www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=3F7FFB8E9FF9355F
"The primary purpose of an Army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times - seemed to have been forgotten....
The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking and I said so out loud. The unwillingness of the Army to forgo certain creature comforts, its timidity about getting off the scanty roads, its reluctance to move without radio and telephone contact, and its lack of imagination in dealing with a foe whom they soon outmatched in firepower and dominated in the air and on the surrounding seas - these were not the fault of the Soldier, but of the policymakers at the top".
--General Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, U.N. Forces Commander during Korea War, Airborne Commander in WWII
NEWS FLASH!
Senator Stevens wants pork, RAND says Army is buying a lemon, Army Soldiers need the diamond-in-the-rough: the M113A3 Gavin
Read all about it here!
DoD QUIETLY ARRANGES TO WORK-AROUND LAV3STRYKER ABSURDITY WITH MRAPS
A little known fact is that in WWII, the U.S. Army horse cavalry existed all the way to 1944 even though it was of no use in the fighting in the Pacific and most of Europe's battlefields!
Why?
Because the Army Chief of Cavalry, General Herr refused to do the right thing and mechanize the cavalry but had powerful Congressional friends who prevented him from being fired. The same kind of situation exists today with the current Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki refusing to field a mechanized M113A3 Gavin-based brigade combat team with parachute forced-entry and cross-country fire & maneuver capabilities instead stubbornly insisting road-bound rubber-tired lav3stryker armored cars that CAN'T FIGHT and CAN'T FLY by C-130 be used. This is despite the fact that the M113A3 Gavins out-performed the lav3strykers at the recent Fort Lewis Congressionally-mandated comparison evaluation tests. The absurdity of such a heavy lav3stryker armored car which makes the C-130 sacrifice so much fuel that you can drive it farther than you can fly it--has not been lost on Rumsfled's DoD. But like General Herr in 1940, they cannot fire or correct the wheeled armored-car-with-a-computer Tofflerian madness due to political corruption so they are now seeking to "work around" the flimsy lav3stryker brigades by surrounding them with mechanized (tracked) M113A3/M2/M1 forces and forward deploying them so the heavy wheeled armored cars will not have to be flown by any USAF aircraft. You could surround a brigade's worth of 300 x ice cream trucks with tracked AFVs and call the force "full operational capability"; the tracks will be used to do the heavy fighting and off-road dirty tasks while the wheels frolic along paved roads and trails as far back in the rear as possible. Maybe when General Shinseki retires in June '03 the current Tofflerian self-destructive course of the U.S. Army can be turned around?
Inside The Army DOD Wants Alternate Fielding Plans For Army's Brigade Combat Teams
The Defense Department has asked the Army to develop alternate fielding plans for its Stryker Brigade Combat Teams that would change the units' home-station locations, sources say.
The request is included in a recently signed program decision memorandum, which outlines major changes for the fiscal year 2004 budget request and outyear spending plans.
The PDM and other documents also direct the Army to augment the capabilities of the SBCTs and to consider acquiring fewer than the six teams the service wants.
Currently, the Army intends to field six Stryker brigades. The service has already transformed two units located at Ft. Lewis, WA, into Stryker teams. [Editor: the lav3stryker-cursed 1st BDE/25th LID at Ft. Lewis is part of the 25th LID in Hawaii]. It also plans to convert the 172nd Infantry Brigade (Separate) at Fts. Wainwright and Richardson in Alaska; the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) at Ft. Polk, Louisiana; the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division (mechanized) of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard.
Officials have spent significant amounts of time during the past few months debating how many Stryker teams the Office of the Secretary of Defense would permit the Army to own. According to the program decision memorandum, OSD has "approved" acquisition of the first four SBCTs. The Army may not, however, expend funds in fiscal year 2004 for procurement and fielding of brigades Nos. 5 and 6 without approval from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.
To get that approval, the Army must submit a plan to OSD detailing how it would use the money now slated for the last two Stryker brigades. Top Army officials, including Secretary Thomas White and Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, have publicly stated that six Stryker teams are required. However, OSD wants the Army to formulate other options as well, some of which would include cutting one or two SBCTs from its forces.
As part of the revised Stryker strategy, OSD has directed the Army to examine new locations for the SBCTs. In a Dec. 12 memo, Wolfowitz asks the service to look at permanently placing a team in South Korea. The Army should also consider bases in the United States and Europe, according to the memo.
In addition, the Army is to evaluate the possibility of associating and stationing SBCTs with Air Force Air Expeditionary Force units "to reinforce the development of joint operational concepts," states the Wolfowitz memo. Relocating one or more of the six -- or perhaps fewer -- SBCTs likely would attract negative attention from Congress. Sens. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) and Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), the chairman and ranking member, respectively, of the Senate Appropriations Committee, have a strong, vested interest [Editor: political corruption; lav3stryker units in their voting districts] in the Stryker program. Sens. Arlen Specter and Rick Santorum, both influential Republicans from Pennsylvania, also have a stake in the decision. Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-Louisiana) sits on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Putting a team in South Korea under the current climate could also prove tricky. The U.S. military has fallen out of favor with a sizeable portion of the Korean populace and the country's new president-elect, Roh Moo-hyun, has called for changes in the relationship between Seoul and Washington. Though service sources say the money for brigades Nos. 5 and 6 remains in the budget, the Wolfowitz memo indicates the service may have to spend those funds in other ways. OSD wants the Army to improve the Stryker teams to a level it calls "Full Operational Capability." [Editor: this is a veiled expression that lav3stryker units are not combat capable] Wolfowitz does not define exactly what FOC means, but cites general objectives listed in a Nov. 12 memo from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
At that time, Rumsfeld stated, "I am not inclined to approve funding for" the fifth and sixth SBCTs in the fiscal years 2004-2009 program. The secretary suggested that he "might be persuaded otherwise" if the Army could demonstrate a plan for augmenting the Stryker teams. According to the November memo, Rumsfeld believes that teams 5 and 6 must be "distinctly different from past descriptions of the Stryker -- that is, true combined-arms units." The Army should consider adding to the SBCTs aviation, air defense, sensors, enhanced command and control and, "as an element of a fully combined-arms team, armor when appropriate," the memo states. The Army's "plan of action" must also detail how all of the Stryker brigades "will be organized so that they can operate independently of a division base and how their combined-arms structure would be applied to various missions -- peacekeeping, forced-entries, major combat operations." A joint experimentation strategy "that will enable a combined arms Stryker unit to operate with other elements of the joint force" is required as well, states the memo.
Rumsfeld notes that "these changes to the [SBCTs] will cost money. You should look for funds within Army resources. For example, if you cannot find the money for backfitting the first three brigades, we might stop at the [fifth] and use the money intended for the [sixth] to pay for the backfit," he suggests.
Wolfowitz takes it one step further, directing the Army to provide funding options that would utilize "some or all" of the money slated for the last two teams "to remodel a combination of the first three brigades and/or other units (e.g., elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps)" as a way to achieve Rumsfeld's capability goals.
Wolfowitz directs the Army to consult with the OSD director for program analysis and evaluation and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as it develops the new SBCT design and fielding strategy.
Rumsfeld originally wanted the Army to complete the plan by Dec. 1; however, according to the Wolfowitz memo, the service now has until July 8, 2003, to submit its proposal.
-- Erin Q. Winograd
CAN'T FIGHT: LAV3STRYKER IS PEACEKEEPING/REAR AREA VEHICLE
Senior Australian Army officer exposes Lexington Institute [a paid hack for the current U.S. Army leadership, look where they get their money from: our tax dollars!] propaganda mouthpiece Dan Goure' as one who parrots the Army's false claims about the lav3stryker and he does so without any documentation or backup to support his (the Army's) claims:
Defense News Stryker Claims Untrue
In his commentary, "Stryker Drives to the Future," in the Oct 21-27 issue, Daniel Goure makes a number of claims about the capability of the U.S. Army's Stryker that cannot go unchallenged.
He states that it consumes less fuel, requires fewer man hours or repair and needs a smaller logistical support base. Compared to what? The Canadian experience is the contrary, where the complexities of the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)-3 have resulted in a cost per kilometer, less turret costs, that ranges from the same as an He also states that Stryker is more flexible in complex terrain. This too is a fallacy, as the lack of pivot steering capability, when compared with tracks, severely reduces its maneuverability in tight areas. The vulnerability of the tires due to the thin sidewalls required for the Central Tire Inflation System means these are an Achilles heel, particularly against any adversary who is aware of this weakness.
Another claim is that Stryker can move faster than a tracked vehicle. This is true along hard roads, but on soft ground, the laws of physics still favor a tracked vehicle with its lower ground pressure. The result is, Stryker needs the extra speed to take the long way around and in the process be channeled through predictable defiles, increasing its vulnerability.
The claim that Stryker is one-half to one-third the weight of existing armored vehicles also is misleading. This is the case when compared with a tank, but it does not have the protection, firepower or mobility of a tank. The reality is that due to The one advantage it will have usually is better mine protection. The much higher ground pressure of wheeled vehicles compared with tracks also will limit any potential required to keep the vehicle relevant (e.g., armor improvements). This is true not only due to mobility consideration, but also to axle-load limits.
Wheels have an important place in a balanced Army, but their utility is at the lower end of the spectrum.
Lt. Col. Doug Fraser, CAN'T FLY: LAV3STRYKER SHORT DECEPTION FLIGHT INTO ANDREWS AFB TO FOOL PRESS WILL NOT MAKE IT OPERATIONALLY AIR-TRANSPORTABLE IN REAL WORLD
A senior USAF officer writes:
"Some senior airlift officers had some interesting comments about Stryker. There's 3/4 of an INCH on either side of the Stryker when it gets loaded into a C-130. You cannot carry anything else onboard when it's loaded in its stripped configuration, which means the crew, extra armor, ammo, etc. have to go in another plane.
Here's the real kicker--they couldn't fly the Stryker up to Andrews AFB (the big 'demo' that was supposed to convince the doubters) from Pope AFB in North Carolina because when you put one Stryker into a C-130 it limits the range to under 200 miles! You have to offload so much fuel to get the plane into a safe flying configuration that it can't fly very far at all--certainly not operationally significant distances. But never mind the details--we have some transformation to do!
Our airlifters just roll their eyes at all the Army's antics, but they play along because they know the Army is the only agency who wants more airlift. They don't care how stupid the concept might be (IBCT in 96 hours? A howler! They can't get an IBCT from Ft Lewis to McChord in 96 hours!), they're just happy to have someone generating more airlift squadrons and wings for them. So it goes."
C-130 Overloaded with wheeled vehicles crashes and burns in Afghanistan: how will they be able to fly 19-21 ton lav3strykers?
This article lays out yet another set of sad implications from Army lies. In this case, the Army understated cargo weight and it cost 3 Americans their life, in addition to a MC-130 etc. And this cargo only weighed 25,000 pounds. What are we doing with Styker at over 40,000 pounds? This should be exposed.
Army Times Weight of cargo cited in crash of MC-130H By Bruce Rolfsen
The June 12 crash of an Air Force transport in Afghanistan that claimed the lives of a Soldier and two Airmen was caused by the plane being overloaded with cargo, an accident investigation board concluded in a report released Nov. 15. Air Force Brig. Gen. Frederick Van Valkenburg Jr., a fighter pilot and commander of the 37th Training Wing at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, presided over the board. He concluded that a combination of "imprecise information" about cargo weight and a "get-the-job-done" attitude led to fatal mistakes.
Valkenburg faulted the weight-estimating procedures used by the Army - and accepted by the Air Force - for allowing the plane to take off with a load heavier than estimated. He didn't fault any individuals for the accident.
The Air Force Special Operations Command has made five changes to its cargo procedures as a result of the accident but the command won't discuss specific changes, said spokeswoman Maj. Karen Finn.
The accident took the lives of Army Sgt. 1st Class Peter P. Tycz II, of the 3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., and two Air Force loadmasters, Tech. Sgt. Sean M. Corlew and Staff Sgt. Anissa A. Shero, both of the 15th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
The assignment for the crew of the MC-130H Combat Talon II that day was to help ferry 30 Soldiers, their vehicles and their gear to Kandahar from a remote dirt-and-rock landing strip near the Bande Sardeh dam.
The movement required five flights split between two aircraft.
The MC-130H, based in Oman, was to fly three of the hops, while an older MC-130E Combat Talon I, staged out of Uzbekistan, was to handle two trips.
As Air Force special-operations planners worked up the flights' fuel and cargo requirements, they figured the first payload weighed about 17,500 pounds and that the maximum allowable load was 21,000 pounds. The Talon carried a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, a Special Forces gun-mounted vehicle, a trailer and three Soldiers.
The payload's weight was a critical factor for the night operation because the special operations-modified C-130 took off in thin air from a dirt airstrip at 7,200 feet above sea level.
About 45 minutes before the crew members departed their Oman office for the plane, a mission coordinator got word the Army had upped cargo weight to 20,500 pounds, the report said.
The weight estimates came from Army Special Forces team members at Kandahar. And because there was no practical way to weigh cargo at such isolated airstrips, Air Force special-operations crews depended on Army weight estimates.
The mission pilot, a major with 4,721 flight hours in C-130s, was given a verbal message about the change, but he misunderstood and thought the new weight was 19,000 pounds.
But all those estimates were wrong, the accident investigation board concluded.
When the investigators weighed similar gear plus other items in the Army trucks - such as six cases of MREs - the board concluded the cargo weighed between 23,000 and 25,800 pounds.
The first sign of problems came when the Talon had to abort its initial takeoff roll because it hadn't accelerated fast enough. The aircrew thought the problem was caused by a tailwind.
After turning around, the plane made a second takeoff attempt and this time got airborne. But the Talon couldn't reach a speed higher than about 123 mph and an altitude of 200 feet.
The landing gear was pulled up, but within seconds the plane began losing speed and altitude after it lost the lifting effect of being near the ground. Even after the flight engineer began dumping fuel, the plane couldn't stay aloft.
At 30 feet above the ground the pilot announced, "We're going down."
The MC-130H struck the ground tail first and skidded to a halt about two miles from the runway.
Loadmasters Corlew and Shero and Soldier Tycz, all of whom were in the cargo bay, died immediately from head injuries.
The other five aircrew members and two Soldiers escaped from the plane before it caught fire.
Bruce Rolfsen covers Air Force issues.
THE LOUGHLIN FILES
A persistent reporter and critic of the lav3stryker fiasco is Don Loughlin. Don is a retired ordnance engineer and is also a former Marine tanker. His detailed and blunt criticisms have not been publicly refuted by any Department of the Army, DARPA or DOD official. He used the Army's own data and sources to critique the Army leadership's false justifications for the Stryker program. He cites his most important documents in his report,
December 23, 2002
November 4-10, 2002
Letters
Royal Australian Army
Standardization Representative,
Kingston, Ontario
December 09, 2002
Three killed in June 12 accident in Afghanistan
www.geocities.com/combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm
SUBSIDIARY FILES
exhibit15.htm COURAGEOUS NEWS REPORTERS TIBONI AND KELLY WARN US ABOUT THE LAV3STRYKER DANGER
exhibit16.htm
exhibit17.htm
gg010209r.htm
gg010321f.htm
gg010409gao.htm
gg010821a.htm
gg010919.htm
gg011029b.htm
gg011108a.htm
gg020112a.htm
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gg020223.htm
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gg021006a.htm
gg021007b.htm
gg021008.htm
Former Speaker of the house, Newt Gingrich blows whistle on lav3stryker deathtrap; tells doD to cancel it
Pittsburg Post-Gazette National Security reporter
COURAGEOUS RETIRED COMBAT VETERAN AND REPORTER JACK KELLY EXPOSES THE LIES AND DECEITS BEHIND THE LAV-III DEATHTRAP---THE ARMY'S POOR CHOICE FOR AN IAV
Army's new wheeled armored vehicle criticized
HEAVY METAL: M113A3s are better vehicles than bloated LAV-IIIs: why do you think U.S. Army is so afraid of comparison testing?
Armor and small arms expert Stan Crist reveals why the M113 Gavin is the better choice for Army BCTs:
His slide show:
http://www.geocities.com/strykerprogram
His recent article in the Winter 2003 issue of SPECIAL WEAPONS FOR MILITARY & POLICE. It's in stores, but it can also be ordered from:
HARRIS OUTDOOR GROUP Online orders:
1115 Broadway, New York, New York 10010
Phone: (212) 807-7100 Fax: (212) 807-1479
Email: HarrisMags@aol.com
www.harrisoutdoorgroup.com/specialweapons.html
GENERAL QUITS NTC WAR GAMES DESIGNED TO MAKE LAV3STRYKER ARMORED CARS LOOK GOOD: CALLS THE WHOLE THING "RIGGED"
LTG VanRiper calls Millenial Challenge '02 war games a fraud
LAV3STRYKER FAILS EVEN IN RIGGED WAR GAMES: U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command observers reveal lav3stryker was dismal failure at MC'02!
PDF File
This is the 21-slide briefing from the Army Operational Test Command (OTC) observers at Millennial Challenge 02 conducted at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California.
It is a PDF document.
In case you didn't know if a PDF document is clearly scanned you can on the top tool bar select "T" for text and copy text and paste into a microsoft word document as we've done here to better utilize the data.
Here are the "smoking gun" excerpts showing the Army is lying about lav3stryker and how its was a dismal failure at MC02, and the obvious conclusion to those aware of the situation vis-a-vis the outstanding M113 Gavins which the Army owns 17,000 that could be upgraded at a fraction of the cost and attain better warfighting capabilities. Details:
www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm
The entire 21 slides are attached and the key slides are posted here with my commentary to show the context.
Key Excerpts:
SLIDE 2
"It was observed that the ICVs accounted for zero kills during the Raid mission.
* It was apparent to the observers that the RWS was not boresighted; as one observer stated that the gun was pointed 20 degrees left of the target."
SLIDE 18
"Seat Padding is insufficient
There is insufficient room was available for upper torso while wearing fighting load (front to back).
Weapon system could only be loaded from the outside of the vehicle, thus exposing ones self to enemy small arms fire" For a fraction of the $3 million cost of a too large, too heavy lav3stryker we can put a real shoot-on-the-move 25-30mm autocannon with continuous ammunition feed, with fire & forget anti-tank guided missile on a more compact and lighter 10.5 ton M113 Gavin and still fit and be light enough for a C-130 to transport it. Instead of looking through a remote weapon system (RWS) narrow optic, the Gavin track commander (TC) would have his head out of the turret to acquire targets before dropping down to engage.
SLIDE 3
"RWS failed to provide on the move SA of the enemy within LOS.
- The company drove into 2 ambushes prior to reaching the objective.
- The RWS must come to a halt to engage targets. This take on an average 2 minutes.
- The enemy destroyed 13 of 14 ICVs during ambushes by the enemy BMPs, small arms, and grenades. This occurred because of the requirement to stop and acquire targets." The Tacoma News Tribune of August 8, 2002,a newspaper with a bias towards the lav3stryker since it means jobs for their local economy in an article by Michael Gilbert; "Strykers Winning War Games" states:
"By the end of the mission, the unofficial count was four of 16 Strykers knocked out, 28 Soldiers killed out of a company of about 200, and one Stryker out with transmission problems".
So this biased news sources is BRAGGING about 4 x lav3strykers dead with 44 men inside which is 25% of a rifle company---that would be combat ineffective to do anything....and this is something GOOD????....disgusting...
But U.S. Army OPTEC observers say 13 out of 14 Strykers were destroyed (completely wiped out)....
Someone is LYING and being LIED TO.
The RWS doesn't allow the lav3stryker VC to fight with his head outside the vehicle for situational awareness (SA) like a M113A3 Gavin's TC can with a more lethal 25-30mm autocannon turret. So lav3strykers "die" each with about a dozen men inside.
SLIDE 4
"The RWS did not provide adequate target resolution during engagements.
- The enemy used flashlights to decoy the Stryker unit.
Vehicles commanders could not simultaneously fight and direct the ICV, maintain SA of the dismounted infantry, man radio nets, maintain FBCB2, or call for fire."
************************************************************* We have and so have dozens of other countries---successfully fought and maintained SA using M113 Gavins and dismounted infantry squads; details are contained in Army Manual FM 7-7. We can do this. We can do this well with M113A3 Gavin IAVs.
SLIDE 6
"Tires
13 tires have been replaced within the 96 hours closing on NTC. (6% of the company ICV tires)." SLIDE 5
"One vehicle was deadlined for HMS.
- These two vehicles had to retighten excessively while being transported via ground transportation.
SLIDE 11
"Stowage General
Transportability procedures for MC02 are not representative of actual due to the many work- arounds derived from the problems with the HMS.
- It took 15- 20 minutes to reconfigure the ICV to combat ready."
SLIDE 13
"Stowage General
The unit needs 8 each scales for weighing the vehicles. Even with the eight scales from the Brigade the unit took over 4 hours to measure and weigh 2 vehicles." SLIDE 7
"Fuel
We must take into consideration that safety restrictions prevent the ICVs from running the APU and that the fuel consumption will be greater.
- Hours Vs Miles. SLIDE 9
"Stowage Internal Squad
The squad loaded equipment into last two feet of the vehicle based upon a load list from the PM. There was very limited ammunition simulated in the ammunition racks on the vehicle much of it was stowed inside the vehicle. The javelin was not loaded into its stowage space."
SLIDE 10
"There was very limited ammunition simulated in the ammunition racks on the vehicle.
- The unit needs the weights by type ammunition to simulate basic load."
SLIDE 14
"Stowage General
Upon weighing A5 they discovered that it was over 700 Lbs. Over the AF weight limit.
- The crew removed 7 rucks, 6 water cans, and 1 Javelin.
A12 was over 500 Lbs over the weight limit and removed 5 water cans and 3 rucks.
A14 is down for HMS- The HMS allowed the frame to rest on the tires and rubbed the paint off the vehicle. The CTIS is failing during transport- The driver had to stop and tighten the chain several times during transport from YTC to SCLA. The lav3stryker has clearly failed the Key Performance Parameter (KPP) for the Army's IAV for IBCT requirement of deploying by C-130 COMBAT-READY and should be cancelled immediately. The lav3stryker cannot deploy by C-130s safely or combat ready.
In sharp contrast, the M113A3 Gavin is already proven capable of carry REAL. FULL combat loads of men, equipment and ammunition and rolls off a C-130 by cargo parachute airdrop or STOL airland COMBAT-READY. Go ask General Meigs of USAEUR who has an Immediate Ready Force (IRF) in Germany with M113A3 Gavins that has been ready to fly into Afghanistan ever since the U.S. involvement in the war, but HQDA will not send them in because it would show the world the Canadian lav3stryker is an un-needed, multi-billion dollar purchase and waste of American tax dollars. Details:
*******************************************************
Conclusion: 19-21 ton Lav3stryker didn't kill ANYTHING during the war game, its impotent, nothing more than a thinly armored truck that can't shoot on the move and exposes the vehicle commander (VC) to enemy fire in order to reload the puny machine gun.
******************************************************************
Conclusion: U.S. Army stated publicly to Inside the Army magazine that only 4 lav3strykers were destroyed. Clearly, the Army is lying since almost all of the lav3strykers were killed and then re-keyed to come back to life; the type of cheating OPFOR Commander LTG VanRiper objected to so much, he quit the war game.
Conclusion: the VC leaders in the lav3stryker are blind-as-bats having to operate their vehicles essentially buttoned up due to the RWS.
*************************************************************
Conclusion: In just 4 days of operations 13 TIRES have had to be changed, each time stopping the lav3stryker and making it an easy mobility kill for the enemy to finish off into a total kill. The Army's troubles and costs will escalate when you multiply the number of lav3strykers--in a force of 300, every single vehicle will have to change at least one tire during a 4 day operation in a rocky desert area. This is absurd and dangerous; entire units on tracks routinely go through entire NTC rotations without having to change even a single track on a single vehicle. Placing a metal box on 8 air-filled rubber tires multiplies by 8 the opportunities for a mobility failure on EVERY lav3stryker.
*************************************************************
Conclusion: the Height Management System (HMS) which tries to lower an overly high vehicle so it can squeeze under a C-130 roof adds not needed complexity to an already overly complex vehicle, making it unreliable and costly to maintain.
- Some ICVs may have better mileage due to them running the APU.
- Three APUs have gone down."
********************************************************
Conclusion: yet another faulty system on the lav3stryker lemon is its non-functioning APU.
***********************************************************
Conclusion: yet again the Army is lying and not actually putting combat loads into the overweight lav3stryker to try to deceive Congress and the American public. It takes 2 x C-130s to transport 1 lav3tyker and infantry squad because even after lots of work-arounds, the vehicle fills up the C-130 cargo bay and blocks escape in event of a crash landing. USAF has only authorized 4 Army Soldiers to ride inside a C-130 with a lav3stryker inside.
M113A3 Gavins in USAEUR SETAF
SLIDE 19
Squad do not have sufficient room on the vehicle to put on and take off protective clothing and equipment
Squad members could found it difficult to access a canteen, drink, then restow it
Squad found it difficult to access ammunition and load personal weapon. SLIDE 20
"Location of recovery 35061 16576; time to recover :43; No damage to the vehicle; A 14 was used to recover A 12 from a 8'- 10' ditch using the tow cable. It is possible that if an alternative method was used to recover the vehicle it would have tipped over." SLIDE 21
"Maintenance
One Full- up- pack was replaced within 3 hours. SOMETHING TO CONSIDER:
Soldiers Magazine, the official magazine of the U.S. Army, November 2001 issue:
www.dtic.mil/soldiers/nov2001/features/lariat2.html
USAREUR's Ready Force
THE Immediate Ready Force was established to improve USAREUR's ability to rapidly respond to potential contingencies within the European Command's area of responsibility.
The cornerstone of the IRF is the Light Immediate Ready Company from the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, in Vicenza, Italy. This Airborne force is deployable within 24 hours and can be quickly reinforced with additional units from SETAF's 173rd Brigade.
The remainder of the IRF is tailored into force enhancement modules that add specific capabilities in the form of combat power, communications, military police, engineers, scouts, and tactical or strategic control assets.
The FEMs can deploy separately or together, based on the mission, to provide a capable, tailorable and integrated force.
Combat power ranges from the Key to the mobility of the IRF is its ability to deploy using tactical airlift assets already available in the European theater, belonging to U.S. Air Forces Europe.
Every IRF FEM is C-130 deployable, with the exception of the HIRC, which requires heavy-lift capability in the form of C-17 or C-5A transport aircraft.
The successful partnership between USAREUR and USAFE, working together to meet the needs of the EUCOM commander, has been an essential part of the development and employment of the IRF.
Also key to the readiness and rapid deployment of the IRF is the prepositioning of equipment at the Deployment Processing Center.
Located at Rhine Ordinance Barracks, the DPC stocks complete equipment sets for the FEMs, maintaining them at a 100 percent readiness rate.
The location of ROB, adjacent to Ramstein Air Base, the primary aerial port of embarkation in Germany's Central Region, helps speed the delivery of IRF personnel and equipment anywhere they are needed. -- MAJ Paul Swiergosz
www.kforonline.com/news/reports/nr_07sep00.htm
Before you can say Jack Robinson... Two Apache helicopters shoots rockets and machine gun for cover fire, the rockets make a shrilling sound as they knock out every target on the Ramjane Range.
When the Immediate Ready Force (IRF) moves, it really moves quickly. Less than 48 hours after their initial alert notification, they were ready to exercise Combined-Arms live fire in MNB East.
The IRF is drawn largely from the 1-18th Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, based in Schweinfurt, Germany. It is a fast-moving American unit specialising in rapid-response, deployment and support to European contingencies. Late August the IRF exercised on a swift and decisive response in Kosovo.
At the request of UNMIK and COMKFOR, USAREUR directed this deployment to Multinational Brigade East, under the command of Brig Gen. Dennis E. Hardy. The IRF included Infantry, Scout and Military Police assets, in addition to command, control and other support elements. The Soldiers deployed with M113A3 Armoured Personnel Carriers and High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles. The exercise is the final event of the IRF's training on rapid deployment in Kosovo.
Heavy fire
Operations officer Tom Fisher gives his briefing in a tent in Ramjane Range close to camp Bondsteel
"Our mission is to conduct a hasty defence movement to deny a paramilitary incursion in our sector," says Operations officer Tom Fisher standing in a tent in Ramjane Range close to camp Bondsteel. The IRF is waiting for the exercise to begin. First the scout locate the different targets and directs artillery fire from Camp Bondsteel. After the targets had been barraged, the scouts engage with mortars and machine guns while pulling out and giving room for a infantry company. At this point the company commander moves in with his men to engage the enemy.
Half through the exercise, the units are running low on ammunition, and requests air support from Bondsteel. Two Apache helicopters arrive and the Soldiers lie low on the ground as the helicopters drop the ammunition while shooting rockets and machine gun for cover fire. The rockets make a shrilling sound as they knock out every target on the Ramjane Range. Indeed a strong demonstration of both the projection capabilities of the IRF, and the rapid force projection capabilities available to the Task Force Falcon commander.
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/briefing/pressbrief18aug.html
Immediate Ready Force Deployment
The first element of the KFOR U.S. Immediate Ready Force (IRF) arrived at Camp Able Sentry (FYROM) at 11:50 a.m. yesterday, less than 48 hours after their initial alert notification.
The IRF is drawn largely from the 1-18th Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, from Schweinfurt, Germany. At UNMIK and KFOR request, the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) headquarters directed the deployment. The force will be assigned to Multi-National Brigade East under the command of Brig Gen. Dennis E. Hardy.
The IRF is composed of roughly 120 Soldiers and includes Infantry, Scout and Military Police assets; command and control; and other support elements. The Soldiers are deploying with The IRF's capability to rapidly deploy from Central Europe and immediately begin executing a wide range of military missions in Kosovo proves USAREUR's ability to respond swiftly and decisively to European contingencies. This IRF deployment is further evidence of the U.S. commitment to NATO's work to achieve peace in Kosovo. Its presence will add additional flexibility and force protection capabilities to MNB East.
U.S. ARMY EUROPE NEWS RELEASE First element of IRF arrives at Kosovo staging point CAMP BONDSTEEL, Kosovo (Aug 17, 2000) --The first element of the Immediate Ready Force (IRF) arrived at Camp Able Sentry at 11:50 a.m. today, less than 48 hours after their initial alert notification. The IRF is drawn largely from the 1-18th Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, from Schweinfurt, Germany. At the JCS's direction, USAREUR deployed this force. The force will be assigned to Multi-National Brigade (East) under the command of Brig Gen. Dennis E. Hardy. The IRF includes Infantry, Scout and Military Police assets; command and control; and other support elements. The Soldiers are deploying with M113A3 Armored Personnel Carriers and High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles. The IRF's capability to rapidly deploy and immediately begin executing a wide range of military missions proves USAREUR's ability to respond swiftly and decisively to European contingencies.
This IRF deployment is further evidence of the U.S . commitment to NATO's work to achieve peace in Kosovo. Its presence will add additional flexibility and force protection capabilities to MNB (E).
For more information about this news release, contact Task Force Falcon Operation Joint Guardian Public Affairs, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, telephone: 00-49-621-730-781-5078, SATPHONE 00-871-762-069-495, or E-mail: pao@bondsteel2.areur.army.mil
Army Times Ready - And Waiting SCHWEINFURT, Germany - Which new Army organization is structured for early deployment, is mostly deployable by C-130s, has a significant medium-weight component and is available for missions today?
If you answered one of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis, Wash., you'd be wrong.
The first of those isn't supposed to be ready for real-world missions until December 2001.
The real answer: U.S. Army Europe's Immediate Ready Force.
While much of the Army's attention is focused on the medium-weight brigades the service is establishing at Lewis to make itself more relevant for the 21st century, the Army's European component has quietly stood up its own quick-reaction force.
The battalion-size force combines a heavy company of Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, a medium-weight mechanized infantry company mounted on M113A3 tracked vehicles, and platoons of scouts, engineers, MPs and communications troops.
Strictly speaking, the IRF is not a new unit. Rather, it is a new capability, responsibility for which rotates every six months among USAREUR's four ground maneuver brigades. It is designed to be used in conjunction with SETAF, the Southern European Task Force's Vicenza, Italy-based Airborne Brigade, which functions as the Army's initial entry force in Europe.
The force is the brainchild of USAREUR commander Gen. Montgomery Meigs. [A HERO.]
"My objective was to try to create a range of capability here," he said in an Oct. 16 interview. "In some situations the may need a headquarters with a brigadier general and an MP platoon. In another he might want a brigade with a heavy component in it."
The IRF can be tailored to meet either requirement, he said.
The new force had its genesis in the deployment of Task Force Hawk from Germany to Albania last spring. That task force was built around a deep strike force of Apache attack helicopters and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. It also included armor, mechanized infantry and light infantry components, as well as much of the V Corps headquarters and other combat support and combat service support elements.
The Army was heavily criticized for taking several weeks to deploy the full task force. But much of the delay stemmed from a lack of adequate airlift, officials contend. Many of the Air Force's C-17 aircraft required to lift the heavy equipment into Albania were busy helping in refugee relief operations. At the conclusion of Operation Allied Force, NATO's war against Serbia, Meigs sat down with then-V Corps commander Gen. John Hendrix to discuss how to fix the shortcomings.
Deploy in 24 to 48 hours
Meigs said he wanted to be able to give the commander-in-chief of U.S. European Command a force he could deploy in 24 to 48 hours, "but without having too many people standing on their heads."
Hendrix, who had previously commanded the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Ga., suggested establishing a force similar to that division's Immediate Ready Company built around Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The Army tasked 3rd Mech to provide that capability to the XVIII Airborne Corps after canceling plans to buy the Armored Gun System light tank for the 82nd Airborne Division.
"I said, OK, having a heavy immediate company makes sense, but we need a range of things to draw from because a lot of times what you're trying to put in is not necessarily a heavy force," Meigs said.
In addition, he noted that any European-based force built around Abrams and Bradleys has a significant drawback: To deploy in a hurry it needs to be airlifted on C-17s, which U.S. Air Force Europe doesn't have.
"One of the lessons of Allied Force was this requirement for intra-theater mobility ... We needed a capability that would move on C-130s that are organic to USAFE," Meigs said. Therefore Meigs decided to include not only a heavy company in his IRF, but also a medium-weight company based around M113A3s, the Vietnam-era armored personnel carriers no longer used by mechanized infantry [NOT TRUE, SEAN, M113A3s are of 1987 manufacture NOT FROM VIETNAM, M2 BFV MECH-INFANTRY BATTALIONS STILL HAVE M113A3s in HHC, and 1 M113A3 in EACH RIFLE COMPANY]. The Army still has thousands of them in storage [WHY YOU UPGRADE THESE SUPERIOR TRACKED VEHICLES INSTEAD OF WASTING $4 BILLION ON ROAD-BOUND, INFERIOR LAV-III wheeled armored cars].
The aluminum-hulled 113s are small and light enough to be flown by C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. But the same characteristics that make the 113 so deployable also make it more vulnerable to enemy fire than tanks and Bradleys. [IF IT GETS HIT---BY BEING MORE CROSS-COUNTRY MOBILE THAN M1s/M2s, M113A3s can AVOID GETTING HIT]
"An armor-piercing .50-caliber round will go right through it," [WHY YOU ORDER THEN PUT ON HMG/RPG RESISTANT P900 APPLIQUE ARMOR ON M113A3s] said Maj. Gen. John Craddock, commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), based in Wuerzburg.
For that reason, commanders here say they have no intention of sending the medium company into a situation it cannot handle.
"One wouldn't try to put the medium company in a big tank battle," Meigs said. "But as the backbone of an Airborne force on the ground quickly, it could be very useful."
A typical mission might see the SETAF Airborne Brigade seize an airfield, with the medium company being flown in immediately afterward in C-130s to help strengthen the perimeter, officials here said. Meigs added the Army also recently had given SETAF 63 Humvees to make the Airborne force more mobile once it hits the ground.
The Army replaced its last 113s with Bradleys in the active-duty mechanized infantry force in 1989. The boxy, tracked vehicles remain in engineer and other outfits. Preparing mech infantry forces in Europe for possible real-world missions in the 113s, however, presented something of a training challenge.
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Conclusion: the lav3stryker is so pathetically cramped Soldiers can't even pull out a canteen and drink. We have perfectly good M113 Gavins with plenty of space for the troops inside, that are combat proven that we can even stretch the hull and provide even more living space all at a fraction of the cost of the too cramped lav3stryker.
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Conclusion: the lav3stryker as a rubber-tired wheeled vehicle is so immbile that it gets stuck on the flat, open desert of NTC. After getting stuck numerous times, experience will lead Soldiers to restricting these armored cars to roads and trails so they can avoid embarrassment in front of their peers though in combat will provide the enemy easy ambush victims akin to GM 100 in Vietnam. When using the inadequate winch, Soldier injuries and deaths over time will occur.
BSB is not maintaining a fuel consumption log.
PMCS is difficult due to restrictions."
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Conclusion: by taking a 16.5 ton lav3 peacekeeping armored car and slapping myriad gear and computers to try to make it into a 19-21 ton quasi-combat vehicle, the engine, suspension and transmission have been grossly overloaded. Fuel consumption and engine break-downs will be not allow the low-cost panacea HQDA has told Congress the IBCT with over 300 lav3stykers will be.
Text: Lt. Sveinung Larsen -- Photos: SFC Sven Christian
August 22, 2000
November 6, 2000
Pg. 18
USAREUR's Immediate Ready Force specialty: quick to react
By Sean Naylor
"The Army is a learning, thinking, adaptable organization,"
Gen. John M. Keane
Army Vice Chief of Staff
www.hqusareur.army.mil/htmlinks/
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER FRANK TIBONI OF DEFENSE NEWS REVEALS THE FAILINGS OF THE LAV-III ARMORED CAR AS AN INTERIM COMBAT VEHICLE
U.S. Army Moves To Avoid Armored Vehicle Test
Most New Armored Vehicles Exceed U.S. Army's Medium-Weight Needs
U.S. Army: Armored Vehicle Too Vulnerable To Gunfire
HOW CAN YOU MENTALLY OUT-THINK THE ENEMY WHEN YOUR COMPUTER IS IN A PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED WITH A LAV3STRYKER ARMORED CAR? WOULD LEGENDARY WAR FUTURIST COLONEL JOHN BOYD ENDORSE THE LAV3STRYKER?
Its clear when you read However, its also depicted that Boyd first created a platform with lots of physical agility by good DESIGN. The Lav-III armored car which the Army has gadgetized into the lav3stryker does not have good physical agility in the first place. In air-to-air combat, the size and shape of the wing is a driving factor, in land combat its GROUND PRESSURE. If your vehicle rolls on rubber tires and these tires have a lot of weight pressing down on them, they will be unable to go off roads and cross country at will. An armored car's inability to maneuver cross-country is like if your aircraft couldn't do aerobatic maneuvers. In an increasingly lethal land battlefield where you cannot afford to be hit, its vital that ground vehicles be able to move cross-country through concealing vegetation to evade line-of-sight targeting. But the lav3stryker cannot do this from the "get go". By moving its fuel tanks to the outside it lost props/rudders and cannot even swim. Its way too heavy to be lifted by helicopters and cannot fly far or safely in C-130s to get into positional advantage for land combat. Does the year that the lav3stryker was concocted make it Its illogical why some Boyd proponents can understand the need for PHYSICAL agility in an aircraft but cannot see that the same is just as important in a ground combat vehicle.
Its my firm belief that if Col Boyd were alive today and the facts were presented to him, he would rightly conclude that a M113 Gavin light tracked AFV could be digitized with SA and more powerful weaponry and protective features than the immobile and vulnerable lav3stryker which is of the erroneous bigger-is-better mindset. In land combat, bigger means a better target for the enemy. The M113 Gavin was created from its design to be an all-terrain, agile x-country capable armored fighting vehicle--before there was the "lightweight fighter" there was the "lightweight ground fighter", ie the AM-PVF, Airborne Multi-Purpose Vehicle Family. The fact that the U.S. ARMY MECHANIZES WITHOUT A DOCTRINE 1940-Present; seduced again by the laxity of wheels
At the dawn of World War II, the U.S. Army's Chief of Cavalry, General Herr refused to mechanize his branch with tracked internal-combustion-engine armored vehicles, clinging instead to muscle-powered animal horses even though in WWI enemy machine gun and artillery fires made cavalry movement impossible on the western front. Rather than fixing the problem and firing General Herr, a "work-around" was employed; the creation of an "Armor branch" with no sound, traditional doctrinal battlefield function to guide it; it was half-combat engineers breaking through for infantry and half-cavalry screening ahead for enemy for the main body. However, the actual result was a hybrid that did neither function very well---Compare the British 79th Armored Division " The Army during WWII, tried to cobble together a "mechanized cavalry" to screen ahead for infantry and armor units using M3 and M8 wheeled armored cars and a fanciful idea of being ultra "stealthy" and avoiding combat entirely. This combat avoidance mentality failed miserably against the smart Germans in North Africa (1942), Sicily (1943) and Italy (1943-4) until it was realized that M3/5 Stuart light tracked tanks were needed in a Details:
The History of U.S. Army Mechanized Cavalry 1940-1985
After WWII, the Germans warned us that even their large bi-directional armored cars were inadequate even for reconnaissance:
However, decades later these and many other clear warnings not to use armored cars have been ignored. Current leaders of U.S. Army are again trying to "work around" the intransigence of tradition-bound branches (Armor and Infantry) to field a C-130 air-transportable armored vehicle equipped force by creating a "hybrid" without any doctrinal foundation using ARMORED CARS to transport a quasi-cavalry type combined-arms team---but not to seek intel (recon) on the enemy and run away----but to do quasi-combat from a safe distance--the same flawed avoidance mentality of early WWII mechanized cavalry---with firepower bombardment followed by a CNN documented occupation to "score points" at home with Congress to secure more funds for the Army. The current IBCT force structure plans on using armored cars to transport entire 9-man infantry squads inside, plus a 2-man crew---when the road and trail-restricted, vulnerable, air-filled rubber-tired armored car has been throughout history a miserable failure, losing a few scouts at a time, with burned-out hulks littering the countryside all over the world. This web site has just a few of these horrific images of wheeled armored cars, which have no design justification for use as massed infantry transports. If the IBCT is just to be a "quasi-cavalry scout force" to call in "Very important to avoid making reconnaissance equipment heavy.
For this reason, we tried through the war to develop a decent light tank for the reconnaissance units, but we were never successful.... the eight wheeler [reconnaissance vehicle] had the serious disadvantage of being too large and heavy, while the four wheeler was not really mobile enough in cross-country work. You know the eight wheeler was so big and heavy because the reconnaissance troops, naturally, wanted as big a cannon as they could get. Well, that does not work."
--Major General Hermann Balck, German Army 1932-45, in a taped interview on 12 January, 1979, page 40. Performed under contract number DAAK40-78-C-0004, Columbus Laboratories, Tactical Technology Center, 505 King Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43201.
What makes an armored car a poor choice for a combat vehicle?
Mobility- Any armored vehicle must be able to get itself into, through and hopefully out of a combat situation. Roads might be the way to get to battle, and they might be the reason for the battle; but in general, battles are fought over varying terrain types with the side able to operate away from predictable roads/trails having the decided operation and tactical advantage. An armored vehicle must safely transport its human cargo to the battlefield, wherever that battlefield may be---not just on comfortable roads/trails. Combatants rarely get a chance to limit their battlefield. Predicting and dictating the condition of the battlefield are luxuries for dreamers and theorists. Practical Soldiers make-do with the dirt on which they stand. Wheeled vehicles have some basic faults when off-road performance is an issue. These faults have been examined and reexamined for 85 years, but they fall into the following and the wheels are still miserable failures:
Tires must be different depending on different terrain. Large soft tires for sand, large semi-soft to hard heavily treaded tires for terrain. Narrower harder wide spaced tread for rain... or compromises there in. No one tired tread shape covers the majority of user needs. Rubber tires need air to keep their shape and once punctured they are useless---even with a run flat insert, the vehicle must limp home. Rubber burns and if ignited by a RPG or molotov cocktail will leave the vehicle ground to its rims. In contrast, Tracks work over a wider range of terrains with little modification. Track road wheels and idlers are solid and can even be solid steel without any rubber, impervious to small-arms fire, artillery bursts and molotov cocktails.
Ground pressure is a problem with tires, the higher the pressure the more the vehicle will sink into the terrain on which it sits. This is not a big problem on a city street, highway, paved road. It becomes a big issue when operating on grass and dirt in the third world, especially when water is added to the mix. The constant ground contact by treads, ability to widen track segments easily, and number of roadwheels in contact with the ground allows for excellent handling characteristics for track systems if they remain under 20 tons.
The LAV-III/IAV's 20-24 ton weight pressing down on just 4 axles becomes an issue with a high 20-40 PSI ground pressure, the vehicle weight must be minimized. The fact remains that the greater the amount of armor weight equals greater protection. The added suspension, drivetrain, steering endemic to an armored car plus equipment, fuel, and troops increases overall vehicle weight, which results in designers decreasing the thickness of the body and decreased armor protection--the LAV-III/IAV is only 1/2 an inch thin. The higher the ground pressure, the less terrain floatation. In contrast, the M113A3 Gavin weighs 10.5 tons and has a ground pressure of just 8.63 PSI, while being an armored box 3 times thicker than a LAV-III/IAV and more armor protected--plus rolling on metal tracks that don't go flat, essentially impervious to enemy small arms fires and able to rumble over verticle obstacles like fallen logs, barricaded cars, debris.
Terrain Floatation which also has to do with firing-on-the-move is a bad problem in any wheeled vehicle. The better the floatation the less the vehicle bounces, rolls, and yaws on broken terrain at speed. Armored cars, basically all wheeled ATV vehicles, have a practical speed limit over open or broken terrain. They do well on road surfaces but must proceed slowly across a field or through the woods.
Crew Protection-Besides transportation, crew protection is an essential consideration with armored vehicles. If armored protection was not important, the job could be accomplished with a Deuce and a half truck. Armored cars have some glaring weaknesses when it comes to crew protection. Armored cars are tall and narrow to allow for large diameter tires. These large wheels allow for limited off-road travel in firm open soil areas, but makes it a bigger target. In addition, the lighter armor required on wheeled vehicles means less crew protection than is optimal in heavy combat. (What most armored vehicles are intended for.) The LAV/MAV/MGS is tall and made of thin sheet metal. The M2/M3 has a high silhouette, but is at least reasonably well armored against RPGs and heavy machine guns rolling on steel tracks that don't get flat.
Lighter Armor means less crew protection. Even in the absence of any limitations on vehicle height, the presence of wheels means that the added weight of armor plate and reactive armor boxes necessary to protect a squad sized crew becomes an issue because it must create space for the wheels to turn and flex with suspension. The LAV-III/IAV uses thin steel which makes it twice as heavy as a M113A3 at less armored protection and is too brittle to accept exlosive reactive armor recoil forces to defeat shaped charge wearheads like RPGs and ATGMs have. The thick, aluminum armor on the M113 facilitates use of explosive reactive armor and the basic chassis can be easily modified to include heavier and more shape advantageous armor types. The narrow gage of the wheeled vehicle also presents some problems with armor thickness impinging on crew space. Armored cars must have their front wheels to turn to steer so armored skirts of any protective consequence are out of the question---a straight in shot at the underhalf of the vehicle sides goes straight into the crew compartment exploding fuel, ammo and burning up men.
Survivability of the vehicle as a functional part of a field formation is critical. An armored car can be "knocked out" by blowing off a tire, wheel, axle combination. A tracked vehicle can be re-tracked and lose little combat effectiveness by the loss of one or multiple roadwheels or sections of track (called short-track). Oblique hull shapes are necessary to help deflect mine blasts and some small-arms fire in any armored vehicle. However, the narrow gauge and limited suspension points of armored cars impinge on the interior shape and configuration of the vehicle. The lack of extra power and terrain floatation inherent in a wheeled armored car prohibits much applique' armor from being fitted to make them proof against small-arms fire, expedient lame weapons let alone RPGs and ATGMs.
Firepower-a vehicle armored for combat usually must be armed for combat. The stated purpose of this new LAV-III/IAV armored car is to provide fire support to its troops among an eclectic mix of ambulance and command vehicle tasks. The problems with the fire support role for an armored car in combat are very daunting. Putting anything greater than a 76mm on a tall narrow vehicle is more than difficult. The turret configuration becomes too cramped to work - This was a problem with the Churchill tank in WWII. It never developed into a great tank because it was limited by its narrow turret ring. The narrower the ring the greater the limit on gun size. Modern mounts and techniques increase it, but ultimately you are limited by Sir Isaac Newton's laws of physics.
Gun stability - a stabilizer has to work like a gimball with a two or three hundred pound gun mount bouncing over open terrain, even on a road. The 25mm Bushmaster barrel and breech assembly weighs in at about 180 lbs. The gun mount is several hundred. (Part of the screw-up with the M2 Bradley is having a very heavy, large 2-man turret leaving you three men short of a full 9-man rifle squad.) To put this system in a narrow, tall armored car you sacrifice your stabilizer. We lose mobility since we have to stop to shoot -to hope to hit anything. Roll and yaw is another factor in stability. A narrow axle length and tall gun position equals serious roll problems in laying the gun. The worst is the yaw. Tracks tend to dampen yaw since there are a greater number of axles on which to spread the motion. If the wheeled LAV-III/IAV armored car looks like a quasi- "tank", it will be tried to be used like a "tank" to get line-of-sight on a target, even if it is just a truck with a "boom-boom" on it. The LAV-III/IAV has the full and complete probability of being inserted into situations that would be much better performed by true tracked tanks, true tracked armored scouts, and tracked infantry carriers.
These vehicles are best marginally suited for scouting on predictable terrain with roads/trails and constabulary work. Adoption of such a vehicle constitutes a serious problem for the military in the near and far future. It is one more signal that the military is being thought of as a "big green policing" instead of combat machine. Warfare and police work might involve threatening people, using guns, and hustling around, but Soldiers are not cops and police work is not Soldier work, unless a Military Policeman.
It is probably wise that the U.S. Army train and equip a Brigade-sized constabulary peacekeeping force comprised of Military Police and some other Soldiers located at Fort Drum, New York and sending the 10th Mountain Division to the mountains of Fort Carson, Colorado, to be a General Shinseki has goofed on several levels. He might have been an excellent commander, and done his duty in wartime with honor, but that does not make him a clear-headed strategist or technotactical planner. The IAV "tests" were weighted in the favor of the favored LAV-III armored car and he then rammed the acceptance of his "pet" project through the "tank destroyer mafia" of Armor branch, which is both interesting and damning. Although it is indicative of a bad trend in an War is a serious business and the U.S. military is based on a WWII culture of desperation blind-obedience; Soldiers in our Army do not think and are not encouraged to think nor bring forward their findings to make leadership make wise decisions. Despite this, after 2 decades of hard work after WWII, egalitarian visionaries like General James Gavin listened to the troops and created the air-transportable, light tracked armored fighting vehicles needed to create a global, go-anywhere, all-purpose combat force in the M113-based Armored Cavalry Regiments used so effectively in Vietnam.
Its self-evident that in Vietnam, the U.S. Army had the world's greatest all-purpose combat force in its 2D ground and 3D Air Cavalry when the 11th ACR and the 1st Air Cav teamed up to fight. However, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the institutional Army without visionary, thinker-doer, 2D/3D maneuver, egalitarian lead-by-example leaders like General Gavin to guide it, threw away the never-equaled combat cavalry capabilities of the 11th ACR and However, fighting a foe like the Soviets---essentially a mirror image of ourselves---is a lot easier in a top-down, After making an American version of the WWII German heavy Tiger II 70-ton defensive tank (M1) , Armor officers without a real branch doctrinal purpose decided they needed " To make matter worse, the Army created the Clearly, the U.S. Army made a mistake with the overweight M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle and should have at the very least continued the Fortunately, today, U.S. Army officers are being led by world events to rediscover the capabilities and The tide of truth and reality is turning against the LAV-III as IAV concoction as smart Soldiers and Paratroopers examine the facts and find the rubber-tired armored car a disaster as a troop carrier:
Paratrooper.net forum
It's OFFICIAL, Lav3stryker is a TURKEY!!
The U.S. Army has had the world's finest air-transportable light tracked armored fighting vehicle for over 4 decades yet has failed to heed the repeated calls of its Soldiers to fully optimize them to have a CHECHNYA 2001-Present
Where - Asia
It's real.
The video clip above shows a BTR type vehicle that is the Russian version of an 8x8 wheeled armored car like the Canadian LAV-III. We don't know if the pictures were taken by a follow-on vehicle in the convoy or by the Chechens that buried the mine and fired the mortar round (fireball in the last several pictures). We think they're frames from a video. At the bottom of this page you'll see links to see the entire video sequence of the wheeled armored car being easily destroyed.
We're trying to get a copy of the videotape, if it exists. The video was available at the Chechen rebel website (kavkaz.org) on the page:
When - don't know
www.kavkaz.org/english/media/video.htm
A source for the entire picture series of this incident can be found at:
www.kavkaz.org/english/news/2001/04/23/undermining.htm
Let's not quibble, a rubber-tired armored car restricted to roads is a deathrap restricted to predictable routes and the pictures taken from the video tell the story. The reason why the Russians are on the outside of the vehicle is because they have learned that when a vehicle hits even lower explosive mines while buttoned-up, sitting inside the vehicle, the G-Force breaks the Soldier's neck. Of course those sent flying are not likely to survive, either.
Click here to start the Chechen ambush of an armored car slides!
AFGHANISTAN 1979-1989
Because the U.S. Army's leaders are so eager to spend money to increase their budget share and brown-nose to liberal politicians with less threatening wheeled peacekeeping vehicles, they have refused to send the SOMALIA 1993
Compare the actual footage through the link above of a Russian BTR
Remember "Blackhawk Down!"???
Burned-out Malaysian Condor wheeled armored car after the Somali firefight
Report of Malaysian Defense Attache' on combat actions in Somalia
See When Pakistani tanks and M113 tracked vehicles led KOREA 1950-Present
This is not a new "revelation". Consider U.S. Army combat experiences in Korea:
Major Robert A. Doughty writes in, "Offensive tactics were also modified and improved in the first part of the war. In the initial fighting, some American units had gotten into serious trouble by charging on the roads up valleys without first securing the high ground on the flanks. This exposed them to ambush or to envelopment or encirclement tactics. After he became commander of the Eighth Army, General Ridgway pushed to get the Americans off the roads and into the surrounding hills. The effect was to broaden the front of American attacks. Closely coordinated armor-infantry teams still operated in the valleys, but they maintained a presence on the hills to the left or right".
Yet these lessons were continually ignored by the lazy, wheel-bound Americans: "In regard to the incident on October 18, 1969, as mentioned in "The Second Korean Conflict," the four 7th Infantry Division Soldiers killed were in a 3/4-ton utility vehicle, not a jeep. They were members of "C" Company, 1/32nd Infantry ("Queens Own"). I was a Staff Sergeant serving with the Battalion Headquarters Company Reconnaissance Platoon in the 1/32 at the time. C/1/32 was providing garrison personnel for Guard Post Turner, the westernmost of two such guard posts in that sector inside the DMZ. There were usually 18 men in each guard post. Just after dawn on the 18th, a pair of gun jeeps from the 1/32nd Headquarters Company Reconnaissance platoon escorted all but one of the vehicles, a 5/4-ton truck, back and advised that they would return at 1030 hours to pick up the last vehicle, what was involved in mess maintenance. At about 0830, the truck left the guard post unescorted. The driver and a Staff Sergeant in the cab were armed with .45 ACPs and the two Soldiers in the back had M14s. Evidence found afterward (footprints and cigarette butts) indicated that the ambushers had set up there before dawn and may have been watching the gun jeeps, and escorted vehicles come and go for some days. Without the gun jeeps to contend with, they fired more than 100 .32-caliber PPSh submachine-gun rounds into the vehicle from 15 to 20 feet and at least two grenades, one on which landed in the bed of the truck. All four Soldiers seem to have died in the first assault. All four tires were flat, the windshield and driver's side window had been shot out and the engine holed. Charlie Company personnel radioed an alarm and stayed in the guard post until Recon gun jeeps arrived and secured the area. A patrol in the area north of Turner tried unsuccessfully to intercept the ambushers."
Michael John Ruffley VIETNAM 1946-1975
Carbondale, IL
A computer screen will NOT excuse away a non-mobile, non-survivable platform. The LAV-III/IAV is no more mobile or protected than an armored HMMWV. Its "Blackhawk Down!" or Groupement' Mobile 100 (Vietnam) 1954 ALL OVER AGAIN!
Burned-out-to-the-rims truck after the Tet offensive, tracked M113s saved the day despite intense enemy fire
Death on the Highway: The Destruction of Groupement Mobile 100
by Captain Kirk A. Luedeke in the January-February issue of U.S. Army ARMOR magazine is a good account except for its politically correct cowardice to not point out the obvious fact that GM 100 was destroyed because its rubber-tired wheeled vehicles made it road-restricted and vulnerable.
The tragedy of The irony is that just about a decade later the Americans would be fighting to keep Vietnam from being split in two and to keep Highway 19 open. While the America 1st Air Cavalry's spoiling The limited off road mobility of wheels is a huge weakness. Groupment Mobile 100 in Indochina (1954) and X Corps' Chosin Reservoir withdrawl (1950) had to use the roads because they were wheeled and couldn't get off road or up hills to hold the high ground as troops withdrew. The ChiComs were able to run the ridgelines in Korea and the Viet Minh used the jungle trails to get to the ambush sites on Route 19 east of Pleiku.
If you are tied to wheeled vehicles, every time the road is blocked, you lose time and momentum. And a foot infantry force that knows where you HAVE to go will place ambushes at every opportunity, until they can dig in a force big enough to hold up the main wheeled column and decisively engage it. Today, they will get as close as possible to deny the use of air power and use everyting to force the air assets too high to be effective. You better have a Stopping a wheeled force is a matter of terrain analysis and small groups of Wheels are fine for log efforts, except if the unit is too far off-road for wheels to travel. You need trailers that can be linked into trains, with band tracks placed over the wheels, and pulled by a M113 to resupply a unit deep off-road. We probably need several big light tracks with a large diesel engine to pull a battalion TF's combat trains anywhere the tracks go to avoid the fate of the Germans with wheeled log in the mud in Russia in WWII, and the French in Vietnam I.
GRENADA 1983
"The two Viet Minh regiments in the central plateau area," noted [Bernard] Fall, "had now worked out their tactics in fine detail: unhampered by heavy equipment, unburdened by such matters as keeping open several hundred kilometers of road, they were able to move faster than any motorized force opposing them which by necessity had to operate from the peripheral roads."
Within a week, the center of action shifted north again to the area of An Khe where the Viet Minh had cut Highway 18 in the east. An Khe was held by Group Mobile 11, composed of lowland Vietnamese. Once again the Group Mobile 100 took to the roads, traveling 140 kilometers to the fortified camp at Pk 22 (i.e., Pleiku 22, the kilometer marking at the point 22 kilometers from An Khe traveling toward Pleiku) at the eastern entrance of the Mang Yang Pass. Their task was to keep Highway 19 open to An Khe.
On Apr. 1 elements of the G.M. 100 were employed to open the road from Pk 22 to Pk 11 while units of the G.M. 11 provided security from there to An Khe for a gasoline convoy. After the convoy completed its mission, the security units began withdrawing from Pk 11 leapfrogging one another toward Pk 22.
At 3:30 p.m. as the units of G.M. 100 passed Pk 15 they were ambushed by two battalions of the 108th Regiment. The French counterattacked and managed to gain enough time to clear the road of wrecked vehicles, load up their dead and wounded and pull back to the camp at Pk 22. The ambush cost the G.M. 90 dead while the Viet Minh lost 81. The GM was now 25% understrength.
Despite its weakness in the face of growing enemy strength, the G.M. 100 was sent back to An Khe to relieve the G.M. 11. There it began digging in to prepare for the expected Communist onslaught.
On May 8, 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell and a few days later the men of the G.M. heard the following broadcast from Viet Minh loudspeakers:
"Soldiers of Mobile Group 100, your friends at Dien Bien Phu have not been able to resist the victorious onslaught of the Vietnamese People's Army. You are much weaker than Dien Bien Phu. You will die, Frenchmen, and so will your Vietnamese running dogs."
It became obvious that the G.M. without reinforcements could not hold An Khe, and the order was given for its return to Pleiku. On June 23 intelligence reported a Viet Minh force moving toward Highway 19 in the west. The G.M. 100 began its evacuation on June 24 with Pk 22 as the objective of the first day's march.
The evacuation began at 3 a.m. with the 43rd Colonials in the lead. The troops were dismounted providing a screen for the vehicles. [Notice the BS excuse offered by the IBCT apologists that they will use a TTP like "dismounting early" to prevent road amushes will not save fatally immobile and vulnerable road-restricted armored cars]
At Pk 6, the rearguard received sniper fire and at Pk 8 a soldier suddenly keeled over dead, hit with a poison dart from a montagnard blow gun.
Rocks on the Road
Shortly after 12:30 p.m., a report was received from jungle commandos screening the advance that Viet Minh elements were three kilometers north of the highway.
Around 2 p.m. the 43rd Colonials reached Pk l5 where a small plain covered with elephant grass borders the road. They found rocks on the road, a sign of an ambush, and sent out a company to reconnoiter through the elephant grass.
"The Viets were here," wrote Fall. "The big, the final ambush to engulf all of G.M. 100 was ready to be sprung. Vietnam's 803rd People's Army Regiment had kept its promise. The main striking force was already in place, its weapons poised, while the French were strung out along a road where their heavier firepower could hardly come into play."
The reconnaissance company triggered the ambush and the Viet Minh opened up with devastating mortar and artillery fire [think what this would do to a "new", sexy, $2,000,000 Canadian-made LAV-III/IAV = "Canadian Bacon"]. Within a few minutes the lead armor was destroyed and the mobile command post knocked out.
Soon the French ammo trucks began to explode under the Viet Minh mortar barrage. At the same time, the Korea Regiment arrived, pushed through the wrecked vehicles and linked up with the 43rd which managed to get a few of its vehicles running and break out. But the Viet Minh quickly closed the ring. The Korea Regiment formed a defensive perimeter and dug in. The B-26 bombers arrived from Nha Trang to strafe and drop napalm but the fighting was at close quarters now and they were ineffective [So much for a LAV-III/IAV computer screen's "situational awareness" calling in an air strike to save you--we still live in a PHYSICAL WORLD where you cannot just "mouse-click" reality to conform to your fanciful plans].
The remnants of G.M. 100 were ordered to break out to Pk 22. When it became dark the break out began into the dense jungle south of the road. There the G.M. broke up into [dismounted, on foot, no wheeled vehicles] small units for faster movement and began its arduous trek. During the night the G.M. suffered hundreds of casualties to Viet Minh ambushes and the next day the struggle continued.
On the morning of June 25 after 40 hours of almost continuous fighting, the survivors reached the camp at Pk 22 held by the
1st Airborne Group. After the stragglers were collected, the French pulled back to a Mang Yang Pass garrison held by the Montagnard Mobile Group 42.
The battle was not yet over for now the retreat began again from the Mang Yang Pass to Pleiku. By June 28 the French were only 30 kilometers from Pleiku and had entered an area of plains with tilled fields and villages bordering the road when signs of an ambush began to appear. It was now the 108th Regiment's turn.
This time the French were prepared to react when the first shots were fired. They quickly formed a defensive perimeter with their artillery and vehicles in the center. At 12:15 p.m. the Viet Minh infantry attacked the sector held by the Korea Regiment, broke through and pressed on toward the artillery now firing at point-blank range.
The Korea Regiment managed to counterattack, however, and with yells of "Coree" hit the Viet Minh in the flank. They were aided by the arrival of the B-26s which, for once, had the Viet Minh in the open. The Viet Minh were forced to withdraw. On June 29 the convoy reached Pleiku.
Group Mobile 100 was finished. Less than half of its more than 3,000 men made it from An Khe to Pleiku. Virtually all its vehicles and equipment were destroyed or captured. In five days of fighting the Korea Regiment had suffered more casualties than in two years of fighting in Korea.
On July 20 the armistice was signed at Geneva ending the First Indochina War. On Sept. 1, 1954, the Group Mobile 100 was officially dissolved by the French High Command.
During the U.S. IRAQ (DESERT STORM) 1990-1991
From a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel:
"FYI, according to ODS expert Thomas Houlahan, there were only two coalition attacks that failed during [Operation Desert Storm] ODS. One on Kafji, one on Kuwait International Airport.
In both cases, failure resulted from the loss of wheeled vehicles with flat tires. See pages 79 and 178 of " So much for the desirability of wheeled vehicles in desert combat!
Can someone please give General Shineski a copy of FM 71-100-2.......please!
The U.S. Army's own manual "Sand
The best time to drive on sand is at night or early morning when the sand is damp and traction is better. By reducing tire pressure, vehicles may gain some traction. However, prolonged driving on partially deflated tires will overheat the tires and break down the sidewalls.
Sandy deserts may be broken up by windblown dunes. Crossing dunes requires careful reconnaissance. Units should stay on the upwind side if possible. The wind may have built up sand around small scrubs forming small hills. Wheeled vehicles should not attempt to move through areas where this has occurred"
EAST TIMOR 1999-Present
The Australian Army reports that their wheeled 8x8 LAVs failed miserably in terms of mobility during recent combat operations in East Timor, an American exchange officer reports:
Brazilian Caravel 4x4 armored car knocked out by 120mm APDS at Al Bussayyah, Iraq, 28 Feb 91. Notice all 4 tires are flat, creating an immobile target easily finished off.
"Just returned from Australia. While there, the Australian officers to include their senior leadership outlined the problems they encountered with the LAVs in East Timor. Apparently, the LAVs were never able to operate off the roads and when the rains washed out the asphalt road surfaces, the LAVs bellied out and the Australians became entirely dependent on the M113s for operations in the interior. They have decided that the LAVs are useful on roads inside Australia where the requirement to cross the northern deserts quickly make them useful. However, for deployments, they are inclined to restrict the use of LAVs to urban areas where the roads are good and rely otherwise exclusively on the new upgraded M113s that they are purchasing. Apparently, the ground pressure exerted by the LAVs is very high indeed and this was a problem on East Timor's poor roads as well. Plus the LAVs provide little or no protection against mines. Australian Generals like MG Abigail and Brigadier Quinn along with a host of Australian Majors and Lieutenant Colonels left me with the impression that the LAVs could be useful in the context of home defense, but should not be the first consideration for use in the deployable formations of the active army. Not sure this is really news, but in view of the language in the QDR that urges accleration of the U.S. Army's 3400 man LAV-equipped motorized infantry brigades called IBCTs, the side-by-side testing with tracked vehicles is more critical than ever."
This is why the Australians are smart and are upgrading their M113s while the U.S. Army's current senior leaders lust for inferior wheeled armored car platforms to create their centralized, top-down bureaucratic transformation concoction without evidence or wisdom backing it up but with sexy "high-tech" looking micro-managing digital electronics inside.
A PBS Frontline interview with Pentagon Analyst Franklin C. Spinney goes into detail why the Army's transformation scheme is top-down without any evidence or facts backing it and is afraid of any sort of real, physical comparison TESTING or experimentation. The page has been removed by the liberals at PBS who want to see our military damaged, and can only be accessed by Google Cache:
Spinney speaks about Army Transformation before being censored by PBS
Spinney is right on except for the fact that we have 8 decades of evidence proving wheeled vehicles are unsuitable for ground combat, and the Army's current leaders have made it very clear how they want to use IBCTs and the "objective force" BCTs---that they prescribe to the Tofflerian/RMA "bombard & occupy" firepower hubris without 2D ground maneuver much less 3D air/ground maneuver. The Army's convenient shelving of the Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR) to pay for the Future Combat System (FCS), 20-ton one-size-platform fits all situations proves they have no desire to do 3D maneuver. They want risk-averse operations, executed by blind obedience robots Soldiers, and whenever possible by air and ground robots in their place. Begging for The NEW ZEALAND 1999-Present
New Zealand Soldier dies in East Timor...and the immobile LAV-III would not have been there to help
www.act.org.nz/item.jsp?id=21130
Burton goes for a Burton Over LAV-III Deployment ACT MP Rodney Hide today accused Defence Minister Mark Burton of misleading Parliament with his response to the usefulness of the army's proposed new LAV-III vehicles in East Timor.
"I asked the Minister a written question about how the to be purchased LAVIIIs would have been used to support the troops involved in the East Timor fire-fight in which the New Zealand private was killed last year, given the terrain in which the fire-fight occurred.
"In his detailed response, the Minister said that in the East Timor terrain where the Private Manning was killed, the proposed new LAV-III "would not have been far behind the patrol conducting the tracking", "would always have been on immediate notice to come forward", that "when the foot patrol came into contact with militia personnel, the LAV would have immediately been activated" and that "The noise of the vehicle moving to the site might have caused the opposing group to withdraw".
"That answer also said that the day after the fire-fight, New Zealand personnel using the current armoured carriers were able to move within 30 metres of where the patrol had been contacted.
"The Minister tabled this answer to me in Parliament on July 18.
I have now learned through an Official Information request to the Chief of Defence Carey Adamson that the Minister based his answer on a the draft response prepared by the Army but not signed off by the Chief of Defence. This answer was forwarded to the Minister's office on the on July 10 but withdrawn on 11 July and the Minister's office was informed that the answer was wrong.
"The subsequent answer signed off by the Chief of Defence flatly contradicted the first draft response, and said that "Because of the rugged nature of the terrain in the immediate area where the fire-fight occurred, it would not have been practicable for the LAV-IIIs to have been used. There was no realistic alternative to moving on foot."
"Yet, five days later the Minister tabled an answer based on the fanciful first response - after he had received a completely different answer from the Chief of Defence.
"The Minister has a great deal of explaining to do. It's no wonder he didn't turn up in the House today to take my question.
"He needs to explain why he didn't give a correct answer when the Chief of Defence had advised him that it was wrong. And he needs to explain why he is buying 105 LAV-IIIs that couldn't support our troops when they are needed when the 'old', 'clapped out' M113 could," Rodney Hide said.
Media Release Serious doubt over adequacy of LAVs
There are serious question marks over the New Zealand Army's proposal to purchase 105 LAV armoured personnel carriers for $658 million, National's Defence spokesperson Max Bradford said today.
"Minister of Defence Mark Burton has been doctoring answers to questions from Members of Parliament to fit the Government's decision to buy the LAV III vehicles.
"We now have clear evidence of Mark Burton changing answers approved by the Government's chief military advisor, the Chief of Defence Force, Air Marshal Carey Adamson.
"Air Marshal Adamson advised the Minster in a draft answer that the LAV IIIs would not have been practicable in the rugged East Timor terrain where Private Manning was killed.
"The Minister of Defence refused to accept a draft answer which made it clear that it would not have been practicable for the LAV IIIs to be used in the incident involving Private Manning. This makes it clear the LAV IIIs are not suitable for use in many parts of East Timor where they would be needed.
Rodney Hide
Thursday 16 Aug 2001
Press Releases - Governance & Constitution
Max Bradford
National Defence Spokesperson
16 August 2001
www.national.org.nz/press/August%202001/bradford16-08-01.htm
"On the other hand it showed that the existing M113 armoured personnel carriers were suitable and where able to move within 30m of the place where Private Manning's patrol was fired upon.
"East Timor is typical of the terrain where we are likely to deploy peacekeeping forces - forces which need APCs which can be used in the terrain.
"This confirms my view that successive Ministers have received poor advice from the army and that there should be a full inquiry into the adequacy of the LAV III before New Zealand makes an irrevocable goof of major proportions in defence," Mr Bradford said.
NEW ZEALAND: Army caught in political imbroglio Bernard Moran reports from Auckland on a scandal that has engulfed the NZ Army.
New Zealand Labour's Minister of Defence, Mark Burton, has finally conceded that a Parliamentary enquiry will be held into claims that the Army organised a covert political strategy to increase its share of defence funding and lobbied to end the Royal NZ Air Force's combat arm, the A4 Skyhawks.
In Parliament on August 30, Opposition Leader and former Prime Minister Jenny Shipley stated: "We believe there is mounting evidence that covert and seditious behaviour was going on within the Army from early 1997, through to the end of 1999 and possibly beyond then."
Earlier that week the Nationals released a nine-page letter, written in March 1997, by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Gordon (then with the NZ Defence Staff in London) to the Deputy Chief of General Staff in Wellington. The letter outlines a detailed strategy to insert selected army officers into key positions where they could subtly influence senior politicians.
The National Party defence spokesman, Max Bradford, claimed the Gordon letter spoke of "destroying" any organisation or individual who took a different view from the Army's.
All this came in the same month that the Auditor-General, David Macdonald, released a scathing report on how Defence staff bungled the Army's largest re-equipment project since 1945: the purchasing of 105 General Motors armoured personnel carriers, the LAV-III. The project has ballooned from an initial allocation of NZ $212 million to $677 million, and is still climbing to almost $7 million a vehicle.
He condemned the bitter power struggle between the Army's Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General Maurice Dodson, and the Chief of Defence Force, Air Marshal Carey Adamson. The working atmosphere and practice at Defence Headquarters were described as "dysfunctional".
Meanwhile, Dr David Dickens, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University in Wellington, and a critic of recent defence policy decisions, suddenly found his Government funding withdrawn. Prime Minister Helen Clark denied any responsibility.
So what is going on? The root cause is the lack of money spent on defence by two successive governments, Labour from 1984 to 1990 and the incoming Nationals under Jim Bolger (Prime Minister 1990-97). The UN deployment to Bosnia involved working with British forces, and brought home to the Kiwis the woeful state of their equipment.
The 1997 Defence Assessment White Paper envisaged the Army rapidly deploying lightly equipped forces: "but it must have sufficient firepower, mobility and protection to cope with the type of warfare that could occur within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the changing spectrum of peace support operations."
The Army considered that future forces would be engaged in "manoeuvre warfare" (alongside more heavily equipped allies) and that fast, agile light armoured vehicles would be required not only to carry the infantry, but to provide effective firepower in support. This led to an internal debate on "wheels versus tracks".
Wheeled vehicles might be more suitable for operating in Australia, or in a repeat of the Gulf War, but the other view was that "manoeuvre warfare" was unlikely in the jungles of the South West Pacific and Asia. However, the "wheels versus tracks" review completed in September 1998 recommended "wheels".
Which brings us to the March 1997 letter of Lieutenant-General Ian Gordon. With hindsight it is clear that the Army was deeply concerned that they would get the crumbs after the Air Force and the Navy had been fed. In the opening paragraph of his letter, Gordon wrote:
"Funding allocated by NZ Defence Force [representing the three services - Ed] has been to Navy and Air at the expense of Army. Army appears to lack influence in the centre (NZDF) and a different approach is required to regain this influence. It is contended that to gain the requisite influence, Army must now open a 'second front' in its war with the centre."
Army had to identify and control the pathways to the making of defence policy and then "gain the requisite degree of control over the policy-making process; co-ordinated at the highest level to ensure each campaign advances the strategic purpose".
East Timor was a godsend for the Army, enabling it to cultivate deep links with the incoming Labour Government and provide behind-the-scenes support for cancelling the American F-16 Lease-Buy deal. A peacekeeping Army is more acceptable to Labour's coalition partners, the Greens and the Alliance Party. [Clintonista types that think armed forces for war are not needed]
by Bernard Moran
Printed in Issue: 22 September 2001
www.newsweekly.com.au/articles/2001sep22_nzarmy.html