Seaplane: any aircraft that can operate at sea

One of the reasons why naval warfare like land and air warfare is so screwed up is because those involved do not properly see the FUNCTIONS of their equipment and try to label them according to just their composition. This narrow-minded view fails to appreciate in actuality, seaplanes are more than just planes that can land on the water by boat hull fuselages, floats or skis, but also aircraft that are salt-water hardened and can take-off and land from the deck of ships and submarines via tail-hook or vertical hovering/landing.

The bottom line here is TO GET AIRCRAFT TO SEA any way we can so the 3rd dimension of battlespace above the water can be leveraged. In this web page we will focus in on SMALL seaplanes operating from ships but refer to LARGE seaplanes that can operate from land bases or pit-stop from ships on the web pages below:

The mythology of WW2 holds that the U.S. Navy was at its best; close examination reveals that the service that let its ass get kicked at Pearl Harbor with its snobby mentality was just a white uniformed version of the "From Here to Eternity" mentality of the Army at nearby Schofield barracks. The only movie that even hints at how screwed up the snobby U.S. Navy was, is Otto Preminger's "In Harm's Way" made in 1965. The little things that saved the U.S. Navy in the early days of WW2; the PBY Catalina seaplane, the Gato patrol class submarine, PT boats, blimps and seaplanes were quickly discarded after the war in a frenzy to exalt the aircraft carrier worship mythology.

Take a peek at U.S. Naval Aviation News from 1945:

www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1945/15jan45.pdf

Not only are they doing COMBAT RESCUE of Sailors in the water from long-range ASW blimps, they were making important, tangible, physical capability improvements resulting in them able to do things we CANNOT DO TODAY. Naval Aviation News is online and is a treasure trove of "reality 101". Compare 1944's CONTENT (Each January issue has the INDEX for the year before's articles) to 2004's CONTENT:

www.history.navy.mil/nan/currentissue/currentnd04.htm

You are going to notice today's CONTENT is a bunch of fascist lemming PR crap which is very weak in comparison to the 1944 magazine's IN DEPTH and DETAILED professional technotactical information.

We are getting weaker not stronger when we can't even fukin tell the truth candidly in our own professional magazines.

Submarines were only saved by the lifelong crusade of Admiral Rickover and a helpful common-sense Congress. The big things that made the USN successful, her 25 x heavily armored battleships whose mighty guns cleared the way for beach landing of Army/marine troops and the almost 100 escort carriers made from cargo ships that swept the seas clean of enemy surface ships and aircraft were scrapped or turned into museums DESPITE THE FACT THAT WW2 MYTHOLOGY IS INCORRECT: ONLY 2 AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS WERE LOST IN ALL OF WW2; the USS Arizona and USS Oaklahoma both OLD 1916 World War 1 battleships at that, and only because they were caught stationary at Pearl Harbor. Once moving NO AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS or heavy Balitimore or Alaska class cruisers were ever sunk by ANYTHING, and no foreign nation battleships were ever sunk if they were moving and had effective air cover SPOILING the aim of the attacking aircraft dropping bombs/torpedoes or guided munitions. "Sea Control" was a tangible goal and not a DoD buzzword at the time thanks to the enemy's pressure that made us do the right things. Once WW2 was underway and the Washington treaty 10, 000 ton cruiser limits were invalidated, the Navy got its act together under fire with the Baltimore class and after the war continued with the even better armored Des Moines heavy cruiser class. Each battleship carried 2-4 seaplanes to provide their own air cover like cruisers did. The seaplanes were shot off short catapults, an idea that an enlistedman came up with in 1912. His idea was for a catapult on top of battleship/cruiser gun turrets to save space but get seaplanes into the air!

www.history. navy.mil/ download/ car-1.pdf

"New York Navy Yard worker to design a light movable platform for installation above the turrets in battleships for the purpose of launching aircraft at sea. Some Navy officials were enthusiastic, but Chambers was not quite so ready for this innovation. 'Recognizing the practicability of Quarterman Joiner [E. C.] Keithley's idea," he wrote, he could not contemplate'..."

As you can see it was an uphill battle against snobby officers before catapult launched seaplanes were on every USN battleship and cruiser. It would be the British Royal Navy (RN) that would use seaplanes first into combat successfully in WW1. The RN also created the flat deck aircraft carrier during that time period to operate land airplanes with heavier wheeled landing gear and tail hooks to keep planes out of the water. Despite these defacto floating airfields delivering high explosives from longer ranges than gun-equipped battleships/cruisers, there is no guarantee that will will actually direct hit anything. The act of direct hitting a moving, armored target from moving aircraft using unguided bombs and torpedoes could be easily SPOILED if even a few friendly fighter aircraft intercepts them. Both the bomb and the torpedo require a direct line-of-sight all-the-way to the target to hit.

DIVE-BOMBING

TORPEDO-DROPPING

The Pearl Harbor mythology fails to recognize these facts that the battleships there were not moving and were actually easy targets not much different than General Billy Mitchell's tests in the 1920s.

Regardless, every battleship damaged in the shallow Pearl Harbor except for two were salvaged and put back into combat just as tanks in land warfare can be more often than not repaired after being knocked out (mobility kill). There is a huge difference between a mobility kill and a total kill (TK). Only the Arizona was TKed; the Oaklahoma capsized and was refloated; after this she was towed back to California to be scrapped when she broke her line and sank. With 23 other battleships, if we really needed her we could have placed her back into service. Take a look at the Des Moines class heavy cruiser armor protection:

WW2 Heavy Cruiser Much More Well-Armored than Flimsy Ships of Today

However, the Pearl Harbor-battleships-are-obsolete mythology played right into the hands of the aircraft carrier-as-the-only-capital-ship-we-can-have-in-the U.S. Navy crowd that ruins the sea service today. Battleships and cruisers are a threat to the weak ego aircraft carrier milicrats and they fight even as we speak to keep these heavily armored ships--the only ships we have that can sail into "Harm's Way" fast and smash an enemy invasion fleet in a guided missile age and survive with anything less than a perfect anti-missile-missile defense. While a couple heavily armored cruisers were converted into missile cruisers, the post-1960 Navy got cheap and lazy resulting in today's flimsy under 10, 000 ton Ticonderoga light cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers---if 10, 000 ton cruisers suffered too many losses in WW2, why in the world would we think they'd be ok today?

The "Hybrid" that works: Surface Ships + Seaplanes

Seaplanes performed the following critical missions:

* FIND THE ENEMY FLEET (RECON)

* SPOT FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE SO IT HITS THE ENEMY FLEET AND SHORE TARGETS (NVGFS)

* PATROLS FOR ENEMY SUBMARINES (ASW)

* SEARCHES AND RESCUES MEN IN WATER/LAND (CSAR)

* WARNS OF AIR ATTACKS AND SHOOTS DOWN ENEMY PLANES (AAW)

The last mission, AAW became possible with the advent of the SC-1 SeaHawk which was a seaplane fighter-bomber. Early SOC SeaGull biplanes were replaced by Kingfisher monoplanes then the failed SeaMew and finally the fabulous SC-1 SeaHawk which was actually a seaplane fighter able to do the AAW mission!

SOC SEAGULLS

KINGFISHERS

SEAHAWKS

On Cruisers...

Notice the rear hanger under the fantail to store SeaHawks and do maintenance in the late model Baltimore class heavy cruisers...

Size comparison of the destroyer to an Iowa class battleship to a heavy cruiser...

On Battleships...

Even when we mass-produced "jeep carriers" (CVEs) from merchant ship hulls, we did not have enough carriers to escort every surface ship grouping so cruisers and battleships---and even destroyers carried their own "air cover" to do reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare and even anti-war warfare when the excellent Curtiss SC-1/SC-2 SeaHawk fighter floatplane arrived.

The U.S. Navy from 1939-1945 operated:

25 x battleships with 2-4 seaplanes each (50-100)
37 x Heavy Cruisers with 2-4 seaplanes each (74-144)
59 x Light Cruisers with 2-3 seaplanes (108-177)
76 x Seaplane Tenders (keep up to PBY Catalina or PBM Mariner large patrol seaplanes on patrol)
3 x Destroyers with 1 seaplane (3)

_________________________________________

FACT: 99 cruiser/destroyers could put into the air a powerful force of 232-421 small seaplanes and 76-228 large seaplanes without need of aircraft carriers!

FACT: Out of 96 cruisers only 10 were sunk in the entire war! Compare this fact that they were ARMORED and had their own portable air cover to the destroyers (cans) that did not and their horrendous loss rates. We lost 82 unarmored destroyers in WW2.

FACT: 9 out of 10 of the U.S. cruisers that were sunk were attacked by torpedoes and/or large caliber gunfire (lots of HE); only 1 was lost to air attack---and that was an air-launched torpedo. Being armored works against unguided HE bombs.

FACT: ALL of the USN's battleships survived the war except two old, unlucky ones from the Pearl Harbor attack. Once our battleships were moving with air cover, they were unsinkable.

FACT: the U.S. Navy LOST 11 x AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN WW2; these were totally destroyed/sunk; there was no salvage back to duty. 11-2, battleships win when it comes to surviving High Explosive (HE) attack combat damage. Yet, after WW2, with the large aircraft carrier "mafia" running the taxpayer-funded historical propaganda machines we have a public who thinks the war was won by the aircraft carriers (Midway) and all the ships getting sunk were our battleships at Pearl Harbor...and only 1 at that all the rest were repaired and put back into combat! Is it a surprise we have no heavily armored ships on active duty in the USN today?

FACT: seaplanes from cruisers/battleships rendered effective observation of their gunfire enabling hits on both land and sea targets

FACT: many downed aircraft carrier airmen and sailors of sunk ships were rescued by seaplanes from cruisers/battleships

U.S./Allied Battleship/Cruiser Small Seaplane Exploits

NOTE: the years 1900-1930 are suppressed history by the large aircraft carrier U.S. Navy for two reasons. You may wonder WHY you don't hear much about what it did in WW1 from the normally boastful U.S. Navy?

1. Maverick ship gunnery genius LT Sims was made into an Admiral and placed in charge of the Navy over the establishment assholes by no-non-sense, get-the-job-done President Teddy Roosevelt and the successors to these assholes still resent a smart winner being placed on top according to merit instead of the brown nosing ego-ocracy they perpetuate to this very day.

2. SEAPLANES kicked ass in the Atlantic and helped ward off German U-Boats and these were operated by ships other than large, bloated, expensive soak-the-taxpayers-dry "supercarriers" and the Navy/marine ego clubs don't want John Q. Public to know there are other, better ways for getting aircraft to operate at sea.

1911

U.S. Navy LT Eugene Ely lands and takes-off from the battleship USS Pennsylvania; the first naval aviator

1912

U.S. Navy Quarterman Joiner [E. C.] Keithley creates idea of catapult-launched seaplanes from battleships/cruisers

1914

First COMBAT actions of U.S. Naval Aviation done by SEAPLANES over Vera cruz, Mexico in 1914, NOT BY AIRCRAFT CARRIER AIRCRAFT.

British Royal Navy SEAPLANES torpedo and sink the first ships in history to be destroyed from air attack (ASuW). They later on in the war sink German U-Boats (ASW-submarines) and do successful land air attacks (LA).

1918-1939

By WW1's end the RN had created the first dry aircraft carrier, but between the wars lag in developing a seaplane fighter for battleship/cruiser self-defense and become overly dependant on their few aircraft carriers for air cover (AAW) and ASW. The British did employ the first submarine-launched seaplane observation/attack aircraft in the 1920s but did not continue with this desirable scouting capability as the French and Japanese did with their submarines.

1937

Once WW2 began, heavy supply ship losses to German U-Boats forces the RN to re-learn WW1 lessons of moving supply ships by ASW destroyer and long-range maritime patrol aircraft guarded convoys and desperately place "Hurricat" fighters that cannot land on water to be recovered on merchant ships to ward off FW-200 Condor patrol/reconnaissance bombers. The Americans provide blimps and mass-produce small escort aircraft carriers to get AAW/ASW protection for convoys to get through German Condors and U-boats.

Why did we buy the 175 mph, 2 x 7.62mm medium machine gun, 900 mile range Kingfisher in 1937 and not the 1400 mile range. faster, better armed N-3PB? Open-sea landing single floats were possible. Wings could have been made to fold. Why were N-3PBs not supplied to British CAM ships to ward off Fw-200 patrol bombers since they could land and be reused unlike Hurricats that ditched? Or was this yet another case of the aircraft carrier "mafia" trying to sabotage the seaplane community and keep it in its "place"?

1940

7 November 40.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-2UAXblTUE

www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTHdb5DEM3g

The Supermarine Walrus was a single-engine amphibious biplane reconnaissance aircraft designed by R. J. Mitchell and operated by the Fleet Air Arm. It also served with the Royal Air Force, RAAF, RNZN, RCAF, and RNZAF.

The Walrus was initially developed for service from cruisers at the request of Australia, and was called the Seagull V; although there was little resemblance to the earlier Supermarine Seagull III. It was designed to be launched from ship-borne catapults, and was the first amphibious aircraft in the world to be launched by catapult with a full military load.

The lower wings of this biplane were set in the shoulder position with a stabilising float mounted under each one, and its horizontal tail-surfaces were positioned high on the tail-fin. The single Bristol Pegasus VI radial engine was housed in a nacelle slung from the upper wing and powered a four-blade propeller in pusher configuration. The wings could be folded on ship, giving a stowage width of 17 ft 11 in (5.5 m). One of the more unusual characteristics of the aircraft was that the control column was not a fixed fitting in the usual way, but could be unplugged from either of two sockets at floor level. It became a habit for only one column to be in use; and when control was passed from the pilot to co-pilot or vice-versa, the control column would simply be unplugged and handed over.

As the Walrus was stressed to a level suitable for catapult-launching, rather surprisingly for such an ungainly-looking machine, it could be looped and bunted, whereupon any water in the bilges would make its presence felt. This usually discouraged the pilot from any future aerobatics on this type.

Armament usually consisted of two Vickers K machine guns, with the capability of carrying 760 lb (345 kg) of bombs or depth charges mounted beneath the lower wings.

The Royal Australian Air Force ordered 24 examples directly off the drawing boards, under the Seagull V "A2" designation, which were delivered for service from cruisers from 1935; followed by orders from the Royal Air Force with the first production Walrus, K5772, flying on 16 March, 1936. It was also hoped to capitalise on the aircraft's successful exports to Japan, Spain, etc.

A total of 740 Walrus were built in three major variants: the metal-hulled Seagull V and Walrus I, and the wooden-hulled Walrus II. The Walrus was affectionately known as the "Shagbat" or sometimes "Steam-pigeon"; the latter name coming from the steam produced by water striking the hot Pegasus engine.

The first Seagull V, A2-1, was handed over to the Royal Australian Air Force in 1935, with the last, A2-24 delivered in 1937 and served aboard the HMA Ships Australia (MTO [Mediterranian Theatre of Operations]), Canberra (MTO, SWPA, lost at Guadalcanal in 1942), Sydney (MTO, SWPA, lost off the coast of Western Australia 1942), Perth and Hobart.

Walrus deliveries started in 1936 when the first example to be deployed was with the New Zealand division of the Royal Navy, on HMS Achilles (later a victor of the Battle of the River Plate). By the start of World War II the Walrus was in widespread use, and saw service in home waters, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Walrus are credited with sinking or damaging at least five enemy submarines, while RAF use in home waters was mainly in the air-sea rescue role. One Walrus, HD874, (Restored and exhibited at the RAAF Museum, Point Cook, Victoria) was still in service in 1947 with the Australian Antarctic Expedition.

The Irish Air Corps used the Walrus as a maritime patrol aircraft during World War II. One of the Walrus aircraft formerly flown by the Air Corps is preserved, albeit in Royal Navy colours. The aircraft was bought back by the Fleet Air Arm after the war as a training aircraft, and now resides in the RNAS museum in Yeovilton.

General characteristics

Crew: 3-4
Length: 33 ft 7 in (10.2 m)
Wingspan: 45 ft 10 in (14.0 m)
Height: 15 ft 3 in (4.6 m)
Wing area: 610 ft² (56.7 m²)
Empty weight: 4,900 lb (2,220 kg)
Loaded weight: 7,200 lb (3,265 kg)
Powerplant: 1× Bristol Pegasus VI radial engine, 680 hp (510 kW)

Performance

Maximum speed: 135 mph (215 km/h) at 4,750 ft (1,450 m)
Range: 600 mi (965 km)
Service ceiling 18,500 ft (5,650 m)
Rate of climb: 1,050 ft/min (5.3 m/s)
Wing loading: 11.8 lb/ft² (57.6 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.094 hp/lb (0.16 kW/kg)

Armament

2 x Vickers K .303 medium machine guns
760 lb (345 kg) of bombs and depth charges

There were at least 5 confirmed enemy submarines sunk or damaged by Royal Navy Battleship/Cruiser operated Supermarine Walruses during WWII, including the Vichy French submarine Poncelet which was bombed by Walrus L2268 of 700 squadron (HMS Devonshire) and attacked by HMS Milford off the Cameroons. They were fitted with ASV radar for ASW and ASuW duties on top of CSAR and gunnery spotting.

1941

8 May 41. Only one day after Krüder got his last victim, the German merchant ship cruiser the Pinguin was sighted by HMS Cromwell's seaplane. The British cruiser gave chase. Pinguin hoisted her battle flag and opened fire when Cromwell was 10,500 yards away, despite having 130 mines on board. The cruiser took some hits from the raider, but at 1726 a four-gun salvo from Cromwell found its mark. One shell detonated in Pinguin's mine compartment, resulting in a terrible explosion that ripped her into pieces. Only 25 of the 225 Allied prisoners were rescued, while 60 Germans survived and 342 others perished, including captain Krüder. Adjutant's captain Hemmer and his crew waited at the planned meeting point with Pinguin and when the bad news broke, said goodbye to their fallen comrades with three hurrahs and the record "Goodbye, Johnny".

1942

www.janeresture.com/rickenbacker/index.htm

13 November 42. Eddie Rickenbacker's downed B-17 crew is rescued by a Kingfisher seaplane

1943

www.youtube.com/watch?v=HT_PClBc8vE

11 February 43. Destroyer Fletcher (DD-445) and seaplane from light cruiser Helena (CL 50) sink Japanese submarine I-18 in Coral Sea.

19 August 43. Kingfisher observation plane sinks Japanese submarine I-17 off eastern Australia

VO observer from seaplane directs gunfire to sink French battleship Jean Bart during the U.S. Army TORCH amphibious landings

1944

1945

Kingfisher rear gunner shoots down Zero over Iwo Jima

U.S. Naval Aviation News, January 1945, page 23

The U.S. Navy follows the lead of the excellent Japanese seaplane fighters and produces the best seaplane fighter of the war: the SeaHawk.

This way, American cruisers and battleships would not fall prey to aircraft attacks that sank the HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales in 1941.

1946

New Small Seaplanes being considered...

Seaplanes go to the South Pole!

Web link: www.violations.dabsol.co.uk/enigma/enigma.htm

Admiral Richard Byrd invades the South Pole land mass of Antarctica (Operation HIGH JUMP) where under-ice and underground Nazi Germans in secret bases remain in hiding. Quasi-cover story is "Antarctic exploration". About 250, 000 Germans were missing at war's end who were NOT MIA from war combat. Germany had claimed Antarctica as their own territory beginning with their ship-launched seaplane expedition in 1938 (see below under German seaplane section). He uses twin-engined C-47s (R4Ds) launched by JATO rockets from the small escort carrier USS Philipine Sea and PBM Mariner large seaplanes from tenders to scout for clues where the German were hiding.

One PBM large seaplane lands and discovers a warm water inlet to the sea that advanced German Type XXI u-boats and other type submarines could covertly enter and exit into while submerged not unlike Captain Nemo's secret base in 20, 000 Leagues Under the Sea.

German U-Boats in the ice of Antarctica and the RFC-2 anti-gravity VTOL flying saucer used on the supply ship raider the Atlantis during WW2

Several of his escorting carrier-based fighters are reported shot down by German anti-gravity flying saucers and the invasion force withdraws.

SeaHawk-in-a-Box!

The amazing SeaHawk fits easily into a metal shipping container for long-term storage; clearly ahead of its time by several decades before SeaAirLand ISO containers become the way dry goods move around the globe! Fighters-in-a-Box are the only way land-based aircraft will be able to survive increasingly lethal guided high explosive attacks in the 21st Century.

1947

Downed Pilot rescued by alert SeaHawk pilot!

SC-1 SeaHawks take-off with JATO improving their rough sea take-off run capabilities

Navy large aircraft carrier brass marginalize the SeaHawk by taking away reminders of its COMBAT functions as a ship-board fighter and naval gunfired spotter for their hated rival cruiser/battleship gunnery faction; budget and ego come before winning wars and saving men's lives.

1948

New SC-2 SeaHawk taking lessons learned from fleet combat experience shows amazing rough sea water landing capabilities

1949

SeaHawks in China occupation duty deploy from their cruiser, the USS Duluth to show their folding-wing truck ground mobility and adaptability to land base use via wheeled landing gear.

Back-Stabbing Navy Aircraft Carrier Egomaniac Brass Pull Switchero: get Rid of the SC-1/2 SeaHawk seaplane fighters that threaten their greed and ego for BS incapable helicopters; of course there's a dress uniform ceremony for them to spout off platitudes and worship their false tin god of alleged progress as they stab the men before them in the back...

1954

U.S. Navy/Convair "SeaDart" is first seaplane to break the sound barrier in level flight

1963

1966

1967

The USMC LARA COIN aircraft competition selects the OV-10 "Bronco" twin-turboprop plane which had the capability to have floats fitted for water landings but this is never exploited operationally. OV-10s would take-off with wheeled landing gear from small amphibious carriers one-way during missions as long as land bases were available since they couldn't return to the ship. OV-10s are later retired in 1994.

1969

British Navy fields the first practical V/STOL subsonic jet fighter-bomber: the Harrier that can take-off and land vertically from small non-aircraft carrier ships decks. AV-8 "A" model's vectored thrust is too tricky to fly and dumb U.S. marines crash nearly every single Harrier they have. The British has ski jumps on the end of their small carriers to give a boost of lift for their Harriers, the USN that sees V/STOL as a threat to their catapult launch and tail-hook recovery seaplanes from large aircraft carriers refuses to put ski jumps on amphibious assault aircraft carriers marine AV-8s use.

1979

The supersonic XFV-12 V/STOL fighter is built in prototype form to fly much faster than the Harrier to provide adequate anti-air-warfare (AAW) capabilities and uses more spread-out ducted thrust for a safer vertical ascent and landing from small surface ships. Sadly, too much power is lost in the ducting and the XFV-12 cannot even take-off vertically so we remain stuck with the Harrier.

1983

The British drastically improve their Harrier and the "B" model is bought by the USMC, which proceeds to crash them at a high rate. No one even tries to operate Harriers from small ship fantail decks since they need a running take-off to carry a full ordnance load: they are actually STOVL aircraft.

Today

USMC has less than 120 x AV-8Bs and will in 5 years have less than 50% of these in service at current crash/loss rates. The safer lift-fan STOVL F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program drags on and on with delays and Lockheed-Martin corporate greed hissy fits. USN/Mc's entire naval aviation future rests on the F-35 which can at any moment be cancelled since the USAF really doesn't want F-35As and wants more capable F-22s operated from pampered static land air bases. The USAF will not shed a tear if USN/Mc naval aviation collapses from their own stupid choices and mismanagement.

When we had a Navy that wasn't Afraid of Getting Wet

Compare the WW2 Navy that could actually go places, land there on the water and investigate to today's emasculated USN that doesn't even want to get its feet wet in huge, comfortable aircraft carriers operating planes that cannot even land in the water. No longer having the lost art of being able to operate seaplanes gives our enemies vast areas of the world where they can hide in, immune to air and sea search. If they cannot even be found, they cannot be targeted by either firepower or maneuver. Let's look at the art of how seaplanes can land in the ocean to enable effective sea-based reconnaissance:

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3834/is_200010/ai_n8917774

Profile of the SC-1

Wings of Gold, Fall 2000 by "Billy Jack" Long

In a career spanning 40 years in aviation, R.J. Long, Naval Aviator engineering test pilot and ANA member, logged 3, 000 hours in over 50 different aircraft. He flew in WWII and Korea, returned to civilian life and from 1953 to 1957 was an engineering test pilot for Convair in San Diego. He was project pilot on the Navy's SeaDart, the world's only supersonic seaplane, and also tested the F-102A, the USAF's first supersonic interceptor. He retired from the Navy as a CDR in the Naval Reserve, is a member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots and for many years following Convair duty, was Director of External Affairs for Rockwell International Space Transportation Systems Division. In the following article he describes operations with the SC-1 Seahawk.

The single-piloted Seahawk was the largest, fastest, most powerful and heavily armed floatplane ever procured by the Navy for operation from battleships and cruisers. It was conceived and built for multi-requirements: scouting, ASW, directing Naval gunfire, storage in cruiser below-deck hangars, using existing catapults and recovery systems. It had no high altitude mission requirements. I flew the SC-1 in 1945 as a 22 year-old ensign (assigned to USS Santa Fe (CL-60)) but my experience involved no combat or heroics. The exposure, however, served as a valuable prelude to test work I later did on the Sea Dart.

The XSC-1's first flight was in February 1944; 566 x SC-1s and 10 x SC-2s were built with final delivery in the fall of 1946. The planes were flown from the Columbus, Ohio plant with fixed landing gear to west coast air stations where float systems were installed. The battle cruiser Guam received the first Seahawks in October 1944. The battleship Missouri had two Seahawks on the fantail catapults during the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, September 2nd 1945. Despite the large number produced, only 22 x SC-1s on seven ships saw combat.

Powered by the Wright R-1820-62, it had a four paddle-blade prop which enabled the SC- 1 to achieve spectacular water takeoff and climb performance. Its combat radius was 290 miles at 110 knots.

Pilots had to be careful on water takeoffs because of the Seahawk powerful torque. [Editor: need counter-rotating props] Aerodynamic stability and control were excellent in flight even when strafing with the two .50-caliber [heavy machine] guns, and bombing. The cockpit and canopy were spacious and comfortable with good visibility. Controls, instrumentation and electronics were state-of-the-art. The folding wings had full-span leading edge slats, aerodynamically actuated which with the trailing edge flaps provided excellent flight characteristcs during approach and touchdown at 65 knots.

Catapult launches and recoveries, especially without a rear seat crewman to assist with ship-crane hook-ups, were challenges. There were four recovery techniques:

Able: After landing in the water, the aircraft was towed by motor whale boat into pick-up position.

Baker: The aircraft taxied under the crane, engine cut, and hoisted aboard.

Charlie: The ship executed a 90 degree turn across the wind line, creating a slick for touchdown and taxi to the sled which the Seahawk engaged with a hook at the bottom of the main float. The aircraft was then maneuvered beneath the crane for hook-up and hoisting.

Dog: With this method the ship made no course change, regardless of wind or sea conditions. This required good piloting and seamanship to land and catch the sled.

When the ship wasn't underway the Seahawk was lowered to the water with the engine off, The pilot unhooked from the crane, started the engine and proceeded to taxi and takeoff.

There were problems with the SC-1s. These included turbo supercharger impellers disintegrating causing extensive in-flight damage and autopilot hydraulic servo system failures which causing fatal accidents. The system was subsequently disconnected which made viewing the APS-4 radar cockpit scope while flying the aircraft more difficult and potentially dangerous. [EDITOR: need rear seater to watch the ASW/ASuW/AAW scope]

One bomb rack was under each wing center section; the right one could carry a radar pod or a bomb. Initial main float opening bays for bombs, depth bombs, or auxiliary tanks were later secured with only one auxiliary tank retained.

Rescues at sea were tough and dangerous without an aircrewman to help. There was a canvas cot inside the aft fuelage to accommodate up to two people.

The pilot seat armor could be tilted forward by the pilot on the wing root to provide access. We didn't have an on-board ladder but used a line instead. A folding metal ladder came along later. The SC-2, in fact, incorporated signficant changes.

Life aboard Santa Fe was great - a happy ship with a top war record. We had three Seahawks, four aviators, a CPO and 19 men - and a single port catapult. An aviator was required on the bridge during underway launches and recoveries. Maintenance was outstanding. I was the unit engineering officer, the ship's photo officer and stood watches underway and in port. Our flag officer on board was the senior U.S. commander for the initial occupation of Kyushu at Sasebo. We visited six ports from southern to northern Japan. I took many aerial photos including one of Nagasaki, from my SC-1. Liberty was interesting and peaceful. My last Seahawk flight was in November 1945 from USS Ominato Bay near Honshu.

I believe that no more than 300 of the 576 Seahawks produced ever saw service. With no other military or civil use, all were destroyed. None exist today. [EDITOR: how convenient of the carrier mafia to erase all memory of the competition!]

Because of my SC-1 and OS-2U floatplane experience I was hired by the Convair company to test the XF2Y and YF2Y SeaDart, delta wing, twin-jet, water based interceptors. Still, the SC-1 stands out as the most intersting of the more than 50 types of aircraft I flew. Single-piloted seaplanes, out of all the aircraft I flew, were my favorites.

Build a 1/72 scale model of the Mighty SC-1 SeaHawk!

Order from Squadron Signal: www.squadron.com/ItemDetails.asp?item=AU2015 for just $4.99

We just built our own SeaHawk II/III version of what it could have been like today had the Navy kept improving versions to the present day! Pictures are posted below!

www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1945/1aug45.pdf

U.S. Navy Aviation News, August 1, 1945, pages 17-27

The problem with any egotistical, narcissistic organization is that only one thing can be in the limelight; in this case, the biggest ships---the aircraft carriers---eclipse all the smaller vessels just as in the Army the heavy tank stifles out lighter tanks. The problem is that big aircraft carriers cannot survive on their own, cannot do all required naval functions and we simply cannot make enough of them even if they could do everything. We are now down to just 11 aircraft carriers and this is exactly the number we lost in WW2. If they are sunk in the first days of a WW3, there will be no aircraft operating from our ships other than a few slow, short-ranged helicopters and maybe some subsonic, short-ranged marine Harrier jump jets from a handful of amphibious carriers. Our surviving surface ships will have to do a "Jutland" and flee the scene or stick around and get sunk like the HMS Repulse/Prince of Wales were without air cover in 1942. Either way, we lose the war at sea.

Imagine now if the U.S. Navy of 1949 were not snobby and lazy....

SC-1 has framing in the canopy

SC-2 had pure, clear bubble canopy

The helicopter would have been rightly seen as never equaling the 313 mph speed nor 1, 000 mile range of the SeaHawk floatplane fighter regardless if it would stay out of the water and require less salt water corrosion preventative maintenance. Could it dip sonar and rescue men in the water with a hoist? Sure. Make sure it can also land itself in the water with a floating hull and have them act as a SUPPLEMENT not a replacement for floatplane fixed-wing aircraft which could land on the water and dip sonar, too. Exploit helicopter VTOL capability to land on different pads on ships like on top of battleship turrets like we used to do in the 1950s for personnel and small supply runs.

The guided-missile is the more lethal heir to the Japanese kamikaze planes that did so much damage in the latter parts of the war. Ships would still need to be armored. Jet aircraft at 600 mph would best the SeaHawk in a gun dogfight.

EXCLUSIVE! NEW PICS!

SC-3 would have contraprops, twin-turbine engined power, reliability and safe JP-8 fuel use

The rear observer would have radar and night vision/image intensifiers, infared to increase his visibility and awareness as well as an ability to fire rear-ward-facing AAMs against enemy MIGs. His ejection seat would swivel to the front if he needed to fly the aircraft in an emergency if the pilot is incapacitated.

Modern SC-3s would have 15-to-1 ratio slender floats for better open sea landings and take-offs or even no floats at all using skis or hydroskis.

The smart USN would have made the wing floats retract to the end wingtips like the PBY to reduce drag and placed a turboprop engine with contra-rotating props in the SeaHawk II, getting a respectable 500 mph. To close the gap with 600 mph fighters, Sidewinder air-to-air-missiles would have been fitted by 1960. By the 1990s, fire & forget AMRAAMs would be available to extend kill range beyond a close-in dogfight with guns/Sidewinders.

Wheeled landing gear enables the SeaHawk II to provide Maneuver Air Support (MAS) for Army and marines ashore during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Improvements in radar in a bulb on the right wing and a more comfortable radar operator rear seat position would make the SeaHawk III a "MINI-AWACS" extending fleet air cover by another 100 miles by 1970. Success with the contra-rotating props helps the R3Y Tradewind seaplane transport and the C-130 fly faster and farther, helping the SEALS insert/extract, the marines to deploy M113 Amphigavin light amphibious tracks and the Army Airborne to airdrop M113 Gavin light tanks further inland.

By the 1970s; a F-107-like turbofan floatplane or derivative (air intake on top of fuselage to avoid sea spray like the SeaDart) of the AV-8A Harrier would have been fielded as a "JetSeaHawk" but exploiting JATO for ZEL take-off from the catapult/rails located amidships on the cruisers and at the stern of the Iowa class battleships. R&D into an engine that can burn ship's JP-5 heavy fuel would have eliminated more volatile JP-8 from having to be carried by cruisers and battleships. We made these ships nuclear powered, so ALL the fuel would be for the SeaHawks/JetHawks to operate for weeks and weeks without need of refuel at sea. Future JetSeaHawks would be HYDROGEN powered with the ship only cracking sea water into oxygen and hydrogen AS NEEDED to fuel her aircraft so NO fossil fuels would be carried. The new Arleigh Burke class destroyers would have at least one mid-ship catapult/rocket rail for one JetHawk and the Ticonderoga class, two. However, the Navy was not stupid and followed up with the USS Long Beach in 1960 and fielded better heavily ARMORED cruisers than the current "tin can" destroyers/light cruisers that would be nuclear powered so this protective weight would be no burden. There was no Ticonderoga or Burke classes; the Long Beach and Bainbridge classes were modernized and kept in service. Each USN surface combatant would have at least one ASW/CSAR helicopter and one AAW/ASuW fighter for synergistic combined-arms effects when with other like-equipped USN surface combatants.

When the war in Kuwait flared up in 1990, the SeaHawk II/IIIs were brought back on duty to spot for the four Iowa class battleships and provide MAS for the Army/marines ashore since the JetSeaHawks fly too fast to see foes on the ground. The SeaHawks are rebuilt into SeaHawk IVs to extend their service lives and add countermeasures to enemy air defense weapons. When U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan, SeaHawk IVs flew 24/7/365 air surveillance missions and in concert with Army Airborne-mech forces in M113 Gavin tracks blocked all escape routes into Pakistan. This air-ground team located and then killed terror mastermind Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Z with Hellfire ATGMs that were laser designated from the ground. The remaining Al Queda operatives were exploded by SeaHawk IV .50 caliber heavy machine gun fire bursting their civilian SUV gas tanks. The "war" on "terror" was decisively ended in a U.S. victory in mid 2002. There would have been no excuse to invade Iraq and 3, 000+ dead and 23, 000 wounded American lives would have been spared.

2006: with the possibility of Red China blockading and invading Taiwan, the egalitarian, indomitable defiant, U.S. Navy, self-reliant and ready operates both JetHawks and SeaHawks from all its surface combatants and will not be forced from the scene if their carriers are lost.

Eyes Poked out of the Fleet: Sadly What Really happened...sorting it all out...Navy brass marginalize then retire seaplane fighters from cruisers/battleships...

The Navy's flimsy excuses for the wimp-out into helicopters:

www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1940s/1949/jul49.pdf

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WW2 ends and the large aircraft carrier capital ship brass start squeezing out everything else. Suddenly in May 1949 the asshole Navy brass declare that bullshit 100 mph unarmed, unarmored Sikorsky 1947 HO-3S Dragonfly helicopters will somehow replace 300 mph, armored, armed SC-1/2 SeaHawk seaplane fighters....where was the outrage at this bean counter stupidity? If you want ONE helicopter to fly around the brass/VIPs on each battleship/cruiser, post one on the aft deck or on top of a gun turret, THERE WAS NO COMPELLING FUNCTIONAL SPACE-ON-SHIP REASON to stop using the SeaHawks seaplane fighters. This was pure Navy brass peacetime squeeze-out-anything-that-threatens-the-money-and-ego-of-the-supercarrier bullshit. This is perfect to keep the battleships/cruisers in their inferior social place as "support" for their fucking supercarriers...if handicapped with short-range helicopters battleships/cruisers can't go out on independent missions---nevermind that's their functional purpose...no they will have to take "big mama" along wherever they go. Did anyone even raise a stink about this pansification of the Navy from combat to peacetime bullshit? Or were all the adults gone from the Navy by 1949 replaced by lifer egomaniacs and bean counters? How many men are going to die soon in Korea because of the things the bullshit little helicopters can't do?

Sikorsky "Dragonfly"

* CAN'T SCOUT FOR THE ENEMY FLEET

* CAN'T DO NAVAL GUNFIRE SPOTTING MISSION

* CAN'T DEFEND THE SHIP FROM AIR ATTACKS

* CAN'T DEFEND THE SHIP FROM SUBMARINE OR SURFACE SHIP ATTACKS

* CAN'T FLY CONTINUOUSLY FOR HOURS TO EVEN WARN VISUALLY OF ATTACKS

* CAN'T CARRY ASW GEAR AT ALL

* CAN'T DO COMBAT SEARCH/RESCUE EXCEPT VERY CLOSE TO THE SHIP

Establishment BS history of the Dragonfly: In 1946, the Navy placed an order for the four- seat HO-3S version of the Army R-5 helicopter. The Navy and marines used the aircraft on carriers and other ships to recover downed pilots on land and sea. The "Dragonfly" was the first Navy helicopter to replace the fixed-wing seaplanes operating with fleet. By late 1949 the HO-3S had replaced all non-carrier-based aircraft as well as taken over all carrier-based rescue operations. The HO-3S saw its finest hour during the Korean War and was utilized by all air operation commands. The helicopter also served as the original combat platform for feasibility tests of automatic pilot systems in helicopters. The tapered wood and metal rotor blades were one of the design flaws that led to the replacement of the HO-3S.

Manufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division

Powerplant Engine Type : One Pratt & Whitney R-985-AN-5 450hp radial engine

Dimensions

Main Rotor span: 42 feet
Length: 57 feet 8 inches
Height: 12 feet 8 inches
Takeoff wt. empty/max. 3,810 lbs./4,390 lbs.
Performance: Maximum speed : 107 mph

U.S. Navy Battleships - USS New Jersey (BB-62)

www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/battleships/newjersey/bb62-nj.html

EXCERPT:

"On 24 May, she lost one of her helicopters when its crew pushed to the limit of their fuel searching for a downed aviator."

Compare/contrast the pitiful helicopter flight performance to what the official U.S. Navy web sites says about what just a few of the thousands of fixed-wing seaplanes did in WW2 to get effective observed and corrected naval gunfire by virtue of their LONG-RANGE and ENDURANCE:

www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/battleships/tennessee/bb43-tenn.html

EXCERPTS:

At about noon on 1 August 1943, Tennessee was out on what all thought another routine patrol when the word was passed to prepare to bombard Kiska. At 1310, she began a zigzag approach through the usual murk to the island with USS Idaho (BB-42) and three destroyers. As the water grew more shallow, the ship slowed down and streamed mine-cutting paravanes from her bows. Tennessee approached the island from the east, closing to a range from which she could open fire with her 5-inch secondary battery. Her two OS-2U Kingfisher floatplanes were catapulted to observe fire; and, at 1610, the battleship commenced firing from 7,000 yards. Though the island's shoreline could be seen, the target area, anti-aircraft gun sites on high ground, were shrouded in low-hanging clouds and were invisible from the ship. Tennessee's aerial spotters caught an occasional glimpse of the impact area and reported the ship's fire as striking home...

The task group continued along Kiska's southern coast Tennessee's 14-inch guns chimed in at 1624, hitting the location of a submarine base and other areas with 60 rounds before firing ceased at 1645. Visibility had dropped to zero, and results could not be seen. The battleship recovered her floatplanes, and the force turned back toward Adak.

Steaming by way of Pearl Harbor and Saipan, Tennessee was just in time to join Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy's bombardment force. Blandy, an ordnance specialist, had been Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance earlier in the war. With the expert help of Lt Col. Donald Weller, USMC, the pre-invasion bombardment was thoroughly planned and was modified to meet immediate needs as the shelling progressed. The Japanese defensive tactic called for the landing troops to be stopped on the beaches before they could move inland, and a heavy belt of defenses extended along the shoreline. The mission of the bombarding ships and planes was to break down the Japanese cordon and permit the landing marines to push through before they could be cut to pieces.

Blandy's gunfire force arrived off Iwo Jima early on 16 February 1945. The morning was cool, with occasional rain squalls, and low cloud cover hindered spotting planes. Shortly after daybreak, the warships deployed to their stations, with escort carriers in the near distance providing air cover. Minesweepers began to clear the approaches to the island at 0645, and gunfire opened at 0707. Tennessee's assigned firing course took her along the southeastern shore of Iwo Jima, and her 14-inch guns struck the slopes of Mount Suribachi while the secondaries aimed at the high ground at the north end of the beach. Floatplanes and fighters observing gunfire over the island were followed by dark puffs of anti-aircraft fire. Blandy ordered the ships to fire only when air spot could function effectively in the intermittent visibility. Whenever the airplanes could observe the results, the ships kept their fire up through the day. During the afternoon, an OS-2U Kingfisher seaplane from the cruiser USS Pensacola (CA-24) found a Japanese "Zeke" on its tail. The observation pilot, determined to put up all the fight he could, went at the fighter though his plane was much slower and less maneuverable, and armed only with one .30-caliber forward- firing machine gun plus a second flexible gun in the observer's cockpit. Against all the odds, the "Zeke" went down in flames.

Visibility was better the next day, and the ships began to approach beaches at 0803. Beginning at 10,000 yards, Tennessee, with Idaho and Nevada, soon closed to 3,000 yards and delivered heavy direct fire to assigned targets while assault minesweeping went on. At 1025, the battleships were ordered to retire to make way for UDTs supported by LCI(G)s. The defenders concluded that this was the beginning of the actual landing and unmasked guns and mortars in a heavy fire on the gunboats and frogmen. Casualties mounted; one gunboat was sunk, another set afire. The other LCIs returned fire but had to withdraw as the bombardment ships resumed firing against the defenses. Three damaged gunboats came alongside Tennessee to transfer their wounded to the battleship's sick bay.

Bombardment continued through 18 February under orders prescribing concentrated hammering of the landing beaches. Once more, Tennessee's big guns pounded Suribachi while her secondaries attacked gun positions overlooking the right flank of the objective area. While the heavier guns fired from ranges varying between 2,200 and 6,000 yards, the 40-millimeter battery raked other targets on cliffs at the north end of the beach and shot up the wrecks of several Japanese ships beached near the shore; these had been used as havens for snipers and machine gunners at Tarawa and in later landings, and were always treated as potential threats. Several fires were started ashore; an ammunition dump exploded spectacularly and burned for several hours. Coastal guns and anti-aircraft weapons were still firing when Tennessee retired for the night, even though she and Idaho had been able to demolish many massive masonry pillboxes with direct hits.

Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner arrived off Iwo Jima at 0600 on the morning of 19 February with the main body of the invasion force and assumed command. Transports formed up in the darkness and, at daybreak, put their landing craft into the water as troops clambered down the ship's cargo nets. The loaded landing craft circled near the transports as they awaited the signal to land. Tank landing ships moved closer to shore, opened their bow doors, and launched LVTs carrying the first wave of assault troops. Shortly after daylight, a heavy bombardment was opened by the ships of Task Force 54 reinforced by the newer battleships North Carolina (BB-55), Washington (BB-56), and three cruisers lent for the occasion by Task Force 58. A total of seven battleships, four 8-inch gun heavy cruisers, and three light cruisers armed with 6-inchers laid their fire on the landing areas. At first, the fire was slow and deliberate. It was checked for an air strike, as planes from the fast carrier force delivered bombs, rockets, and napalm before the ships resumed a heavier fire. Beginning at 0850, fire was so adjusted that carrier fighters could strafe the beaches during the last few minutes before H-hour. One minute before H-hour, the turret guns ceased firing, and the secondary guns began to drop a rolling barrage just ahead of the marines as they landed and moved inland. Shore fire control parties (SFCP) accompanied the marines ashore; one SFCP was assigned to work with each of the supporting battleships and cruisers.

The first wave crossed the line of departure at 0830 and landed only a fraction before the scheduled 0900 H-hour. As the troops landed, the Japanese, who had waited out the bombardment in their deep tunnels, manned guns and mortars in protected emplacements and opened an increasingly heavy fire. The ships' guns were kept busy; main batteries took on gun positions as they were located while the lighter guns kept up their barrage ahead of the [exposed on foot unarmored] men on the ground. Tennessee's station was 3,000 yards from Suribachi at the southern end of the landing area, and the water around her was churned by hundreds of vehicles and landing craft as the successive waves moved in. By the end of the day, some 30,000 marines were on Iwo Jima, and some tanks and artillery had been landed.

Ground fighting on Iwo Jima continued until 28 March 1945, as the stubborn Japanese were slowly rooted out of the positions that they continued to defend to the last. Even before the struggle ended, though, Army engineers had patched up the island's battered airstrip; and damaged B-29s were able to seek refuge on dry land instead of ditching. Tennessee was a part of this struggle until 7 March, when she sailed for Ulithi. The days after the landing were a steady routine of call fire and counterbattery work as Japanese guns continued to reveal themselves by opening fire on the hovering support ships before being located and taken out. For this purpose, it had been found that single-gun salvoes at close range, using "pointer fire" (in which the gun is directly aimed by telescopic sight), were the most precise and effective. The notion of using a 14-inch naval gun for sniping was rather new, but it seemed to work very well. Tennessee left the area, having deposited 1,370 rounds of main- battery fire on Iwo Jima along with 6,380 5-inch and 11,481 40-millimeter projectiles. At Ulithi, she began to prepare for the Okinawa operation. Supplies and ammunition were loaded, and the tired sailors stretched their legs and drank beer on tiny Mog Mog Island, whose principal selling point as a vacation resort seemed to be that it did not move underfoot.

We know the Navy brass retired our excellent SC-1/s SeaHawk catapult-launched seaplanes from our cruisers/battleships around 1949...how convenient....now their guns wouldn't have any air observers (AFACs) watching the fall of the shells to adjust fire to hit the enemy to make this fire effective....what does the peacetime Navy and marines REALLY want to do?

They want to goof-off and chase wine, women and song and leave the war preparations to another day, when men will be dying and desperation measures required...

What the Navy and marines really have their "eyes" on

In response to a lack of naval gunfire control against shore targets (imagine that? what would cause that?), the Navy has Shore Fire Control Parties and the USMC creates ANGLICO units of ground FACs/gunfire observers..but how will this help if you are bombarding a North Korea or a North Vietnam where there isn't a major American ground force for the GFACs to be safe ashore? What if your ground radio doesn't work or reach? Here's one real-world example from the March 1951 issue of U.S. Naval Aviation News taken from thousands of incidents:

www.history.navy.mil/nan/backissues/1950s/1951/mar51.pdf

The SeaHawk backstab was to marginalize the effectiveness of naval guns so they couldn't compete for missions with the fighter-bomber jock/supercarrier mafia.

The official U.S. Navy history web site on "Korean War--Naval Gunfire Activities, July-September 1950", shows that cruisers like the USS Helena were able to drop bridges if their gunfire could be observed/corrected denying these routes over rivers to enemy forces attacking our troops:

www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/50-nkof/nk-3.htm

With manned observer guidance, battleship and cruiser guns can take-out vital targets like bridges without having pilots in aircraft getting shot down trying to deliver HE ordnance. Why have "The Bridges of Toko-Ri" (Korean War) or Than Hoi (Vietnam War) bridge type tragedies when we can cheaply take-out point targets with aiming corrected battleship/cruiser guns lobbing inexpensive HE shells? Cruiser/battleship seaplanes HELP NAVAL GUNFIRE get the glory and all the downed carrier pilots lives they saved from death in the water doesn't mean a "hill of beans" when it comes to GREED and EGO of the Navy supercarrier brass. Having all naval warfare forms under one bureaucracy is unsound and dangerous as in the end the many little things required to do naval warfare right will be marginalized, ignored and eventually squeezed out of existence.

1. SC-1/2 SeaHawk VO-VCs were intended and used for BOTH ship target and shore target observation to assist cruiser/battleship guns. That's a historical fact.

The truth behind this is that the enemy ships we want to sink are not under observation by friendly ships radioing in aiming corrections. Secondly, on shore, our Army and marines simply may be having their asses kicked by the enemy, pinned down by enemy fire for the GFAC to observe & radio back corrections or for an AFAC to exist. Cruisers/battleships should provide their own MANNED O/A plane grasshopper ie; a SeaHawk.

2. ANGLICO is for marines, too

I was enlisted and officer marine for about a decade while we had ANGLICO before the disbandment and revival. None of our Arty FOs or me or my company CO could call in naval guns, but we did get to call in a CAS A-4 SkyHawk strike at 29 Palms in 1983. We had an ANGLICO attached to my infantry company when we did semi-serious FTXes. He had a long-range AM radio, an AN/PRC-104. Today they have VHF/UHF AN/PRC-117Fs.

Today, with the advent of the "JTAC" mentality that its sort of tolerated if you go to the school; but not welcomed. Army Arty FOs (13Fs) should go to all the necessary JTAC schools to learn how to do CAS radio talk-ons and direct the current wimpy 5" naval guns we got available. Army CSA General Schoomaker wants a JTAC IN EVERY RIFLE PLATOON and an entire BATTALION made into a "RSTA Squadron" of sensor-shooter interfacers in his "modularity" reorganization to insure GFAC capabilities are there. In our artillery and tank study groups I reminded everyone that the key is having a LASER TARGET DESIGNATOR to shine coded laser beams to get an accurate GPS target location for GPS guided munitions and terminally guide laser-directed munitions in addition to talking on aircraft with guns, rockets and dumb bombs. How the USAF ETACs are going to handle this Army pitching-in will be very interesting. They may fall back on the fact that only they have laser designators to protect their "turf".

The lack of AFACS from cruisers/battleships was a deliberate marginalization of naval gunfire support since even if you have GFACS embedded throughout your ground maneuver force, the fact is they still may not be in a position to direct naval guns or CAS. We need naval manned O/A planes that can operate from small surface ships.

Here's two examples from the Korean War. In the first one, you can see that the target Wonson, was on the coast and cruiser/battleship guns could be directed from the ship itself.

Where are all those "observation" helicopters from cruisers/battleships now?: Navy has to use Corsairs to naval gunfire spot during the Korean War

....slow helicopters cannot survive over North Korea to naval gunfire spot....

where are the BS helicopters?

The examples above from the June and September 1952 issues of U.S. Naval Aviation News show that helicopters cannot get the naval gunfire observation job done and naval guns are not being fully utilized since an attacking WW2 era Corsair carrier fixed-wing plane is the only platform in position or can get into position far inland to find the enemy and SURVIVE to act as a spotter; though its only a single-seater and lacks a back-seat observer to do it well. Many Corsair pilots would die doing naval gunfire spotting over Korea because of the large aircraft carrier Navy brass's backstab elimination of the SeaHawk seaplanes resulted in a lack of preparedness via unsuitable helicopters. Some may rightfully ask WHERE DID ALL THE MASS-PRODUCED WW2 AIRCRAFT GO? Can't we use them NOW to fight sub-national threats? Why can't the Navy operate its own prop SC-1/2 SeaHawk observation/attack planes to spot for their own cruiser/battleship guns and act as an airborne forward air controller (AFAC) like the highly successful USAF "Mosquitoes" using slower SNJ/T-6 "Texans"?

True, but ONLY IF THEY STILL EXIST. the Navy/marines in the 1940s were CRASHING 1, 000 WW2 aircraft each year! And what they were not crashing they were scrapping.

We only built roughly 10, 000 of the main types of WW2 fighter-bombers.

Let me be more clear: WE TRASHED OR CRASHED ALL OUR SAVED WW2 AIRCRAFT.

Where are these aircraft storage boxes and their aircraft?

They were used up and thrown away.

Now don't get me wrong...this is a CONSPIRACY.

There were about 600 x SeaHawks built AND NOT ONE SINGLE ONE SURVIVES OPENLY TODAY.

How "convenient" of the Navy brass.

Not even one SeaHawk for a naval museum somewhere. What assholes. They saved the NC-4 seaplane that was a part of the cross-Atlantic flight large aircraft carrier-worshipping asshole Mitscher participated in...and the Navy brass couldn't even respect the sacrifices of 5 decades of naval service from the catapult seaplane community? And this ISN'T a conspiracy to stamp out all memories that there IS other ways to get airplanes to sea other than their bloated, cash cow supercarriers?

If you still think helicopters are effective naval gunfire spotters in COMBAT where they are easily shot down, why then did the Iowa class battleships upon rec-commissioning in the 1980s get UNMANNED FIXED WING PLANES to do their gunfire spotting and not helicopters? Case closed on the "helicopter naval gunfire spotting" BS.

What I'm trying to reveal here is that ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY SERVICE IS A RACKET. Its composed of EGO CLUBS who keep secrets. An A-37 combat pilot just revealed a secret that a LOT OF PILOTS DIVE RIGHT INTO THE GROUND doing low-altitude attacks re: target fixation. This is but one example of the devil-in-the-details kept secret from us.

WE ARE NOT BEING TOLD THE TRUTH HERE!!!

MILITARY EGO CLUB BACK STABS ARE TAKING PLACE ALL THE FUCKING TIME!!!

I personally witnessed at Fort Bragg the 3/73rd Armor's M551 Sheridans being PLACED ON RAILROAD CARS BEFORE THE M8 Buford AGS non-build decision was made. This made it ohh so easy to disband the 3/73rd Armor Battalion with ready-made excuse: "we have no tracks". BULLSHIT. WE had and still have THOUSANDS OF M113 GAVINS THE 3/73rd COULD HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED. They were not because the heavy tanker assholes ("heavy mafia") ruining, eh running the Army DID NOT WANT THE AIRBORNE ("light mafia") TO HAVE ANY TANKS.

Don't you see it?

First, the Navy stops having SeaHawk units on every battleship/cruiser; only one "centralized" detachment (surface excuse: "to cut costs") to farm out AS NEEDED seaplane fighter floatplanes; this severs any loyalty ties of the ship to the SeaHawk unit's men.

Next, they rip off the armor and armament from the SeaHawks to not remind anyone of their COMBAT ATTACK PURPOSE, marginalizing them as JUST search & rescue means.

Then comes the bullshit fucking piece-of-shit helicopter doing highly sexy PR grabbing "rescues"--they can do this mission easier than seaplanes yadda yadda yadda.

VOILA!!!

Navy brass-to-peons: "We are taking your SeaHawks from you. They are umm, OLD, yeah that's right. We are giving you a NEW TOY to stroke your egos that mommy/daddy naval service loves you. Go back now into your corner and be subservient to us with your cruiser/battleship guns and little rescue choppers to rescue us real men in real fighter-bombers flying off our large aircraft carriers".

Nevermind there always was enough space for BOTH SeaHawk seaplanes AND a BS helicopter.

This was never about FUNCTION what works BEST. Its always been about EGO and GREED. And the fixed-wing seaplane fighter helping naval guns poses a DOUBLE THREAT to the bloated supercarrier cash and ego cow!

And already existing, proven equipment poses a threat to ego and greed to the Military, Industrial Congressional and Think-Tank Complex or MICC-TT.

More proof that the Helicopter Fails as Replacement for the Seaplane Observation/Attack Fighter...

The following excerpts from U.S. Naval Aviation News reveals that replacing fixed-wing seaplanes on cruisers/battleships with helicopters has brought us much grief when we should have ADDED a helicopter to the seaplane fighters we had--that's PROGRESS but instead in the zero-sum small minds of our Navy brass we have had to suffer with REGRESS ever since 1949. We've not had real cruiser capabilities to scour the seas independantly ever since! Only clusterfucks around a few oversized aircraft carriers! Is it a wonder piracy is on the rise?

Problems that wouldn't have happened to SC-1/2 SeaHawks...

So much for human "progress" actually REGRESS at helm controlled by Navy brass; in a few years we will not have any large seaplanes, either.

There were some level-headed types who saw that the war proved each surface ship needed some kind of its own aircraft for sea control protection notwithstanding the bogus claims of the carrier "mafia" that they would "protect them". However, the SeaHawks were retired and once a sound practice is no longer being done by an egotistical bureaucratic organization, its tough to bring it back as lies and excuses are allowed to harden in the minds of the stupid people elevated by groupthink and conformity to decision-making positions.

If you did this...

Why didn't you use this instead?

During the war, the British were so desperate to stop German FW-200 Condor long range maritime patrol plane and U-Boat attacks, they placed land Hurricane fighters on rails and shot them off merchant ships with rockets knowing the pilot after the mission would have to ditch into the extremely cold North Atlantic ocean! Why the British didn't rocket cat-launch fighters with floats that can be recovered and re-used during the whole duration of a convoy when the Spitfire was originally derived from a seaplane racing plane is a mystery...

However, instead of seaplanes proven after years of service/combat success and simply placing a crane with at least one improved seaplane on every surface ship---to include merchant and sealift ones---and creating a force of seaplane fighter aviators and maintainers, NAVAIR went looking for a lazy technological solution since the uninspired conventional helicopter would never be an air-to-air threat any time soon---if ever.

POGO: Convoy Defense Fighter

To avoid landing in the water and the aerodynamic penalty of floats or floating fuselages, VTOL was tried with the Pogo. Pogo would try to take-off and land with the plane standing on its end. Taking off was straight-foward, backing down looking over your shoulder was too much.

The U.S. Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics in 1951, after having ordered two prototypes of the revolutionary supersonic XF2Y-l seaplane, issued a Request for Proposals for a single-seat vertical take-off and landing fighter which could be used to escort convoys, based on cargo vessels which did not have flight decks. The U.S. Navy accepted Convair's submission and in March 1951 ordered the XFY-I as well as placing an order for Lockheed's project, which was designated XFV-1 (q.v.).

The Pogo, as the XFV-1 was called, had a short, stubby fuselage, on which were mounted two near-delta wings and two enormous fins, one ventral and one dorsal, giving the arrangement a cruciform appearance. A small wheel was attached to the apices of all four of these surfaces and when parked, the aircraft rested, nose in the air, on these four wheels. Power was supplied by a 5,850 shp Allison YT40-A-6 turboprop engine, driving two coaxial propellers and a large spinner. The ventral fin could be jettisoned in flight were it necessary to make an emergency belly landing (on land or sea). By March 1954 the prototype was completed and taken to Moffet Field naval base in Sunnyvale, California where, inside an enormous hangar, braced by a special rig to prevent any possible chance of the aircraft toppling over, powered tethered tests were carried out, during which the aircraft was allowed to lift itself a few inches off the ground.

Finally on August 1, 1954, the XFY-1 was taken outside the hangar and it was up to the test pilot, J.F. (Skeets) Coleman to make the first vertical take-off; the plane rose to a height of 40 feet, followed by a trouble-free landing. The XFY-1 was then taken to the Naval Auxiliary Air Station at Brown Field for further testing and this culminated, on November 4, in the first complete experimental flight: the aircraft achieved vertical take-off, subsequently carried out the transition from vertical to horizontal flight and flew normally for about 20 minutes, before lowering itself gently to the ground. Skeets Coleman was very enthusiastic about the XFY-1 and his verdict was that he found it easier to handle and more maneuverable than any otherplane he had ever flown.

There was no doubt that the XFY-1 project was a success so far but the U.S.Navy did not feel it was a practicable proposition for series production and deployment as a warplane at that point. There were still many problems to overcome; not least the pilot's uncomfortable accommodation as well as the need to develop a zero-altitude ejector seat for his safety. Before the test program was halted, however, the XFY-1 flew for a total of 40 hours and earned itself the distinction of being the first vertical take-off and landing aircraft to fly successfully in the history of aviation.

www.luft46.com/heinkel/hewespe.html

The Heinkel "Wespe" (Wasp) was designed in late 1944 at the Vienna Heinkel works as a VTOL (Vertical Take Off and Landing) interceptor. It was mainly to be used around factory complexes as a "point defense" interceptor, much like the Bachem Ba-349 "Natter". The Wespe was designed around a circular wing, with small wing tips protruding beyond the circular wing at the two lower wing support locations. A single He S 021 turboprop (the turboprop development of the He S 011 jet engine), driving a six-bladed propeller, provided 2000 horsepower plus 750 kp thrust and was fed by an air intake located below the cockpit. The Wespe took off and landed on three landing gear, which in flight were covered for aerodynamical purposes. The pilot sat in a normal seated position in the nose under a huge blown canopy, and two MK 108 30mm cannon mounted in blisters on each side of the cockpit were envisioned for the armament. Further development was not carried forth due to the approaching war's end, and that a more aerodynamic, cleaner VTOL project (the "Lerche II") was also in the design phase.

Span: 5 meters (16' 5")
Length: 6.2 meters (20' 4")
Max. Speed: 800 km/h (497 mph)

OBSERVATION:

Take-off

Why not just use catapults to launch regular fighters from essentially zero distances? Here's a picture of a F-6F Hellcat and TBF Avenger being launched like a seaplane from a short catapult from THE INSIDE HANGER OF A U.S. CARRIER IN WW2! Some WW2 carriers had this capability (still a good idea if you have prop planes with no jet back blast). Ship catapults could be on land.

Or use ZEL rockets and a steep or vertical ramp to get into the air fast from the factories you want to defend.

Landing

Must the tail-sitter land back down on its end with pilot unable to see? Notice the Germans were not even thinking of trying this on a pitching ship at sea. Why not land the tail-sitter normally like Phil Carter proposes with his HUMMINGBIRD?

This doesn't get us a VTOL fighter at sea, though. Would a tail-sitter vertical landing work if the pilot had a TV camera feeding him a view looking down? How about a rear gunner/co-pilot in back to do the landings? Retired LTC Larry Altersitz writes:

"Today, you could do it with a radar/laser/IR system to measure ground distance. They are putting similar systems in vehicles to aid people in backing up and to see if there is someone/thing behind the vehicle."

Above is a picture of the Lockheed tail-sitter candidate that I've drawn in a back-seat co-pilot/gunner who could LAND the plane vertically by his seat swiveling to face rearward so he can see what he is doing on the way down. The Lockheed XFV-1 and German Wespe have X shaped tails so a rear-facing pilot could see to the rear that the Convair POGO candidate's tail blocks.

Another idea offered was to have the pilot's canopy area to bend/hinge for landings/take-offs:

Just a thought.

Aircraft with a high-trust-to-weight ratio can be launched vertically without sitting on their tails if they are held into position. Here's a proposed sea control ship configuration that has them landing normally in a horizontal position.

Skate

"If you believe in the future of a thing, you better be doing it in the present"

Here, the imaginations of common sense industry designers is in play while the actual Navy isn't even operating ANY seaplane fighters in the present tense, having thrown their fabulous SC-1/2 SeaHawks away.

Saunders-Roe S50

VIDEO

www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9ks7RF9TBM

The British more than anyone else remembered from WW2 how close they came to losing the war to submarines and maritime patrol aircraft sinking the cargo ships they needed to survive. Stung by MILLIONS of men lost in two world wars, they would never be an empire again. Full of inventive people, the British would come up with most of the ideas the Americans with a much larger land mass and population base would have the money to exploit. The dry deck aircraft carrier itself, the angled deck, the Harrier etc. were all British inventions the Americans took and perverted.

One of the British inventions the Americans ignored was the Saunders-Roe seaplane fighter of the early 1950s which could easily been catapulted from cargo ships and then land next to them and be craned aboard to effect convoy defense. However, WW2 was over and no U-Boats were threstening, so the Brits shelved the idea when they should have pursued it and developed a CONVOY DEFENSE BRANCH OF THE ROYAL NAVY (RN) that would specialize in converting cargo ships into defacto seaplane tenders in time of war. When the container ship arrived, this branch of the RN could have further developed the "Arapaho" concept of using ISO containers to make expedient dry deck aircraft carriers using VSTOL with light load aircraft like the Harrier which saved them during the Falklands war in 1982. In human organizations, important practices have to be sustained over time by organizations with budget and a mission mandate or else these capabilities will not be there when needed during a "rainy day" like a nation-state war where national survival is in jeopardy.

Douglas Model 640 Seaplane Fighter version of the A-4 SkyHawk

DETAILS: www.combatreform2.com/submarineaircraftcarriers.htm

The USN also stole money dishonestly from Congress to allegedly create a SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT CARRIER capability; of course not giving any credit where credit was due to the Japanese for actually using submarine aircraft carriers in COMBAT in WW2. Why the low-risk, sensible seaplane SkyHawk was not also used as a SURFACE ship seaplane fighter just goes to show you how the Navy was not serious about seaplanes lest they infringe on their bloated large aircraft carrier scam.

SeaDart

Bush pilots in the northwest USA/Canada discovered they could use snow skis to land on water as long as they kept moving and alerted the Navy.

Skis as-is do not even harm the flight performance of aircraft by more than 10% and if they retracted into the aircraft would impact 0%. Without floats or even a boat-hull fuselage shape like the British S50, seaplanes would be identical to land plane speed, range, climb and maneuverability flight performances. A purpose-built jet seaplane fighter using skis and a floating fuselage/wings structure would be the next generation "JetSeaHawk" aircraft that should have supplemented the SC-1/2/3 series prop SeaHawks had the Navy not been corrupted by the Midway Myth. Nevertheless, in the 1950s there were still enough WW2 veterans that remembered the German U-Boat and enemy air threat in general to know that a handful of large carriers would not cut it and that a ship defence seaplane fighter was required. Another aspect was the technological enthusiasm for jets meant $$ from Congress that the selfish and greedy Navy would never say no to. They'd take the money and build some "golly, gee-wiz" seaplanes and have no intention whatsoever of ever building them lest they threaten their large aircraft carrier Midway Myth racket.

Thus, the amazing SeaDart was born with no intention of ever being a part of the Navy mafia "family".

In contrast to the books written by real American patriots like above, here's the politically correct and flagrantly dishonest at the end "no operational requirement" BS short history of the SeaDart from the National Air & Space museum:

www.nasm.si.edu/research/aero/aircraft/convair_seadart.htm

Seaplanes (aircraft that use some form of pontoon rather than wheels) have played a major role in the development of aircraft. Waterborne craft were developed by many nations in the early years of flight because harbors were readily available and accessible as compared to airfields. Flying boats pioneered most international airline operations through the 1930s. The U.S. Navy relied heavily on them from 1911 through the Second World War and beyond. During the Vietnam war, for example, Martin P-5M flying boats were used extensively for coastal and shipping patrols.

On 19 January 1951, Convair received an order from the U.S. Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to develop two XF-2Y1 aircraft to be equipped with twin hydroskis (the twin hydroskis were "planing" skis and derived lift the same as a person using water skis. They were not skis that provided lift in the same manner as hydrofoils.). They were to be prototypes of a definitive water-based, single-seat, afterburning supersonic interceptor/fighter. This action resulted in an experimental test program that began in December 1952 and continued through 1957. A total of five aircraft, dubbed SeaDart, were built. Only three ever flew. The last two were completed except for engine installation.

The first XF-2Y1 aircraft, Bu. No. 137634, is part of the Air & Space Museum's collection. The remaining four were YF-2Y1 aircraft, Bu. No. 135762 through 765, built and numbered consecutively. The SeaDart aerodynamic design is best illustrated by the No. 3 aircraft (763). Unfortunately, these aircraft were designed, built, and flown before the supersonic "area rule" was first incorporated in aircraft designs. The area rule revealed that streamlining the aircraft fuselage into an hourglass shape, to compensate for the wing area, reduced aerodynamic drag-the unseen forces that slow aircraft down and increase thrust requirements. Compounding the issue, high-thrust engines were not available at that time.

On 14 December 1952, E. D. "Sam" Shannon, Convair's Chief of Engineering Flight Test, took the XF-2Y1 SeaDart out into San Diego Bay for its first taxi tests. The aircraft "taxied" up the seaplane ramp after its first test run. Small wheels at the aft end of the skis plus a small tail wheel provided this land taxi capability. The airplane entered the water the same way. Taxi down the ramp was made with the ski oleos in the beach position for attitude purposes. Upon attaining flotation, the main wheels on the ski afterbodies were rotated 90 degrees by electrical switch and hydraulic action to place the tapered afterbody of the ski in the proper hydrodynamic position. Takeoff was accomplished by a combination of ski extension, retraction, afterburner thrust, and a rapid rotation at take off speed. Two Westinghouse J46 engines producing 4,000 lb. of thrust (augmented to 6,000 lb. with afterburner operating) powered the SeaDart during most of its testing. The characteristic sharp rotation and liftoff was necessary to achieve positive separation from the water allowing rapid acceleration. The skis could be retracted immediately as with any retractable landing gear.

On 9 April 1953, Shannon made the first flight of the XF-2Y1. The dark blue paint with yellow markings provided aircraft attitude reference in instrumentation photos of taxi tests including take off and landing. Two afterburning Westinghouse J34 engines were soon replaced by Westinghouse's more powerful J46. The second SeaDart exceeded Mach 1.0 on 3 August 1954.

The taxi tests revealed serious vibration and pounding that drastically increased with rougher water. In mid-1954, the first SeaDart was refitted with a single ski in an effort to reduce vibration during water operations. The final flight of the twin-ski version was made on 28 April 1955.

Normal landing and takeoff procedures for both the twin-ski and single-ski configuration were to maintain a heading parallel to the major wave or swell condition and into the wind as much as possible. Usually, this involved a crosswind component of 30 to 60 degrees. Landing or takeoff directly into any sizeable wave pattern or swells was unacceptable and not attempted. A smoke float deployed during operations indicated wind conditions. Except for being underpowered, the open-sea handling characteristics were considered excellent by the test pilots. This was despite the 120-knot takeoff speed and 125-knot landing speed.

The large single-ski and oleo configuration finally derived for the XF-2Y1 aircraft was a very sound and satisfactory design for use on a delta wing, water-based, supersonic aircraft. The SeaDart test program also proved the feasibility of designing and developing supersonic water-based aircraft for support of Navy Fleet Operations. Because of the lack of an approved operational requirement and the lack of funds for such an aircraft, the U.S. Navy did not continue SeaDart development. [EDITOR: if there was no requirement to have ships defend themselves with their own seaplanes there wouldn't have even been a SeaDart or a POGO program to begin with. Duhh. This is an outrageous lie. The requirement is obvious from WW2 experiences and in writing. The money wasn't there because the BS carrier mafia didn't want it to be spent on anything but themselves]

SeaDarts are on display at several museums reminding us what we should do if we ever got our Navy run by non-corrupt men with common sense.

SeaDart-on-steroids: Lockheed Hydrofighter

In the '70s Lockheed, which makes GREAT AIRCRAFT but is run by greedy assholes offered a Mach 2 SeaDart type seaplane which was ignored of course, by the USN/Mc.

As you can see the seaplane fighter was examined by using SKIS to land in the water and would retract in flight to eliminate the drag penalty. This succeeded with the amazing Convair SeaDart. However, now that the aerodynamic handicap of seaplanes were finally solved with the SeaDart, Tradewinds and SeaMaster, the Navy brass had to act quick to kill this threat to their multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier floating cash cows. All 3 seaplanes were cancelled using flimsy excuses to hide the fact that it was from sheer corruption and power that made the Navy reject seaplanes after they had flourished. The only evil comparable to the Navy's seaplane backstab is the Air Force's rejection of Jack Northrop's YB-49 "Flying Wing" and Burnelli's lifting body technology to persist with inefficient, unsafe tube and wing land-based aircraft. The thousands of people who have died post-WW2 from a lack of seaplanes and safer Burnelli designs is horrific and obscene.

When Pogo and SeaDart were cancelled, the PROBLEM was also forgotten; a problem now that threatens the entire viability of the partial WW2 re-enactment U.S. Navy!

Sea Control anyone? Reality Check! What do we do about the Mess we are in today?

Its the height of hubris to think that our 11 aircraft carriers will be untouched and able to operate aircraft to fly CAP in an all-out missile war against a capable nation-state foe like Red China. We lost 11 aircraft carriers in WW2. Its down right fatal to make the same mistake of the Repulse and Prince of Wales and several other USN ships (see USS Pringle below) to think their onboard anti-aircraft weapons will be enough to ward off multiple enemy air attacks at the last second once they are upon you. The best way to defeat air attacks is to SPOIL them with your own aircraft.

Carriers eat aircraft. We should equip carrier plane fuel tanks with pop-out floats to at least salvage some of their expensive gear if they fail to land and go over the side.

Zumwalt's Sea Control Ships: he was right all along

I guess we're playing catch-up...Zumwalt had this figured out long ago with his sea control ships (SCSs) in the 1970s...we need LOTS of ships with LOTS of aircraft to control the sea.....smaller aircraft carriers and V/STOL or STOVL seaplanes threatened the BS egomaniac aircraft carrier "mafia" who wanted and still want to do things the old warmed-over WW2 way and as soon as he was gone they went back to the crap handfuls of overly large aircraft carriers that can't put up enough or the quality of aircraft we need to control the sea...

This web site below has an AMAZING documentation of the V/STOL sea control ship effort....

www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php?topic=103.75

The Grumman 698 tilt-engine V/STOL aircraft would have been a great way to accomplish multiple missions without even needing a SCS small aircraft carrier. ASW, AEW, ASuW and land attack delivering SEALS or marines could have been done from the fantail landing pads of existing cruisers, destroyers and frigates at far greater speeds, ranges and combat power than the current slow and short-ranged ASW helicopters now in use. The problem is egomaniac moron marine rotorheads opted for the V-22 flying death trap when we could have had 500+ mph 698s.

http://findarticles .com/p/articles/ mi_qa3897/ is_200306/ ai_n9262064/ pg_1

The last frontier: VTOL

Flight Journal, Jun 2003 by Robert Kress

The Ups and Downs of Vertical Takeoff and Landing

This is my insider's look at the sometimes frustrating world of creative aerodynamics and the difficulties associated with getting a new design concept adopted. Two decades or so ago, Grumman had an idea that we thought would fill a national need, but it was not to be. Politics doesn't always understand the rationale behind technical progress. Today, the idea in question is still viable. The national need for it is still unsatisfied. So, this old engineer soldiers on.

Since the laws of physics refuse to bend for anyone, we engineering types are reaching the point of diminishing returns with much of our design work. For instance, the progression from the Wright Flyer to Spads to Mustangs to Tomcats represents enormous strides, but since the F-14/F-15-type aircraft came on the scene, we've been bumping our heads against technological ceilings. Does the absolutely state-of-the- art F-22 represent the same progression as we saw from Mustang to F-86? Of course not. Does it offer anything hugely different from its predecessors? No, it doesn't. It does, however, improve the breed, but it doesn't redefine it.

So, have we seen all there is to see with respect to the development of flying machines? Here, too, the answer is no because at least one frontier hasn't been efficiently conquered: vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). VTOL represents the last frontier primarily because, although we've poked our toes into those aeronautical waters, with the exception of helicopters, we really haven't waded all the way in and learned to swim. For the most part, we have retreated to the shore when we found the going tougher than we expected.

VTOL

A ton of VTOL aircraft (not helicopter types) have been invented and some were even tested as full-scale prototypes. Seth Anderson of NASA-Ames constructed a wonderful "pinwheel" chart, later named the "wheel of misfortune," that presented all of the VTOL configurations tested up to about 1980 (there haven't been many since then). Some flew without crashing. Some were inventors' dreams. Some attempted to defy the laws of physics and suffered the consequences. However, with the exception of the Harrier and the XV-15 (V-22 prototype), nothing came of them.

WHY?

When you study most of these aircraft knowing what we know now, it's obvious that they were technically flawed. The most obvious problems included inadequate control authority in hover, mechanical complexity, poor structural integrity, erratic stability and control during transition and that they had to try to lift too much weight with too little thrust.

It's important to understand the history of VTOL aircraft in terms of the principles of aerodynamics. Thrust-per-shaft- horsepower in VTOL aircraft is determined by the amount of horsepower applied to the tube of air being accelerated by the powerplant. Power could come from a reciprocating engine ducted fan, a jet engine or a turbofan. As long as the horsepower is there-it could be generated by a rubber band-the column of air doesn't care.

At the low-disc loadings typical of helicopters (that is, the weight the disc is required to lift measured in pounds per square foot of disc area), the thrust produced per input-shaft horsepower is very high. Aircraft in this class lift large loads, have long hover duration but not enough downwash to chew up the ground as a jet does. Their speed, endurance and ceiling are generally much lower than the higher-disc- loading vehicles. A good modern example of low-disc loading was the XV-15 (which became the V-22 Osprey). At the other end of the disc-loading spectrum is the low-bypass turbofan AV-8 Harrier. This thing is really loaded! The Harrier made the concept work but not without paying a price: high fuel flow in hover. Airshows excluded, Harrier pilots don't want to hover for long, or they'd better hover right over to a gas station.

If all of the VTOL concepts, those that have been proposed and those that have flown, are compared, it would be noticed that there is a distinct gap between the lightly loaded birds and those that carry a lot of weight on a small disc. This gap indicates that little effort has been expended on developing VTOL turbofan transport-type aircraft, with one exception-Grumman' s Design 698 Tilt Fan VTOL. The goal of Design 698 was to fill this gap with a Learjet class, high-speed, long-endurance and high-altitude aircraft that would also have USN surface-combat applications. A lot of work was done on the 698 and, considering that the niche for which it was designed still exists, more needs to be done on this and other promising turbofan VTOL concepts. If we could just get our VTOL act together, the payoff could be huge in terms of highly versatile civil and military aircraft.

Grumman started blasting away at the last frontier in the early '70s. I was the primary player along with a couple of other fugitives from the lunar module (LM) program. Our first concept was the Nutcracker.

IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS THE NUTCRACKER

Another radical concept was to have a V/STOL aircraft like the bending fuselage "nutcracker" hover next to the ship and be snatched by a crane and brought on board.

---

o fully savor the essence of the Nutcracker, look at the photo above. If you don't exclaim, "What is that?" you're one of the few who don't. It is exactly what it appears to be:

* a VTOL aircraft that folds in the middle;

* a VTOL aircraft attempting in-flight docking on a destroyer.

Regardless of how weird it looks, the space guys had a reasonable aircraft concept. The VTOL breaking in half cured all of the ills associated with the "tail-sitter" VTOLs (they had to reverse into a landing tail first), which were:

* poor visibility for pilot;

* wing stall during transition when the wing had to plow through the high-angle-of- attack regime, usually with serious stability and control problems;

* when they are hovering, they present their entire profile to the wind, so gusts can blow them all over the place; this makes precision maneuvering difficult, particularly at sea and over oil rigs.

A benefit of the seemingly strange configuration was that the Nutcracker could make conventional takeoffs and landings with the fuselage unbent. We had created a "perch sitter"essentially, the Nutcracker came in like a hovering hummingbird and plugged into its landing nest.

The Nutcracker was not small. It was designed for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and ocean surveillance/ attack roles. On hot days, takeoff gross weight (TOGW) was 21,500 pounds. For attack, the Nutcracker could carry one harpoon missile. Powered by two cross-shafted GE TF-34 engines, it could hit 500 knots and 45,000 feet and it had a 400nautical- mile-radius of action. The cross-shaft provided engine-out control in transitional flight. We had put a lot of thought into our strange-looking creation.

We conducted extensive hover and conventional- flight radio model tests and realistically simulated the docking procedure. To answer questions about how the tail would work while being beaten to death by the engine blast, we tested an A-6 stabilizer behind a Hamilton Standard T-55 Q-fan engine.

THE USN WAS LOOKING FOR ANSWERS

Between 1973 and 1975, substantial USN/NASA activity was devoted to design and to small-scale testing of what were known as lift-fan vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) concepts. In 1976, CNO Adm. James L. Holloway III announced a bold new USN program that would lead to two new types of VSTOL aircraft. A "Type A" utility class would be developed first, and a "Type B" fighter class would follow. The object was to deploy a large number of combat aircraft on various combat ships (destroyers, etc.) rather than to cluster them all on carriers. This would make air operations more flexible, and it would be harder for the bad guys to nail a lot of airplanes at one time.

A single Type A aircraft would replace a bunch of conventional carrier aircraft. The grand plan was that one basic VSTOL airfrarne would replace E-2, C-Z, S-3 and EW types and the USMC H-46 helos. Obviously, this would be a very big ball game.

And where was Grumman while all of this was going on? We were working on a "perching" bird that was as simple as all get out but useless for the tasks at hand because it needed a special apparatus to land. It was time to change direction.

ENTER SON OF NUTCRACKER

At Grumman, our first objective in VSTOL design was always simplicity, and we asked ourselves how we could retain the simplicity of Nutcracker while getting it off its perch. We had to make it compatible with ship decks without having the special gear needed to land it. The answer came when we reflected on the Nutcracker's control power, which was very large about all three axes owing to the long tail length of the surfaces immersed in the fan blast. We designed a configuration in which tilt nacelles rotated about the wing's leading edge and had horizontal and vertical vanes in the fan blast. These were hung as far below the airplane's center of gravity (CG) as they could be and still use a reasonably long landing gear.

Our initial calculations indicated that we could more than meet USN control power specs, but we had to prove it. To turn theory into reality, we built a full-scale "iron monster" test rig next to the Bethpage runway. Essentially, it was a huge bed frame with a Hamilton Standard T-55 Q-fan mounted horizontally with control vanes (almost like Venetian blinds) in the jet blast at the proper locations. Our estimates of vane lift and drag were verified by this rig's performance, but we certainly killed a lot of grass in the process.

We kicked around a lot of names for the new design, and "short-tailed Nutcracker" was just too much to say easily; besides, it sounded like an exotic bird. We settled on Design 698, which existed in several configurations. The earliest version of 698 had a canard up front that was changed to a tailed configuration when we discovered that the fan cowls acted like ring wing canards. This was a fortuitous turn of events that resulted in high-speed airflow through the cowls, making the cowls themselves act like endless wings.

THE TILT-FAN ROADSHOW

We at Grumman had a late start in the Type A VSTOL ball game, but we launched an intensive and rather different promotional campaign. A large, radio-controlled, tethered, hover model was constructed by Nick Ziroli of model fame and was demonstrated at every government facility that would let us on its grounds. The tether was there to save the model in the event of an engine failure, which happened only once in roughly 100 demo flights.

While the airplane was flying, a "barker" provided a colorful commentary on what was going on and kept up the excitement level up. We had everything but dancing girls. The whole thing was known as "Baron von Kress flying circus." Among other places, the "circus" went to NASA-Ames, the Naval Air Development Center and the Naval Air Test Center.

Our highest-profile demonstrations were when we rented the Butler Aviation Hangar at Washington National Airport for one week and flew three demonstrations every day (preceded by the usual barker on the PA system extolling the virtues of our design). Grumman bussed military and civilian personnel from all over O.C. and charged them 50 cents a bus ride to keep it all legal. Hey, when you market at this level, you have to stretch the boundaries if you expect to be noticed.

Perhaps the strangest 698 flight demo was the one in Grumman Calverton's huge anechoic chamber that deadens sound. As I started my preflight talk, I realized that there was absolutely no sound feedback, and I couldn't hear my own voice; I wasn't sure whether I was making any sound at all. I was more unhinged than usual, and the model sounded as though it were rubber-powered instead of powered by two screaming model engines.

DESIGN 698 EMERGES

As is the case with many government programs, the Type A VSTOL faded from view, but that didn't faze us in the Nutcracker suite. We continued as if nothing had happened, and in the process, we refined the 698's design.

* The canard became a horizontal tail.

* A simpler and more producible way to hang the engines was invented; they were mounted on the ends of a wing leading edge cross-member that could be rotated.

* Strakes added to the lower fuselage were carefully designed with respect to angle and length to effectively control the downward blast that bounced off the ground.

* Vertical vanes were installed in the jet blasts for roll control; they replaced the variable inlet guide vanes that had been added earlier for thrust modulation.

* A new landing gear was designed and optimized for operations off rolling, pitching carrier decks.

From about 1978, we concentrated on putting high-performance surveillance/ attack aircraft on surface combatants. Also, the idea of a small Learjet-class VTOL seemed very attractive. We envisioned a 20,000-pound- class aircraft with two TF-34 turbofans. At the time, there was skepticism about the 10,000-pound- thrust output of the TF-34s for the application. Today, one can buy CF-34s rated at 14,500 pounds, which will shortly be upgraded to 18,500.

698 FLIGHT DEMONSTRATOR PROGRAM

By 1978, there was enough interest in the project for us to obtain USN R&D funding. A vigorous program funded by NASA and Grumman was set in motion; it built on the progress already made in 698 Type A work.

One interesting test involved piloted flight through transition by using a radio-controlled model on the end of a 50-foot whirling arm rig. The Grumman Research Department constructed an extremely light whirling arm that was inflated to 200psi for stiffness and had gossamer guy wires. Its function was to restrain the model's centrifugal forces without corrupting its mass and inertia. Nick Ziroli sat on a whirling chair and flew the model with throttle and vane control. The effects on Nick were the subject of much mirth; he survived, but he still walks a little funny!

The program's crowning achievement was the construction of a full-scale, 43,000-pound test model of the 698. It was tested in NASA Ames' 40x80-foot wind tunnel and was later the first unit tested in the new 80x120-foot test section.

WHAT'S IN THE FUTURE

The full-scale Design 698 was exhibited in the Great Hall at the 1981 Paris Air Show. It had completed more feasibility and proof-of-concept testing than was usual; it had reached the point at which a flight demonstrator would be a reasonable proposal, and much of Grumman's work focused on that.

Also, at the Paris Air Show, however, was the XV-15 tilt rotor, and it flew morning and afternoon shows with all sorts of precious human cargo on board. Predictably, the proposal to build the JVX won strong NASA support. The 698 was perceived to be a threat to the development of the JVX (later known as the Osprey). This aircraft was for USMC use, and our design did not fit the operational missions envisioned because its jet blast was too fierce. No government thought was given to anything other than the marines' needs, even though there were lots of obvious other V