the maximum effective range of the weapon. If necessary and if available, multiple gun trucks can be used. When using multiple gun trucks in a convoy, overlapping fields of fire greatly increases the convoy's chance of survival.
NOTES:
1. Based on availability, types of weapon systems, and size of the
convoy, the placement and number of gun trucks may vary. With company-size and
larger convoys, a minimum of two gun trucks should be used to provide
overlapping fire. One gun truck for every eight vehicles in the convoy is
recommended.
2. Consider using the MK19 or M203 to penetrate prepared
defensive positions since small arms fire may not be capable of destroying enemy
positions.
Figure O-6 shows how M2 machine guns were mounted on the gun truck using locally fabricated materials.
O-7. BALLISTIC TEST RESULTS. It is critical that the most protective material available be used to harden a vehicle. Ballistic tests show that sand is about twice as effective as clay in hardening vehicles. At a maximum velocity of 3,250 feet per second at a range of zero feet, it takes about .6 feet of sand and 1.2 feet of clay to stop a 5.56-mm round. At a maximum velocity of 2,750 feet per second, it takes about .9 feet of sand or 1.7 feet of clay to stop a 7.62-mm round. Finally, at the maximum velocity, it takes about 1.4 feet of sand or 2.6 feet of clay to stop a 50-caliber round. Using the most protective substance could mean the difference between life and death for our most precious resource--our Soldiers.
Table O-1, shows the results of mine tests conducted using a variety of C4 explosive charges. It offers insight to the devastating effects and damage that mines can cause.
Figure O-6. M2 machine gun mounted on gun truck
O-8. CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT. Camouflage and concealment techniques can be used to make it more difficult for the enemy to spot the convoy. The type of cargo being transported can be disguised or concealed by a tarpaulin. Other effective measures include the following:
Table O-1. Mine test table
Table O-1. Mine test table (continued)
O-9. MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS. Forces engaging in ambush frequently use mines and booby traps. Command-detonated mines are often used to initiate an ambush. Mines may also be planted along the shoulder of the road to harass and interdict. A booby trap system may be used against personnel and equipment. Convoys have employed the following guidelines to effectively limit damage from mines:
- Use water in vehicle tires when there is a threat of mines exploding under
the tires.
- Increase ground clearance distance between the point of
explosion and the vehicle, if possible.
- Wear protective equipment.
- Use safety belts. Ensure seat belts are
tight; otherwise, whiplash may occur during an explosion. Also, fasten the seat
belt as low as possible on the stomach. - Use correct posture. Keep the backbone straight and supported by a backrest (to better absorb shock) and place feet flat on the floor.
NOTE: In Somalia, around Mogadishu, the Army experienced command-detonated mines of 30, 50, and 60 pounds. These devices were placed in one of the many potholes in the road and wired for command-detonation. To avoid such obstacles and/or minimize damage, implement the above techniques.
Some indicators that have proven effective in identifying the location of potential mines are--
The enemy is likely to place mines on--
SPECIAL TIP!
Protective materials that are lighter than sand bags like kevlar are expensive$. However the Army has in the past bought some kevlar materials.
Red River Arsenal has some old M113 Gavin "TOW CAP" armor kevlar 8' x 10' blankets that can be used to line vehicle floors and sides in a lighter form than sandbags:
"MAINSTREAM" ARMY ACCEPTANCE OF VEHICLE HARDENING SELF-HELP?
YES (+)
Some evidence that PARTS OF the U.S. Army does indeed have the spirit, ingenuity, and ability to adapt to circumstances. Note the hypocrisy that Butler is allowed to armor HMMWVs but the reservists from Missouri are not.
www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5467Ingenuity, elbow grease improves Humvee protection
By Spc. Chad D. Wilkerson
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Capt. Darryl M. Butler, facility engineer for the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, Task Force 1st Armored Division, inspects a new Modified Protection for un-Armored Humvees kit, or MPAH, before it is lowered onto a Humvee. Butler, the kits designer, personally oversees the installation of each kit. Spc. Chad D. Wilkerson
BAGHDAD, Iraq (Army News Service, Dec. 3, 2003) Ingenuity and improvisation have been hallmarks of the U.S. Army since its inception. Whether it is making something faster, easier, deadlier or safer, Soldiers always find a way to improve upon what they are issued.
An improvising reservist has been using his engineering skills to help provide better protection to Soldiers riding around Iraq in unarmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles.
Capt. Darryl M. Butler, a facility engineer for Task Force 1st Armored Divisions 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, an Army Reserve unit from Riverdale, Md., is the type of Soldier who is never satisfied with equipment that is simply adequate.
A U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employee in his civilian job, Butler refers to himself as an engineer through-and-through.
Butlers outlook: if he believes that he can come up with a project that will allow his fellow Soldiers to accomplish their mission quicker, safer or more effectively, it is his duty to do so.
Currently, Butler is working with a growing team of Iraqi engineers, including metal workers, sprayers and welders, piecing together his new brainchild: the Modified Protection for un-Armored Humvees.
More than 900 pounds of steel in a 25-piece kit make up what has been dubbed The Butler Mobile, a custom, modular armor plating system designed to be an addition to soft-top Humvees.
The kit includes door pieces, floor plates and a bolt-on fortress for the rear and roof, all of which put a layer of heavy steel between Soldiers and whatever the enemy throws at them, Butler said.
The entire project, Butler said, fits right into the scheme of what civil affairs Soldiers are trying to accomplish in Iraq. Protecting Soldiers while they are traveling to and from their mission locations boosts mission effectiveness and their confidence. And, employing Iraqis to help contributes to improvement of life and economic growth in the area.
With all that Butler has accomplished, with dozens of kits installed and hundreds on order, he is still looking at possible ways to improve upon his improvements.
There are munitions that the MPAH is still susceptible to, Butler said. We are ready and willing to beef the kit up even more, if need be.
The bottom line for Butler is not recognition from his command or adoration from his peers, he said. Although he has received an Army Commendation Medal for his efforts, Butler stands firm that he and his team are in the business of saving lives and getting Soldiers home safely.
This was done out of necessity, Butler said. With the number of Coalition vehicles hit by improvised explosive devices, we had the opportunity to do something to prevent Soldiers from being hurt and/or killed, and this thing does work.
(Editors note: Spc. Chad. D Wilkerson is assigned to the 372nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.)
NO! (-)
Army denying Soldier's right to protect themselves
This violates FM 55-30 Appendix O which says you can do this.
FM 55-30, ARMY MOTOR TRANSPORT UNITS AND OPERATIONS is the Army's "Bible" for hardening vehicles: www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/toc.htm specifically: checkout Appendix O at the Reimer Library: www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/55-30/appo.htm
The military wants you to stay-in-your-lane, eat a feces sandwhich and like it.
Again, why we say supply them light tracked M113 Gavin AFVs so ***holes cannot deny them armor protection.
That Pentagon spokesman is a liar, the Army isn;'t doing feces to protect these men, even when the up-armored HMMWV/kits arrive in 2005 they will not stop RPGs.
Hypocrisy and callous disregard for Soldier's lives is what this is. MISSION and PEOPLE FIRST. 1st TSG (A) editorial comments in [ ] brackets.
www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special_packages/iraq/7523317.htmPosted on Thu, Dec. 18, 2003
AP Exclusive: Army questioning Soldiers' plan to armor vehicles
DAVID A. LIEB
Associated PressJEFFERSON CITY, Mo. - Fearing roadside bombs and sniper bullets, the members of the Army Reserves' 428th Transportation Co. turned to a local steel fabricator to fashion extra armor for their 5-ton trucks and Humvees before beginning their journey to Iraq earlier this month.
But their armor might not make it into the war, because the Soldiers didn't get Pentagon "approval" for their homemade protection.
The Army, which is still developing its own add-on armor kits for vehicles, doesn't typically allow any equipment that is not Army-tested-and-approved [like Stryker?], Maj. Gary Tallman, a Pentagon spokesman [liar] for Army weapons and technology issues, said Thursday.
"It's important that other units out there that are getting ready to mobilize understand that we are doing things" to protect them, Tallman said, "but there's policy you have to consider before you go out on your own try to do something." {EDITOR: typical lying bureaucratic bullshit]
The possibility that Soldiers could be denied extra protection because of an Army policy has outraged some of the friends and neighbors who tried to help the Missouri reserve unit.
"I think it's the stupidest thing I ever heard of," said Virgil Kirkweg, owner of the Jefferson City steel company that rushed to meet the local reserve unit's armor request. "I just hope the government is not dumb enough to make them go out there without something that's going to protect them somewhat."
The 72 vehicles operated by the 428th Transportation Co. aren't designed for battle and so have thin metal floorboards and, in some cases, a canvas covering for doors. But Iraqi guerrilla groups have been targeting all types of military vehicles with homemade bombs and small-caliber weapons.
E-mails from Soldiers already deployed in Iraq urged the Missouri reservists to get extra armor if possible, said 1st Sgt. Tim Beydler of the Jefferson City-based transportation unit. So the Soldiers approached a local funeral home director active in community affairs, who paid the roughly $4,000 tab for 13,000 pounds of one-quarter inch steel. Industrial Enterprises Inc. donated the fabricating work, valued at nearly another $4,000, so the steel could be fitted under vehicle floorboards and on the inside of doors.
The Soldiers drove off in convoy Dec. 12 for Fort Riley, Kan., planning to fasten the specially made steel to their vehicles when they got to Iraq.
"We're doing what we can to protect our Soldiers. That's the bottom line," Beydler said last week while news of the donated steel was being praised locally as an example of grass-roots support for the troops. "It not only boosts morale of the Soldiers, but also of the Soldiers' family members, who know their Soldiers will be afforded some extra protection."
Fort Riley spokeswoman Deb Skidmore said Thursday that the Army reserve unit will be allowed to take their steel with them to Iraq, but she said Central Command will decide later whether the troops will be "allowed" to use it.
The Army's concern, Tallman said, is that "unapproved" steel-plating could somehow cripple the vehicles or cause them not to perform the way they were designed. For example, a Humvee armor kit recently tested at the Army's Aberdeen (Md.) Proving Ground was so heavy that it caused the vehicle to break, he said.
Tallman and spokesmen at several Army bases said they were unaware of any other units trying to craft their own armor before leaving for Iraq. But Tallman said the Army had discouraged several families of individual Soldiers from trying to obtain their own bulletproof vests, citing the same reason for Army "testing" of equipment.
Kirkweg said the Missouri Soldiers didn't have time to wait weeks, months or years for the Army to test and approve a steel-plating project that he could complete in three days. Among those deploying with the transportation unit was Kirkweg's neighbor, a mother of a 5-month-old child.
"We thought this is a very important project here - we're talking about possibility of saving people's lives," he said. "So without hesitation we went ahead and proceeded with the thing."
http://www.fayettevillenc.com/story.php?Template=war&Story=6086747
Dec 29, 10:14 PM EST
Democrat Urges Homemade Armor in Iraq
By DAVID A. LIEB
Associated Press WriterJEFFERSON CITY, Mo. (AP) -- The ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee urged the Army's top civilian official Monday to seriously consider allowing an Army Reserve unit to outfit its vehicles with homemade armor while serving in Iraq.
Army policy generally prohibits troops from using equipment that has not been tested and approved by the military.
But fearing roadside bombs and snipers, the 428th Transportation Company turned to local businessmen to fund and fabricate special steel plates for their five-ton trucks and Humvees, which have thin metal floorboards and, in some cases, a canvas covering for doors.
The Army has made no decision yet on whether the soldiers will be allowed to use the armor.
Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, the House Armed Services Committee's senior Democrat, sent a letter Monday urging Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee to encourage the Army to "give every consideration to the efforts of the 428th."
"The Army should commend the Soldiers of the 428th Transportation Company for their innovation and old fashioned American ingenuity," Skelton wrote.
Army spokeswoman Cynthia Smith said policy prohibits the Army from commenting on letters between congressmen and senior Army leaders. But Smith added the Army has asked the steel fabricator to submit a sample of the armor for testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground.
Brownlee told the Senate Armed Services Committee in November that the Army was examining ways to add armor to vehicles, but he said it could take until summer 2005 to have armor on all the Humvees in Iraq.
A spokeswoman at Fort Riley, Kan., where the Missouri-based troops are preparing to depart for Iraq, said the unit will be able to take the steel with them, but that the Central Command will decide later whether it can be used.
Copyright 2003 Associated Press. All rights reserved.
MAYBE: Soldier armors own HMMWV, saves his own life in Iraq
www.thewgalchannel.com/news/2711175/detail.htmlIraqi Explosion Injures Local Soldier
POSTED: 12:39 PM EST December 17, 2003
UPDATED: 6:26 PM EST December 17, 2003A Lancaster County Soldier serving in Iraq was wounded by a roadside bomb.
Sgt. Jordon Ketner, (pictured, left) 20, is with the 82nd Airborne Division.
The Manheim Township graduate was riding in a Humvee near Falluja Sunday when a blast from a roadside bomb sent shrapnel into his legs and chest. Fortunately, he was wearing a flack jacket, so his chest was protected. The blast shattered his ankle and melted his boots into the Humvee floor.
Ketner had worried that the Humvee would not be enough protection in the event of an explosion, so he had recently asked some Iraqis to help make it safer.
"Jordon had just asked some Iraqis to put some sheet metal on, and they were helping. He was worried about its safety, the way it was made. They put some sheet metal on the doors and the sides, bolted it on, and that saved his life," said Sandy Katner, Jordon's mother.
He underwent surgery and is expected to make a full recovery.
MAYBE NOT: Armored Door fails to save CPT Blanco's life in Iraq.
From a Soldier in Iraq who could not save CPT Blanco after he was hit in the face by an exploding Iraqi command-detonated land mine. His HMMWV truck had an improvised steel door but it wasn't made with face protection:
"I am sending two pix, one of a HMMWV with steel plate mods done right, and the other is our HMMWV. If we'd had the right pattern, CPT Blanco might be alive. The problem is no standardization in the Haji contacting and no oversight for all of the patterns. I think it is an honest attempt to do the right thing but in a "check the block" frame of mind. Also included is the last picture of CPT Blanco, if you want to advertise the atrocity"
WHO PAID FOR THE ARMY'S MISTAKE: CPT BLANCO
DoD SPIN:
http://www.dod.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0823.htmlUnited States Department of Defense
News Release On the web: var a = self.location document.writeln('' + a
+ '');http://www.dod.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0823.html Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131
Public contact: http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html or +1 (703) 428- 0711No. 992-03
IMMEDIATE RELEASE December 30, 2003DoD Identifies Army Casualty
The Department of Defense announced today the death of a Soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Capt. Ernesto M. Blanco, 28, of Texas, was killed on Dec. 28, in Qaryat Ash Shababi, Iraq. Blanco was conducting a support mission when an improvised explosive device hit his vehicle. Blanco was assigned to 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, based in Fort Bragg, N.C.
This incident is under investigation.
GROUND TRUTH FROM IRAQ:
Forwarded Message:
Subj: Tragedy
Date: 12/30/2003 1:02:29 AM Eastern Standard Time
From: XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
To: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXDear all,
I am writing now from Kuwait, awaiting the final orders whether to proceed home or back to Iraq. I am tentatively escorting home the body of my XXXXXXXXXXXXX friend, Captain Ernesto Blanco, who was killed before my eyes in XXXXXXXXXXXX, Iraq, on Sunday, 28 December 2003 at 1245 HRS, approximately 3 hours after my last email to you.
We were returning from a "routine" vehicle recovery mission when an IED went off right next to his Humvee. He took the force of the blast in his face. He had lost so much blood there was nothing we could do, though we sped as quickly as possible to the Medical Detachment at the nearest base camp. He was still hanging on, but soon thereafter the docs were performing CPR. After about 30 minutes, it was over.
What makes me angry is we saw the little Haji bastards who did it; they couldn't have been older than 10. They were 400 meters away and running right to left at an oblique, and so they escaped. Our rounds missed them. Old enough to pull the trigger, old enough to pay the price, I say, but they got away to do it again some other day.
Ernie Blanco was an upstanding Christian man, one of the best officers I have ever had the privelidge of working with. He was a friend I could confide in "off line." He will be sorely missed.
His roommate, CPT XXXXXXX, is also enroute to Kuwait, possibly to take over for me and so I would then return to FOB XXXXXXX. I am praying that I would still be given the honor and privelidge of taking him home. God's Will Be Done.
XXXXXXXX
Subj: Re: Preventing Future Tragedies
Date: 12/30/2003 9:21:34 AM Eastern Standard Time
From: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
To: XXXXXXXXXXX
Sent from the Internet (Details)We have contracted for steel hardening of the HMMWVs. CPT Blanco was hit in the face, above the armor plating. The rest of his body was unscathed. There is only so much one can do. We are still trying to contract for the LMTV armor, but it is in the works. Depending on how long I am home, I'll give you a call.
The real tragedy in all this is we don't have to be driving and making desperation mods to HMMWVs at all--thousands of M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs are sitting in storage with 1.5" thich hulls, metal road wheels and steel tracks with rubber pads.
The U.S. Army is self-destructing.
The wheeled rubber-tired truck or armored car-with-a-computer madness to steer weak, All Volunteer Force (AVF) co-dependants around a map graphic linear battlefield fantasy that doesn't exist is a miserable failure in the physical world we live in populated by RPGs, land mines and an "AK47" in every third world household. So while our men are getting killed and maimed in wheeled vehicles that can never adequately protect them, the Army tries to bribe them with $10,000 re-enlistment bonuses to stay in Iraq for one more year. If you are DEAD you can't spend it. However, if these monies were instead pooled together, say the money that would have been given to 8 Soldiers ($80,000) a M113A3 Gavin light tracked Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) sitting in storage could be supplied with RPG-resistant armor, underbelly countermine armor and gunshields to enable these same 8 Soldiers to fight alert, and heads-out to prevail in 360 non-linear combat, so they can return home ALIVE and intact.
Tragically, current Army leaders refuse to do what's right to accomplish the mission and save their men; they have bought into the discredited sociologists Tofflerian world-view that anything that is physical is no longer important; all that matters is that we slap a computer in to do mental gymnastics to create a virtual, WWII-style linear battlefield that does not exist, where everybody stays in their inferior social position in the Army, relying on higher headquarters to micromanage them and save them when they beg for outside fire support when overwhelmed by enemy AK47s, RPGs and IEDs. A homogenized, one-size-fits-all, "medium" weight Army on hope-to-pinch-pennies-wheels too light to fight and too heavy to fly, restricted to easily ambushed roads/trails. The Army's Generals can then brag that they have been such "visionaries" bringing in a mythical "new age" of warfare; a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) where local units are physically weak and unable to take initiative like the science fiction movie, "Demolition Man". Providing ALL Army units with 22,000 pound light tracked M113A3 Gavin AFVs instead of impotent rubber-tired 22,000 pound FMTV-type trucks would provide local units physical, armored/air/ amphibious/cross-country mobility, firepower and supply superiority to take the fight to the enemy anywhere in the world using small-unit initiative, imagination and daring. The IDF has up-armored M113 light tracked AFVs and doesn't lose a man a day like we are in Iraq....
We certainly can't have that!
This is why its time the American people and the Soldiers of the Army itself work through the Congress to take back control of the Army which belongs to them---NOT the senior officers who are on ego trips and waiting for high-paid jobs after retirement from corrupt contractors building crap equipment for our troops like General Dynamics Land Systems and their borrowed Canadian Stryker armored car/deathtrap design.
If you REALLY care about our troops dying and being maimed in combat, contact your Congressman/Senator and insist that up-armored M113 Gavin light tracked AFVs be sent immediately to replace ALL unarmored HMMWV and FMTV trucks in Iraq:
Day Late & Dollar Short: Army re-discovers sandbagging vehicles for recruit training: WHO IS GOING TO INSURE TROOPS IN IRAQ SAND BAG THEIR VEHICLES? How long before this training is stopped and forgotten?
USATODAY.com - Army updates training (about time, too late for 500 KIA)AZTIK 100www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-01-06-army-training_x.htm
Posted 1/5/2004 11:48 PM Updated 1/6/2004 5:21 AM
Army updates training By Dave Moniz, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON - The Army is overhauling its basic training to help recruits survive the particular dangers of missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
PIC: A U.S. Soldier patrols a street Dec. 24 near Samarra, Iraq. By Mario Tama, Getty Images
The changes add or beef up instruction on skills that include traveling in convoys and fighting in cities. (Related story: Army to forbid some to leave)The program begins this month and will be in use at all basic training installations by spring. The changes are some of the biggest since the Vietnam War, says Col. William Gallagher, who commands the basic combat training brigade at Fort Benning in Georgia. He is in the group that devised the new instruction. The military made similar changes to basic training during the Vietnam War. Starting in the 1960s, recruits were taught how to avoid booby traps and how to search villages where Viet Cong guerrillas might be hiding.
Army basic training, a rite of passage for generations of Soldiers, is designed to transform civilians into fighters by teaching them to march, shoot rifles and kill the enemy. Every recruit attends basic training for a minimum of nine weeks. "When Soldiers arrive in Baghdad and get off the planes and into Humvees, they are immediately thrust into combat operations," Gallagher says. "They have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage and kill the enemy on their first day in country."
Among the changes the Army is making:
More weapons training. Recruits will be taught to fire weapons other than the M-16, the standard rifle for foot Soldiers. New troops will learn how to fire other weapons commonly found in the U.S. arsenal, including a variety of machine guns.
New training on how to identify and counter remote-controlled bombs known as IEDs, or improvised explosive devices. Those bombs have killed dozens of Soldiers in Iraq and are a weapon of choice for guerrilla fighters.
Convoy tactics. For the first time, recruits will ride in convoys and face simulated ambushes. They will learn how to place sandbags inside vehicles to protect against bombs, grenades and machine guns.
Urban combat. Soldiers will learn tactics for fighting enemies who blend in with civilians.
Increased first-aid training. Officials say it is important for all Soldiers to have better lifesaving skills, because troops are traveling in smaller groups and can be ambushed without a medic or doctor nearby.
The changes added lessons will not lengthen basic training, but recruits will drill more on Sundays, which has been traditionally a light training day. The last major change in basic training was in 1997, when the Army began teaching values such as courage and honesty. It came after a scandal at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, where drill sergeants forced female trainees to have sex with them. Sgt. 1st Class Donovan Manley, a Fort Benning drill sergeant, says the new program will make a big difference in preparing young Soldiers for guerrilla warfare."We don't have the luxury of time right now. We graduate Soldiers, and a short time later they are deploying," he says. "This will save lives."
From strategypage.com:
Easy Stick Add-On Armor?
February 3, 2004: When American troops in Iraq first encountered ambushes and roadside bombs, they realized that their unarmored trucks and hummers were particularly vulnerable. While many rushed to attach armor plates to the vehicles, some of the reserve troops who were cops back home knew of better solutions. At least two firms were selling light weight bulletproof composites that could be quickly attacked to police cars (doors, hood and so on). One type, Aztik 100, consisted of light weight, bendable panels. One side had glue on it, protected by paper that was peeled away when you wanted to attach a panel to a police car, or hummer, door or hood. Another product, RhinoPak, quickly developed a set of rigid lightweight bulletproof panels built to fit right on a hummer, including the top. Bullet proof glass is also provided for the windshield. The composite armor will stop a heavy machine-gun bullet (.50 caliber or 14.5mm. These panels would also stop most fragments from a bomb exploding nearby. As a result of recent reforms, units had money, and authority, available to get these armor kits, and many did.
www.armorsystemsint.com/aztik100.htm
As a Leader in the application of ceramic and inorganic polymer materials, Armor Systems International has developed Aztik 100(tm).
Aztik 100(tm) is a lightweight, semi-flexible composite protective armor system unique to the market. It is capable of withstanding armor piercing rounds up to the common NATO 7.62 AP round. this modifiable armor can stop a 0.50 caliber armor piercing bullet at 40 feet.
The Aztik 100(tm) Peel & Stick Armoring System(c) quickly applies to any smooth curved or flat surface within a military, law enforcement or private vehicle or aircraft for instant threat protection. This revolutionary patent pending armoring system incorporates a unique construction of multi-layer fabrics and adhesives that provides threat protection against NIJ STD-0108.01 Level II, IIA, III, IIIA and IV and has passed Ballistic tests for multi-hit capability. Aztik 100's(tm) integration of low weight and Ballistic characteristics makes it the armor of choice in personnel protection.
For more information on Aztik 100(tm), Aztik 200 Marine(tm) or Aztik Spall Liner(tm), contact Armor Systems International toll free (866) 993-5181.
110 Columbia Street
Vancouver, WA 98660
phone: (360) 993-5181
toll free: (866) 993-5181
fax: (360) 737-0743
info@armorsystemsint.com
www.armorsystemsint.com
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www.labock.com/english/sv_pak_hmmwv.htm
Labock Technologies has developed a Portable Armor Kit for the military High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), also known as "Humvee" and "Hummer". With the RhinoPAK for the HMMWV we are able to offer a field deployable and low cost up-armoring solution for large military fleets.
The durability and reusability of the armor panels brings even more value to this product since it can be moved to new vehicles once the original carrier of the kit has to be decommissioned.
With armies performing U.N. peacekeeping missions or deployed abroad in dangerous regions fighting off terrorism in its nests, it is clear the need of countries to protect their troops against high level threats anywhere and at any moment notice. Once the threat disapears or the vehicles are called off from the theater of operations, the portable armor kits can be quickly removed and stored for future use.
Headquarters
Labock Technologies, Inc.
1495 North Park Drive
Weston 33326 FL
Tel #: (954) 335-3535
Fax #: (954) 335 3525
4. Hard Body Armor
All Soldiers riding in ANY vehicle should be wearing head and HARD body armor. Their BDUs should be the aircrew type made of nomex for fire protection.
Interceptor (hard) Bod