The Navy adamantly refused to place their fleet, (and their marines), under the command of the Army. After five weeks of bureaucratic wrangling, General MacArthur was given command of the Southwest Pacific theatre, while Admiral Nimitz had jurisdiction over the remainder of the Pacific ocean. The result, in Macarthur's own words, was a "divided effort, the... duplication of force (and) undue extension of the war with added casualties and cost".

The U.S. Army fought the main force of the Japanese Imperial Army in New Guinea and the Philippines. The Navy and Marines carried out an "island hopping" strategy that involved amphibious assaults on islands such as Guadalcanal and Saipan. General Macarthur complained bitterly to the President that "these frontal attacks by the Navy, as at Tarawa, are tragic and unnecessary massacres of American lives".

By way of comparison, General Macarthur's Army killed, captured, or stranded over a quarter of a million Japanese troops during the New Guinea campaign, at a cost of only 33,000 U.S. casualties. The Navy and Marines suffered over 28,000 casualties to kill roughly 20,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima. Even then, the Army played a greater role than marines like to admit; the Army had more divisions assaulting Okinawa than the marines.

The famous image of marines raising the U.S. flag on Mount Suribachi is actually a photograph of the second, staged flag-raising ceremony. The marines raised the flag a second time to replace the original, smaller flag, and to provide the press corps with a better photo opportunity. That photograph has become one of the most enduring images of WW II, and served as the model for the marine corps Memorial statue.

The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, was on Iwo Jima that morning in 1945, and when he saw the Stars and Stripes go up he declared; 'The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a marine corps for the next five hundred years!"

In fact, the marine corps was nearly legislated out of existence two years later. After the bureaucratic infighting that characterized inter-service relations during WW II, there was a strong desire among military professionals to unify the military commands. President Truman agreed, and in 1946 his administration proposed a bill to unify the separate service bureaucracies.

Having one budgetary authority for the Armed Forces, and one chain of command each for land forces, ships, and aircraft makes sense. But this would have placed the U.S. Navy at a distinct disadvantage. The Navy had their own air wings aboard their carriers, and their own army, the marine Corps.

The Navy and marine corps were determined to scuttle this legislation. Marine generals created a secret office code named the Chowder Society to lobby behind the scenes, (in opposition to their President and Commander in Chief), and thwart the unification bill before Congress. The Commandant of the marine corps even made an impassioned speech before Congress to plead for his separate service.

It worked. Congress rejected the Truman administration's unification bill, and instead passed the National Security Act of 1947. This Act guaranteed separate services, with their own independent budgets, and was a victory for the Navy and marine corps.

In addition, the marines succeeded in having their separate force structure written into the language of the legislation. It is very unusual for Congress to dictate the actual composition of a military service. Yet the National Security Act mandates that the marines corps must maintain "not less than three combat divisions and three aircraft wings and such land combat, aviation, and other services as necessary to support them".

President Truman was furious, and military professionals were appalled. General Eisenhower characterized the marines as "being so unsure of their value to their country that they insisted on writing into the law a complete set of rules and specifications for their future operations and duties. Such freezing of detail...is silly, even vicious."

The war between the Army and marines would get more vicious in Korea. On November 27^th, 1950 a division of marines 25,000 strong, was ordered to proceed along the west side of the Chosin reservoir, while a much smaller task force of 2500 Army troops went up the eastern side. Waiting for them were 120,000 troops of the Chinese Communist 9^th Army Group.

The Army Soldiers fought a running battle for three days against a Chinese force eight times their size, in temperatures as low as minus 35 degrees. Despite the death of two commanding officers, the task force lumbered south with over 600 dead and wounded soldiers loaded into trucks, fought through repeated ambushes, and was even mistakenly bombed by U.S. marine aircraft. Finally, just four miles from safety, the convoy was cut off by the Chinese and annihilated.

385 men made it to the safety of American lines by crossing the frozen Chosin Reservoir.

The first marine division, with the help of allied air power, managed to fight their way out of the Chinese encirclement. Marines claimed that the Army had disgraced itself, and passed on stories of U.S. Soldiers throwing down their weapons and feigning injuries. A marine Chaplain even made statements to the press and wrote an article accusing Army Soldiers of cowardice.

There were so few officers and men left from the Army task force that the marine's claims were accepted as fact. But newly released Chinese documents prove otherwise. The Army task force fought bravely against overwhelming odds before being destroyed, and their stubborn defense bought time for the marines to escape the encirclement.

Nevertheless, marines to this day hold up the fight at the Chosin reservoir as proof of their superiority over the Army.

In Vietnam, a marine regiment at Khe Sanh refused to come to the aid of a Special Forces outpost only four miles from their perimeter. On Febuary 7^th, 1968, the camp at Lang Vei was overran by heavily armed North Vietnamese troops during an all-night battle. The marines had earlier agreed to reinforce the camp in the event of an attack, but two requests for assistance were denied.

General Westmoreland himself had to order the marines to provide helicopters for Special Forces personnel, so they could be airlifted into the besieged outpost. By this time the post had been overrun, at a cost of 208 Soldiers killed and another 80 wounded. Ironically, two months later this same marine regiment would be besieged at Khe Sanh, and they would be relieved by Army troops of the First Cavalry Division.

During Operation Desert Storm 90,000 marines attacked Iraqi forces alongside over 500,000 U.S. Army and coalition troops. Yet the marines garnered 75 percent of the newsprint and TV coverage. This was not an accident.

The Commanding General of the marines in Iraq, Gen. Walt Boomer, was the former Director of Public Affairs for the Corps. He issued the following order to marine units in the theater:

During the war marine officers used military communications systems to transmit stories for reporters in the field, and even assigned personnel to carry press dispatches to rear areas. The marine commander also had his own entourage of reporters complete with satellite uplinks, and used them to good effect. He received far more air time than his Army counterparts.

The U.S. Army performed a "Hail Mary" operation that trapped Iraq's Republican Guard divisions and fought numerous running battles in the Iraqi desert. But no one saw them. Instead the press focused on Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer parading triumphantly through the streets of Kuwait City abandoned by the enemy.

When George Bush the Second launched his misguided invasion of Iraq, the marines were once again included, and this time the goal was Baghdad. The invasion, which began on March 20^th, 2003, called for a two pronged assault on Baghdad. The Army's 5th Corps would advance from the desert west of the Euphrates river, while the First marine division was ordered to cross the Euphrates and make a parallel advance through central Iraq.

The invasion did not go well for the marines. In several cities, including Umm al Qasr and Nasiriya, their units suffered heavy casualties fighting remnants of the Iraqi Army and fedayeen guerrillas. Since the marines had fewer armored vehicles, and they were exposed to a more tenacious enemy, their progress was slower than the Army's.

Major General Mattis, the commanding general of the marines in Iraq, was not pleased. He repeatedly pressured his regiments to make greater speed, and this pressure grew more intense as the marines lagged further behind Army units. On the morning of April 3^rd, the first marine regiment, commanded by Colonel Dowdy, was ordered to drive to the town of al-Kut.

The city was another choke point, where Iraqi fedayeen guerrillas could ambush marine convoys in city streets. As soon as his marines reached the city, they began taking fire. Colonel Dowdy could not forget the mauling another regiment had received in Nasiriya, where 17 marines were killed and another seventy were wounded.

He had to make a choice. His orders were to proceed to al-Kut, but the decision to push through or bypass the town was up to him. However, Colonel Dowdy was receiving mixed signals from his superiors. According to him "there was a lot of confusion", some officers were recommending an attack, others urged withdrawal.

Colonel Dowdy decided to bypass al-Kut. His regiment would take an alternative route to Baghdad that was safer, but the detour of 170 miles meant that the marines fell further behind schedule. Colonel Dowdy's superiors were furious with his decision.

After the withdrawal from al-Kut, General Mattis and other staff officers let the Colonel know that his regiment was to make greater speed. That night on the road to Baghdad, vehicles of the first marine Regiment were ordered to drive the highways of Iraq with their headlights on, irregardless of security. But their progress was not good enough, the Army's Fifth Corps had already reached Baghdad.

Colonel Joe Dowdy was relieved of his command the following day. The marine corps will never admit it, but he was fired because he failed to carry out the Corps most important mission in Iraq: Colonel Dowdy failed to upstage the U.S. Army by being the first to reach Baghdad.

The marines would return to Iraq one year later, when the first marine expeditionary Force assumed responsibility for Al Anbar province, which includes the city of Fallujah.

During the change of command ceremony Lt. Gen. James T. Conway of the I MEF proclaimed that; "Although marines don't normally do nation-building, they will tell you that once given the mission, nobody can do it better." The marines took control of the area from the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division, and they made no secret of their distain for the Army's strategy in Iraq.

Before deploying, General Conway had told the New York Times "I don't envision using that tactic", when asked about Army troops using air strikes against the insurgents. "I don't want to condemn what [Army] people are doing. I think that they are doing what they think they have to do."

On March 30th, General Conway told a reporter that "There's no place in our area of operation that we won't go, and we have taken some casualties in the early going making that point". The next day four civilian contractors were killed and mutilated in Fallujah, and five marines also lost their lives. The marines sealed off the city and attempted to reassert control over Fallujah, but the insurgents proved to be more determined than expected.

When their patrols came under heavy fire the lightly armed marines had only two choices; Fight it out with the insurgents on foot, or call in artillery and air strikes. The inevitable result was scores of marines killed or wounded, and hundreds of civilian casualties. The world was appalled by the carnage in Fallujah, and the marines were called off.

While marines were fighting in Fallujah, the U.S. Army was heavily engaged against militiamen loyal to Muqtata al-Sadr in cities throughout Iraq. But in contrast to the marine's failure to recapture Fallujah, the U.S. Army's heavy armored vehicles could enter hostile cities with impunity. They brought al-Sadr to heel after two months of fighting, while suffering relatively few casualties.

An uneasy truce was made between the U.S. Army and al-Sadr's militia, that would last until the marines again became involved. On July 31^st 2004, the 11^th marine expeditionary unit replaced Army units in the holy city of Najaf, headquarters of Muqtata al-Sadr. Just five days later, al-Sadr's militia would again be waging open war against the U.S., and the marines would be calling for reinforcements.

The marines began skirmishing with al-Sadr's militiamen as soon as they were given responsibility for Najaf. After the uprising in April, U.S. Army units had avoided driving past al-Sadr's house as part of the informal truce, but this would not do for the marines. The second Shia uprising began after marines in Najaf provoked al-Sadr by driving their patrols right up to his stronghold.

A firefight ensued, and al-Sadr's militiamen took up arms in cities throughout Iraq in a replay of the uprising in April. The marines had not just picked a fight with Muqtada in Najaf, they had engaged his militia in an ancient cemetery that abutted the Imam Ali Mosque, Shiite Islam's holiest shrine. And they did this without informing the Army chain of command, or the Iraqi government.

According to Maj. David Holahan, second in command of the marine unit in Najaf, "We just did it". But in a replay of the Fallujah assault, the marines faced an enemy that they were not prepared for. Within hours of launching their attack on August 5^th, the marines were pinned down, and requesting assistance.

Unfortunately for the marines, their rash attack on al-Sadr's headquarters had sparked another revolt by his militiamen. Army units were once again fighting the Mahdi army in cities throughout Iraq. When the Army's Fifth Cavalry Regiment received orders to reinforce the beleaguered marines, they were deployed against al-Sadr's militia in the outskirts of Bagdhad, 120 miles away.

The Fifth Cavalry arrived in Najaf after a two day drive through insurgent controlled territory. By then any opportunity to capture al-Sadr had been lost, because the press, and the Islamic world, were focused on the Imam Ali Mosque and the adjacent cemetery. Any attack on Shiite Islam's holiest shrine, where Muqtata al-Sadr was holed up, would have had disastrous consequences for the U.S. war effort.

In Fallujah and Najaf, inexperienced marine units picked fights with insurgents, and in both cases ended up handing the enemy a strategic victory. Their failure to recapture Fallujah made the city a rallying cry for Islamic militarism worldwide, (that is until the second U.S. assault rendered Fallujah uninhabitable). The marine's botched attempt to capture Muqtata al-Sadr has only strengthened his hand.

Today there are 23,000 marines in Iraq, out of a total 138,000 U.S. Armed Forces personnel. Marines are 17 percent of our total force, yet they have suffered 29 percent of all U.S. casualties; 530 of the more than 1,820 U.S. service personnel killed in Iraq. The marine's aggressive tactics combined with a lack of armored firepower has proven lethal to themselves, their bravery notwithstanding.

The United States marines pride themselves on being better than the U.S. Army. They say they are "harder", "more gung-ho", and they possess some magic that enables them to do things the U.S. Army can't do. If this is not true, (as recent events in Iraq suggest), then there is no reason for a separate marine corps.

President Harry Truman once stated that marines; "Have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." The marines have always advertised themselves, but in Truman's day, they at least had something to sell. The original raison d'etre of the USMC was their ability to carry out amphibious landings on hostile beaches.

The truth is, the U.S. Army conducted the biggest amphibious assault in our nation's history when they captured the Normandy beaches. And neither the Army or the marines have assaulted an enemy-held beach since the Korean war, over fifty years ago. In every subsequent conflict Soldiers and marines have fought in the same way, using similar equipment and tactics.

The marines are in fact a second Army, and since they compete with the Army for funds, missions, and prestige, their real enemy is... the US Army.

However, the marine corps has an unfair advantage in this "competition". Since the end of Desert Storm the U.S. Army has been downsized by one third, losing over 200,000 troops and eight combat divisions. By contrast, the marines have lost only twenty thousand personnel. The reason is the National Security Act of 1947, which prevents any changes in the force structure of the Marines.

Today's United States marine corps is only slightly larger than the U.S. Army in Iraq. That war is stretching our Army to the breaking point. The obvious solution is to merge the Army and marine corps into one service.

The savings would add up to tens of billions of dollars when their training, logistics, administration, and headquarters were merged. The personnel shortages that are now crippling both services would disappear. And so would the rivalry between the Army and the marine corps.

3rd Tactical Studies Group (Maritime) Staff: A GREAT ARTICLE!

It can be argued since 1947 we have not won a large scale war. Grenada and Panama were small. Desert Storm as you will see stopped too early causing us to refight it again, which we are losing now by an un-needed occupation.

The NSA of 1947 pits firepower (USAF & Navy) against maneuver (Army & marines) in the BS DoD construct.

We should abolish it, start over with a WAR Department and end the firepower/maneuver schism by merging USMC into the Army and giving it FULL AUTHORITY to USE WHATEVER TYPE/QUANTITIES OF AIRCRAFT THEY NEED TO WIN from 10, 000 feet on down.

S3 Roy S. Ardillo II writes:

"Not withstanding my previous comments about the marine corps restructuring, I agree with Scott.

This would give the Army a total of 15 ground divisions with a three division air arm. The three air divisions could be rotated on alert status over the 18 month period such as Colonel Macgregor suggested in his Breaking the Phalanx. The Army would then go back to sea with the Navy. All old marine divisions would then be converted to light mech status.

A light tank then would have to be developed for the regiments with the M1 and M2 going to the heavy tank battalions.

Comments?

Another member writes: "I think we should make the marine divisions specialist elite light-assault divisions optimised for deployment by sea, just as the Airbourne divisions are elite light-assault units deployed by air, under an overall Army command rather than a seperate corps.

The Air Force should get it's butt out of CAS and specilize in strategic missions which is what they want to do anyway. AWACS, JSTARS, Strategic and Interdictory bombing campaigns and air-superiority (Both Interceptor and Wild-Weasel flights) and strategic airlift should be under Air Force responsibility, give the CAS mission over to a re-born Army Air Corps with the former marine airgroups as their corps.... turn-over the AC-130 gunships and A-10s to the new AAC as well. Maybe turn-over most if not all of the C-130 fleet to the AAC to give the Army theatre air-lift on demand and not on the Air Force's whim.

Just a couple of thoughts."

xxxxx

"I've been blown up by a better class of bastard than this." Anonymous interviewee contrasting Al-Qaida's London bombs with the Blitz.

Where is Task Force 34? Where is the U.S. Navy and marines as we fight a global war on terrorism? Will they transform or pretend its still their mythical version of WW2?

If America's military does not refocus from air and maritime firepower onto decisive land maneuver she will not win the war against global Islamofascist terrorism and is at risk at nation-state war defeat by rival techo-economic peer competitors

*************************

During the Battle for Leyte Gulf in WWII, Admiral "Bull" Halsey was led away by a Japanese decoy fleet leaving the invasion force exposed to Japanese battleship attack. Admiral Nimitz grew confused about the situation off Samar, he requested that Halsey be given a gentle nudge, to ask what the location was of Admiral Lee and his fast battleships. The message sent by Admrial Nimitz and received aboard the New Jersey was "TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG WHERE IS RPT (repeat) WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS". When the message was delivered to Halsey, the padding "Turkey trots to water" had fortunately been removed, but the signalman recording the message failed to remove "the world wonders" from the end of the message. Halsey read the message as a stinging slap from his friend and advocate, and with great emotion threw his cap to the deck. And then, reluctantly, he ordered his battleships to proceed South in an attempt to respond to Nimitz and to save Kinkaid. Unfortunately, due to his northern position, he would arrive off Leyte a day after the Japanese had left. Had Halsey stayed on station off San Bernardino Straight, he would have had his massive surface battle. Had he continued on to the north, a different yet still massive surface battle would have resulted. But, instead, his fleet of fast battleships sailed ineffectually between the two engagements, unable to participate in either.

--www.battleship.org/html/Articles/History/Leyte6.htm

Are the U.S. Navy and marines off on a "from the sea..." techno-tangent like Halsey was at Leyte Gulf, as the real war on terrorism rages elsewhere on land?

How did we go so far astray?

Myth #1: the large deck aircraft carrier won WWII

The shocking revelations that are coming out from internet information sharing is that we have totally misunderstood WWII naval history.

The cliché' is that the war at sea was won by large deck aircraft carriers which made gun battleships obsolete which U.S. establishment historians have foisted upon us. Commentator Dave B. writes:

www.warships1.com/US/BB61stats/index-BB2-pst04.htm

Aerial dominance over battleships: a reality check.
Sunday, 13-Dec-98 13:02:11

First a disclaimer; this in know way is intended to discredit aircrews at all. It takes balls the size of which you use to bowl to strap yourself in a cockpit and go to war. I have much admiration and respect for aircrews and the incredible job they have done. This is simply to point out that maybe the idea that battleships are relegated to "aircraft targets" is a bit premature. Now to the point.

Keep in mind that when I refer to "modern" battleships, I am referring to those which were designed and built after WWI.

We have all heard and read that the airplane relegated the battleship to a secondary role proving it was the dominant threat. While this may essentially be true, I believe it is overstated in reference to how vulnerable battleships were to WWII aircraft. Let me explain.

A reality check is needed to demonstrate the actual results of aircraft versus battleship in WWII. The first step is to realize that only THREE modern battleships succumbed to combined aerial ordnance: Prince of Wales, Mushashi, and Yamato. In the case of the Japanese battleships, coordinated torpedo attack was almost impossible until bombs neutralized the massed AA firepower. In any event, Mushashi required 20 torpedoes & 33 bombs, while Yamato required 10 torpedoes & 23 bombs to sink using an overwhelming force of aircraft. We have read the excellent post on this board which pointed out that air interdiction of Kurita's force was an abstract failure: they failed to halt the Japanese surface fleet and only succeeded in sinking one battleship. Also keep in mind the Japanese air protection was non- existent when they lost these two battleships. In the case of Prince of Wales, she was hampered by inadequate AA, lack of escorts and air cover. In addition a torpedo impacted the stern bending a propeller shaft while she was underway hastening her demise. (Others here are far more qualified to analyze damage that a bent propeller shaft can cause. This situation also happened to Pennsylvania, but, fortunately, she was at anchor at the time minimizing the damage in contrast to POW)

I have to wonder why only THREE modern battleships succumbed like this if the aircraft were, supposedly, SO MUCH MORE POWERFUL. Look again at the Japanese battleships and you can see than ONE CV sinking ONE BB is not very probable at all. Many of our battleships were hit, but few seriously damaged and none sunk after Pearl Harbor.

As a way of contrast let's look at list of some battleships destroyed while they were stationary targets (moored, laid up, etc.):

Royal Oak - U-Boat torpedoes.
Strasburg - aircraft bombs.
Oklahoma - aircraft, 5 torpedoes.
Arizona - aircraft, 1 torpedo & 8 bombs.
Marat - aircraft, 1+ bombs.
Tirpitz - aircraft bombs.
Schleswig Holstein - aircraft bombs.
Gneisenau - aircraft bombs.
Schliesen - aircraft bombs.
Lutzow - aircraft bombs.
Scheer - aircraft bombs.
Conti di Cavour - aircraft torpedoes.
Haruna - aircraft bombs.
Hyuga - aircraft bombs.
Ise - aircraft bombs.

15 battleships, 5 modern and 10 old. (Okay, I know I'm considering the Deutschlands as battleships instead of extremely heavy cruisers) I don't think I forgot any, but add to the list if I did. Again, not to take away from aircrews, but destroying stationary warships is a far cry from doing the same thing when they are at sea and readied for war. Keep in mind that some of these vessels were attacked repeatedly, even though sitting stationary & unable to much about the attacks against them.

How about battleships destroyed in surface actions?

Hood, Bretagne, Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Hiei, Kirishima, Fuso, and Yamashiro. Now it's 2 modern and 6 old.

In addition, we have the following victims (Mutsu, Kongo, & Roma all have additional factors involved. Roma was destroyed by glider bomb, but she was not prepared for action and little better off than our BB's at Pearl Harbor)

Barham (underway)- U-Boat, 3 torpedoes.
Graf Spee - scuttled after surface action.
Mutsu - accidental explosion.
Kongo (underway) - slowed down & blew up two hours after Sealion torpedoed her.
Roma (underway, barely) - German glider bomb.

If I missed any or if I made any mistakes on this list feel free to correct me.

The question: is destroying stationary battleships a testament to their vulnerability to aircraft? I think not. If air power was so much more dominant, then why were 8 battleships sunk in surface actions yet only 3 during air actions? (Roma was technically an air action, so we could say 4 instead of 3) Also remember how many battleships were damaged by air attack but failed to sink. The only American battleship that even came close to this was Pennsylvania. North Carolina, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Mississippi, California, & Colorado, to name as many as I can off the top of my head, all received major damage in WWII after Pearl Harbor. They all survived the war. The aircraft proved for certain their power over battleships sitting stationary, but I think the ability of aircraft to destroy battleships which are underway AND ready for war is quite overstated.

Even Pearl Harbor needs to be looked at. Oklahoma was hit by 5 torpedoes. Even this was not the critical factor in her turning turtle, but the fact that there was no time to set condition Z, nor was damage control even close to attempt counter flooding, and the fact that she was hit so many times so QUICKLY spelled her doom. Her outer strakes simply flooded too fast and without counter flooding, she rolled over. Arizona, it is thought, was destroyed because the converted 16" shell used as a bomb set off the highly unstable black powder magazine (used for the catpault) which in turn set off the main magazine. A fluke. Others had the time to counter flood so as to prevent Oklahoma's fate. West Virginia was struck by SEVEN torpedoes, and counter flooding saved her. My point is this; even Pearl Harbor does not prove that battleships are totally vulnerable to air power.

I posted this a result of a "Heated" discussion I just had. Take the bible: remove anything out of context and you can prove anything you damn well want to. As a comparison, simply shooting off with statements about how events in WWII prove how battleships are helpless against aircraft is simply untrue. You must get the big picture and see the WHOLE thing. Carrier aircraft are valuable and can strike deep into enemy territory, and are very versatile. But battleships too can deliver destructive blows and are still needed today. Besides, WWII proved just how rugged battleships are, and in the big picture of actual events, aircraft were not nearly as dominant over battleships as so many have professed.

Aircraft victims (including Roma): Stationary = 14 battleships, underway = 4 battleships.

Surface action: 8 battleships.

Other (including Royal Oak): 5 battleships.

God bless ALL our vets!

Dave B.

The truth is that both the Japanese and American Navies still believed in armored gun battleships and these vessels were sunk far less often than unarmored aircraft carriers were during all of WWII. Furthermore, to sink other enemy ships there are other, better ways to include seaplane patrol bombers and submarines than large deck aircraft carriers. American subs and PBY seaplanes did far greater damage to Japan than the large deck aircraft carriers. These truths have long been suppressed by a U.S. Navy bureaucracy bent on creating the large aircraft carrier myth. Another one is that the U.S. Navy created the aircraft carrier. Details:

www.combatreform.com/a40mma.htm

The one thing that quickly became apparent to the Japanese after Midway was that pilots to FLY aircraft cannot be mass-produced. When aircraft carriers launch all their aircraft they are defenseless and easily sunk. This happened repeatedly during WWII with aircraft carriers even sunk by gunships if they ventured too close. This is the rub, the primary benefit of the aircraft at sea is STAND-OFF, the ocean is still a very large place and if you can see the enemy's ships hundreds of miles away first and strike them first they will not get within gun range. The problem is that once the carrier loses its planes its unarmored easy meat for battleships and today missile ships on top of the previously mentioned submarines and patrol bombers. Aircraft carriers are one dimensional threats. The U.S. Navy works around aircraft carrier weakness by surrounding them with missile and anti-submarine ships to protect them when they are threatened by these asymmetric weapons. However this entire "house of cards" soon collapses once the carrier's deck is wrecked and planes and pilots start splashing into the water. America today is not fully mobilized ala WWII to mass-produce pilots. If we lose pilots there will be none to replace them for the war at hand. In a major nation- state shooting war, we will only have the pilots we had when the war began, and when we lose them we could have carriers with decks empty of both planes and pilots like the Japanese found themselves at the end of WWII. It will not be 5 years of war that brings about this condition, it will be 5 weeks or 5 days of modern war.

Myth #2: the U.S. Navy invented the large deck aircraft carrier

Another lie that needs some FYI is this BS that "in the 30s" the U.S. Navy did all of this pioneering work on aircraft carriers blah, blah, blah, blah, BULLSHIT. The British already created aircraft carriers and used them IN COMBAT IN WORLD WAR ONE. The U.S. Navy has NOT been at the forefront on war excellence until forced to by circumstances (asses getting kicked ie; Pearl Harbor). The truly think ahead pro- active types are in smaller navies with less resources and less smugness.

www.steelnavy.com/LooseCannonFuriousPV.htm

In July 1918 Furious launched the first significant carrier strike in naval history. Seven Sopwith Camels each with two 50-pound bombs, attacked Zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The attack successfully damaged the sheds and destroyed two Zeppelins. From that point carrier aviation was off and running, with Furious being the first aircraft carrier. In 1921 Furious went back in and was converted to a true full flight deck carrier. Oddly enough, although Furious was first, she was also the only survivor of the early 1920s British carriers. Hermes, Eagle, Courageous and Glorious were all gone by 1942, while Furious sailed on to triumph in World War Two and the torch of the boneyard in 1948. (History from Aircraft Carriers of the World by Roger Chesneau)

If you doubt how screwed up the large aircraft-carrier-centric U.S. Navy is, here's a report

Is the U.S. Navy Overrated?

www.knightsbridgeuniversity.com/documents/Is%20the%20US.%20Navy%20overrated.pdf.

 Is the U.S. Navy Overrated (5.1)

An Updated Knightsbridge Working Paper

Copyright 2004 By Roger Thompson

Professor of Military Studies, Knightsbridge University.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and are not to be construed as the opinions of Knightsbridge University. This is a work in progress and supercedes all previous versions. It may be revised and updated as required.

Introduction: David versus Goliath at Sea

In 1981, The NATO exercise Ocean Venture ended with much embarrassment for the U.S. Navy, and more specifically, its enormously expensive aircraft carrier battle groups. During the exercise, a Canadian submarine slipped quietly through the aircraft carrier U.S.S. America's destroyer screen, and conducted a devastating simulated torpedo attack on the ship. The submarine was never detected, and the exercise umpire, a U.S. Navy officer, pronounced the carrier "dead." One analyst has stated that a second carrier, presumably the U.S.S. Forrestal, was also reportedly destroyed by another enemy submarine during this exercise. Later, the U.S.N. umpire tried to use material from his official report in a magazine article, but when his superiors read it, his work was promptly stamped "classified" to minimize the potential fallout. Unfortunately, an anonymous Canadian submariner leaked the story to a local newspaper, and indicated that this successful Canadian attack on an American supercarrier was by no means an isolated incident. It was a simple ambush in the North Atlantic, and it worked perfectly. Indeed, the article concluded that the Americans never knew what hit them, that they were embarrassed by this failure, and that they wanted to bury the matter then and there. The Canadian diesel submarine ambushed a surface ship in the same way that Germany's U-boats had done it decades before. This news caused quite a stir in Congress, and the U.S. Navy had a lot of explaining to do. Why had not one but two U.S.N. carriers been sunk? Why indeed had a small, 1960s-vintage diesel submarine of the under-funded Canadian Navy been able to defeat one of America's most powerful and expensive warships, and with such apparent ease?

As for the Canadian attack on the U.S.S. America, there are several possible explanations. Firstly, Canadian submariners are extremely well trained and professional. Secondly, at that time, the Oberon submarines used by the Canadian Navy were probably the quietest in the world. A third possible reason, not so commonly stated, and with all due respect, is that the mighty U.S. Navy is simply overrated. It is my humble contention that the U.S. Navy is "not all it's cracked up to be," and that is the focus of this paper.

Diesel Subs Feast on U.S. Carriers

"Remember, submarines are best at sinking surface ships; the lesson of the Thomas Jefferson ought not to be ignored. The Kilo that nailed her did not stalk the carrier. It was just lying in wait, hardly moving, virtually silent, an explosive hole in the water."

- Admiral Sir John Woodward, R.N. (ret.) on the sinking of an American carrier by a diesel submarine in the novel Nimitz Class.

While Canadian submarines have routinely taken on U.S. Navy carriers, other small navies have enjoyed similar victories. The Royal Netherlands Navy, with its small force of extremely quiet diesel submarines, has made the U.S. Navy eat the proverbial slice of humble pie on more than one occasion. In 1989, naval analyst Norman Polmar wrote in Naval Forces that during NATO's exercise Northern Star, "...the Dutch submarine "Zwaardvis" was the only orange (enemy) submarine to successfully stalk and sink a blue (allied) aircraft carrier..." The carrier in question might have been the U.S.S. America, as it was a participant in this exercise. Ten years later there were reports that the Dutch submarine Walrus had been even more successful in the exercise JTFEX/TMDI99. "During this exercise the Walrus penetrates the U.S. screen and 'sinks' many ships, including the U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71. The submarine launches two attacks and manages to sneak away. To celebrate the sinking the crew designed a special T-shirt." Fittingly, the T-shirt depicted the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt impaled on the tusks of a walrus. It was also reported that the Walrus sank many of the Roosevelt's escorts, including the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Boise, a cruiser, several destroyers and frigates, plus the command ship U.S.S. Mount Whitney. The Walrus herself survived the exercise with no damage. Some U.S.N. apologists might counter by saying that the exercise was probably scripted, and the Dutch submarine probably knew exactly where the carrier was, had an unfair advantage, and that in a real war, the submarine would have been easily detected and destroyed. If so, then why would the Dutch submariners, a very professional and well-trained group, take such delight in simply completing a scripted "shoot the fish in a barrel" scenario? Talented and wily enemies, of course, usually don't play by the rules.

Not to be outdone by the Canadians and Dutch, the Australian submarine force has also scored many goals against U.S. Navy carriers and nuclear submarines. On September 24 2003, the Australian newspaper The Age disclosed that Australia's Collins class diesel submarines had taught the U.S. Navy a few lessons during multinational exercises. By the end of the exercises, Australian submarines had destroyed two U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier. According to the article: "'The Americans were wide-eyed,' Commodore Deeks (Commander of the R.A.N. Submarine Group) said. 'They realized that another navy knows how to operate submarines... They went away very impressed.'"

However, officially, the U.S. Navy soon went into damage control mode and denied that the Australians could beat a U.S. nuclear boat in a fair fight. Said The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: "The United States is justly proud of its military prowess, but apparently a little defensive when anyone else shows a bit of talent. Defense Week's 'Daily Update' on October 1, 2003, reported that the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet was trying to downplay the fact that an Australian diesel-electric submarine had 'sunk' an American submarine during recent training exercises, and said the Australians were making too much of the simulated hit. Adm. Walter Doran said that the outcome 'certainly does not mean that the Collins-class submarine in a one-on-one situation is going to defeat our Los Angeles-class or our nuclear submarines.'" But even if the entire exercise had been completely scripted and the American submarine was "supposed" to be sunk, for training purposes (like damage control), then why did an experienced Australian submariner like Commodore Deeks, an officer in one of the finest, best trained, and most professional navies in the world, make such unsubstantiated statements to the media? Because, like the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, the Australians had actually caught the Americans off guard and unawares. As we will see later, Captain Richard Marcinko, U.S.N., strayed from the rules during exercises in the 1980s, and he achieved incredible results. War, as they say, is not fair, and pre-emptive or surprise attacks have often proven devastatingly effective, as the Israelis demonstrated in 1967.

In October 2002, the Australians also reported that their diesel submarine H.M.A.S. Sheehan had successfully "hunted down and killed" the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Olympia during exercises near Hawaii. The C.O. of the Sheehan observed that the larger U.S.N. nuclear boat's greater speed was no advantage because "It just means you make more noise when you go faster." In the previous year, during Operation Tandem Thrust, analyst Derek Woolner set forth that H.M.A.S. Waller sank "two American amphibious assault ships in waters of between 70-80 metres depth, barely more than the length of the submarine itself. The Collins class was described by Vice-Admiral James Metzger, Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet as 'a very capable and quiet submarine..." Although the Waller was herself sunk during the exercise, the loss of a single diesel submarine, in exchange for two massive amphibious assault ships, is quite a good bargain, and very cost effective.

Finally, during RIMPAC 2000 it was reported that H.M.A.S. Waller had sunk two American nuclear submarines and gotten dangerously close to the carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. Even more ominous, asserted researcher Maryanne Kelton, is that: "Even though the exercises were planned and the US group knew that Waller was in the designated target area, they were still unable to locate it. New Minister for Defence, Robert Hill, recorded later that the 'Americans are finding them exceptional boats...in exercises with the Americans they astound the Americans in terms of their capability, their speed, their agility, their loitering capacity, they can do all sorts of things that the American submarines can't do as well.'"

The Chileans too, have used their diesel submarines to successfully attack U.S. Navy ships during exercises. In 2001, the unusually candid skipper of the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Montpelier (Commander Ron LaSilva, U.S.N.) recounted that a Chilean diesel submarine "Shot him twice during successive exercise runs." As a result, LaSilva learned that "bigger and nuclear is not always better." Commander LaSilva should be commended for his courage, for as we shall later in this paper, this kind of honesty is usually not the best policy for U.S.N. officers.

And lastly, in 1998, U.S. News and World Report noted "In two recent exercises with Latin American navies, a Chilean sub managed to evade its U.S. counterparts and 'sink' a U.S. ship." To be more specific, during RIMPAC 1996, the Chilean submarine Simpson was responsible for sinking the carrier U.S.S. Independence (this event was mentioned in the 1997 Discovery Channel TV documentary "Fleet Command.") U.S. News and World Report also quoted retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral W. J. Holland, who maintained if the U.S. Navy had to deal with a hostile diesel submarine today, "It would take a month to handle that problem, including two weeks of learning." In any event, the moral of this naval story is that the U.S. Navy really needs "a healthy dose of humility and caution in future operations."

Today, the U.S. Navy has no diesel submarine combatants, and this means that although the diesel submarine is a very dangerous threat, the Americans must rely on smaller allies like Canada, Chile, Peru, Columbia, Australia, and others to provide this vital training. This, it can be argued, is a very serious handicap for any blue water navy, much less the world's largest. Likewise, the U.S. Navy is also very weak in mine countermeasures, and must rely on allies for those capabilities as well.

Not surprisingly, NATO and allied diesel submariners are extremely confident in their ability to sink American carriers. In his 1984 book The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine, Andrew Cockburn wryly noted that European submariners on NATO exercises were far more concerned about colliding with noisy American nuclear submarines (running fast and therefore, blind) than about being attacked by American ships. Despite the vast amount of propaganda put out by the U.S. Navy, well-run diesel submarines are still intrinsically quieter than any nuclear submarine because they have fewer moving parts. As former Royal Navy submarine officer Ashley Bennington said in his 1999 response to an article on the Virginia class submarines: "...You mention that the new Virginia class of nuclear submarines will easily detect diesel submarines, implying that diesels are noisy. As a general rule, however, diesel submarines, which use an electric motor that runs on batteries, are quieter than nuclear-powered subs, which constantly run coolant pumps."

Bennington's sentiments were echoed in late 2004 by Captain Viktor Tokya of the German Navy. Toyka said that conventional submarines, especially those with Air Independent Propulsion, are more difficult to detect than nuclear boats. It seems that Bennington and Tokya rather doubt the farfetched claim from the Office of Naval Intelligence (O.N.I.) that modern U.S.N. nuclear boats have become "just as quiet" as conventional boats in the past ten years. Any startling revelations coming from O.N.I. should be treated with the greatest skepticism because, after all, one of their main jobs during World War II was to broadcast disinformation and propaganda to frighten and demoralize the enemy. In doing so, they greatly exaggerated U.S.N. capabilities, and they do the same today. Former Navy Secretary John Lehman also mentioned that senior U.S. Navy admirals have a tradition of omitting information about the U.S. Navy's weaknesses and deficiencies during public testimony and, during the 1970s at least, of promoting an "illusion of overall superiority" to Congress. "Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was the first naval leader to break ranks after he left office, and he wrote in his memoirs that 'none of us thought we had such a capability and all of us were under heavy pressure not to let on'; his public testimony was purged by the Pentagon of references to 'adequate, marginal or inadequate capability..."

Captain Li Chao-peng of the Taiwanese Navy also concurred that diesel submarines are more cost-effective and are still quieter than any nuclear submarines. His navy has Dutch Zwaardvis diesel submarines and in 2002 he told the Taipei Times: "The only advantage that a nuclear submarine has over a conventionally-powered one is its endurance under the sea...But a diesel-powered sub like ours is much quieter than a nuclear one." He added that the Taiwanese diesel subs can definitely "compete" with nuclear boats. New advances in Air Independent Propulsion, such as fuel cells, will give conventional submarines more endurance, and even greater stealth. The future for nuclear submarines does not look promising.

Since the end of the Cold War, and the demise of the Soviet submarine fleet, the U.S. Navy has admitted that it has not made Anti-Submarine Warfare (A.S.W.) a high priority, especially in shallow water, and it shows. The U.S.N. has announced a new initiative to improve and coordinate A.S.W. tactics, units, training, and equipment, but one should take note that even during the Cold War, the U.S.N. was not the most proficient navy in this specialty, even in deep water. Other forces, such as the Canadian Navy and Air Force, were and are more skilled in most aspects of A.S.W. (in deep or shallow water), despite having old equipment like the Sea King helicopter. In the early 1980s, Canada's Navy was on the verge of rusting out, yet due to its intensive training and emphasis on A.S.W. excellence, it was still better at hunting submarines than the U.S.N. At the time, a retired British naval officer and Dalhousie University defense analyst told a Halifax newspaper that, "ship-for-ship," the Canadian Navy's elderly frigates and destroyers were still "better equipped, better maintained, and better trained" for A.S.W. than U.S.N. surface ships. Today, Canada's incoming Victoria class diesel submarines, Halifax class frigates (equipped with the Canadian-designed AN/SQR-501 CANTASS towed sonar array system, which is said to be "superior to other similar systems in western navies," ) the Iroquois class destroyers, and updated CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft are in many ways better equipped, better designed, more suitable, and better trained for A.S.W. than their American equivalents.

Fortunately, these failures and shortcomings are finally and slowly becoming public knowledge in the United States, for as the Congressional Budget Office revealed in 2001: "Some analysts argue that the Navy is not very good at locating diesel-electric submarines, especially in noisy, shallower waters near coastal areas. Exercises with allied navies that use diesel-electric submarines confirm that problem. U.S. antisubmarine units reportedly have had trouble detecting and countering diesel-electric submarines of South American countries. Israeli diesel-electric submarines, which until recently were relatively old, are said to always 'sink' some of the large and powerful warships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in exercises. And most recently, an Australian Collins class submarine penetrated a U.S. carrier battle group and was in a position to sink an aircraft carrier during exercises off Hawaii in May 2000. Thus, if a real opponent had even one such submarine with a competent commanding officer and crew, it could dramatically limit the freedom of action of U.S. naval forces in future conflicts."

The U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers have plenty of supporters as well as detractors, and one of their most common defenses is to argue, as former Navy Secretary John Lehman did, "We never lost an aircraft carrier of over thirty thousand tons in World War II." Quite right, but this argument loses considerable strength when we consider how easily the U.S. Navy might have lost the Battle of Midway in 1942. In his brilliant work "Our Midway Disaster: Japan Springs a Trap, June 4, 1942 " Professor Theodore F. Cook postulated that had the Japanese been just a little bit more diligent and skeptical about the phony radio reports about Midway's water problems, there would have been a very high probability that they would have won the ensuing battle. "Given the deadly suddenness of carrier warfare," he noted, "How easily might it have been the U.S. Navy mourning the loss of three carriers... in exchange for, perhaps, one or two Japanese flattops on June 4, 1942?" Furthermore, he recommended that his readers ponder a rather unpleasant theoretical possibility: "What would have happened if the Japanese had won at Midway? With only one carrier left in the Pacific, how could we have resisted their advance?" One should never forget that the American victory at Midway was far from certain, and has been often been called a "miracle." Heavily outnumbered, the Americans prevailed, but this was largely due to the gullibility of a few Japanese naval personnel. Had the Americans lost at Midway, the modern day "big carrier" U.S. Navy might have evolved quite differently, to say the least.

One final comment on the diesel submarine versus carrier scenario. In the preceding paragraphs, it was apparent that foreign navies openly and unashamedly boast when one of their submarines "sinks" an American carrier on exercises. They have no problem letting the news media know about their triumphs. With a few courageous and candid exceptions, such as the people quoted in this paper, American nuclear submariners generally do not publicly reveal their own accomplishments against U.S.N. aircraft carriers. If they do, they do it anonymously, usually after they leave the service, or they provide only the sketchiest of details. Why is this so? Former U.S.N. F-14 Radar Intercept Officer Jerry Burns gave a pretty straightforward answer in 2000: because "Anyone who says something is wrong gets thrown out of the Navy." Also, as Professor Thomas Etzhold pointed out, there is an "unwritten rule" in U.S. Navy exercises: No carrier is ever to be sunk (or even seriously damaged). Obviously, these gag orders only apply to U.S.N. personnel, not to foreign crews. The author of the 1987 book War Games, Thomas B. Allen, described this naval censorship during an interview with the American NPR network in 2003. "The Navy had a kind of unwritten rule: You can't sink an aircraft carrier in a war game. And if you talked to any submariner who had been in either an exercise or a war game, you get a whole story about how many times they really sank aircraft carriers." In other words, the truth is suppressed for "the good of the service." We can therefore deduce that the good of the service is the paramount concern in the U.S.N; not the good of the country, and not the good of the taxpayers who bankroll these extravagant, anachronistic leviathans of the sea.

The Russians Mug the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation

These examples provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was "mugged" by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier's flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk's flight deck, and very courteously, provided the pictures to the American C.O. via e-mail. In a story in the December 7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, one U.S. sailor exclaimed, "The entire crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of intercepting them." Russia's air force is now only a faint shadow of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary, do significant damage to the U.S. Navy. It's little wonder then that a Russian newspaper gloated that "If these had been planes on a war mission, the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk."

Perhaps they are right. As Howard Bloom and Dianne Star Petryk-Bloom advised in 2003, both the Russians and Chinese now have the deadly SS-N-22 Sunburn missile at their disposal. This massive long-range missile, equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads, is extremely difficult to detect or destroy. According to Jane's Information Group, it is more than capable of destroying any U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. Some would say that this example is not valid because in a real war, the carrier and her escorts would have been more careful, and at a higher level of readiness. Indeed yes, but what if this mock attack had been the opening shot in an unexpected war? In that case, the U.S. Navy probably would have lost one multi-billion dollar carrier and probably some of its escorts on the very first day. Multiple coordinated surprise attacks by aircraft, cruise missiles and diesel submarines could quickly emasculate many of the U.S. Navy's carrier battle groups.

 

A Navy spokesman said that the Kitty Hawk had not been surprised, that they knew the Russian planes were not going to attack, and that the Russian aircraft were tracked almost from the moment they took off. In other words, "We were on top of things, no need to intercept, and certainly no reason for alarm." When the Russians over flew the Kitty Hawk, the carrier was "in the process of refueling and therefore was not going fast enough at the moment of the refueling to launch planes." It took 40 minutes for the first American aircraft to be launched, and the Russian Air Force was delighted with the results: "'For the Americans, our planes were a complete surprise,' said Gen. Anatoly M. Kornukov, the Russian air force's commander in chief. 'In the pictures, you can clearly see the panic on deck.''' This episode sounds somewhat like what happened to the Japanese Navy at the Battle of Midway, where its aircraft carriers were caught off guard and attacked while their planes were being rearmed.

Those who say this happened only because the carrier was not in a high state of readiness at the time, and because the Russians were expected and tracked anyway, are clearly missing the entire point. Firstly, enemies often attack during periods of low readiness. Secondly, if the crew of the Kitty Hawk really knew of the impending Russian visit, why did the Russian photos apparently depict a mass panic on the flight deck, and why did the U.S. Navy decline to release the photos? If the crew had truly not been surprised, the photos of the flight deck should surely reveal this, and clear the U.S. Navy. If there had been some classified equipment or activity depicted in the Russian photos, surely the Pentagon could have censored the photos as required, then released them to show the world a crew at sea going about routine business.

Why also did the Kitty Hawk, 40 minutes later, finally launch aircraft to intercept the Russian planes that had already flown over, but did no physical harm to the ship? Why was it necessary to belatedly intercept the Russians if the U.S. Navy was so confident that the Russians were no threat? And why did the Washington Times impart that the "Kitty Hawk commanders were so unnerved by the aerial penetration they rotated squadrons on 24-hour alert and had planes routinely meet or intercept various aircraft?" Because in asymmetrical warfare, the very concept is to strike when the larger, more powerful enemy is least prepared. This is what the Japanese did when they attacked Pearl Harbor in the early morning hours on a Sunday. This is why the 1968 Tet holiday offensive was launched when the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was in a low state of readiness. But then, perhaps it would have been more sporting of the Russians to have called in first before launching their mock attack.

It goes without saying that Soviet/Russian submarines have a long tradition of tracking and stalking U.S. Navy carriers, especially during the Cold War. The Soviets maintained a huge force of both nuclear and diesel submarines, and it seems that both types were able to close with U.S. Navy carrier battle groups. In 1997, to name just one example, a Russian nuclear submarine got uncomfortably close to the carrier U.S.S. Constellation during a Pacific cruise. So close, in fact, that an anonymous U.S. Navy source "concluded later than the submarine would have sunk the Constellation near Seattle if there had been a conflict." No doubt the official wanted to remain anonymous to protect his career, as it is well known that the U.S. Navy goes to great lengths to officially deny that anyone or anything can even damage one of their aircraft carriers (as mentioned earlier). Nonetheless, one might expect that the Russians too have many high quality periscope photos of American ships taken by surprise from very close range.

The Chinese Know Thy Potential Enemy

The Chinese too have a strong interest in neutralizing American aircraft carriers, and in his 2000 book China Debates the Future Security Environment, Michael Pillsbury demonstrated that the Chinese have completed detailed studies of the vulnerabilities of U.S. Navy carriers. He documented that the Chinese have noted the following possible weaknesses: lack of stealth due to the large number of radar reflections plus infrared and electromagnetic signatures, all of which make the carrier "very difficult to effectively conceal," flight restrictions during bad weather, the inability to safely operate in shallow waters, decreased readiness during regular at-sea replenishments, poor A.S.W. and mine countermeasures capabilities, and the structural vulnerabilities of catapults, elevators, and arresting gear. Sun Tzu put it best when he said "Know thy enemy and know thy self and you will win a hundred battles." It seems the Chinese have taken Sun Tzu's advice to heart when it comes to their potential rivals.

Lax Security

One would think that the U.S. Navy would spare no expense to protect its bases, especially those in which their nuclear submarines, both attack and missile boats, are stationed. One would think that effective, vigilant, round-the-clock, air-tight, multi-tiered security would shroud an installation in which Trident missile submarines are based. One would think that the security around these nuclear missile-launching platforms would be almost impregnable. But if one also thinks that strong security measures were the norm in the U.S. Navy during (and after) the Cold War, one should think again.

In June, 2001, Lieutenant Commander Jack Daly, U.S.N., told the audience of a radio broadcast called Judicial Watch that U.S.N. nuclear submarine and aircraft carrier bases were becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack due to lax security measures. He cited an incident in April, 1997, in which a Russian spy ship reportedly used a laser to attack a helicopter in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, near two U.S.N. bases. Daly and his Canadian Air Force pilot suffered permanent eye damage because of the attack, and Daly said it was now routine for Russian spy ships to go snooping around the U.S.N. bases at Bremerton and Everett, Washington. He also propounded that the spy ship that attacked his helicopter had "come to within 1,000 yards of the nuclear-missile-armed U.S.S. Ohio." The reason why the Russians had gotten so bold, he argued, was that the U.S. Navy had grown complacent and unconcerned about espionage and security. With the end of the Cold War, he said, the U.S.N. had basically let its guard down.

However, it must be pointed out that even during the Cold War, security at U.S.N. bases was often very poor. Probably the most qualified man to speak on this issue is a former U.S.N. senior officer, Captain Richard Marcinko. In the 1980s, during the watch of C.N.O. Admiral James Watkins, U.S.N., Marcinko and his SEAL Team Six were assigned to test security at major U.S.N. bases, and the results of his simulated terrorist raids were very disturbing. His team infiltrated the New London Naval Base, where nuclear submarines, including missile boats, are based. Marcinko's team had little difficulty infiltrating the base, and it made a mockery of the base security forces. In his own words: "I rented a small plane, and Horseface flew us under the I-95 bridge, wetting our wheels in the Thames as we swooped low. We buzzed the sub pens. No one waved us off. We rented a boat and flew the Soviet flag on its stern, then chugged past the base while we openly taped video of the subs in their dry docks, capturing classified details of their construction elements. The dry docks were exposed and unprotected - if we'd decided to ram one of the subs, nothing stood in our way."

Marcinko's team did far worse during his visit to New London. His men infiltrated the sub pens, and thereby proceeded to wreak havoc on the submarines therein. "First, they found the sentries - who were secure in their shacks drinking coffee - and silenced them. Then, they concealed explosives behind the diving planes of one nuclear sub. They boarded another Boomer sub and placed demolition charges in the control room, in the nuclear-reactor compartment, and in the torpedo room." They were challenged by base personnel, but explained that they were just doing maintenance, and amazingly, they were never asked to identify themselves. Marcinko later briefed a very unhappy admiral and boasted "I blew up two of your nuclear subs, and if I'd wanted to, I could have blown 'em all up." To be fair, the U.S. Navy is now taking security much more seriously, but only as a result of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and the September 11^th attacks. Despite the lessons taught by Captain Marcinko and his SEALS in the 1980s, little was done to improve security in the interim. Apparently the U.S. Navy prefers to learn its lessons, when it does actually learn, the hard way.

A Few Realistic Men

"My own experience (in war games) is that I never have any problem getting a carrier...those fleets are going to get ground into peanut butter in a war."

- Anonymous U.S.N submarine commander on how easy it is to find and sink a U.S.N. aircraft carrier.

"One enemy diesel submarine lucky enough to get one torpedo hit on a CVN (nuclear powered aircraft carrier) or an AEGIS cruiser could easily turn US resolve and have a huge impact on a conflict... the challenge of finding and destroying a diesel submarine in littoral waters can be nearly impossible... In general...a diesel submarine operating on battery power is quieter, slower, and operating more shallow than a nuclear submarine."

• Lieutenant Commander Christopher J. Kelly, U.S.N.

Earlier, I discussed how easy it is for foreign diesel submarines and air forces to attack U.S.N. carriers. But it's not just the Russians, Chinese, Canadians, Chileans, Dutch and Australians who think the U.S. Navy's carrier battle groups are overrated, expensive and extremely vulnerable. Admiral Hyman Rickover himself didn't think much of his own carrier-centered Navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours. The well-known and atypically out-spoken American retired submarine commander, Captain John L. Byron, also intimated in the early 1980s that even noisy American nuclear submarines had little difficulty operating against U.S. Navy carriers. "Operating against a carrier is too easy," he quipped. "The carrier's ASW protection often resembles Swiss cheese." Another former U.S. Navy officer and columnist, the late Scott Shuger, said pretty much the same thing in 1989: "I've seen enough photos of American carriers through periscope crosshairs - most sub crew offices feature one - to become a believer. Despite all the antisubmarine warfare (A.S.W.) equipment that carrier groups take with them to sea, in my own experience most exercises against subs ended up with my carrier getting a green flare at close quarters, the standard simulation for a successful torpedo or cruise missile attack." Former C.I.A. director Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S.N. (ret.) has also complained that the U.S. Navy's continuing policy of building and deploying "big, over-powered aircraft carriers" is "ill-advised."

Another senior American officer who might agree with Rickover, Turner, Byron and Shuger is retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper. In Exercise Millennium Challenge (2002), Van Riper, playing the role of Saddam Hussein, used small boats to destroy 16 U.S. Navy ships, including an aircraft carrier and two helicopter carriers, in the Persian Gulf. As usual, the U.S. Navy was not pleased with this successful attack against its most powerful ships, and so it stopped the exercise, "reactivated" the dead ships and continued as though nothing had happened. "'A phrase I heard over and over was, 'That would never have happened,' Van Riper recalls. And I said 'Nobody would have thought that anyone would fly an airliner into the World Trade Centre'... but nobody seemed interested.'" Sadly, this kind of official denial is standard operating procedure in the U.S. Navy. Consider also the American submarine commander who once said that, during war games, he "put six torpedoes into a carrier, and I was commended - for reducing the carrier's efficiency by 2 percent." The battleship admirals did the same thing when they ran the U.S.N., and we all know what happened to the battleship.

Many of the criticisms of the carrier-centered navy come from U.S. Army officers who see the U.S.N. as a rival more than as a partner in national defense. One might dismiss army criticisms of the U.S.N. as merely parochial slander, but some army critics make good sense. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Macgregor, U.S. Army, made a number of convincing arguments in his ground-breaking book, Breaking the Phalanx. Macgregor is a vocal critic of U.S. military strategy, and his criticisms are not restricted to the U.S. Army. He argued that with the U.S. Navy's new focus on littoral warfare, the big carrier navy is in even more danger now than during its days as a high seas fleet designed to face the Soviet Union. The fact that U.S.N. aircraft carriers are so big, and so much firepower is concentrated on them, makes them attractive and worthy targets for weapons of mass destruction in littoral waters: "The concentration of several thousand sailors, airmen, and Marines in an amphibious or Nimitz-class aircraft carrier risks single point failure in future warfighting." Also, as the quality and availability of cruise missiles increase, so do the chances of a successful attack on carrier battle groups: "The survivability of large carriers and amphibious ships depends on antiship missile defenses, which must perform perfectly within a few seconds of a missile alert. In both cases, very expensive platforms can be destroyed by relatively inexpensive weapons..." (emphasis added).

Former U.S.N. officer (and submariner) Dr. Robert Williscroft said in September 2004 that there are several possible nightmare scenarios that face the modern U.S. Navy, and they most certainly will involve quiet diesel submarines: "The bad guys can station one of the new ultra-quiet AIP subs at a choke point, and seriously damage or even sink a carrier. An AIP sub can sneak up on a Virginia class (nuclear submarine) deploying a Seal team with devastating results. A hunter-killer pack of several AIP subs can take out any nuke we have, once they find it." Macgregor also noted that at a cost of approximately $4 billion for construction alone, the loss of even one Nimitz-class carrier would be morally and financially devastating. The loss of one or more of the $2 billion Virginia-class nuclear submarines would also be a tremendous burden on the United States Treasury.

This isn't "Top Gun"

As we've seen, U.S. carriers are remarkably vulnerable to attacks by submarines and aircraft, but what about the much-vaunted American naval aviators? How would the U.S.N. pilots fare in a dogfight with a well-trained enemy? The evidence is not encouraging. Canadian pilots routinely outperform U.S.N. aircrews in exercises, and have done so for many years. During the days of Royal Canadian Navy carrier aviation it was well known that the pocket carrier H.M.C.S. Bonaventure, which had just one catapult, could put more planes in the air than much larger U.S.N. A.S.W. carriers of the Essex class. Furthermore, although the little Bonaventure (which displaced only about 16,000 tons) operated R.C.N. Banshee jet fighters for years, U.S.N. Banshee pilots did not wish to risk a landing on a smaller carrier. One author put it this way: "In joint RCN-USN exercises, aircraft from both fleets regularly landed on the other's carriers.  However, the American Banshee pilots straight-out refused to attempt a landing on Bonaventure. The task was becoming so routine for the Canadian pilots that they were doing it before sunrise."

U.S. Naval aviators pride themselves as being supposedly far better than any air force pilots, but one merely has to look at the Canadian, Israeli and Chilean air forces to cast doubt on that assumption. In the early 1980s it was revealed that the average pilot in the Canadian Air Force flew about 300 hours a year, whereas his U.S. Navy counterpart flew only about 160 hours annually. Although the Canadian pilots fly fewer hours these days, they can still hold more than their own with U.S.N. pilots. Since the late 1990s, Canada's new military pilot training center has established a new standard of excellence, and is recognized internationally as having the most advanced pilot training regimen in the world. The official Canadian Air Force Web site makes it clear that Canada's pilot training system is far ahead of the U.S. Navy: "To date, Canada has sold more than $1-billion in training to pilots from Britain, Italy, Denmark, Singapore and Hungary since the inception of NFTC training in 1999. Using the most advanced and effective integrated pilot training system at the most modern training facilities currently available in the world, Canada has become the benchmark in military pilot training. 'We have the leading edge, most advanced technology for pilot training in the world. It is well ahead of everyone, Britain, the United States, everyone. It is the model for other countries so we are very proud of that,'" said Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Houlgate, Director of the Canadian Aerospace Training Project.

Canadian fighter pilots, in particular, receive certain training benefits that are simply not readily available to many U.S. Navy aviators most of the year, simply because Canada has huge, under populated areas that are ideal for flight training. U.S. Naval aviators at bases such as Oceana Naval Air Station (the largest U.S.N. fighter base on the east coast) must deal with massive military and civilian air traffic congestion, plus the close proximity of civilian living areas, and thus, very limited air space. As a result, according to journalist Jack Dorsey, their training, particularly at low levels, suffers because of safety and noise concerns. Canadian pilots training at Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada's largest fighter base, have far fewer restrictions due to the base's relative isolation and huge 4,000 square mile air weapons range. That is one reason why many U.S.N. pilots covet the opportunity to fly at the Canadian base during the annual Maple Flag air combat exercises. But it is not just the vast air space that attracts the interest of U.S.N. pilots. The new Canadian air combat training system now in place at Cold Lake "is the first system of its kind" to integrate a "rangeless" Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation system (ACMI) "with an electronic warfare system - the Surface Threat Electronic Warfare (STEW) system, which simulates surface-to-air and other ground-to-air threats." "Together, these systems make up the most modern training system in the world today," said Keith Shein of Cubic Corporation in June, 2004. "The combination of these two training systems enables pilots to realistically view their performance and tactics on each mission." Better training makes better pilots.

Like the Canadians, The Israeli Air Force, also one of the most professional in the world, has outshined the U.S. Navy, and they have done so even with less capable aircraft. A joint U.S.N.-I.A.F. air combat exercise in 1999 underlines and highlights the thesis that the U.S. Navy is overrated. On September 14, 1999, The Jerusalem Post announced that the Israelis soundly dispatched the air wing from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (which, incidentally, was the same carrier the Dutch destroyed in 1999). Israeli F-16s squared off against American F-14s and F-18s, both of which are said to be more capable than the F-16. The final results were astonishing. The Israelis shot down a whopping 220 U.S. aircraft while losing only 20 themselves. The 10:1 kill ratio was so embarrassing that the results were not "officially published 'to save the reputations of the U.S. Navy pilots.'" The magazine article on which the article was based, however, reported the kill ratio to be about 20:1.

Some dispute these figures, and claim that the Israelis had an "unfair advantage," and did not include American victories from "stand-off missile hits." But, as The Washington Times reported on September 15, 2000, an official investigation by Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, U.S.N., confirmed "Navy pilots were thoroughly beaten in an exercise against Israeli fliers. 'An air wing commander was proud the Israelis only achieved a 6-to-1 kill ratio during simulated air-to-air combat maneuvers against a carrier air wing during a recent exercise, instead of the 20-to-1 kill ratio initially claimed.'"

Other former navy officers agree that U.S. Naval aviation has been sub-par for a number of years. In the February 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, former F-14 radar intercept officer Jerry Burns said "We are a much less effective force than we were seven or eight years ago." "At the start of the Kosovo conflict, says Burns, who at the time was stationed at the Strike Weapons Tactics School in Virginia Beach, U.S. Navy pilots hadn't been trained in using laser-guided weapons. 'That's why we had such high miss rates in the opening phases of the war. We had to dispatch someone [to tutor pilots] in laser-guided bomb delivery techniques.' Burns, who retired in 1999, says that when he last served on the Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, the carrier was 'undermanned' by 450 to 500 sailors. 'They didn't have enough people to keep the [approach] radar fully manned at all times.' If the weather closed in, he adds, someone would have to be sent down to the bunkroom to wake up a radar operator. 'The Navy says operations are safe. But they aren't safe. Planes were running out of gas and they couldn't come on board.' Flight training hours have been cut back so much, says Burns, that the last time his carrier fighter squadron went on deployment, its aviators were only getting 10 to 15 hours a month."

Chile is not a great military power, but its air force is well trained, and they too have given the U.S. Navy reason for pause. In the August 1989 issue of Air Combat magazine, author Jeffrey Ethell reported that Chilean Air Force pilots, flying the relatively unsophisticated but nimble F-5, had trounced an American carrier air group from the U.S.S. Independence in air combat exercises. The kill ratio was 56:16 in favor of the Chileans, and as one might expect, this incident did not receive much press coverage in the United States.

An Australian colleague recently informed me of an amusing incident between a Royal Australian Air Force (R.A.A.F.) P-3C Orion and a U.S.N. aircraft carrier, and it is definitely worth mentioning. In the words of retired Squadron Leader J.R. Sampson, R.A.A.F.: "When I was an R.A.A.F. liaison/briefing officer enroute from Diego to Perth for R&R sometime in 1981/82, I dined in the (American) admiral's suite and the admiral gave me a copy of a message that censured an air wing commander for allowing an R.A.A.F. P-3C to get in undetected amongst the C.V.B.G. (Carrier Battle Group) screen a few days earlier. According to the message the commander himself was in an F-14 cockpit checking out the T.C.S. (Television Camera Set) that had just been installed as a new piece of F-14 kit. T.C.S enables long-range visual identification of targets. He was adjusting the FOV (Field of View) when he saw a P-3 swim across his screen, right on the carrier's bow at about 300 feet above sea level. He'd just come from C.I.C. (Combat Information Center) and knew that no cooperating P-3's were due so he queried the FLYCO who queried the C.I.C. who asked the on station E-2C. They didn't even have the capability to launch an F-14 intercept. Very embarrassing but the admiral gave me a copy of the message to take back to headquarters..." Embarrassing yes, and it proves that an enemy doesn't even need speedy jet fighters to get through a U.S.N. battle group's defenses. A large and relatively slow turbo prop aircraft like the P-3 can do it just as well.

Lack of Training

Despite its vastly superior numbers, resources and weapons, the U.S. Navy, the world's only true heavyweight navy, continually fails to vanquish welterweight and lightweight naval powers. This would indicate that training and good officers, not big, expensive ships, are the key to naval power. It is training, or lack thereof, that truly undermines the performance of the U.S. Navy. For example, even though the U.S. Navy maintains the largest submarine fleet in the world (because the Russian fleet is mostly tied up at dockside), their submariners do not currently receive escape training. The Canadian submarine force has only 4 boats, and yet it has the most advanced submarine escape training facility in the world.

The U.S. Navy opines that its officers and crews are the most professional in the world, yet media reports have indicated a startling number of U.S. Navy ship commanders have been fired or suspended in recent years, including the captain of the carrier John F. Kennedy, whose ship collided with a small dhow in the Persian Gulf in 2004. One should also recall the attack on the U.S.S. Stark and the shoddy damage control procedures used by her crew, the accidental and inexcusable attack on an Iranian airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes, and the more recent collision between the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Greeneville and a Japanese vessel. When the Japanese government found out that untrained civilian guests were actually at the controls of the Greenville before the collision, they were most undiplomatic. "It is outrageous. The US Navy is slack," said the Japanese Defence Agency Chief Toshitsugu Saito in response. Paul Beaver, Military Editor at Jane's Defence Weekly, told National Public Radio's Lisa Simeone in 2001 that the U.S. Navy is quite probably the only navy in the world that has a "civilian ride-along program". Although civilians can visit British and Canadian warships, for example, they may only do so when the ships are at dockside, and they must leave the ships before they get underway. He added that Britain's Royal Navy would never even consider such a ride-along program because of the inherent risks involved.

Regarding the Vincennes incident, former Chicago Tribune military correspondent Lt. Col. David Evans, U.S.M.C. retired, said it was "An operationally inept tragedy that caused the loss of 290 civilians, when the skipper had electronic (transponder) evidence that the 'target' was not an Iranian F-14 but a commercial airliner, not to mention that the captain was in Iranian territorial waters, where he had no business being since he was not under attack. Many U.S. Navy officers feared this sort of thing could happen, calling their apprehension a case of 'Aegis arrogance.'" If U.S. Navy officers and crews are really the best, at the very least, many of them appear to suffer from a lot of bad luck, or bad policies, or just poor judgment.

In addition to training deficiencies, in recent years there has also been compelling evidence of serious morale problems among U.S.N. junior officers. "In the fall of 1999," reported Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation, "the Navy surveyed its junior officers to gauge morale. They expected a 15 percent response rate, but, to their surprise, over 55 percent of those surveyed responded. Of these responses, 82 percent responded negatively. Citing poor leadership, inadequate pay and compensation, and insufficient spare parts and equipment, only one-third said they planned to reenlist." Notice that the primary reason listed for low morale is "poor leadership," which, one might suspect, is a nice way of saying "bad senior officers and bad politicians, in that order."

The U.S. Navy also boasts that its Blue Angels flight and maintenance teams are the world's best, but when one examines their bloated, overly specialized maintenance team, one really has to wonder. The Blue Angels perform with only six F-18 jets, whereas the Canadian Snowbirds fly nine Tutors, which are much older. The Canadian team flies more airplanes, but has a much smaller maintenance team. The Blue Angels have approximately 100 technicians, but the Snowbirds have only about ten. American technicians are very specialized, and as a result they need lots of them to do the same job that just one Canadian technician can do. This does not sound like an efficient or cost-effective arrangement, to say the least.

A 2002 study by the RAND Corporation confirmed that U.S. Navy training in fighters, A.S.W. aircraft and surface ship A.S.W. also does not compare favorably with the training received by members of the French Navy and the British Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. The study compared the training of U.S.N. F-18 pilots with R.A.F. Tornado pilots and French Navy Super Etendard aviators, and found that "The British and French pilots have greater experience levels and more continuity in their units than the U.S. pilots." The study also compared U.S.N. P-3 Orion crews and DDG-51 destroyer crews with their French and British A.S.W. counterparts and concluded once again that the American A.S.W. crews were, on average, the least experienced and the least cohesive. The French and British units were more cohesive and provided greater continuity because "While the typical career pattern for U.S. Navy officers takes them away from the operational ship world to various headquarters and staff assignments, French and British naval officers may stay in the operational community throughout their careers." In addition, "Enlisted sailors in the French and British navies have longer initial service commitments than those of U.S. Navy sailors."

The RAND study also observed that unlike the British and the French forces, U.S. Navy aviation units do not maintain consistent readiness to go into battle throughout the fiscal year. As Scott Shuger said, "Amazingly, it's not uncommon for navy squadrons to cut back their flight hours drastically or even to be grounded due to the scarcity of aviation fuel near the end of the fiscal quarter. This even happens to squadrons already at sea. Several times during my carrier service we had to drop anchor and wait for more fuel money." This inconsistent readiness is due to the U.S. Navy's rigid deployment cycle system and its "training philosophy". The authors concluded that this "readiness bathtub" has "caused concern at the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) level." The French and British do not have this problem because they do not use "fixed deployment and training cycles" and also because they strive to have their air units consistently ready for combat at all times of the year.

What Tom Clancy Doesn'